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Abstract
In October 1991 Zambia abandoned one party politics and embraced multi-party politics. Upon
winning the elections, the MMD Government abandoned UNIP's commandist development
strategies for Neo-Liberal ones, in an effort to salvage the ailing Zambian economy and ensure
development sustainability. In adopting the Structural Adjustment Programme and its affiliated
policy of Enabling Shelter Strategy, the Government hopes among other things to stimulate
supply in the hitherto ailing construction industry. It is postulated that, by applying Neo-Liberal
policies, an enabling environment for private investment can be created, where an efficient and
high productivity private sector is the main provider of construction supply.
This research aims at assessing the contributions made by the construction industry to the macro-
economic in Zambia, during the first five years of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the
Enabling Shelter Strategy. To do this, the study analyses the adjustment and enablement
conditionalities that have been placed on the Zambian economy and then analyses their net effect
on the supply-side of the construction market. The contention of in this study is that although the
Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy have made positive
contributions to the Zambian Construction industry, there are, however, areas that still need
reviewing and changing in light of the experiences of the last five years.
The study was conducted using a survey research strategy, using both quantitative and qualitative
analysis techniques. Primary data was collected during a field survey trip to Zambia between the
10th of October 1995 and 17th of March 1996. Secondary data on the other hand has mainly
come from published literature, business journals, World Bank and IMF publications and
Government publications and the media.
The conclusions reached at the end of the study are twofold. First they validate the postulations
that have been made in both strategies, that enabling policies do indeed break down the structural
rigidities in the macro-economy and the construction industry. The result of which has been to
promote international and local private participation at different levels in the Zambia
construction industry. Secondly, they show that despite the easy entry of construction firms in the
industry, especially in the informal sector, the formal construction sector labour market has,
however, continued to reduce. The study further concludes that some of the (adjustment and
enablement) conditionalites, and Neo-Liberal (Government) measures meant to promote the
economy and the industry in particular have had the net effect of reducing construction demand,
thereby reducing overall construction output in response to reduced demand. In some cases,
however, the study found that surplus local supply was diverted to exports within the region.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Research Methodology
1.1.0 Introduction
Third world countries, particularly those in Sub-S aharan Africa, entered the mid 1970s and
early 1980s in serious economic and development crisis. Whereas, Sub-Saharan Africa had
managed to record unprecedented annual development growth rates in the 1960s and early
1970s (6.4%), the mid 1970s began to see a reduction in this figure (3.2%), and by the mid
1980s the figure had fallen to negative rates averaging -1.5% (World Bank, 1987, p. 16).
The Sub-Saharan Africa development crisis is well manifested in the region's huge foreign
debt, rising unemployment, high infant mortality rate, and a reduction in the per capita
income. These problems persisted into the 1990s, eventually culminating in serious social and
political disorder in the region. Although the text book explanation to this crisis has always
been to try and trace the origins of this malaise to the 1974/5 fuel crisis, there is now a
growing school of thought that believes that the fuel crisis of the mid 1970s was only a 'tip of
the ice berg', and that more needs to be done to the internal structures of these economies, if
the situation is to be remedied (Campbell and Loxley, 1989; Cornia et al, 1992; Kiffick,
1982).
In an effort to arrest the above crisis, which is by no means restricted only to the Sub-Saharan
region, billions of dollars in both local and foreign resources were poured into these countries,
but little or no meaningful progress was recorded. In the more recent past, however,
researchers and policy makers began to question the use of past development strategies to
arrest the situation and in the process developed Neo-Liberal development strategies. Neo-
Liberal development strategies of structural adjustment are conceived to be appropriate
development strategies for ailing and former commandist economies', as they are postulated
not only to alleviate poverty but also to ensure long term sustained development. In this new
global phenomenon, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been the key
institutions in propagating structural adjustment policies to the rest of the Developing World.
This has been achieved largely as a result of these two financial institutions giving
development loans and aid to recipient countries on condition that they adopt structural
adjustment policies.
The unique feature in this new development strategy, unlike previous development strategies,
is that all national development activities and sectors of the -economy are integrated and co-
ordinated together through one principal programme; The Structural Adjustment Programme.
For instance, in the past, development projects were carried out as purely project-based
exercises without due regard to the combined social, political and economic effects on the
1 Commandist economies refers to national economies which are centrally planned and controlled by the
Government
+
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recipients and prevailing local environment. Under this new Neo-Liberal strategy, however,
local governance (often refereed to as the good governance factor), employment creation, the
raising of productivity, and the related forward and backward linkages are all important
components of the strategy. Every programme (unlike projects in the past) is intended to fulfil
a set of economic, social and political aims and objectives (Burgess et al, 1994).
The underlying prognosis in the Neo-Liberalist thesis of the Structural Adjustment
Programme as it relates to shelter and the construction industry, is that governments should
concentrate on matters relating to legislation and governance, and leave construction
(business) matters to business persons and institutions that are better able to carry out these
tasks. To further facilitate the objective of solving the social, political, and economic
problems, directly concerned with shelter, the Enabling Shelter Strategy was formulated,
albeit within the realms of the Structural Adjustment Programme. The postulation in the
Enabling Shelter Strategy is that it not only accelerates housing provision (to alleviate the
present housing crisis), but goes further to improve water, electricity, and the road networks in
urban settlements and municipalities. In this regard, therefore, investment in shelter and
ultimately the construction industry is seen as a positive contribution to domestic job creation,
the increasing of incomes, stimulation of savings, facilitation of domestic production and
saving of the scarce foreign exchange (Woodfield, 1989, p. 46-49).
The withdraw of government from direct provision of construction services, market prices,
liberalised trade and exchange rates, the break down of state monopolies, and the removal of
subsidies has meant that the private sector now takes the leading role in shelter provision. In
this new shelter and construction paradigm, democratisation entails the empowerment of the
general public to make their own decisions on matters affecting their shelter needs, either
through direct consultations or through their elected officials. The creation of an enabling
environment, on the other hand entails governments removing regulatory and bureaucratic
obstacles that have hitherto impeded development or discouraged the public and, more so,
private sector initiative in shelter and construction industry development (UNCHS, 1996, p.
337-338). To this end, it is not surprising to see the tying of development aid and loans by the
Western World and the International Financial Institutions to democratic and economic
reforms in the Third World.
Events in Zambia, have followed more or less the global phenomenon described above. The
turning point in fully embracing the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling
Shelter Strategy in Zambia came with the change of government in October 1991. The United
National Independence Party (UN1P) a socialist-based party lost the elections to the capitalist-
oriented Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). The 1991 elections not only saw the
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abandonment of socialist principals, but also the improvement in relations between the new
Zambian Government and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), relations which had
hitherto been strained because of the strong socialist principles of the former UNIP
Government.
To this end, the last five years (1991-1996) have seen the Zambian Government follow and
implement the principles of structural adjustment and shelter enablement to the IMFs and
World Bank's satisfaction. Subsequently, in 1996, Zambia graduated from the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) to the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). 2
 In
the last five years, therefore, trade and exchange rates have been liberalised, state monopolies
broken down and sold to the private sector, subsidies withdrawn, and market pricing
introduced. In the shelter market, housing which used to be tied to employment under the
country's labour laws is no more, rent controls have been abolished, monopoly rights of the
Zambia Building Society taken away, public sector houses (both local and central
government) are been sold to sitting tenants and full cost recovery for public services have
being effected.
After five years of these Neo-Liberal measures, there is now a growing school of thought
(including academics, industrialist and politicians) that is questioning the whole development
strategy of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy as
experienced in Zambia, especially in the way they affect the construction industry. Questions
are now being asked as to whether the imposition of these two Neo-Liberal policies have
helped the Zambian construction industry in particular and the economy in general. This thesis
is, therefore, an attempt to answer some of these questions.
1.1.1 Structure of the study
This thesis is divided into three main parts: Part one covers the introduction and theoretical
framework. Part two deals with the field data and analysis and finally Part three covers the
research conclusions.
1.1.1.1 Part one: The theoretical framework
Part one begins with chapter one, which serves to introduce the subject matter under
discussion and explains the methodological approach and strategy chosen in meeting the
stated study research aims and objectives. It is followed by the literature review: chapter two,
and sets the context and literature in which the research study lies. Considering the vast
2Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) is a country status that the World Bank and the IMF gives to a
country that has successfully embarked on SAP. ESAF carries with it concessionaire lending rates and more
favourable conditionalities than those given under SAP.
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amount of literature available on shelter and development issues, the literature review is
deliberately concentrated on the Third World, and Sub-Sahara Africa in particular. The
literature review has been arranged so as to trace the historical development of shelter and
development strategies; from social housing and the welfare state system, through to self-help
programmes and right up to present day shelter enablement policies. The literature review also
covers macro-economic aspects of the construction industry in Sub-Sahara Africa. In this way,
the chapter leads the reader to the reasoning behind present day Neo-Liberalist shelter and
development strategies. The chapter ends by looking at rival theories, dominated by the Neo-
Marxist philosophies and the other liberal criticisms, from independent minded researchers
and scholars. Having devoted chapter two to contextualising the literature under which our
research work lies, chapter three then introduces the reader to the background information as
to what led to present day shelter and construction industry problems in Zambia. The focus of
this chapter is on the historical developments in the Zambian construction industry, its
successes and failures, and then draws conclusions as to the reasons why this should be so.
This information is meant to help in relating the new strategy of reforming the industry under
structural adjustment and shelter enablement in subsequent chapters.
1.1.1.2 Part two: Data analysis and research findings
Part two contains the main thrust of the research work, where the field and secondary data is
processed and analysed. It contains four chapters, arranged to deal with the different specific
areas of the Zambian construction market and the resultant macro-economy as related to our
study. Chapter four deals with government efforts in creating an enabling environment
through legislation, whereas chapter five looks at efforts applied to the construction
investment and finance markets with a view to stimulating construction supply. Chapters six
and seven, focus on the Zambian construction labour market and the supply levels
respectively, in view of the imposition of both the Structural Adjustment Programme and
Enabling Shelter Strategy,
1.1.1.3 Part three: summary and conclusions
Finally in Part three, we summarise our research findings from chapters three to seven, and
then draw conclusions as to how the application of the two Neo-Liberal policies have affected
the Zambian construction industry and ultimately the rest of the economy.
1.2.0 Study aims and objectives
From the literature review in chapter two, it will become quite clear that the strategies of
structural adjustment and shelter enablement are relatively new and untested strategies;
strategies that have to be tested on the ground to ascertain their validity. Pugh (1989, p. 249)
has stated that the Neo-Liberalist principals on which these two strategies are based are not
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only without empirical evidence to support their postulated claims, but are also "foreign" to
Third World countries.
The new theory of housing was based upon Neo-Liberalist political economy
with emphasis upon individualism, free markets and the user pay principle.
The new theory was formulated intellectually in the early 1 970s, without any
really convincing practical experience in the actual urban setting of the
developing countries.., the theory had to be adjusted and broadened in the
light of practice (Pugh, 1989, p. 249).
In an effort to contribute to this body of knowledge and thence the global debate on the true
effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy on the
construction industry and the resultant national development, this study therefore aims at
validating the two policies though a case study in Zambia. Zambia being a Sub-Sahara African
country that has applied both strategies in an effort to sustain its construction market and
foster national development will be taken as a case study to validate the theories in the two
strategies. This proposition is based on findings by most researchers, that investing in the
construction industry leads to economic growth (Moavenzadeh, 1987, p. 97-86; UNCHS,
1996, p. 224). This research project further aims at drawing the attention of scholars, policy
makers, bureaucrats and implementers of policy, to those aspects of these Neo-Liberal policies
that are working and fulfilling their desired results and those which ones are not. To meet
these study aims, the research sets out the following objectives:
• To document the transformation of the Zambian construction in relationship to the macro-
economy in the light of the imposition of the Structural Adjustment Programme and
enabling shelter strategy.
• To understand and analyse the policy, design and implementation of the Structural
Adjustment Programme and Enabling Shelter Strategy as they relate to shelter and the
construction industry in Zambia.
• To evaluate the construction industry and its contribution to national development in
Zambia, by making comparisons to construction output and other construction indicators,
prior to and after the application of SAP and shelter enablement.
The key question to be asked in this study, therefore, is "has the Zambian construction
industry improved with the resultant positive national development growth trickling down the
rest of the economy as a result of applying both the Structural Adjustment Programme and the
Enabling Shelter Strategy." This study focuses on national development issues primarily under
the construction industry. In other words, this study examines the direct impact of the
structural, fiscal and monetary changes made to Zambia under the strategies of adjustment and
enablement and the resultant changes bought about to the construction industry. To answer the
key study question of whether SAP and the enabling shelter strategy have improved the
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performance of the Zambian construction to national development (i.e. new jobs created,
increased national income, increased housing stock and Gross Fixed Capital Formation
[GFCF]), the thesis will study the contribution of the construction industry before and after
the application of the two aforementioned strategies.
By verifying the conditions under which the strategies relating to the Structural Adjustment
Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy will produce the postulated results in the
Zambian construction industry, we are inevitably in the process which Crano and Brewer
(1986. p.15) have called theory purification: purifying the theories pertaining to structural
adjustment and shelter enablement under local Zambian conditions. Theory purification
involves the act of refining and br recasting a theory in the light of new findings on the
ground.
Fig. 1.1 Theory development (and purification process)
Logical induction	 LogIc
Scaling and
	 OperationaIiation
measurement	
OBSERVAONS	
trumentation
Source: Smith 1991, p. 9
1.2.1 Study research method
This thesis has basically two aims, which are
(1) to compare and analyse the Zambian construction industry before and after the application
of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy.
To meet this objective the study will rely on measurable economic indicators (variables) of the
Zambian construction industry, such as employment figures, Value added, new and number of
construction firms. exports, and the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF).
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(2) to evaluate the effects of the two Neo-Liberal strategies above on the Zambian
construction industry though responses from the construction firms concerned. This
information is currently not available as published data. To meet this particular study aim,
therefore, a sample survey has been conducted on the Zambian construction industry to solicit
their views on the effects SAP and the Enabling Shelter Strategy have had on their
construction businesses. The study will be conducted iii three of Zambia's cities: Lusaka,
Ndola and Kitwe, all with very distinct economic bases and characteristics, from which a
general pattern on Zambia will be drawn. In this respect, it will also be important to include
all categories of firms in the construction industry to avoid any biases on the results obtained.
Given that the two strategies of adjustment and enablement under study are, in the main,
supply oriented theories, we took the view that the best way of testing the effectiveness of the
two theories was to see how the construction supply constraints had been removed or
minimised by the application of these two Neo-Liberal strategies. In this connection,
therefore, the contractors, construction consultants, construction materials manufactures and
suppliers were chosen as the target group for answering our survey questions (respondents).
Note however, that this position does not ignore the steps taken under the two strategies to
stimulate demand. Resources (time, financial and human) were not adequate to cover both
sides of the market. Besides, improved supply is said to induce demand and the two are
always related and, therefore, difficult to separate in the market (Warren, 1993, p1 80-197).
1.3.0. Operationalization and hypothesis formulation
In setting our study aims and objectives, we have stated that we want to assess the effect of the
Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy on the construction
industry and the national development Status of Zambia. However, without operationalising
the term "national development," it remains ambiguous and confusing, thus we need to defme
exactly (operationalise) what we mean by it (at least for the purposes of this study); a process
Smith (1991) has defined as operationalization. To illustrate the confusion and disagreements
among scholars on the common definition of national development, Agrawal and Kundan Lal
(1994) attempted to define it, but still failed. They debated the various methods and indicators
used world-wide and still could not come up with one without faults or demerits. Among the
many methods and indicators that they looked at were the following, Gross National Product
(GNP), human and natural resources index, literacy rate, life expectancy index, and industry
and technological advancement. On the other hand, Todaro (1994, p. 18) has loosely defined
'development' as "both a physical reality and a state of mind in which society has, through
some combination of social, economic and institutional processes, secured the means for
obtaining a better life."
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In the context of this study, however, national development will be taken to mean reduced
unemployment rates, low inflation rates, high Gross Fixed Capital Formation, increased
national income, increased export base for construction exports, and high rate of local
materials utilisation in the macro-economy. This definition has deliberating been framed in
this manner, so as to be identical to the desired goals of both the Structural Adjustment
Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy. In which case, therefore, should this research
project conclude that Zambia has indeed experienced national development from the
construction industry perspective as a direct result of applying the two Neo-Liberalist
strategies, then the study will have validated the aforementioned strategies.
As we are researching on an already existing theory, we shall use the deductive scientific
model to formulate our hypothesis; where a hypothesis is deduced from existing theories and
tested against field observations (Baker 1994, p. 41, see also fig. 1.1). Given the aims and
objectives of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its sectoral programme of the
Enabling Shelter Strategy (as will be seen in chapter two), we shall draw the following
hypothesis: that the imposition of the Structural Adjustment Programme, with its affiliated
policy of shelter enablement, has not only helped in increasing net construction supply in
Zambia, but has also helped in fostering national development in Zambia.
It should be noted, however, that the above hypothesis is very abstract to allow for empirical
verification, hence the need to break down our hypothesis to small workable hypothesis
known as an operative hypothesis. Whereas, the main hypothesis will be looking at the overall
impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy on the
Zambian construction industry and the resultant national development, the minor hypothesis
will be testing the validity in Zambia, or any country for that matter, of having to apply the
various structural adjustment and shelter enablement conditionailties to achieve the desired
aims and objectives of both development strategies. In this way, we hope to analyse the two
related development strategies in greater detail than would be otherwise be possible.
1.3.1 Concepts and variables
The process of operationalization involves the breaking down of our main hypothesis into
small measurable concepts. Baker (1994, p. 115) has defined concepts as abstract terms
employed to explain or make sense of everyday life. No doubt, as existing theories, the
Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy already have their own
concepts. For example, the Structural Adjustment Programme is often reduced to the concept
of 'Adjustment' and while the Enabling Shelter Strategy is referred to by the concept of
'Shelter enablement'. Another common concept we shall constantly come across in this study
is the concept of 'Adjustment Conditionalities' or simply 'Conditionalities'. The concept of
+
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conditionalities refers to the set of conditions that were originally set by the IMF and the
World Bank for recipient loan/aid countries to meet before giving them loans/aid. These
conditions include among other things, foreign exchange liberalisation, democratisation,
privatisation of major public sector companies, market pricing, removal of subsidies, civil
service reforms, and so on. We will explain more about these in the next chapter.
Similarly, the postulated resultant improved construction supply and increased nation
developed will be reduced to the concept of national development. We can therefore,
effectively express our main hypothesis in the following conceptual expression:
Adjustment + Shelter enablement (inputs) = National development (Increased construction out
put)]. In-turn we shall subdivide our three concepts above into smaller and measurable
variables of either independent variables if they are on the left side of the equation and
dependent variables if they are on the right side of the equation.
The validation of our hypothesis will thus be based on comparing the net contribution of the
Zambian construction industry to national development, prior to and after the application of
the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy. For this purpose,
therefore, we shall use our measurable concepts (output) of national construction output and
employment figures, value added for construction industry (in national economic indicators)
to assess the performance of the industry prior to and after the application of SAP and the
Enabling Shelter Strategy. It must be made very clear, however, that this was not always
possible, mainly due to the absence of relevant data, especially before the Third Republic3.
Monthly and yearly statistical publications that had hitherto been published regularly were no
longer being published. Although the rate of publications has since improved, it is still not
regular nor does it have all relevant economic indicators. To counter this weakness, the thesis
will be using primary field data to supplement and complement published secondary data.
1.4.0. Research assumptions and choice of location samples
The argument in making generalisations from observations drawn from three cities to the rest
of the country is well made by Edmund Leach when he argues that:
It is assumed that a social system exists within a somewhat arbitrary
geographical area; the population involved in this social system is of one
culture; the social system is uniform. Hence the anthropologist can choose for
himself a locality of "any convenient size" and examine in detail what goes on
in this locality; from this examination he will hope to reach conclusions about
Zambia's political history is divided into three Republic eras, The First Republic began with the birth of
Zambia as an independent state from Britain in 1964 based on multi-party politics, the Second Republic starts
from 1971 when Zambia abolished multi-politics for the One-Party political system, and finally the Third
Republic is what ushered in Multi-Party politics once again in 1991.
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the principles of organisation operating in this particular locality. He then
generalises from these conclusions and writes a book about the organisation of
the society considered as a whole (Quoted from Hamel et a!., 1993, p. 4)
The limitations in being able to gather data from the whole of Zambia are well known:
financial, logistics and time constraints. In this connection, therefore, the collection of data
was done in the three cities of Zambia, namely Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola4, This decision was
taken against the greater temptation for the researcher to restrict the collection of data to the
city of Kitwe only, the researcher's home city. The decision to pick on all the three cities of
Zambia was based on the fact that 84% of all construction firms registered with the
Government Buildings Department are in Lusaka and the Copperbelt provinces. Note also that
all the three cities have their own distinct roles and characteristics, such that the omission of
any one of them could have skewed the results.
For example, restricting the study to Kitwe, Zambia's chief mining town, could have raised
questions like, 'aren't the results not only peculiar to this city, because of its dominance by the
copper industry? In the same vein, picking Ndola or Lusaka, the industrial and administrative
capitals of Zambia respectively, would have skewed the results to one side or the other. But,
by having the study conducted in all the three cities, we hope to avoid that pitfalL Another
very imported reason for picking these three cities lies in the fact that the two theories under
study are based on urban world phenomenon, and since the three cities under study account
for 51.8% of Zambia's urban population and 21.8% of the total population, there could not
have been any better choice of locations (percentages calculated from Central Statistical
Office, 1991). Although figures are not available for the percentage share of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) produced in these three cities, it is reasonable to say that the bulk of
Zambia's GDP is produced here, if the roles played by these three cities are anything to go by.
1.5.0. Research strategy: The survey research approach
The importance of research strategy or methodology to science whether social or natural can
not be over emphasised. The method employed in finding out knowledge is of crucial
importance to the research project so that the findings can be said to be scientific. Baker
(1994, p. 37) goes even further to argue that science is simply doing empirical research;
It is based on observable evidence (what the field researchers saw, answers to
questions, reactions to experimental stimuli) which has been carefully recorded
and presented so as to make it as close to the actual observation as possible.
This attention to recording and presenting the observations carefully and
precisely is a part of the art to make these studies scientific. Science depends
4At the time of the field survey, Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola were the only cities in Zambia, Livingstone the tourist
capital has since been made the fourth city.
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on a logical and rational system of rules for thinking and using language;
therefore, precision in the measurement of what is being studied and clarity in
the presentation of data are both necessary.
Similarly, Smith (1991, p. 35) in tracing the importance of methodology to research, goes on
to argue that;
Science is a series of methods for knowing, rather than simply believing or
opining; it is an attempt to learn, using research methods, how and why things
fit together... Theories are abstractions- that is, ideas in the scientist's head
concerning how to organise the empirical generalisations he or she observes...
A theory is correct if it should produce hypotheses that are supported through
observation.., the process of observing instances that confirm or disconfirm
hypotheses requires some means of precisely and explicitly measuring the
variables in the hypotheses so that other trained scientist can replicate the
work.
In appreciation of the importance placed in the systematic collection, arrangement, and
analysis of data in research, as emphasised above, this study will be guided by the survey
research study approach. The mode of gathering research data in social survey research is
usually through personal interviewing or mall questionnaires. The survey research approach
uses a Set of questions on a number of chosen respondents (sample) considered representative
of the individuals, group/s or organisations to be studied. The intention in conducting the
interview or sending the mall questionnaire to the respondents is to elicit specific information
from them. A representative number of responses is gathered from a chosen sample from
which results can be aggregated and then generalisation to the rest of the working population.
The results obtained at the end of the survey can then be used to develop, support or refute a
theory (Baker, 1994, p. 10). It should be made very clear, nevertheless, that generalisation is
only possible if the sample under study is representative of the working population to which
the research wishes to make generalisations (Smith, 1991, p. 125).
In a survey research as in most research strategies, the most important source of information
comes from respondents themselves. In our case, therefore, the respondents will be the
sampled construction firms. It is important, however, to realise that events in the Zambiari
construction industry, measures in the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling
Shelter Strategy are dynamic and therefore constantly changing. In this regard, we have tried
very much to keep ourselves abreast of the latest developments in the subject matter by
constant reference to local newspapers, the Zambia Business Journal: Profit, the (Zambia)
Financial Mall, Statistical Bulletins, Government and World Bank annual publications.
Annual reviews from the Zambia Privation Agency, the Zambia Investment Centre and the
Ministry of Finance are also intensively used.
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1.6.0 Quantitative and qualitative analysis
Whereas there are a number of research strategies to draw from, there are only two main
methods of analysing social research data; qualitative and quantitative analysis. But as most
writers have rightly pointed out, these two methods are not mutually exclusive, on the
contrary the combination of both methods in a single research study complement each other in
their weaknesses and strength. For instance, Bryman (1988, pp. 61) argues that the most
fundamental characteristic of qualitative research is in its express commitment to viewing
events, action, norms and values. While, on the other hand, the quantitative method has been
credited with rigour and reliable data that is systematically collected and can be readily
checked by other researchers (Bryman, 1988, p. 103).
It is important, however, to note that the choice of the research method to be employed is
dependent solely on the research questions raised in the research or on the issue been
investigated. Research studies dealing with attitudes, social process or values are best dealt
with qualitative methods and those that deal in variables like gender or class, involving large
populations reduced to samples, are best dealt with quantitative methods. By way of
definition, Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 17) have defined the qualitative research method as
"any kind of research that produces fmdings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures
or other means of quantification..." By the same token, therefore, we could define the
quantitative research method as any kind of research that produces findings by statistical
procedures and other means of quantification.
There would appear to be a general consensus among researchers that research studies
dealing with socio-economic and political conditions are best dealt with by qualitative
research methods. For instance, Baken and Van der Linden (1993, pp. 7 & 8) criticised the
World Bank (and indeed the IMP) in its quantitative methodological approach in evaluating
the land market in an enabling shelter environment. They argued that the mere collection of
economic figures without analysis of the contextual factors and rational economic behaviour
related to them gave rise to conflicting results. Malpezzi (1994, p. 461) a former World Bank
economist, concedes to their arguments by advocating for more contextual analysis when
studying structural adjustment related policies.
The Neo-Marxist school on the other hand has always relied on qualitative research methods
in its analysis of human relations and in understanding the inherent contradictions between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie (Shaw 1975). The Neo-Marxist school tends, therefore, to be
very wary in using quantity analysis in social sciences The use of both qualitative and
qualitative methods in our study, therefore, will eliminate the arguments against findings
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which were predominately based on quantitative methods and any criticism from the Neo-
Marxist school.
Within this goal of research generalisation are two sub-conditions to be fplfihled;
generalisation across subjects and condition replicability. Generalisation across subjects refers
to generalisations that are applicable irrespective of the subjects, for example in our study,
generalisations that would apply to all construction firms; small, medium or large and formal
or informal construction firms, hence the inclusions of all the these types of firms in the study.
In other words if our study was to find that only "certain subjects", e.g. informal and small
scale contractors, had responded as postulated in the two theories and the rest did not, then our
theories would have failed the generalisation across subjects test. Notwithstanding this, it is
important to note that certain postulations refer only to specific subjects, for example the
aspect of intensive employment creation is a specific element that is tied to small scale labour
intensive construction firms and would not, therefore, apply to large and capital intensive
firms.
Triangulation of research data was used to check on the reliability of data sources. Using this
method, data from various sources (i.e. published documents, government and private media
information, local and central government sources) was used as a check against our findings.
This was done so as to test the reliability of the data and any differences (if any) could be thus
identified and explained.5
1.7.0 Profile of the Zambian construction industry and survey respondents
As this study will be analysing the Zambian construction industry, it is important that we give
a brief profile of its characteristic and nature of business operations. As a former British
colony, Zambia inherited the British construction operation procedures. The modelling of
Zambian construction courses at trades schools, colleges and the universities has further
ensured that British construction practices, contracts and procedures continue to be practised
to this day. However, whereas the construction industry in Britain has undergone various
changes in the last 30 years, especially in the standard form of contract, the Zambian
construction industry has not, save for the active participation of the informal construction
industry, who are allowed to operate on small government and public contracts on a less
formal basis.
The Zambian construction industry comprises civil and building contractors, consultants,
manufactures of construction materials and their suppliers (hardware shops). It is important to
mention that in Zambia, the law does not allow construction consultants to be engaged in the
51n this respect, the assistance rendered from friends and colleagues back in Zambia is greatly appreciated.
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manufacture and/or the supply of construction materials. There is quite a lot of interaction
among all these different sectors of the industry. The informal sector seems to have increased
its interaction with the rest of the other sectors in the industry, especially in supplying them
with door, and window frames, burglar bars, crushed stones and building sand. This strong
linkage between the two sectors, is not only evident in Zambia, Klaassen et a! have also
witnessed similar linkages in other Third World countries. They have best summarised the
strong linkages between the formal and informal construction sector in the diagram below.
Fig. 1. 2 Linkages between the formal and informal construction sectors
Type of' project	 Direct employment 	 Indirect employment
impacts	 Impacts
Formal large-scale
Formal small-scale
I
Informal
I
Occupants
Source: Klaassen et a! 1987, p. 43
1.7.1 Structure of construction firms in Zambia
Construction firms in Zambia can be classified into four main categories: of (a) informal
sector, (b) small scale formal, (c) medium scale formal and (d) large scale formal construction
tirms. Table 1.1 below will help illustrate the characteristics of each of the four categories. It
should be noted, however, that this classification, and (personnel and plant) requirements
listed below, pertains only to government construction contracts and some other public
(purastatal) sector firms and local authorities. Private sector clients have their own individual
requirements in terms of the expertise and plant with the construction firms they engage.
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Table 1.1 Classification of consultants, contractors and suppliers of construction
materials by the Government Buildings Department- Lusaka
Category	 Value	 Personnel	 Plant and Equipment for
_____________________ _________________________ _______________________ 	 contractors_only
General Maintenance	 Up to K15 000:00	 4 Tradesmen/women	 Any mode of transport (on
hire basis! or capacity to
_____________________ _________________________ _______________________ hire)
GI	 From K15,000:00 to	 1 Technician and	 1 Pick-up
____________________	 K20,000:00	 4 Tradesmen	 I Concrete mixer
Gil	 From K20,000:00 to	 2 Technicians and 4
	
1 Pick-up
____________________	 K50,000:00	 Tradesmen	 2 Concrete mixers
Gill	 From K50,000:0O to 	 1 Professional,	 I Tipper
K 120,000: 00	 2 Technicians, and	 2 Pick-ups
_____________________ _________________________ 5 Tradesmen	 2 Concrete mixers
GIV	 From K50,000:00 to
	 3 Professionals	 2 Tippers
K250,000:00	 4 Technicians and	 2 Pick-ups
______________________ __________________________ 
10 Tradesmen	 4 Concrete mixers
GV	 From K250,000 to K	 5 Professionals	 4 Tippers
unlimited	 6 Technicians and	 5 Pick-ups
20 Tradesmen	 6 Concrete mixers
Source: Complied from data supplied by the Government Buildings Department, Oct. 1995
1.7.1.1 Informal sector construction firms
Informal sector construction firms, normally consist of one to four workers. In most cases
these "workers" will be family members of the owner of the firm, who is carpenter, bricklayer,
printer or just ati entrepreneur in the business. For example, one of our respondents in this
study is a retired medical assistance from the Army with no building experience, but relies on
experienced workers and relatives. The informal construction sector is characterised by the
fact that this sector does not operate on the standard western business norms or within the
country's tax framework. For instance, whereas firms in the formal sector are not allowed by
law to be consultants as well as contractors or even suppliers of construction materials at the
same time, in the informal sector such practices are very common. Another distinct feature of
the informal construction firms in Zambia is that they tend to operate from residential homes
or in local council markets (for those in manufacturing and supply) or by the main road side
(suppliers, see plates 7.2 and 7.4).
Another striking feature that was observed during the field survey was the willingness of firms
in this sector to deal in very small quantities and to offer credit to its customers, services not
normally offered by the formal construction sector. There was also a strong tendency by firms
in this sector to vary their prices to suite the customers purse or if the customer haggled. For
example a customer driving an expensive car was more likely to be charged a higher price
than one that came on foot.
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Unfortunately, there is little or no literature on the informal construction sector in Zambia. For
example, early studies on the Zambian construction industry by Christie (1971), Chakwe
(1983) and Fewings (1991) all show little or no significance of this sector in the overall
construction industry in Zambia. Christie (1971, P. 378) went further to say that in the early
l960s, the Zambian construction industry was more British than Zambian. In this study,
however, it will soon be made clear that the informal sector is increasing playing a major role
in the industry. For instance, 36% of our survey respondents chosen through snowball
'ampling, in the small scale category (1-49 workers) of the construction sector were in the
informal sector. Contraiy to common belief, we also found that the informal construction
sector was not only active in informal settlements, but also in convention and mostly former
coLincil houses where they were actively engaged in building security walls, house
improvements and extensions, welding burglar bars and also supplying building materials.
Plate 1.1 Window frames with burglar bars made and sold by the informal sector
by the main road side in Kitwe
For tendering purposes and procedure the Zambian government Buildings Department
classifies this category of construction firms as Grade G.M. (General Maintenance). Informal
construction firms are allowed to tender for any government contract up to the value of
K15,000,000 ($11,538) provided they have 4 tradesmen/women with them. The Private sector
and individuals clients tend to be less demanding in terms of the minimum requirements that
they request from this sector. The use of informal sector contractors is limited, however, in
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cases where the money used is borrowed from Commercial banks or the Zambia Building
Society. These formal financial institutions do not allow the use of informal construction
firms on their funded projects.
1.7.1.2 Formal sector construction firms
Unlike firms in the informal sector, firms in the formal sector are formally registered with the
authorities through the registrar of firms and will normally also be affiliated with their
respective bodies. For instance, consultancy firms will be registered with their respective
professional bodies: architects with the Zambia Institute of Architects (ZIA), engineers with
the Engineers Institute of Zambia (EJZ), surveyor with the Surveyors Institute of Zambia
(SIZ), whereas the contractors are affiliated with the Associated of Building and Civil
Engineering Contractors (ABCEC). All these bodies work closely together, especially in
matters of building and civil engineering contracts. For example, all the bodies above are
signatories to the Joint Standard Form of Building and Civil Engineering Contracts, which is
basically an adoption of the British Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT). Firms in the formal sector
are be reclassified in three groups depending on their size in manpower and investment in
plant and machinery.
(a) Small scale (formal) construction firms; these have a work-force which ranges from 1 (for
traders in hardware shops) to 49 workers. However, what makes this construction sector
different from the informal sector above, is that the small scale (formal) construction sector
follows professional business practices and have permanent business premises (not in
residential areas). In that sense, therefore, small scale (formal) construction firms in Zambia
operate more less like any other firms in the developed world. Most private consulting and
contracting firms tend to follow under this category.
(b) Medium scale construction firms; these are firms with workers ranging from 50 to 499
workers. Medium scale construction firms also tend to carry out bigger construction contracts
that (b) above, and therefore, tend to have larger capital investment. Medium sized
construction firms fall under the Gil to Gifi category of the government Building Department,
which allows or entitles them to tender for any government contract from K20,000,000 to
K250,000,000 ($15,385 to $192,307). Under this classification, therefore, they are required to
have professionals, technicians, skilled and unskilled workers (see table 1.1 above). Most of
the firms are either local or international private limited firms or parastatals.
(c) Large scale construction companies: this comprises of construction companies with a
labour force of more than 500, with a number of professionals, skilled, and unskilled workers.
Because of the huge numbers of workers it is common to find a specialised management
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structure: finance, personnel, plant, estimating, contracts, and so on in these firms. Figure 1.3
below shows a typical management structure of any of the large construction companies in
Zambia. This figure shows how power and management responsibility arranged in a pyramid
structure starting from the Board of Directors, through the Managing Director to the various
directors, managers, officers down to the last worker. Like the medium scale construction
companies, large scale construction companies have a sizeable investment of capital;
machineiy, plant and large site offices. Large scale construction companies are classified
under the GV category by the government Buildings Department. Companies under this
category have an unlimited upper limit for the nature and type of government construction
project they can tender or be invited for. The large capital, plant and skilled manpower needed
for this categoly of construction firms thus means that there are only a very few firms in this
category most of which are either government, foreign or part foreign owned. Although there
are currently only 34 construction companies in this category, only five companies; Delkins;
Apollo; Kajeema; Minestone and Lewis tend to dominate this category of firms, following
the closure of the state owned Zecco construction company soon after 1991.
Fig. 1.3 Typical Management structure of a large construction firm in Zambia
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
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1.7.2 Construction commissions, tendering and contractual procedures
Construction commissions, tendering and contractual procedures in Zambia are all based on
the British traditional system. The formal commission of any construction job starts with the
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client approaching a consultant, who could be an Engineer, Quantity Surveyor or Architect
depending on the nature on work. It is important to note, however, that in Zambia,
professional consultants a firms are not allowed to advertise for their work nor to compete on
the basis of consultancy fees6 . Individuals or firms, can advertise their services as long as their
do not belong to the professional bodies of Architects, Quantity Surveyors, or Engineers and
do not call themselves so. This loophole in the law, thus gives the informal sector
"consultants" who are normally retrenched draftsmen and women, an opportunity to practise
their trade. Local Councils allow any work to be submitted for planning approval as long as
the submitted plans fulfil their by-laws. There are, however, calls from the professional
consultants to restrict the type and nature of construction contracts that can be done by the
informal sector or unregistered consultants. By-laws in all towns and cities further require that
all construction taking place in their jurisdiction is closely monitored and supervised by the
council's own building inspectors.
No person shall construct a domestic dwelling or materially change the use of
such or part thereof without the prior permission from the Council of the area in
which the building is, or is to be situated. The form of submission is to be in
accordance with the Council regulations (Local Government [Urban Building and
Drainage Regulations] Act of 1968).
In reality, however, there is little enforcement of this Act, as the councils do not have the
qualified manpower and resources to do so.
Once the consultant/s have been appointed and the plans for the project drawn and approved
by the client, the consultant/s in consultation with the client appoint a contractor. In large
projects, this may involve one main contractor and several other sub-contracts and nominated
suppliers. The involvement of all these various construction professionals and their firms thus
clearly justifies the having of only one Standard Form of Contract among them. Depending on
the scale of the project, the Standard Form of Contract can be one WiTH or WITHOUT
Quantities (Bill of Quantities (BQ) from the quantity surveyor). The Standard Form of
Contract not only stimulates the various roles and obligations of each party to the contract, but
also lies down the procuring procedures and methods of settling disputes should they arise. A
typical contractual relationship chart is shown in fig. 1.4. The informal sector does not follow
these elaborate contractual procedures. With informal sector firms, the contractual agreement
tends to be very informal, in most cases the whole contract is only verbally agreed to, except
in cases where they are dealing with institutions or clients that insist on a written contract.
6 The Zambian government has since liberalised all consultancy fees as from 1996.
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Fig. 1.4 Contractual relationships in the formal Zambian construction industry
Other construction consultants 4	 Architect/Engineer	 Quantity Surveyors
Various construction materia's
	
Various Construction materials
suppliers	 suppliers
Various Manufactures of
construction materials (other
from out side Zambia)
Source: Mashamba 1997; based on professional experience in the construction industry
The Zambian tendering system like the British system and many others, is based on the
premise that the client through his/her consultants selects from a group of tenders one who is
best able to carry out the work at the minimum of cost. To achieve minimum construction
costs, the contractor therefore, has to ensure that he/she has to find inexpensive sources for
his/her materials. This is where the cheap construction materials from the informal sector
came in handy. There are basically two ways to this system: (a) Open and (b) selective
tendering.
Open tendering is open to all construction firms within the catchment of the construction
firms on offer (from those on the approved list of firms, the government's own classification is
shown as in table 1.1). All major central and local government and public (parastatals)
construction contracts save for small routine and general maintenance contracts are by
regulation required to go through open tendering through the Zambia National Tender Board.
The theoretic advantage with open tendering is that it offers new construction firms an
opportunity to win contracts. On the other hand, selective tendering as the name implies is
only open to a few chosen construction firms, normally chosen on the basis of their past work
or reputation. This, therefore, means that new and unproved contractors have no chance to bid
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for this type of tender. Selective tendering is normally preferred by private clients because it
saves on time taken to scrutinise the tender documents. Chakwe (1983, pL339) however, has
rightly argued that both tendering procedures outlined above are not conducive to the small
scale and informal construction firms. He argues that the contractual demands tend to be
complex to the small and informal construction firm, with limited expertise and understanding
of the contract, even when the project involved is simple and small. The meticulous detail and
bureaucratic processes involved in these formal construction contracts entails the use of many
resources at pre-contract stage, which increases the final cost of buildings and other
construction end-products (Edmonds and Miles, 1984, p.22-23).
On major construction contracts and sites, there are normally more that one consultant and
contractor. This is because major construction contracts tend to be very larger and complex,
that no one consultant or contractor could be able to carry out the work alone. In this case the
main consultant, for example the Architect, would subcontract work to Electric Engineers,
Service Engineers, Structural Engineers, Quantity Surveyors and so on depending on the scale
and nature of the contract, and so also would the main contractor sub-contract his work to
specialist sub-contractors for work such as joinery, glazing, lifts, and so on. Sub-contracting
thus gives an opportunity to small scale contractors to work on major construction works,
which they would not otherwise do. For example, informal sector welders are often seen
working on formal construction sites, on a sub-contracting basis. Equally active are the
informal sector construction suppliers of aggregate, building and river sand in supplying
formal and informal construction sites with their products.
Once the tendering procedure is over, most construction contracts will be based on the Zambia
Institute of Architects (ZIA) or Engineers Institute of Zambia (EJZ) contractual and
procurement system, both of which can be traced to the British [Joint Contracts Tribunal]
JCT. 63 (1971 amendment) and the G.C./works/1 (Fewings, 1991, p. 16). As is to be
expected, the informal sector construction contracts with individuals tend to be informally
drawn, and more often than not, the binding "contract" is only verbal between the parties, save
for those with the government or the formal private sector.
1.8.0 Field survey
The field data was gathered using structured survey interviews, with possible responses given
in a form of multiple choice, to reduce the rate of non responses and time taken in conducting
the interview. The survey document (questions) was deliberately framed in a clear,
unambiguous manner and with few technical terms, with the intention that respondents who
were found to be very busy or away from station, could be left with the document to fill in, in
their own time.
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However, interviewing was always preferred to the questionnaire form, as it always accorded
the researcher the opportunity to record the respondents unsolicited answers. The other
disadvantage with leaving the survey document with the respondents was that it required the
researcher to make a second visit in order to collect it, and many a time two or three visits had
to be made before the document was answered. With most construction firms dotted around
the periphery of the three cities under study and without any research assistants, revisiting one
or two firms greatly increased the travel cost and time. Subsequently, the practice of leaving
the survey questions to be filled by the respondents had to be abandoned during the pilot
survey stage. A copy of the survey questions is attached as appendices at the end of this thesis.
1.8.1 Sampling procedure for survey respondents
In the foregoing sub-sections, we emphasised the need to make generalisations out of our
study to the rest of Zambia, based on our observations from the three (sample) cities. The first
prerequisite in meeting that goal is ensuring that the sample chosen is truly representative of
the total population or the general universe. This process should also involve the different
strata of respondents, as would be found in the general universe. For example, we know that
the construction industry in Sub-Sahara Africa and Zambia in particular comprises of two very
distinct forms of contractors, namely the formal and informal sectors, which can be further
subdivided into large, medium and small scale (see above). In this connection, therefore, it is
imperative that our sample respondents be representative of this stratification in the general
universe. To ignore this general rule, would be to offer our study to criticisms of the wrong
level of analysis; where information collected at one level of abstraction is used for another
level with the basic assumption that this holds.
Having stratified the working population, the initial intention was simply to randomly sample
the respondents from the different strata, using the register at the Government Buildings
Department as our working universe. In this way each construction firm in the three cities had
an equal chance of be picked as one of our cases and thus avoided biased selection of
respondents or cases. It should be noted, however, that, in the field, this proved difficult for
reasons explained later under 1.8.3 Pilot survey, and thus we used the snowball sampling
method.
The snow ball sampling method is based on the principle that the researcher builds on his
sample size, having interviewed earlier respondents with the characteristics sought by the
researcher, through introduction to their colleagues or business associates [as was the case in
our field survey] (Baker, 1994, p. 165). Mindful of the need to maintain the stratification of
construction firms at different levels, the researcher made sure that the chosen strata was kept
(see table 1.2).
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TABLE 1.2 Distribution of survey respondents by sector and location
CITY	 Contractors Consultants Manufacturers Suppliers 	 TOTALS
Lusaka	 21	 24	 8	 8	 61
Kitwe	 22	 8	 11	 16	 57
Ndola	 12	 6	 5	 6	 29
TOTALS I	 55	 38	 24	 30	 147
Source: Mashamba 195/6 survey data
TABLE 1.3 Stratification of survey respondents
Formal Sector construction firms 	 Informal sector
Large construction Firms
GV Category
>500 workers
No.of respondents in survey 5 	 _________________________________________
Medium sized construction firms
Gil to GIV Category
50-499 workers
No._of respondents_11	 _________________________________________
Small scale construction firms 	 Small scale Informal sector construction
GM to GiCategory	 "firms" GM Category
1-49 workers	 No. of respondents in survey 47
No._of respondents_84	 _________________________________________
Totals	 100	 47
NB. For explanation of categories see table 1.1
Source: Field data and data from table 1.1
To supplement our responses from the survey questions, some respondents were picked by the
researcher based on their working expertise to give their own views in a unstructured manner.
These were chosen using the expert choice sampling method which is a scientific but
subjective sampling technique in which the researcher uses his or her expert/ professional
judgement in picking those individuals in society he/she considers representative experts on
the subject matter (Baker, 1994, p.163).
Among those picked for these in-depth and unstructured interviews, were Mrs Mwanza, the
Assistance Director of Housing,- Kitwe City Council; Mr. Sonny Mulenga, President,
+
24
Chapter One: Introduction and Research Methodology
Surveyors Institute of Zambia; 7 Vinay Naik, Prominent Kitwe businessman and owner of
Woodcrafters Limited; Frank Chileshe, Kitwe Architect; Mr Jere, Director of Water and
Sewerage Company in Kitwe; Dr. Khonje, Commissioner of Town and Country Planning
(Chairman of the Zambia Housing Committee); Dr. J. Lungu, Lecturer in Land Economics
(Copperbelt University) on the new land bill; and various other prominent businessmen in
Zambia. Most of these interviews were conducted at the business forum "The Zambian
Industry In Decline" organised by the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry (ZACCI) and the Zambia Association of Manufacturers (ZAM) at the New Savoy
Hotel in Ndola on the 12th of January 1996.
1.8.2 Pilot survey
Prior to conducting the main survey in this study, a pilot survey was conducted in the three
chosen cities between the 17th of October and the 1st of November 1995. The main reason in
conducting this pilot survey was to test the suitability of questions and form and manner of
conducting the survey.
A list of all contractors, consultants and manufacturers/suppliers registered with the Ministry
of Works and Supply, Buildings Department was obtained (477 in all), from which a sample
of 30 contractors, consultants, manufacturers and suppliers/traders was chosen, representing
10 from each of the three cities. Unfortunately, only the postal address is shown on this list as
the contact address, meaning that the intended respondents could only be contacted by post,
except for the few for which the researcher was able to locate their business premises (13 in
total).
Two weeks after posting the self introductory letter, a copy of the survey questions, and a self
addressed envelope, there was no response from any of those sent the letters (17 in all,
although 3 did respond almost towards the end of the field trip), hence the need to change the
survey strategy in the field, from random sampling to a snowball sampling method. The
snowball sampling method was based on the 13 respondents that answered the pilot survey
questions and a number of known construction consultants introducing their business
associates and colleagues in the other sectors, i.e., contractors and materials suppliers.
7Mr Sonny Mulenga the then President of the Surveyors Institute of Zambia and a colleague in the Housing
Policy Committee is now the Hon. Minister for Lusaka Province.
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1.8.3 Research limitations and problems
The major problem encountered during the course of the field work was the reluctance by
most parastatal companies in responding to the survey questions, mainly because most of
them were lined up for privatisation and were, therefore, not allowed to divulge company
information to the public. Most of them did ultimately respond on condition that the
information given would not be made public until after the companies had been sold or that
the information was not to be attributable to the responding officers.
The second problem was one concerning Asian businesses. At the time the field work was
conducted, there had been some racial tension between Asians and blacks. This was following
some allegation in the press that some Asian businessmen were involved in ritual killings of
black Zambians for human parts for use in magic. This racial tension finally culminated in
violent riots the Southern Province, in which millions of dollars worth of Asian property was
destroyed. Although these riots were mainly in the Southern Province of Zambia, especially in
Livingstone, there was a noticeable reluctance and fear by most Asians businessmen in the
three cities to talk about their businesses, let alone the effects of the Structural Adjustment
Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy on their businesses.
To a lesser extent, there was also a lack of understanding of academic research among most
respondents who, for one reason or the other, were sceptical of where their responses would
end. This scepticism was not only among the less educated respondents but also the elite in
society who, by virtue of their job positions, where expected to toe party and government lines
when they had their own opposing view.
The other problem related to logistics, although as already mentioned there were very few of
the intended respondents in the telephone directory, even contacting these proved very
difficult as most of the time the phones were not working. The telephone company, the
Zambia Telecommunications Corporation (ZAMTEL), blamed this situation on vandals who
were stealing their cables for resale and the constant lightning that accompanies the rainy
season. As a result, most of the time was spent on making appointments and visiting
respondents who wçre either too busy at the time of the visit or away on business, a situation
which could have easily have been avoided had the phones been working.
The Zambia Postal Services Corporation did not help matters either. For example, the survey
document from the Ndola City Council took 6 weeks to arrive in Kitwe, yet Ndola is only 59
kilometres away. Three other survey documents were never received, although the
respondents claim to have posted the documents using the same self addressed envelopes
which were given to them.
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Another major problem that was faced in the field related to the bureaucracy involved in
collecting and releasing vital information by most Government related agencies. For example,
efforts to obtain detailed information on the number of houses sold by the three city councils,
either on cash sale or credit, was not available from any of the three councils.
1.9.0 Data analysis
The survey data compiled from our survey questions were coded on excel, a spread sheet, and
processed using Minitab version 9.2, a Windows statistical analysis package. But as already
explained, our study relied on a number of data sources, hence the processed quantitative data
from our software package had to be analysed and interpreted against the other data sources
using qualitative analytical methods.
1.10.0 Summary
The main aim of this chapter was to introduce and give a brief background to the research
project on which we are about to embank, and also state the aims and objectives of the
research study. We also explained the research methodology adopted and the reasons and
circumstances that led to these choices, given the environment on the ground. In chapter two,
we set out to contextualise our chosen research study in the broad literature available.
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Chapter Two: Literature review
2.1.0. Introduction
Having set the study aims and objectives in the last chapter, let us now set the literature context
under which our research study falls. The shelter and development paradigm within the context of
the construction industry has taken different turns and twists in the last four decades'. It first took
international prominence in 1972, with the Vancouver Conference and has constantly undergone
theoretical and practical changes since then. The latest global changes are contained under Habitat
II (UNCHS, 1996).
It must be stressed, however, that Habitat II in itself did not introduce new strategies nor policy
changes to shelter and development, as earlier defined under the Global Shelter Strategy. All it
did was to reaffirm, consolidate and integrate previous international and isolated conference
resolutions containing enabling shelter and development strategies. The main international
conference resolutions that have now been integrated into the shelter, construction industry and
development paradigm are the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), the World
Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1995), the International Conference on Population
and Development (Cairo, 1994), the World Conference for Human Rights (Vienna, 1993) and the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) (UNCHS,
1996, p.227; UNDP, 1996). By integrating all these international conferences, Habitat II thus
consolidates shelter with economic, social and environmental development. It is now our
intention in this chapter to trace the historical and theoretical reasoning behind this global and
integrated sectoral approach of tackling shelter and development issues.
2.2.0 Contemporary Third World development problems
Third world problems are very wide and complex. However, for the purpose of this study, we
shall restrict ourselves to the construction industry, shelter and development issues. We are,
nevertheless, aware of the fact that other apparently unrelated Third World problems ultimately
have a bearing on shelter and development issues. The root cause of most Third World problems,
in which Sub-S aharan Africa seems to be leading, stem from a combination of high population
growth rates and decreasing national incomes. The high rate of urbanisation in the Third World
has also meant that urban areas have taken the brunt of these shelter and unemployment
problems. For instance, whereas there were only 12 cities with populations over 10 million people
in 1992, this figure is expected to rise to 21 such cities by the year 2000, with 18 of them in the
Third World (The Courier, Jan.-Feb., 1992, p. 49; UNCHS, 1996, p. 11-15).
Although the problems of rapid urbanisation are still well appreciated, there is now a growing
recognition that Third World urbanisation presents its own unique economic contributions to the
t At the time, it was referred to as the housing and development paradigm'.
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regions battered economies. The World Bank estimates that up to 80% of GNP in the Third
World is being produced in these same urban areas (UNCHS, 1996, p. 24-28; The Courier No.
131, 1992, p. 49). The World Bank and the United Nations further argue that Third World
urbanisation creates large markets for agricultural produce from the rural areas hence stimulating
rural agriculture (The Courier, Jan.-Feb., 1992, pp. 49-51). This thesis in no way supports rapid
Third World urbanisation per Se, but aims at tapping the positive aspects of urbanisation, whilst
trying to solve its associated problems of transportation congestion, housing shortages and
squatting, and urban pollution (UNCHS, 1996, p. 418-424).
Decreasing national income and the corresponding increase in foreign debt has thus meant that,
increasingly, less investment is going into improving, let alone maintaining, the basic
infrastructure in the face of massive urban population increase. With the public formal services
unable to cope due to reduced Government spending, the private (and mainly informal) sector
have thus become the key providers of urban services. This phenomenon has given impetus to the
Neo-Liberalist thesis that the private sector (and especially the informal sector) can do much
more, given the necessary Government backing and enabling business environment. Bearing in
mind the indebtedness of most of these Sub-S aharan countries, the current global trend which is
basically pro-private sector and anti- increased public spending, finds fertile ground in most of
these countries.
It is important to mention at this juncture that both the Structural Adjustment Programme and the
Enabling Shelter Strategy advocate a multi-faceted approach in tackling Third World problems of
unemployment, inflation, reduced incomes, and the housing and debt crisis (United
Nations[Woodfield], 1989; Tipple, 1994b; World Bank, 1983; 1993a; 1993).
2.2.1 Third World debt crisis
The Third World debt crisis is a widely debated subject. It is, therefore, not the intention of this
study to repeat the debate here. However, it is important that we contextualise the Sub-Saharan
Africa debt crisis and relate it to the shelter problems faced by most countries and also relate the
role of the International Financial Institutions (IFI) in trying to solve these problems. The
Structural Adjustment Programme was initiated as a direct response to the debt crisis that hit
most Third World countries in general, but especially those of Latin America and Sub-Saharan
Africa. The origin of this debt can be traced to the 1970s, when oil prices rapidly increased amid
low prices for most primary materials, which these countries were exporting (see debt-to-export
ratio in table 2.1). So to balance their accounts, most Sub-Saharan countries resorted to excess
borrowing from both commercial banks and the IFI (Todaro 1994, p. 46 1-2). Sub-Saharan
Africa's debt is smaller than most other regions in the World. But what makes its debt a peculiar
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problem is that, whilst the region's debt is growing quickly, its capacity to service the debt is
diminishing more quickly. This is well illustrated in the table below which shows, for example,
that between 1975 and 1993 the region's outstanding debt grew from $14.9 billion to $137.4
billion, an increase of more than 800% (see table 2.1). At about the same time its share of debt-to-
service ratio2 grew from $14.4 billion (in 1980) to $24.6 billion in 1993. With most of their
resources committed to debt serving and repayment, most Sub-Saharan countries, therefore,
resorted to deficit financing with the concomitant results of high inflation and debt perpetuation3
(Sparr, 1994).
Table 2.1 Growth of African indebtedness
_______________________ 1975
	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1993
External debt (billion of 14.9	 55.6	 64.7	 126.1	 137.4
dollars)	 _________ _________ _________ _________ __________
Debt-service	 payments 14.9
	
55.6	 64.7	 126.1	 137.4
(billion of dollars) 	 ________ ________ ________ ________ __________
Debt-to-Export 	 ratio N/A	 92.5	 189.0	 234.9	 219.6
(percent)	 __________ __________ __________ __________ ___________
Debt-service ratio (percent N/A 	 14.4	 27.6	 25.5	 24.6
ofexports)	 _________ _________ _________ _________ ___________
Debt-to-GDP	 ratio N/A
	 28.3	 46.6	 62.2	 57.4
(percent)	 __________ __________ __________ __________ ___________
Source: Todaro, 1994, p. 460
2.2.2.1 The role of the International Financial Institutions
The two main players in international financing: the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) are both products of the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 (the "Bretton Woods
twins"). Although these two financial institutions have different specific aims and objectives,
there were designed to complement each other on matters of financial and monetary aid to
member countries. The IMF is now more concerned with stabilisation polices, whereas the World
Bank is concerned with the Structural Adjustment Programme (Sinha, 1994, p. 558). The
"Bretton Woods twins" were created with the initial purpose of mobilising international capital,
both from private institutions and member country contributions for rebuilding the ravaged
countries after the Second World War. The basic principle of operation is that the share capital in
these two institutions is structured such that any risk or loss is shared among its member
countries, in proportions to their shares. Membership to both institutions is open to all members
2 Ratio of external debt to gross domestic product (GNP)
3Refers to a situation where a country borrows to service past debts.
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of the UN, although a country has to be a member of the IMF before becoming a member of the
World Bank (The World Bank, 1976, PP. 3-4).
Having successfully helped the developed countries rebuild their countries after the destruction of
the second World War, the focus of these two institutions is now on using their expertise and
experience in helping the Third World countries attain similar status. In helping member
countries, it must be emphasised that the two institutions operate more or less like private banks;
a member country intending to borrow must provide some form of assurance that the loan will be
repaid. However, unlike private banks, "the Bretton Woods twins" main focus of operation is on
budget financing and developmental assistance to member countries.
Another striking feature of these two institutions, beginning in the 1980's, has been the variable
interest rate loans they give, as against the fixed interest loans of the past. This development has
been necessitated by the increasing role of mobilised private capital from the commercial banks
and other private financial institutions (Todaro, 1994, p. 461-2; Nowzad, 1982, p. 166). This
means that not only is the nominal debt for Third World countries increasing, but the real cost has
increased considerably, due to fluctuations on the global financial markets. For instance, between
1974 and 1982 alone, Nowzad cites interest rate rises of about 250% (from 7% to 17%) on the
international capital markets.
2.3.0. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)
The term structural adjustment first gained world prominence in April, 1980, when the World
Bank gave a $200 million loan to Turkey, with conditionalities that were meant to support
structural reforms in the Turkish economy. The reform structures agreed between the Turkish
Government and the World Bank were mainly focused in the area of development policy and
economic structures, designed to sustain the Turkish economy in the short and long terms (Reed,
1992, p.2). After this record signing, most other Third World countries followed the Turkish
example and signed similar loan agreements with the World Bank and the IMF.
What made the advent of the Structural Adjustment lending so different from previous lending
agreements of the World Bank and its affiliate the IMF, was the emphasis that was placed on the
strict adherence to the loan condition clauses (adjustment conditionalities). With the changing
nature of World economic problems: from basic unemployment and inflation to economic
stagnation it became almost inevitable that classical Keynesian economics had to be replaced with
a more appropriate economic theory of addressing the new problem. Classical Keynesian
economics had basically been about solving the aggregate unemployment and inflation problem
through the manipulation of the Government budget (spending; monetary policy) and taxes (fiscal
policy). Under the Keynesian economic model, unemployment was seen as a direct result of a
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deficiency of aggregate demand, and hence the prognosis that by increasing aggregate demand (by
way of increasing total Government spending) and lowering taxes to induce private spending,
unemployment would be checked. If, on the other hand, there was high inflation (high aggregate
demand compared to aggregate supply) Government would reduce its total budget (spending) and
raise taxes to curtail aggregate demand and thus reduce inflation. Given the role of Government
in manipulating monetary and fiscal policy under this regime, we can safely say that this model
relied largely on Government intervention in the market for its success.
Today, however, our economic problems have somewhat changed, there is not merely
unemployment or inflation as during the great depression of the 1930's, today's economic
problems combine both unemployment and (structural and demand) inflation coupled with the
debt crisis (for most Third World countries), rendering the Keynesian model irrelevant (Todaro,
1977, pp. 6-12). The perceived failure of the Keynesian model to solve contemporary economic
problems thus led to the rise of a new economic model called Neo-Liberalism. Neo-Liberalist
economists view national economic problems both in the developed and Third World countries as
arising mainly from internal and external rigidities in these countries. The rigidities are said to be
found in the institutional and structural arrangements of the country's economies, hence the usage
of the term Structural Adjustment when addressing these "rigidities."
Looking at the structural adjustment changes proposed by the World Bank and the IMF in their
adjustment lending agreements to the Third World, it would be argued that they have identified
the following as being the main "rigidities:" protectionalist tendencies, active participation of
Government in the market, and deficit budgeting. Like Neo-classical economics, the structural
adjustment strategy argues that public sector spending is largely responsible for rising budget
deficits, thence the rising debt in most Third World countries (Sinha, 1994, p. 558). To remedy
this situation, Neo-liberalism advocates limiting Government participation in the economy to the
mere creation of the so, called, "enabling environment" and further advocates the promotion of
market forces in determining prices and resource allocation.
Whereas traditional classical and Neo-classic economists like Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall, and
Stuart Mill were the protagonists of market forces, they were mindful of the limitations of market
forces in social and moral interests of society. Neo-Liberalists on the other hand seem to believe
that social and moral issues could be addressed by the market as well. At least that seemed to be
the position until the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 1987 presented their critical
report "Adjustment with a human face" (Cornia et al, 1987) on the negative effects of structural
adjustment on children, women and the vulnerable groups in countries undergoing structural
adjustment. Since then, the World Bank and the IMF have included the Programme of Action to
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Mitigating the Social Costs of Structural Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in their adjustment
programmes. These social action programmes are, however, considered outside the realms of
central Government and are therefore, left to the Non Governmental Organisations (NGO's). We
will leave this discussion for now until we come to sub-heading 2.6.4: Community enablement.
There can be no doubt at the political and socio-economic consequences that structural
adjustment has brought to those countries that have "opted" to implement the programme, as
countless examples from the affected countries show, among them the Zambian food riots of
December, 1986. The fear for social and political backlash when implementing structural
adjustment has, therefore, always tend to sway Governments from implementing them in part or
in full, hence the insistence by the World Bank and the IMF on the conditionalities clauses.
2.3.1. Adjustment conditionalities
In the main there are six standard adjustment conditionalities to which a country intending to
borrow from the "Bretton-Woods twins" will be expected to agree. These conditionalities are best
summaries by Reed4 (1992, pp. 26-27) as follows;
1. TRADE POLICY- Adopting a competitive real exchange rate and lifting
export restrictions to encourage exports: reducing quantitative restrictions on
imports, and cutting tariffs to strengthen the international competitiveness of
domestic industry.
2. FISCAL POLICY- Reducing and eliminating fiscal deficits by contracting
public expenditure; increasing prices in the public sector to cover costs and raise
revenues; reforming the tax system to improve the efficiency of raising revenue;
and creating new sources of revenue.
3. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE POLICY- Cutting public investment and shifting
resources to infrastructure and social sectors; reforming public enterprise to
improve efficiency and profitability; closing or privatising unprofitable public
enterprise to reduce the government fiscal burden.
4. FINANCIAL SECTOR POLICY- Restructuring institutions to facilitate
resource mobilisation; improving regulatory framework to restore public
confidence; relaxing interest rates ceilings and reserve requirements; and
diminishing the role of credit allocation to provide incentives for efficient use of
resources.
5. INDUSTRIAL POLICY- Reducing protection to make the industrial sector
more competitive internationally; liberalising price controls to improve resource
allocation; providing investment incentives for producing domestic value added;
devaluing the currency to develop an export-oriented strategy.
6. AGRICULTURAL POLICY- Adjusting exchange rates and removing
industrial protection to eliminate the bias against agriculture; liberalising
agriculture prices; funding agriculture research and improving infrastructure;
4Original sourced from the World Bank: Problems and issues in Structural Adjustment, 1990, pp. 40-42.
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deregulating agriculture trade to smoothen the circulation of agriculture inputs and
products.
Looking through the above six conditionalities of structural adjustment, it is very clear that the
term "Structural Adjustment" is somewhat a misname in that the changes being proposed are not
only structural in nature but monetary as well, i.e., devaluation and exchange rates. There is also a
risk of confusing the original structuralist economists with the advocates of Structural Adjustment
Programmes. The original Structuralist economists of Latin America was a school of thought that
opposed the IMFs 1950's explanation of inflation through monetarism as against structuralism
and has little or no bearing on today's Structural Adjustment Programme (Little, 1982). Today
however, both the Structural Adjustment Programme and Neo-liberalism implicitly embrace both
monetarism and structuralism in their modus operandi.
In view of the world-wide criticism of the World Bank and the IMF on their role in structural
adjustment in Third World countries, it is important to state from the outset that not all Structural
Adjustment Programmes are initiated and sponsored by the two Financial Institutions. Some
Third World countries have implemented their own brand of structural adjustment, among them
Mexico, Thailand and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso was one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa (back in 1983 under Captain Thomas Sankara) to implement structural adjustment, and its
results were widely reported as being successful, enticing other African countries to follow suit.
The Burkina Faso government froze civil service wages at the 1982 level, reduced housing
allowances by 25%, banned the importation of luxury cars by Government officials and also
banned fertiliser subsidy. The net result of the above measures was an average growth rate of
5.8% in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1983-1989, compared to 3.8% recorded
between 1970-1982, which was also the average for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (Savadogo
and Wetta, 1992, pp. 61).
From the other countries that followed suit, Ghana, Uganda and Mauritius within the Sub-
Saharan continent, also recorded positive growth rates after implementing the World Bank and
IMF brand of structural adjustment programme. Independent research, however, like that of
OXFAM, have refuted such claims by the World Bank and the IMP as being "full of holes and a
blend of half truths" (Swift, 1994, p. 6). Despite such negative reports on the effects on structural
adjustment, Third World countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to subject
themselves to structural adjustment loans and their associated conditionalities.
Embedded within the structural adjustment theory, is the important role placed on private
international capital in the postulated amelioration of poverty and the debt crisis in Third World
countries (UNDP, 1996). According to the Nurkse's theory of development, poor countries remain
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poor because they are poor and need large injections of foreign capital to get out of the poverty
trap. It argues that Third World countries have a low savings to national income ratio, hence a
low rate of capital accumulation with the resultant low productivity in the national economy. If
this prognosis is right, then there is every justification for Third World countries to borrow from
International Financial Institutions and to open up their economies to foreign multi-nationals to
fill the capital short fall. The Far-East Asian economic miracle of the 1980's, using Western
money, may be a valid case in point to validity this theory (World Bank, 1993b). The Neo-
Marxist school, however, is not convinced about the need for injecting international capital into
Third World economies. They argue that this trend only goes to perpetuate the dependence
syndrome of Third World countries on the developed countries (Amin, 1976; see also Mamdani,
1991).
2.3.2 Structural adjustment, shelter, and the construction industry
How then does this Neo-Liberalist development theory affect shelter provision and the
construction industry? We have already seen that the key objective of the Structural Adjustment
Programme is in restoring economic growth and sustaining long-term national development.
Among other things, it seeks to restore economic growth and sustain long-term development in a
nation, achieve positive balance of payments, generate employment opportunities, increase
national income, increase fixed capital formation, and improve shelter provision (UNCHS, 1996,
7). The above attributes have all been highly associated with the construction industry (see 2.4.0).
Consequently, the protagonist of the Structural Adjustment Programme have argued that
investment in shelter will stimulate the construction industry, which in turn contributes to
national development (Woodfield, 1989, p. 26-27). Although the Structural Adjustment
Progran-ime advocates for reduced government expenditure, it seeks to promote private sector
investment in the construction industry to take the place of a hitherto large percentage share of
public sector investment.
As a consequence of the six conditionalities of the Structural Adjustment Programme (on page
34-5) and in line with the Neo-Liberalist economic philosophy, the housing sector and the
construction industry in general are affected as follows (summarised from Van Huyck, 1987, p.
355-358; UNCHS, 1996, 116-120; World Bank, 1993a):
1. State housing allowances and subsidies have to be reduced and eventually
eliminated, but in the meantime they should be target-oriented.
2. Public services like water, electricity, and sewerage should be priced at market
rates and housing policy measures like rent control done away with, not only to
recover costs but to increase the revenue base of the Government.
3. Loss-making construction and housing-related public-controlled companies
should be sold off or privatised.
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4. Construction materials companies previously enjoying foreign trade protection
should lose that privilege, in a measure meant to promote efficiency and lower costs
in the housing market.
5 The role of the Government in the housing market and construction industry
should be reduced: from direct participation to operating the regulatory framework
and easing the supply markets (enabling). This entails creating an enabling
environment for private sector investment in the housing market.
Given the reduced role of Government in both the housing sector and the construction industry
under the Structural Adjustment Programme, it then becomes very clear why private sector
investment both local and foreign is pivotal to the success of this programme. In recognition of
this fact, the protagonist of this thesis place an important role on the part of the host Government
to put in place rules and regulations that will be seen to facilitate, promote and protect the private
sector. The strategy of creating this environment in the housing sector, in which the public and
more especially the private sector are able to carry out their intended business objectives, is what
has become known as the "Enabling Shelter Strategy."
2.4.0. The construction industry in Sub-Saharan Africa and its role in national development
Before we go to discuss the relation between the Enabling Shelter Strategy in great detail, lets us
first give a brief profile of the structure and the role of the construction industry in national
development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Studies by various researchers show that there is a strong
relation between shelter and the construction industry on one hand and the level of national
development on the other (Edmonds and Miles, 1984, p. 8; Rodwin, 1987; Meen, 1995).
Edmonds and Miles (1984, p.1-3) and UNCHS (1996, p. 224) have further argued that the
importance of the construction industry in any country is not only in terms of the products it
produces, but in the amount of public investment (50-80%) it consumes, its high share of Gross
Fixed Capital Formation (over 50%) and the percentage of workers engaged in it. Klaassen et al
(1987) and Spence et al (1993) have argued that investment in housing is a major catalyst in
stimulating the construction industry and ensuring sustained long-term development. Their thesis
is that increased housing spending leads to increased building of housing, consequently creating
more job opportunities within and outside the direct construction industry. They go on to
postulate that, since spending on housing normally requires huge investments, this encourages
aggregate savings and hence reduces disposable income leading to reduced inflation.
Edmonds and Miles (1984, p. 5) also found that, the Value Added by the Construction industry
(VAC) varies from country to country depending on Gross National Product (GNP). They found
that the percentage value added in construction is on average higher for countries with a higher
GNP/capita than those with a lower GNP/capita (see table 2.2). Table 2.2 also shows that Value
added as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)
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per capita, investment per workplace and employment per 1,000 population all increase with an
increase in a country's Gross National Product. This explains the low percentage contribution of
the construction industry to the national economy in Sub-Saharan African as compared to the
percentage contribution in developed countries.
Table 2.2 Characteristics of the construction industry
GNP per Type	 Number VAC	 VAC as GFCF Investment Employment
capita ($)
	
of	 per	 %	 of per	 per	 per 1,000
	
countries capita	 GDP	 capita	 workplace
__________ ________ __________ ($) 	 ________ ($)	 ($)	 _____________
<500	 A	 30	 13	 4.66	 19.5	 6,518	 3.6
500-999	 B	 23	 44	 5.62	 99.7	 10,974	 9.1
1000-1999	 C	 22	 87	 6.08	 187.9	 15,437	 15.3
2000-3999	 D	 15	 239	 7.49	 490.6	 23,571	 25.2
4000-8999	 E	 14	 466	 7.36	 861.2	 33,787	 25.4
>9000	 F	 12	 919	 7.80	 1,672.1	 57,489	 26.9
Source: Edmonds and Miles, 1984, p. 7
The structure of the construction industry in Sub-Saharan Africa is very varied and tends to vary
from country to country. In general terms, however, the industry can be divided into formal and
informal sectors
(a) Formal sector: Comprising mostly large international and local public and private construction
companies working on large projects. Like the formal construction sector in Zambia (in chapter
one) which is developed on the model of its former colonial master: Britain, the same can be said
for most other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The formal construction sector tends to cover
projects in all areas of the construction i.e. industrial plant, buildings (including housing), roads
and general infrastructure. Because of the huge investment needed to buy plant and machinery,
especially for civil engineering projects, most firms in this sub-sector tended to be public sector
or private limited firms. Grimes (1976, p. 55) has, however, argued that the tendency to use
capital-intensive techniques was largely because of the overvalued exchange rates, subsidised
interest rates and other distortions in these economies.
(b) Informal sector: Comprising mostly small sized and family construction companies working
with both the formal and mostly informal sector. As was the case in Zambia (see chapter one), the
informal sector elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa also tends to have low overheads which gives
the sector advantages over the formal construction sector. For example, Korboe (1993) showed
how the informal construction sector in Ghana was able to build a "bedsitter" at one sixth the cost
of building the same unit by the formal construction sector.
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In economic terms, however, relationships in the construction market are classified under (1)
Demand and (2) supply
2.4.1 Construction demand
Demand for construction goods and services can be grouped into two main classes of
(a) Civil engineering works: of which infrastructure (provision and repairs) is the main
component i.e. roads works, water and electricity reticulation, sewerage and so on. Not surprising,
therefore, civil engineering works have traditionally been undertaken by the public sector. But
with the promotion of the private sector in the provision of public services, under the Structural
Adjustment Programme, this has resulted in the entry of the private sector in this area.
(b) Building works: This sector groups all construction works involved in the building of houses,
offices, schools, clinics, hospitals, factories, and so on. This is in which the private sector
investment has traditionally invested in.
Reduced public sector budgets for capital programmes resulting from the debt crisis and the
application of Structural Adjustment policies in most Sub-Saharan African countries has resulted
in drastic reduction in construction demand. Private institutions and individuals have also tended
to cut back on their spending on construction goods and services as their incomes has equally
fallen (UNCHS, 1985, p. 24; UNCHS, 1996, p. 207).
2.4.2 Construction supply
There are four main factors of production on the supply side of the construction industry: (a)
construction materials (b) labour (c) capital or machinery and (d) construction finance. Various
studies have found that construction materials tend to be the largest single input for most
construction works in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for over 50% of the total construction cost
(Edmonds and Miles, 1984, p. 13; UNCHS, 1985, p. 5; UNCHS, 1996, p. 225). The very high
percentage contribution for materials cost is attributed to the high percent of imported
construction materials in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Third World (UNCHS, 1985, p.
13). This will explain attempts by most of these countries in reducing the amount of imported
construction materials used.
Construction labour is another very important component on the supply side of the construction
market. The construction labour component comprises unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled and
professional workers. Large and public construction projects normally tend to require professional
manpower of architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, and building surveyors, whereas small and
private construction works might not require all these professionals (Edmonds and Miles, 1984,
p. 22-32). This is because formal public construction works and finance regulations have strict
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laid down procedures for awarding and implementing contracts, which require the services of
these professionals. Construction works in the informal (and mainly housing) sector, however, do
not follow these procedures and can thus be carried out by less qualified workers. Refer also to
the Zambian situation under 1.7.2.
Construction plant or machinery is another expensive component that adds to the total cost of
most public construction works in most African countries. This again, is attributed to the
expensive and imported plant engaged on large public construction sites. The situation is made
worse by the fact that most African governments demand that contractors should own a large
stock of construction stock to be eligible to qualify for large government construction contracts
(Edmonds and Miles, 1984, p. 32). To counter this, there is now a growing call to substitute the
amount of machinery used in these projects with local and cheap labour (Edmonds and Miles,
1984, p. 10; Strassmann and Wells, 1988, p. 4-9). Lastly, for any construction to take place, there
must be money (construction finance) available to employ the above construction factors.
2.4.3 The informal sector construction industry
In Sub-Saharan Africa the contribution of the construction industry is less documented and,
therefore, less appreciated because most construction activities tend to be in the informal sector
(UNCHS, 1985, p. 8). Despite this lack of appreciation, the informal construction industry plays
an important role in most Third World countries. Although the informal construction sector has
only become more accepted with the advent of SAP and the Enabling Shelter Strategy in most
Sub-Saharan countries, this sector has always played a key role in shelter provision for most
informal households. For example, in the 1970s the informal construction sector was the main
sector in building houses in the squatter upgrading and site and service schemes that took place in
these countries, including Zambia (World Bank, 1983; Martin, 1975, Schlyter and Schlyter,
1980).
Similar examples in other Sub-Saharan African countries can be cited. For instance,
Moavenzadeh (1987, p.86-8'7) found that, in Kenya, 60% of GFCF in the shelter market and 16%
in the rest of construction market was provided by the informal sector. In Cote d'Ivoire the
informal sector accounted for 60% of the workers in the whole of that country's construction
industry (Moavenzadeh, 1987, p. 86). In most other Sub-Saharan countries including Zambia,
however, such accurate data on the informal construction sector is not available. The advent of
SAP in Sub-Saharan Africa has only added to the significant role played by the informal sector of
the construction industry, as the formal construction sector (which was largely public owned) is
constantly been reduced as a cost saving measure (UNCHS, 1996, p. 116).
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The informal sector construction industry has been credited with using less or no imported
construction materials, thus saving foreign exchange and promoting locally produced construction
materials (UNCHS, 1996, p.225; Moavenzadeh, 1987, p.86). This is so, because the informal
construction industry is predominately concerned with building houses for the urban poor. For
example, research by Wells (1995, p. 76) in four selected Third World countries, found that there
was a high rate of locally produced building materials used in housing construction for both walls
and roofing. Wells (1995, p. 76) notes that, the small price difference between traditional
(organic) and locally produced building materials in urban areas and the short life of unprocessed
organic materials is one factor that encourages the greater use of locally produced materials than
traditional materials (see table 2.3 below). Similarly, Klaassen et al (1987, 45) went further to
show that local and informally supplied construction materials have high labour component in
their production and processing, thus enhancing local employment generation (see table 2.4).
Table 2.3 Materials used in some selected urban housing
Material	 I Bangladesh	 Tanzania	 Malawi	 Ethiopia	 Zimbabwe
Walls_____________ _____________ _____________ _____________ _____________
Poles/bamboo!	 53	 18	 1	 3.5	 N/A
grass/straw	 _________________ _________________ _________________ __________________ __________________
Poles and mud	 N/A	 45	 15	 80	 5.1
Roofs____________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
Poles/bamboo!	 40	 20	 34	 20	 1.5
grass/straw	 _________________ ________________ ________________ ________________ _________________
Iron sheets	 40	 67	 61	 77	 N/A
Source: Wells (1995, p. 76)
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Table 2.4 Source and labour intensity of various construction materials
Materials	 Source of materials	 Source of	 Labour intensity in
Place	 material	 production and
________________________ ____________________ 	 (Sector)	 processing
Mud and wattle, Sun-dried
	
local	 informal	 high
clayblocks	 ____________________ _____________ _______________________
Murrain-enforced blocks,
	
local	 informal or	 high
Blackcotton bricks	 ___________________ - formal 	 ______________________
Stones	 local	 informal or	 high
________________ ______________ formal ________________
Timber	 local	 informal or	 high intensive use of
______________________ ___________________	 formal	 skilled labour
Precast concrete panels 	 local or imported	 formal	 medium
Cement blocks with a
	
local or imported	 formal	 low
chemicaladd itive	 ____________________ ______________ ________________________
Source: Klaassen et al, 1987, p. 45
Although no recent research has been carried out on the informal sector in Africa, in the mid
1970s it was estimated that a typical African country informal sector employed about 60% of the
urban labour force (UNCHS, 1996, p. 90). In recognition of the various problems faced by the
informal construction sector, but yet appreciating its valuable contribution to the economies of
Third World countries, the UNCHS (1985, p. 29) has suggested the following measures to
improve its efficiency;
1. Promoting the formation of organisations and associations within the
informal sector and using such organs as the medium of information flow to
the sector and, in general, as a mechanism for providing support in requisite
areas;
2. Integrating institutional arrangements in the informal construction sector
with the overall machinery for planning the construction industry;
3. Strengthening the capacities of existing institutions or associations in the
informal construction by offering support in areas such as dissemination of
information, training, and basic administration practices;
4. Designating a focal agency to co-ordinate activities in the informal sector
and set out broad policy guidelines;
5, Expanding the use of non-conventional approaches in government
construction programmes for low-income population.
2.4.4 The construction industry and housing provision
Although house construction and repairs constitutes only a part of the many roles of the
construction industry, in the Third World, Moavenzadeh (1987, p. 88) has estimated that 35-40%
of construction demand is for housing, 22-27% for non-residential buildings and 35-38% for civil
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engineering works. With 40% of the most households in the Third World unable to afford a house
from the formal sector contractor, the task of proving most housing has thus fallen on the
informal construction sector (Moavenzadeh, 1987, p. 87-88). Apart from the inability to pay for
housing, most urban poor households in the Third World cannot afford a house in the formal
sector because of the scarce of serviced land, inability to get mortgages and the high transport
Costs to places of employment with the formal sector houses (UNCHS, 1996, p. 207). The
continued rise of urban areas in the Third World, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa has also meant
that housing demand, be it in the informal sector, continues to key stimulant for informal
(housing) construction market. For instance, the UNCHS (1996, p. 195) has estimated that,
whereas annual new formal housing in Africa is usually between 2 and 4 units per 1,000
inhabitants, in the informal sector it is likely to be between 15 and 30 units per 1,000 inhabitants.
This estimation only goes to demonstrate the pivotal role of the informal sector construction
industry in Sub-Sahara Africa.
2.5.0 Housing (Shelter), the construction industry and development paradigms
We have already stated that our research on "the effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme
and the Enabling Shelter Strategy on the construction industry (supply-side of the market) and
national development in Zambia, falls under the paradigm of "housing 5 and development." The
shelter and development paradigm deals with the relationship between shelter policy and
provision and their effects on national development. Klaassen at al (1987) have best illustrated
the national development impacts of housing on the rest of the economy in fig. 2.1 below. In this
diagram they have summarised the direct and indirect impacts of investment in housing on the
formal and informal employment markets both in the construction industry and other related
industries. The diagram further shows the interrelation between the formal and informal shelter
companies, and their net effects on local construction supply and prices. Figure 2.1 further shows
that macro-economic changes are by and large influenced by economic, social and spatial factors
in the shelter sub-market. For example, demand for shelter at the top of the diagram results in
both public and private sector investment in shelter, which trigger off reactions or movements in
formal and informal construction labour and materials markets. The resultant increase in housing
stock ultimately thus has influences in the social and economic welfare of the citizens, through
higher productivity at work, better health, higher incomes through rents and subletting and
similarly higher taxes for the government.
5 1n the Neo-Liberal policies the term shelter is preferred to housing.
43
Chapter Two: Literature review
Fig. 2.1 Impacts of shelter investment on the construction industry and national
development
Source: Klaasen et a!, 1987, p. 38
In tracing the hi'1torical development of this paradigm in the Sub-Saharan African continent we
can ee three ery distinct housing and development schools of thoughts:
(1.) Social housing and the welfare state;
(2.) Self housing programme;
(1.) Enabling Shelter Strategy.
2.5.1. Social Housing and the welfare state system
Social housing and the welfare state system is the name we shall give to that school of thought
that aw the role of housing in national development more in social than economic terms. This
school was particularly popular in the 1960's, termed the decolonialisation decade, when most
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Sub-Saharan African countries gained their independence. Most of these countries set out
interventionist policies meant to uplift the living standards of their people in the shortest possible
time. Housing, water, education, among other things, were rightly regarded as basic needs of each
and every citizen and the responsibility of satisfying these needs was literally taken up by the
newly created Governments themselves. Large public sector construction companies were set up,
to fulfil that role. The general national development policies tended to follow what has become
known as "redistribution with growth and basic needs" (Burgess et al, 1994). The overall
objective was to eradicate poverty, inequalities and unemployment, yet at the same time achieve
positive economic growth.
Although housing was never explicitly cited as being a vehicle to meet the stated national
development objectives, it was implicitly seen as a medium for raising productivity amongst the
"well" housed workers and those engaged in the construction industry. Due to the vast numbers of
people in need of housing and other construction products, rapid industrialisation of the
construction industry was seen as being the key to meeting the set national development targets.
2.5.1.1 Rapid industrialisation
Decades of colonialisation had left the former colonial states heavily dependent on the
industrialised nations, for most of their construction goods and services. Colonies were taken to
be mere sources of raw materials and markets for finished goods, for the industries and workers
in the developed West (Yue-man Yeung, p. 1). However, with the attainment of independence,
the new states attempted to reverse this trend by setting up their own industries. The basic
objective was to create jobs for the locals and save foreign exchange on imported goods and
services. To facilitate this objective, import tariffs were introduced as a measure designed to
substitute imports as part of a strategy of import substitution.
Unfortunately the mode of production chosen for these new local industries was basically capital
intensive, relying mostly on Western technology, semi-processed raw materials and capital goods.
This development has now been criticised by the Neo-Liberalist and other economists for
contributing to foreign exchange losses mainly due to payments made to expatriate workers,
spares and maintenance costs needed to run these capital intensive industries. The other
detrimental effect brought about by these Western-oriented industries was the marginalisation of
the local crafts-based industries and their products. Locally produced construction materials like
timber door and window frames and bricks, which had thereto been produced by the local
domestic industry and craftsmen, were replaced by colonial type metal franies and concrete
blocks (Chakwe, 1983, pp. 37 1-3).
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The reliance on Western labour, technology and semi-processed raw materials inevitably meant
that, with the collapse of these countries economies, these large public construction industries and
companies could not sustain themselves any longer. With foreign exchange generally in short
supply and the little that there was going to servicing debts, production capacities went down with
the resultant situation of chronic shortages of building materials and longer building times on
construction sites (Fewings, 1991). Conventional housing thus became expensive and out of the
reach of ordinary urban dwellers so that most opted to build and live in the so-called squatter
settlements where they built using traditional methods and materials (Wells, 1993; 1995). This
phenomenon was particularly true in the case of Zambia (Mashamba, 1990).
2.5.1.2 High housing standards
Years of colonial rule had also seen a perpetuation of a dual housing system by both the British
and French colonial governments. Housing was provided on the basis of race, with the Whites
being provided with housing built to colonial standards whereas the locals were provided with
mere modifications of their village huts. With the departure of the colonialists the new
bureaucrats and the technocrats simply copied the standards that had being reserved for whites
and adopted them as minimum housing standards for both public and private housing (Grimes,
1976, p. 41). There was no evaluation of these standards as to their appropriateness to local
conditions or factors. High housing and civil engineering standards with their concomitant formal
construction practices also effectively eliminated the participation of the indigenous (or informal)
contractor or builder in the construction process of these houses and public infrastructure
(UNCHS, 1985, p. 18).
It was not until Turner (1972; 1976; 1980) began to research and write on the adverse effects
which the setting of high housing standards was having on the national economies that slowly
Governments began to relax on high housing standards. The entry of the World Bank on the Third
World housing market and its support of Turner's findings on the need to rethink high housing
and infrastructure standards added weight to Turner's theories and saw a turn about on this
subject. The World Bank actually went further than Turner in its criticism by stating that high
housing standards were not only siphoning the little available public resources, but also benefiting
only a handful of people (World Bank, 1983, p. 3).
Turner (1972, p. 148) has best summarised the notion that the bureaucrats and the professionals in
the Third world had when he writes "the standards the objectors have in mind, however, are not
something which can be achieved with available resources but, rather, represent the objectors own
notion of what housing ought to be".
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2.5.1.3 Housing subsidies and allowances
It will be appreciated that, at the time of independence, very few natives in the former colonies
had adequate education, let alone good paying jobs to be able to afford the high standard housing
that was being produced mainly by the public sector. Housing allowances and subsidies thus had
to be introduced or perpetuated by the Governments to assist the 'urban poor' to foot the housing
bill. Unfortunately, it turned out that these housing allowances and subsidies were actually biased
towards the middle and high income groups, rather than the low income groups as was the
original intention (World Bank, 1983, p. 3). Housing allowances were fixed as a percentage of
one's income, so that those with high incomes got more than those with low. With housing
subsidies tending to rise in proportion to the value to the house, this was in no way assisting the
poor, as both housing allowances and subsidies were certainly benefiting the rich more than the
poor.
The other form of Government subsidy to housing was in the form of rent control, whereby
Government legislation was enacted to limit the rent payable for certain types of housing. The
intention here as well, was to "protect" the poor households from unscrupulous landlords who
would otherwise charged very high rents at the time of acute housing shortages. But, as Malpezzi
et a! (1990) and Malpezzi (1994, p. 454) have found, this practice only discouraged more
investment in the housing market due to curtailed profits and thus further contributed to the
housing crisis.
At the other extreme, Governments actually went to the extent of forming their own
consultancies, construction companies and housing finance companies as a way of reducing
housing costs. The rationale was that middlle men were partly to blame for the high housing costs,
due to their excessive profits, and that once they were cut off this would reduce costs. Once again,
this was not to be as Government subsidies and trade protection to these state housing companies
turned them into mal-administered and inefficient companies, with the consequence of increased
costs and erratic supply (Chakwe, 1983, pp. 372-3).
2.5.2 Self-help housing
Continued economic decline, rapid population increase and the continued oil crises in the early
1970's led to a complete rethink on the Third World housing and development paradigm. National
incomes from the export of primary goods was not only falling but more and more of this income
was going into repaying the increasing foreign debt. As a consequence, less and less money was
made available for public services and housing in the Third World. A tendency was slowly
growing of moving away from social housing and the welfare state system to some form of cost
recovery. The Turner school was not only having a positive impact on Third World housing
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policy, but more so on the World Bank urban lending programme. With the World Bank entering
the Third World housing market through their urban lending programme which was
predominately a pro-Turner approach, low housing standards and the concept of self- help were
quickly spread through the Third World (World Bank, 1983).
A notable contribution of the World Bank to Turner's ideas on self-help was the inclusion of
economic sustainability within the self-help housing programme. The programme was based on
the principle of full cost recovery, designed to sustain long term maintenance and repairs. It was
also envisaged that full cost recovery would also ensure that the individual self-help projects were
replicated to other residential areas and towns/cities. In the same vein, the programme provided
for small scale business plots within the projects, to ensure that local residents had sufficient
economic outlets to generate enough incomes for house loan repayments. These business outlets
included, among other things, market stands, small scale industries and basic service industry
(World Bank, 1983). One of the weakness, however, was that the industries that were created
under this programme were never fully integrated with the established formal industry, and hence
were never really accepted as part of the national economy.
Turner successfully publicised the self-help housing concept, based on his experiences in Latin
America where he had found that the urban poor were already building their own houses with
little or no state help. The key to this concept, was the progressive renovation or improvements
that the urban poor were constantly making to their houses with the course of time. From these
observations, Turner went on to develop the prognosis that housing should be regarded as an
activity rather than a commodity or product, and hence its value could not be judged on material
quality, but rather in the fulfilment that it brought to its owners (Turner, 1972).
The significance of the self-help housing on Sub-Saharan Africa and its construction industry was
that self-help housing relied by and large on the informal house builder (1983). For the first time,
the informal contractor was officially recognised for his role in contributing to national
development (World Bank, 1984; Martin 1976; Rakodi 1980). In Zambia, for example, formal
institutional finance was for the first time made available to households using informal sector
contractors, although the practice was never carried through after the upgrading scheme (Martin
1976). Self-help housing also saw the active participation of women in house building alongside
their men folk. Whereas in some countries, self-help housing has had the effect of increasing
local and traditional construction materials, in Zambia there is very little evidence of that, as most
households used modern construction materials (Schlyter and Schlyter, 1979, p. 113-124; Rakodi,
1980, p. 18).
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Not all housing scholars and researchers agreed with this self-help housing concept, among the
notable ones being Rod Burgess, a Neo-Marxist who has extensively criticised the Turner school.
Burgess' line of argument was that the idea of letting the poor build their own housing without
Government funding was a capitalist plot to exploit the poor and a negation of government
responsibility (Burgess, 1977). More liberal scholars like Marcuse and Tipple have argued against
some form of self-help on different lines. Professor Peter Marcuse has argued point by point
against conventional self-help housing as advocated by the Turner school. In summary form,
Marcuse dismisses the notion that self-help housing can contribute significantly to national
economic development and economic redistribution of wealth. He also highlights the failure of
regular maintenance and repairs under this programme as one reason why self-help won't work
(Marcuse, 1992, pp. 15-22). His other point that self-help housing lowers standards, is an
argument that goes against current housing theories. Tipple (1994a, p. 5) on the other hand,
criticises the practice of households having to physically build their own houses as been wasteful,
in that once the house is built the skills and experience gained in the process are left unexploited.
2.5.2.1 Reduced housing and infrastructure standards
Given the numerous research results that showed that high housing and infrastructure standards
were a major factor to raising housing costs, the World Bank urban lending programme of the
1970's was deliberately designed on the basis of low infrastructure and shelter standards. Building
on Turner's concept of housing as an activity, it was envisaged that these low infrastructure and
shelter standards could be improved on over time, at affordable costs to both Governments and
the households. The other advantage of low infrastructure and shelter standards was the fact that
small local construction companies could be awarded contracts to undertake their construction
(World Bank, 1993, p. 40). Rather than provide the conventional fully serviced plots and finished
housing units, the World Bank changed the strategy to providing semi-serviced plots: with shared
stand pipes, main road provision only, Street lighting, and ablution blocks, depending on whether
the area was a site and service or squatter upgraded settlement.
2.5.2.2 Cost recovery and project replication
The inclusion of the principle of full cost recovery in the World Bank's self-help housing
programme marked the beginning of the end of social housing and the welfare state system. As
already stated, this principle was based on the need to ensure prompt repayment of the World
Bank loans, without much recourse to state funds. The second reason was based on the revolving
fund system, whereby the same money would be circulated from one housing project to another,
within the same town and in between towns. Unfortunately, party politics and the lack of
administrative control failed to ensure that the housing loans were repaid on time or repaid at all
(Bamberger et al, 1982; Keare & Parris, 1982). The host governments thus ended up having to
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repay the loans to the World Bank, adding only to the already massive foreign debt, a situation it
was designed to avoid in the first place.
2.5.2.3 Squatter up-grading projects
It should be noted that there were two components to self-help housing:
(I) squatter up-grading and
(2) Site and service.
Squatter upgrading schemes involved the provision of basic infrastructure and services to urban
low income areas, which were already in existence, albeit not legally recognised by the
authorities. The theory was that once these "squatter" settlements were up-graded by way of basic
infrastructure and services and housing loans made available to the households, this would give
residents a sense of security and hence further encourage them to improve their houses.
As the Zambian case demonstrates, the path to success of this scheme was the cost recovery
exercise, and when this failed the whole project failed as well, as there was no long term
maintenance and repairs carried out. As a result, within a short time, the up-graded settlements
reverted to their previous status, of no piped water, street lighting, surface drainage and garbage
collection (Bamberger et al, 1982).
2.5.2.4 Site and service schemes
Unlike the squatter upgrading schemes, the Site and service schemes were new creations in their
own right, in that they were developed from non-settled areas. In Zambia, for example fully
serviced plots were initially provided, before the government introduced semi-serviced plots
(basic site and service). In basic site and service, plots were semi-serviced with low basic
infrastructure and services, just like in squatter upgrading schemes, except that there were only
allocated to residents upon the successful completion of their servicing. They were, however, to
suffer the same predicament as the squatter upgrading schemes in slowly degenerating into Un-
serviced areas for lack of regular maintenance and repairs.
2.6.0 The Enabling Shelter Strategy and its linkages to the construction industry
The failure of the self-help housing programme to eliminate the urban housing crisis and to make
a significant contribution to Third World economies, led to the World Bank and the United
Nations Commission on Human Settlements (UNCHS) making more radical policy changes to
their urban development programmes. The major point of departure was the decision to move
away from the sectoral housing programme to a more integrated development policy, of which
housing would play a part. In a paper, entitled Effects of economic conditions on human
settlements, the Centre for Building and Planning of the Department of Economic and Social
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Affairs of the United Nations, argued that no significant progress could be attained in the area of
shelter without a corresponding increase in the productivity levels. This was a realisation that
improvements to shelter could only be brought about by a corresponding increase in people's
income and thus general economic welfare. The paper went on to argue that attaining high
production levels in the construction industry was a sure way of doing this, as this would bring
about a variety and abundance in building materials, reduced housing costs, increased housing
provision and increased job opportunities (UNCHS, 1976; World Bank, 1993a, p. 41).
Since the above strategy first caught World attention, when it was presented at the Vancouver
Conference in 1976, there has been much consolidation done to the theory by both UNCHS and
the World Bank. This new global theory on housing is basically drawn from past experiences and
mistakes, as admitted by the World Bank in the paper "Learning by Doing" (World Bank, 1983).
The culmination for the search of a more practical shelter policy came with the declaration of
1987, as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH) and Habitat II in June, 1996 in
Istanbul, Turkey. In addition, a shelter policy document "Global Shelter Strategy (GSS) was
produced, which outlined the mechanisms and instruments required in fulfilling the global goal of
shelter for all by the year 2000. The World Bank and UNCHS work very closely together on
Third World housing, thence their identical views on how best to solve Third World housing
problems viz.; the Enabling Shelter Strategy.
For instance the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations,
summaries the main objectives of the Enabling Shelter Strategy as follows;
to improve urban residential conditions and, in so doing, generate higher levels
of capital investment, expand labour-intensive employment opportunities, and
generally protect the position of vulnerable groups during periods of economic
stabilisation and structural adjustment. Among the main advantages of the
proposed approach is the fact that it can be implemented with little recourse to
institutional support, public funds or foreign exchange. (The United Nations
[Anthony Woodfield], 1989, p. 2)
The above quotation, together with the similarities and references to the structural adjustment
conditionalities, is testimony of the close collaboration between the two institutions in this area. It
can be said, therefore, that the signing of structural adjustment lending inevitably leads to a policy
of enabling shelter by way of following its conditionalities, while it is also true that some
countries follow the shelter strategy without necessarily having structural adjustment lending
agreements. Suffice to say that the enabling shelter strategy would theoretically operate very well
in an environment of structural adjustment, where the socio-economic and political machinery
will already have been put in place.
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In essence, the basic argument for this "new" approach is that private enterprise and the general
public are best suited to providing shelter efficiently and equitably provided the right environment
(an enabling environment) is created by the government. The role of Government is thus
restricted to the creation of a conducive environment and provision of public services, which
entice/ facilitate the private sector to mobilise private finance and resources for shelter and
infrastructure provision. This call for the redefinition of the Government's role in the shelter
sector, from provider to enabler (facilitator) is what has led to the global shelter strategy being
known as the enabling shelter strategy. It is important to mention that the Enabling Shelter
Strategy does not only deal with housing per Se, but includes other infrastructure facilities such as
roads, water, electricity reticulation and sewerage. The Enabling Shelter Strategy, therefore,
effectively involves both the building and civil engineering sides of the construction industry.
In the main, the enabling shelter strategy (UNCHS, 1996, p. 205-224; World Bank 1993, United
Nations, 1989) calls for the host Government to:
1. Transfer the financial responsibility of shelter provision from the public sector to
the private sector, through market forces. This entails the abolition of the project-
based approach and adoption of the programme approach, whereby the World Bank
in conjunction with the host government would stop funding specific shelter
projects and fund macro-economic programmes that would enable private
investment in the housing market.
2. Reduce public expenditure, through the elimination of housing subsidies and
housing allowances.
3. Raise government revenue by ensuring that all collectable taxes and levies from
the housing sector are collected and that full cost recovery of all infrastructure and
utility services provided is attained.
4. Promote private investment in the housing market, through the elimination of
regulatory complexities, i.e., rent controls, and the privatisation of public
enterprises. Public enterprises are accused of inefficiency, brought about by over
protectionism by the government, whereas rent controls are counter productive to
the housing market (Malpezzi et al, 1990).
5. Enhance productivity and reduce the cost of shelter, by encouraging small scale
contractors who are likely to use local building materials and labour intensive
building techniques.
6. Liberalise the land market so as to facilitate land supply. Shortage of land for
housing has mostly been attributed to government bureaucracy, hence the removal
of these bureaucratic practices is seen as a possible solution to the problem.
7. Facilitate employment creation in the housing sector, by promoting labour
intensive building techniques and supporting the creation of housing affiliated
industries like building materials, house furniture and so on.
ooking at the main aspects of the Structural Adjustment Programme (on p. 34-35) and the
pabling Shelter Strategy above, we see a striking relation. The main relationship between
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structural adjustment and the shelter enablement is in their emphasis for reduced government
involvement in the local economy, reduced subsidies, and in their support for a viable economy
dominated by the private sector. Both strategies are strong advocates of increased domestic
demand resulting in increased local production, in our case increased construction output. The
advocacy for a viable private sector market in an effort to stimulate the local economy in both
SAP and the enabling Shelter Strategy thus means that Neo-Liberalism is another common
denominator between them (United Nations, 1994). It is no wonder that most Sub-Saharan
African countries that have applied the Structural Adjustment Programme and also applied the
Enabling Shelter Strategy in an effort to maximise their economic effects (UNCHS, 1996, p.
116).
In Ghana, preliminary research on the impact on structural adjustment and the Urban
Management Programme show substantial gains in economic growth, although housing
investment per se has not contributed very much to that growth. This is because reduced
government spending on current and capital expenditure has had the effect of slowing down
economic activity, as more people are retrenched from the public service and public enterprise
resulting in reduced national income. Reduced income coupled with increased housing rents and
prices also meant reduced local and central government revenue as more and more tenants failed
to pay their bills (rent and service bills). The anticipated large growth in the private sector has not
taken place as anticipated, so as to absorb the large numbers of retrenched public workers and
unemployed youth (Hutchful, 1987; Ghana Rep. of, 1987: World Bank, 1994).
Studies carried out in Nigeria by the Centre For Settlement Studies And Development (CASSAD,
1991) found that the imposition of the structural adjustment programme did not encourage
investment in housing, but in short term businesses like taxis and trading. The study found that,
whilst substantial ground had being made in import substitution for finished building materials,
there was still a large component of imports in the raw materials. As a result, the cost of building
materials was always increasing, between 100% and 800% within a decade(1977-1987). Tight
monetary and fiscal control brought about by structural adjustment were also found to be
impediments to housing investment as interest rates went up by as much as 15%, making
mortgagee borrowing expensive and out of reach of most people. The study recommended that
the private sector be given the "right climate to be able to deliver housing to all classes of people
and for all tastes." The CASSAD study did not, however, find this "right climate" but called for
further studies both in scope and geographical coverage to generate findings.
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2.6.1 Employment creation
Employment creation is one of the pinnacles of the enabling shelter strategy, and this it is hoped
should be achieved through the creation of labour intensive construction building activities, both
on and off site (Spence et al, 1993, p.32: Tipple, 1994b). As we have already seen, the experience
under the era of rapid industrialisation contributed to urban unemployment, as most industries
relied heavily on mechanised and expatriate human labour. But, under the enabling shelter
strategy, the concentration on labour intensive technologies is intended to create more jobs by
absorbing the mostly unskilled urban labour force. Moavenzadeh (1987, pp. 83-86) has drawn on
the experiences from Mexico, Brazil and India to demonstrate the effects of investing in the
construction industry on the local and national job markets. For example, in Mexico in 1970, he
demonstrates that the ratio for direct to indirect employment created as a result of investment in
construction was between 3:2 and 5:2, whereas, in Brazil's Rio de Janeiro, one job was created
indirectly for every three jobs created directly in the construction industry. In India, another Third
world country, Moavenzadeh goes on to illustrate how an investment of US$ 1 million in the
construction industry was able to generate 624 person-years in on-site employment (of which
about 70% where unskilled labourers) and about 1000 person-years in indirect employment in the
building related industry (Moavenzadeh, 1987, p. 86).
In Nairobi-Kenya, the same strategy was put to test in the Koma Rock Housing Project for 1,700
middle income households organised by the Kenya Building Society with international financial
support. In this project, the organisers deliberately specified fibre concrete roofing tiles as the
roofing material with the sole objective of promoting on site small scale fibre concrete roofmg
enterprises. Indeed, during the 14 months construction period 1.2m fibre concrete roofing tiles
were produced by the 120 employees in the resultant small scale enterprises, of which two-thirds
were from the low income women's co-operative. (Cambridge Architectural Research, 1993, p.
13-17) We can draw on another practical example from Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, where the city
council is involved in training school leavers in building skills and helping them form small scale
Building Co-operatives (10 -12 members). It is reported that these building co-operatives have
built most of the recent low cost formal houses in the city and that this has enabled the Co-
operative to pay wages to their members that are substantially more than the private sector is
paying. These Co-operatives only need $600 as starting up capital compared to 10 to 100 times
that amount required in the ordinary building business (Brock and Moyo, 1993, pp. 4-7). In both
cases, however, the writers do not give the enabling macro-economic environments that were
created by both Governments, to enable the small scale building enterprises to flourish. Although
in both Kenya and Zimbabwe favourable financial assistance was rendered by the German
government and the World Bank respectively. This leads us to ask whether foreign financial
assistance is a prerequisite in the initial setting up of these small scale enterprises.
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2.6.2 Forward and backward linkages
Apart from the direct economic impact within the construction industry itself, investment in it has
been found to generate increased demand of products from other industries within the economy.
For instance, the decision to invest and the subsequent building of houses in a country would
entail increased demand for products and services like paint, timber and wood products, glass,
iron and steel, cement, water supply, sewerage capacity and many others (Spence et al, 1993, p.
29-30). The measure of the aggregate demands created in the economy is what is termed
backward linkages. Although in most cases, the aggregate demand of the products and services
will typically be the same in most countries, their individual proportion of contribution of each
product and service will tend to vary from country to country, as Moavenzadeh (1987, p. 81-83)
has shown with the two cases from Kenya and Mexico. See below for details.
Table 2.5 Construction sector purchases from other sectors: Kenya, 1976 (per
thousand Kenyan pounds of gross output)
Sector	 Increases in intermediate
____________________________________________ output
mining	 42
Wood furniture	 26
paper and printing	 7
petroleum products	 92
rubber products	 7
paint and detergents	 14
other chemicals	 17
non-metallic products	 86
metals: machinery 	 156
transport: bus and rail	 14
electricity: supply	 5
construction	 119
trade	 47
transport services	 17
restaurants and hotels 	 12
financial services	 30
businesses: premises 	 5
other intermediate	 713
wages and salaries	 233
other inputs	 54
total primary inputs
	
287
gross output	 1000
SOURCE: Moavenzadeh, 1987, p. 81
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Table 2.6 Construction sector purchases from other sectors per thousand
Mexican pesos of gross output: Mexico, 1970.
Sector	 Increases in intermediate output
quarrying	 12
wood processing! other wood products 	 45
oil relining	 18
other chemicals	 17
rubber & plastic products
	 11
glass	 4
cement	 29
non-metallic mining products	 103
basic iron and steel 	 63
non-ferrous metals	 7
furniture	 3
metal structures & other metal products 	 38
equipment	 12
electricity	 3
trade	 78
transport	 38
financial & other services	 20
other intermediate	 9
totil intermediate	 510
wages	 304
gross value added	 490
gross output	 1000
SOURCE: Moavenzadeh, 1987, P. 8 1-2.
Forward linkages on the other hand refer to the resultant aggregate demand generated as a direct
result of the production of the aforementioned intermediate goods above. Unfortunately, as
Moavenzadeb (1987, p. 83) has argued, forward linkages in the construction industry are more
difficult to establish than backward linkages. This is because no clear empirical method exists for
the calculation of the relationship between the commercial buildings / houses/ or civil engineering
structures and the social and economic benefits accruing to the activities they shelter or serve.
Klaassen et al. (1987, pp. 47-5 1) have expressed similar difficulties in trying to find an empirical
method of calculating forward linkages, but that they still insist that forward linkages do exist in
the construction industiy.
2.6.3 The multiplier effects
Various studies by different scholars and researchers have shown that direct investment in shelter
results in income multipliers of about 2, which translates to mean that for every pound spent on
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shelter, there is a resultant income of two pounds generated in the national economy. Klaassen et
al. (1987, p. 53) have gone further to argue that this income multiplier varies depending on the
source of the inputs used in the production process of the goods and services. Tipple (1994d, p.
14) has simply defined the income multiplier effect as "a ratio of change in nation income to the
initial change in the sectoral investment." He further goes on argue that income multiplier effects
are, therefore, largely dependent on the marginal propensity to buy local goods rather than buying
Imports.
If indeed, this is true, then it should follow that investment in shelter, for the urban poor, which
tends to rely mostly on local produced and recycled materials, should have an even higher income
multiplier than housing investment for the middle and high income groups (United Nations, 1995,
p. 29). For example, Fernandez-Wagner (1994) has shown through a matrix (Se fig. 2.2) that in
Latin America high low-income households have a strong tendency of using informal self-help
builders than contracting the formal building or construction companies. Similarly, the matrix
shows that the very high and high income households utilise more formal construction materials
and construction companies than the middle or low income households. The strong linkages
among the various "actors" is shown through the size of the lines linking these "actors", in this
case, therefore, a thin line between two groups shows very little linkage. For example, we see that
there is very little linkages between the very the formal building companies and households in
low-income or extreme poverty. The promotion of locally produced construction materials, both
under the structural adjustment programme and enabling shelter strategy, can only go to support
the efforts of raising national income, especially for the low income households, thereby raising
the Gross National Product.
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Fig. 2.2 Formal and informal linkages in the construction industry
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2.6.4 Community enablement
The elimination of government intervention in the urban housing market and central planning
tendencies under structural adjustment and enabling shelter strategy, led to a new thinking
towards community planning, design and implementation. Without having to go back to the
interventionist era, the Neo-Liberalists reassessed the position of the community in meeting their
basic shelter needs within the realms of the free market concept, and developed the theory of
community enablement. Community enablement is best defined by Burgess et a!. (1994. p. 65) as
a strategy adopted by central and local government to co-ordinate and facilitate the efforts of
Community and neighbourhood- based organisations to initiate, plan and implement their own
pLojects according to the principles of self-determination, seif-organisation and self-
management." Community enablement has since been enhanced as an important component of
shelter enablement, especially in taking care of the vulnerable groups in society, after the World
Conference for Social Development in 1995 in Copenhagen.
What is new in this concept of community action, is in the shift in terms of the organisation
structure and power base of the community based organisations, in that control and management
has moved away from central planning (under the previous system) to the grass-roots in the
community itself. The role of government (both local and central) has also been mininiised to
policy formulation, with the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs )and Community Based
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Organisations (CBOs) undertaking the actual ground work. Grants and any form of assistance to
these communities is thus channelled through these organisations. The premise for this
operational arrangement is that these community organisations are better placed than
governments to effectively help the (urban) poor, especially the vulnerable groups like women. It
is argued that the advantages in using the NGOs and CBOs are that they;
1. are low cost in their operations;
2. are grassroots oriented and thus know the conditions of the community best;
3. plough back the profits in the community hence raising the economic base of the
community;
4. teach appropriate skills to the community;
5. are non partisan. (Urban Edge, Oct. 1989, pp. 1-6)
In the shelter sector, community enablement calls for the full participation of the communities in
the decision making process affecting their housing; shelter provision, improvement and
maintenance. To this end, UNCHS and the international community have mobilised themselves
in assisting local NGOs and CBOs to achieve that goal. International aid funds for this scheme
now go directly to these community organisations rather than through governments, the key
objective being to help the community help itself through business activities rather than
perpetuate aid by simply giving food aid. To this end, UNCHS and the World Bank have helped
set up shelter related businesses like brick making, clay tile maldng, crushed stones sales, and
fibre cement roofing sheets, in different parts of the World. Besides placing high priorities on the
profit motive, these businesses all tend to rely on traditional! appropriate technologies: local raw
materials, labour intensive labour, and small scale operations, which are encouraged under the
Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy.
However, despite this seeming success story, others are not entirely convinced that the theoretical
benefits are really been enjoyed on the ground and would like to see empirical research carried
out to verify this thesis (Burgess at al, 1994).
2.6.5 Gender empowerment
Gender empowerment is another fashionable concept that has recently been added to the shelter
and development paradigm after the Beijing Women's and the Copenhagen Social conferences.
Irrefutable data now exist to prove that most women, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, do not
have the same access as their male counterparts to shelter resources (UNCHS, 1996, p. 347). The
Copenhagen Social Development summit of 1995, actually went further to identify most women
in the Third World as constituting the bulk of the disadvantaged and vulnerable groups that had
no access to shelter. To eradicate these negative trends, the Enabling Shelter Strategy now has a
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deliberate policy component of targeting women in its shelter strategy in the hope of not only
giving them access to better shelter but also an opportunity to better themselves economically
(UNCHS, 1996, p. 349).
2.6.6 Sustainable development
The protagonists of the enabling shelter strategy claim to have developed their strategy within the
realms of global sustainable development. There are three components to sustainable
development, Economic, Social and Environmental sustainability, with each component
concerned with present and future methods of sustaining national development. According to the
World Commission on Environment and Development, "sustainable development is development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to
meet their own needs" (FINNIDA, 1991, pp. 1).
Although sustainable development first gained World prominence in 1987, with the report by the
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, it was only in 1992
with the Rio de Janeiro Conference that countries appended signatures to their commitment to
attaining sustainable development. The Rio Conference was based on the recognition that rapid
population increase, high technology and mass production were increasingly depleting our natural
resources and that, unless something was done immediately, the future was going to be bleak (see
also Wells, 1993, 1995). The resultant plan of action adopted by the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development is contained in a document called Agenda 21, of which chapter
7 is devoted on human settlements.
Agenda 21 does not in any way introduce new concepts to the global shelter strategy, on the
contrary it reinforces the same areas only with sustainable development in mind (Urban
directions, 1993). Having seen the emphasis of enabling shelter strategy on the use of local raw
materials, like timber and stone, it is not difficult to imagine the possible environmental impact,
given the millions of homeless people in the Third World. To this end, Agenda 21 sets the
following environmental guidelines 6 for the construction industry in order to attain sustainable
development:
1. provide technical support and economic incentives to small scale and informal
sector builders that use local materials and traditional construction methods;
2. adopt standards that promote energy efficient designs and sustainable use of
resources;
3. promote the free exchange of information and develop databases on
environmental and health aspects of construction;
6The economic and social guidelines are mostly covered under structural adjustment and enabling shelter strategy,
hence are not repeated here.
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4. discourage the use of materials that create pollution during their life cycle;
5. promote recycling of energy-intensive building materials and energy conservation
in the production methods.
(Urban Directions, 1993. p. 9; UNCHS, 1996, p.227)
2.7.0. Rival shelter and development models /theories
So far we have looked at the Third World housing and development paradigms mainly from a one
sided view point, i.e., the Western model. In reality, however, the Third World was always
divided into the Eastern and Western camps; between those that followed Capitalist and Marxist
economic and housing principals. The dichotomy was not always as clear as black and white.
Some countries had a mixture of both principals, Zambia being one of them. Similarly on the
housing front, not all researchers and scholaiIwere/are divided into the capitalist and Marxist
camps, some are liberal minded and accommodate both philosophies, hence coming up with their
own brand of housing and development models.
2.7.1 The Neo-Marxist school
The Neo-Marxist school, despite the apparent demise of Marxism, remains the most renowned
critic of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its affiliate, the Enabling Shelter Strategy.
Drawing on the writings of its founding fathers like Marx, Lenin, and Engels, the Neo-Marxist
school sees the Structural Adjustment Programme as a late twentieth century Neo-imperialist
plot, to plunder the Third World countries as against the primitive nineteenth and early twentieth
century plunder of the colonies.
The new global economic order is seen as the prerequisite for the expansion of capitalism; the
search for profit. Amin (1976) argues that market expansion beyond national borders is inherent
in capitalist societies, in their search for profits, through expanded markets to sell their goods and
as cheap sources of raw materials. The Neo-Marxist theory goes on to argue that, having lost the
Third World market through decolonialistion in the 1960's, the debt crisis of the 1970's thus
presented the Western Capitalist order with yet another opportunity to bring the Third World
under its economic hegemony. The Neo-Marxist school argue that the Structural Adjustment
Programme and its affiliated programmes like the Enabling Shelter Strategy are designed to
perpetuate underdevelopment in the Third World and have developed a model: The Neo-colonial
Dependency Model, to argue their case (Todaro, 1994, p. 81).
In the housing sector, the withdrawal of housing subsidies to the poor, the principal of full cost
recovery and market pricing while at the same time reducing public service employment (where
most poor work), are further manifestations to the Neo-Marxists that the structural adjustment
programme and its sectoral programme of enablement are only profit driven, with no human or
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developmental considerations. To a Neo-Marxist, housing is a basic need and hence a basic right
of each and every citizen and, therefore, they see the responsibility of housing provision to be that
of the state rather than of the private individual through the market. By placing housing on the
market, the Neo-Marxist school argue that housing is being treated like a commodity rather than
its rightful place of a social service.
Recent trends, however, point to the fact that Neo-Marxist now agree that housing has a role to
play in the macro-economic equation of a nation's economy. For instance Mathey (1985) admits
that the state role in housing provision, using industrialised building technology, was uneconomic
as it relied on imported components and was highly capital intensive rather than labour intensive,
hence contributing to unemployment. He, therefore, proposed a more labour intensive labour
approach in the production of houses, although still rejecting the notion of self-help through an
individual but favouring the collective type of self-help. His reasoning is based on the thesis that
self-help is, by definition, unqualified labour and, therefore, time consuming and inefficient. Also
since self-help is done outside normal working hours, its contribution to economic growth is
never taken into account.
The Neo-Marxist school also dismisses the Neo-Liberalist's theory that central planning,
bureaucratic system and highly industrialised housing provision are costly, inefficient and
mismatch people's needs. Whilst demonstrating that self-help housing is cheaper than official
housing, they attribute this to the fact the self-help builder is able to avoid the exploitative
capitalist land market, by squatting or building in the urban fringe, avoiding the building
materials monopolies by using his own made materials or throwaways, and avoiding the
exploitative labour market of subcontracting, by using cheap and unprotected labour. To the
Marxist, therefore, self-help lowers the building cost not because it bypasses the state
bureaucratic system but because it bypasses the exploitative capitalistic market. In Rod Burgess's
own words, "thus it is not the absence of a technocratic and bureaucratic system or the legal
housing norms, or the sequence of building operations, that have cheapened his house, it is
merely the fact that he is operating in a different sphere of circulating capital that covered by the
petty-commodity production of housing. He has not escaped capitalism . . .he is merely in another
part of it" (Rod Burgess, 1977, pp 5455 )Y
In purely housing terms, the principal of common ownership of the means of production meant
placing the decisions on housing provision, its allocation and pricing, in the hands of the central
and local government (and co-operatives). In extreme cases, especially in the early years of
1Note that this theory was being advanced to counter John Turners theory of autonomous /self-help housing in Latin
America.
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socialism in the eastern block, all the supply factors (land, capital and labour) of housing were in
state control, although later on some form of individual private controls were exercised depending
on the individual states (for details see Trialog, 6, 1985 and Turner et al, 1992). Strict central
planning controls ensured that building regulations were enforced, the absence of a capital market
also saw to it that no private house construction was possible. With the central planning
authorities firmly in charge of the setting of building standards, the actual construction of the
houses, maintenance, and allocation, there was little room for individual interests. Families were
often forced to share flats and houses, depending on the authority's judgement of the best way of
meeting the housing needs and the resources available at rents set to reflect political or social
circumstances (symbolic rent) rather than demand and supply. Marxist are also against the policy
of home ownership as they argue that private property tends to divide the working class into
tenants and owners, thus exacerbating the class conflict in society (Merrett, 1982, p. 279). There
is no evidence, however, to support this view. On the contrary, home ownership especially where
council houses are sold to the public, tends to help the under-class own their own houses.
In socialist states, the quest for rapid industrialisation, heavy burden of welfare services, and
limited financial resources, meant neglecting the housing sector altogether. This point is well
illustrated in the Guinea Bissau case, where the socialist government there invested heavily in its
agriculture and industrial sectors, at the expense of urban housing. With no private housing
market to fill the void created by the government, the shortage of urban housing soon became a
national crisis (Davila, 1987). The net result of this form of practices was that there was massive
shortages of housing in almost all socialist states, which most scholars including Turner et al
(1992) have attributed to the following;
1. The absence of a capital market meant that individuals, most of whom earned very little
wages to save, had no access to capital for house building.8
2. The setting of symbolic rents, meant that the governments were not able to recoup their
investment to replicate the housing construction process, let alone take care of
maintenance. In the end, less and less housing was made available whilst the need for it
was going up, opening the system to corrupt practices.
3. Centralised planning, design and housing construction without the consent or
consultation of the households led to unsuitable housing being built; the typical socialist
concrete high rise tower blocks.
4. State control and protection of the construction (housing) market is said to have kified off
the competitive urge of the construction industry and hence eliminating the incentive to
maximise profit that could have been used to reinvest in housing and the national income.
5. Inefficiency in the housing market is blamed on state intervention and state control of the
housing market, although Baken and Van der Linden (1993, p.5) have argued that this
8Although in principal private ownership in housing was banned, individuals were allowed to build and own a house
as long as they did not seek to make private capital from it.
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phenomenon (inefficiency) is equally prevalent in housing markets of advanced capitalist
states.
No doubt, the Neo-Marxist school has made a positive contribution to the housing and
development debate. However, its greatest weakness has been its failure to offer an alternative
model in the wake of the crippling Third World debt and the resultant structural adjustment
programme and enabling shelter strategy.
2.7.2 The moderates (or Liberals)
For the purposes of this thesis, we shall refer to the moderates as that school of thought which
does not agree in totality with structural adjustment and the enabling shelter strategy nor with the
Neo-Marxist school, but could be said to be in-between the two opposing theories. Ironically, the
dominant voice in this school has come from the United Nations own agencies like UNICEF,
which produced a very critical document on structural adjustment and the negative effects it had
on the vuEnerable groups, especially the women and children. Whereas it did not call for the total
abandonment of structural adjustment, it was very critical of the low levels of investment in areas
of social development, especially health and education. The full findings were published in a
book entitled Adjustment with a human face (Cornia et al[UNICEF], 1987), which had adverse
influence on subsequent programmes of the World Bank and the IMF. The major criticism in this
report was over the drastic cuts that were being made to social services, and the resultant effects
this was having on the "poorest of the poor" in society. The report went on to warn of the creation
of a poverty trap if corrective action was not taken sooner. The response from the two
international financial institutions was prompt, and the social action programme was born, as we
have seen undet community enablement (above).
There is now a vast literature that shows that the immediate net impact of the Structural
Adjustment Programme on poor households in urban communities of Africa is to further reduce
their incomes. Even the UNCHS (1996, p.116), whilst supporting Adjustment policies, have
conceded that SAP has had negative effects on poor urban households.
Although there have long been serious problems with urban poverty in the South,
it was only in the 1980s that it was given more attention as economic crises and
the impacts of structural adjustment increased the number of households with
incomes below the poverty line and increased the intensity of their deprivation
(UNCHS, 1996, p. 116).
Such findings have only reinforced the arguments against the removal of government benefits
(subsidies) to the poor in the hope that the market will take care of them. Research by Hardoy and
Satterthwaite (1981) also dispels the criticism that public agencies have failed to provide
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adequate housing to the public especially the poor. In a study of seventeen9 countries drawn from
the Gulf region, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, they found that only Singapore had almost
solved its housing problem with two-thirds of the housing stock being provided by the public
housing body: The Housing and Developing Board. They drew the conclusion that it was not so
much the operation apparatus that mattered but the state of the economy in the success of housing
provision. In their comparison of the seventeen countries they found that only Singapore, Mexico
and Tanzania had comprehensive settlement polices and political will to tackle housing problems,
but yet only Singapore had nearly achieved that, and with public enterprise, when in the other
sixteen countries the informal sector seemed to fare better. Singapore's economy was then (1960-
1978) the fastest growing amongst the seventeen at 7.45 % per annum.
Weeks is another prominent development economist critical of structural adjustment and its
effects on low-income countries. Writing in the FAO Journal (Ceres, No 143, September-October
1993), Professor Weeks argues that structural adjustment has failed to achieve its intended targets
in most of the low-income counties and that where it has done so, it had done so despite the
World Bank's policies (The Courier, 1994, p. 64). Sinha (1995) has also argued that "the outcome
of stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, largely based on the neo-classical economic
rationale, was justifiable neither in terms of the analytical nor the historical literature." He further
goes on to demonstrate how the contradictions in policy and the ideological nature of the host
countries have "inhibited successful implementation and accentuated poverty and inequity in
developing countries." Sinha also questions the theory of free trade as applied to developing
countries. He notes that all developed countries only adopted free trade upon reaching
technological maturity, a factor missing in developing countries. He then wonders why the
change in principal? He is equally unconvinced on the conditionality of devaluation as he argues
Currency devaluation in countries dependent on imports of food, machinery
and intermediate goods, raised cost of production and the living costs, thus
furthering inflationary pressures. Even if such devaluation raised the prospects
for increased export earnings, parts of the stimulus effect was undercut by the
increase in production costs. Besides, the very act of devaluation imposed on
debtors an enlarged burden of debt repayment and servicing. Consequently,
International Financial Institutions policies became an exercise in debt
enhancement rather than debt reduction. Above all, devaluation results in
increased costs of living, drastic reduction in government expenditures, and
reduction in wages (Sinha, 1995).
9me seventeen countries are Kenya , Nigeria, Tanzania, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Phillippes, Singapore, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia.
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2.8.0 Summary
In this chapter, we have traced the origins and context of the current global phenomenon of
structural adjustment and the enabling shelter strategy, and discussed the postulated national
development gains in the construction industry, supposedly to accrue to the countries applying
them. Preliminary research in some countries do not give conclusive results, so as to generalise
the implications of the aforementioned policies and nor give insights of what the future for Sub
Sahara African housing and the construction industry are likely to be, in light of the Neo-
Liberalist policies being applied.
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Chapter Three: Background information on Zambia
3.1.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter we saw how the linkages between the construction industry, shelter
strategies and national development have evolved world-wide in the past few decades. We now
intend to focus on Zambia and see how the same linkages have evolved in Zambia and also look
at the factors that led to their adoption and implementation. In this regard, it is important to
understand the Zambian political and socio-economic environment, especially the construction
market and its shelter-sub market. It is hoped that, by contextualising the Zambian environment
with the rest of the World and the global phenomenon of structural adjustment and shelter
enablement, we shall avoid the pitfalls that other researchers may have fallen into. Baken and Van
der Linden (1993, p. 8) have argued that the absence of context of the home country when
applying and analysing housing policy is one of the fundamental flaws of most scholars and
institutions, including the World Bank. They rightly observe that,
.many World Bank consultants set out from a one-sided technical viewpoint:
they assume that internal coherence and integrity make their plans self-
validating. They largely ignore the fact, however, that the main actors in urban
development may behave in ways which are not in keeping with the technical
logic of their plans, but which, nonetheless are quite coherent in view of the
specific local political and social-economic situation.
In tracing the historical background of Zambia's national development problems, particularly
those pertaining to the construction industry, we hope to give the reader an insight into the
origins of today's construction industry problems in Zambia and also analyse past attempts at
solving them. We intend to highlight the reasons why some past UNIP Government policies
relating to the construction industry are now being condemned by the present M]\4D
Government, scholars and the International Monetary Institutions. For example, we intend to
discuss the reasons and rationale for the previous UNIP Government in nationalising private
companies and why today's privatisation of the same state companies is one of the key issues
under the Structural Adjustment Programme.
We shall discuss the reasons why earlier UNIP Governments development strategies as guided
by the philosophy of humanism were able to record unprecedented high economic growth rates
and a booming construction industry. We will focus on the reasons why the economic and
construction boom took an irreversible downward trend in the mid 1970's. In this chapter we
intend to find out whether there are lessons to be learned from Zambia's past in relation to the
construction industry when adopting new development strategies like SAP and shelter
enablement.
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3.2.0 Post independence Zambia (1964-1991)
It is no exaggeration to say that Zambia's problems started almost immediately after independence
in 1964, when the pass laws which had previously barred rural dwellers from coming into the
urban areas were lifted, and Ian Smith the then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe) declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. The adoption of
Humanism as a guiding national philosophy for economic, social and political development by
the United National Independence Party (UNIP) only seems to have worsened matters.
Nationalisation of foreign and privately owned property was encouraged under the philosophy of
Humanism in the late 1960's. The events cited above had the effect of increasing Government
spending in the area of social services and defence, and at the same time introducing inefficiency
in the newly established state controlled companies (Elliott, 1971; Hamalengwa, 1992;
Mwanakatwe, 1994).
We can divide Zambia's construction industry contemporary problems in the area of national and
shelter development in the following main factors:
1. Political factors
2. Economical factors
3. Social factors
3.2.1 Political factors
In the words of Dr. Kaunda, the first president of Zambia, "political independence without
matching economic independence is meaningless" (Kaunda, 1969b, p. 35). According to Dr.
Kaunda, only when Zambians and Africans in general had attained control of their economic and
social affairs could they regard themselves as totally independent, in other words political
independence was only a "vehicle" for total independence (Davidson, 1978, p. 287). Dr. Kaunda
regarded foreign investors and their investment in Zambia as a source of Zambia's
underdevelopment problems. This view was based on the pre-independence figures that showed
that, although Zambia was relatively rich from the sale of copper, most of her wealth was
externalised and thus very little economic and social development took place in Zambia. For
example, between 1924 and 1964, Segal (1979, p.198) has stated that over £400 million was
externalised from Zambia mostly to Britain and Southern Rhodesia in the form of dividends,
interest and royalty payments. He further states that, from the £40 million that was collected as
taxes, only £5 million was spent within Zambia.
With the attainment of independence on the 24th of October 1964, it was felt that the socio-
economic structure left by the British colonialist was not adequate or appropriate in meeting the
expectations of Zambians. Hence, there was a need to adopt an appropriate development strategy
69
Chapter Three: Background information on Zambia
for Zambia. There were very high expectations from the attainment of independence. Zambians
expected good pay, good housing and a high standard of living almost overnight. The UNIP
Government seems to have been content with the capitalist structure left by the colonial masters
until 1968, when capitalist practices were increasingly being held responsible for Zambia's
development problems. Dr. Kaunda repeatedly asserted that capitalism was the motive behind the
continued siphonage of huge profits from Zambia to the West, to the detriment of the country. Dr.
Kaunda and his UNIP Government associated Capitalism with the exploitation of man by man for
the benefit of individuals or a few and hence justified the introduction of their brand of socio-
economical and political philosophy of Humanism.
The declaration of a one-party-state in 1973 also meant the party UNIP was supreme to
Government. Members of Parliament were not allowed to criticise any of Government policies in
public or ask critical parliamentary questions. In the end, especially during the Second Republic,
parliament was a mere rubber stamp of policy decisions that were being taken at UNIP's national
party conferences (Tordoff and Molteno, 1974). The supremacy of Party over the Government in
the 'One Party Participatory Democracy' ultimately led to poor economic and developmental
decisions not being criticised or critically analysed by competent civil servants, professionals or
parliamentarians. Top civil servants, the police and defence chiefs, trade unions leaders and
academics were all brought into the rank and file of UNIP, with the result that these people could
not effectively criticise or analyse party policy or decisions. The introduction of the
Decentralisation Act of 1980 which removed the elected mayors and replaced them with the
appointed party District Governors only added to the mal-administration of local Government.
The appointed District Governors were no longer accountable to the local inhabitants but to the
appointing authority: the President.
3.2.1.1 Humanism
In rejecting capitalism and its profit motive, Dr. Kaunda developed the philosophy of Humanism,
which he often said put mankind at the centre of all his activities (Kaunda, 1969:1974). It is
important to note, however, that Dr. Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism is different from the
traditional western notion of Humanism: the denial of God. With Kaunda it was the reverse,
Humanism it was clalmed, saw mankind as the centre of God's creation. Coming from a deeply
religious family, Dr. Kaunda did not divorce his philosophy or his politics from the bible,
although he has been often criticised for not practising what he preached. The opposition party,
the African National Congress (ANC) went further to condemn the philosophy of Humanism
saying 'the philosophy of Humanism is nothing but Communism" (Tordoff and Molteno, 1974,
p.204). Although in practice, humanism was not as extreme as communism, capitalist tendencies
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(profit maximisation, ownership of property by foreigners, economic prices and rents) were all
condemned under the philosophy of humanism.
Continued control of any economy by foreigners tends to impose limitations on the
freedom and independence and this factor is a negation of the concept of
Humanism.. .Humanism does not prevent an investor from making profit, it merely
ensures the equitable distribution of the economic returns among all participants... If
I see that prices in Zambian retail shops are higher than those in expatriate shops, if I
hear that Zambian workers are not provided with housing... then the Zambian
businessman will be dealt with firmly indeed whether they are Co-operatives,
companies, partnerships or individuals (Kaunda, 1969b).
It was further urged that a Humanist state could only be best achieved through a socialist state:
through the elimination of privileges and inequalities for all Zambians. Given this background it
is not surprising that the UNIP Government set about nationalising all major means of production
in Zambia, and went further to providing all major social services free to all its citizens
irrespective of their financial status. Education and Health were provided free of charge (non-fee-
paying), housing was heavily subsidised by the employers through legislation which required
every employer to house his/her employees or provide a housing allowance in lieu. It is fair to
say, however, that the policy of tying housing to employment was a carry-over from the British
colonialists. Other aspects of everyday life like transport, water and electricity were also
subsidised. The selling and buying of undeveloped land was also banned, arguing that there was
no justification in making profit from God's own given resource, when no effort or resource had
been put in to develop them. Following the Matero reforms of 1969, most urban land was
compulsorily acquired by the government, subject to payment of compensation, and in respect of
undeveloped land or absent landlords no compensation was paid.
Land obviously must remain the property of the state today. This in no way departs
from our heritage. Land was never bought, it came to belong to individuals through
usage and the passing of time. Even the elders had overall controls although as is
already pointed out, this was done on behalf of all the people (Kaunda, 1969, p. 21).
On 30th June, 1975, the Zambia government went further and changed the entire land tenure
system in Zambia under the Land (Conversion of Titles Act of 1975). All vacant and undeveloped
plot were nationalised, the freehold land tenure system was abolished, and in its place a 99 years
leasehold was introduced. The nationalisation of all vacant and undeveloped (plots) land only
contributed to squatting, as the government was less effective in removing squatter settlers from
its land than private landlords (Mashamba, 1990, p. 59).
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3.2.1.2. Decolonialisation of Southern Africa
Apart from striving to attain total independence within Zambia, the Zambian leaders, like most
other African leaders of the time, were not content with individual state independence and thus
committed themselves to the total liberation of the rest of Africa from the Colonialists. Zambia
committed most of her efforts and resources to this objective and paid dearly for her out spoken
views at international fora, for supporting liberation movements and even applying economic
sanctions on her 'white African' principal trading partner: Southern Rhodesia.
The United Nations (UN) put Zambia's cost of applying economic sanctions to Rhodesia alone
between 1965-1977 at $750-800 million, while its share of aid from the United Nations (UN) was
only $100 million during the same period (Segal, 1979, p. 202). Aside from the economic
sanctions, other losses came as a result of military operations carried out inside Zambia by the
Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian security forces in their pursuit of freedom fighters
based in Zambia. Although the Zambian Government has never released military spending
figures, it is well known that a considerable amount of the Zambian budget went into her defence.
As a result, less and less of Zambia's budget was made available for other developmental projects
like housing.
3.2.1.3 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia
The declaration of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia by Ian Smith on the 11th
of November, 1965 and the economic sanctions that followed, had the effect of exposing
Zambia's economic vulnerability and its heavy dependence on the white-led Southern African
countries. At independence in 1964 for example, 38% of Zambia's imports came from Rhodesia
and a further 22% from South Africa, and its copper exports were entirely dependent on Rhodesia
Railways (Pettman, 1974, p.114). Sensing economic and military vulnerability, Zambia
responded with economic measures of nationalisation and import substitution. These measures
were meant to ensure economic growth amid the hostile external forces of the white-led Southern
African countries of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.
The quest to ensure economic growth in Zambia and the equitable redistribution of wealth among
Zambians, amid potential military and economic threats from her white neighbours, led Zambia to
develop her own industries and new trading routes to the north (see fig. 3.1). The imposition of an
export tax of £5 a tonne on Rhodesian coal, immediately after UDI, applicable only to Zambia,
increased the price of coal six fold and only added to the quest to seek alternative trade routes
(Pettman, 1974, p. 119). For example, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), a railway line
stretching over 1,500 km from the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Kapiri Mposhi in
Zambia, was built as a gateway to a friendly 'black' African country. The railway line was built by
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the Chinese Government after the World Bank and the Western World had refused to finance and
carry out the project because they considered it to be uneconomical (Pettman, 1974, p. 118).
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Fig. 3.1 Surface transport routes between Zambia and the sea
Source: Bostock, 1971, p. 326
The experiences of December 1965, when Rhodesia cut off Zambia's fuel and oil supplies, led to
the decision to build the Tanzania -Zambia pipeline (Tan-Zam-Pipeline) in October 1966. It runs
from the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to the industrial city of Ndola in Zambia and was
siiccessfuUy completed in September 1968 by an Italian company: ENT. Consequently, this
massive investment in Zambia's infrastructure and industries, as a way of fighting its dependence
on the 'white South,' led to a great economic and construction boom in the period immediate after
independence (see figures 3.3 and 3.5).
3.2.2 Economic factors
At independence from Britain in October 1964, Zambia inherited a capitalist oriented economy,
dominated by the copper industry which contributed on average 90% of Zambia's total exports
and about 50% of government revenue. Refer to figure 3.2 for details. Subsequently 5 the heavy
dependence on copper exports as a main source of government revenue, with its high volatile
prices has been the major cause of Zambia's economic problems, ultimately affecting the
construction industry. In times of high copper prices resulting in increased government revenue,
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the Zambia government has been able to carry out large construction projects which have
increased the value added for the construction industry.
Fig 3.2 Percentage (%) contribution of copper industry to principle
economic variables
Source: Elliott 1971, p. 3: with additions from TNDP, 4th.NDP and 1991 Economic report
3.2.2.1 Economic disengagement
The Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) was formed in 1965, with the key objective
of spearheading the "economic disengagement" programme. A number of state owned companies
were formed which in essence gave the state a 51% share interest. Within two years Rhodesia's
share of the Zambia's market dropped from 40% in 1965 to 10% in 1967 (Goodman, 1971). The
economy was recorded to have been growing at an average rate of 15% per year, owing mainly to
the new economic programme. The total contribution of manufacturing to GNP also rose from
1(24.2 m in 1963 to K78.9 m in 1967. As a proportion of GNP it rose from 6.1% to 10.8% in the
same period (Faber, 1971).
3.2.2.2 Nationalisation of private property
The nationalisation measures contained in the Mulungushi reforms of 19th April 1968, the
Matero reforms of 11th August 1968 and finally those of the 10th of November 1970, completely
changed the structure of the Zambian economy. By 1975, 70 large companies in the construction,
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commerce and road transport had been nationalised or incorporated by the Zambia Government.
But with only about 100 graduates at independence, there was obviously a tendency to place
unqualified Zambians in positions in which they had no training, as most previous owners of
these nationalised companies opted to go to Rhodesia or South Africa (Beveridge and Oberschall,
1979, p. 253). The appointment of party members into the civil service and state owned
companies also meant that the Zambian economy was heavily politicised (Tordoff and Molteno,
1974, pp. 242-288).
Fig. 3.3 GNP and per capital income at constant 1980 prices 1964-91 (GNP in
Kwacha million)
Source: Mwanawina, 1993, p. 70; Economic Report 1991 and 1995, CSO 1991
From figure 3.3, we see that the Zambian economy was growing at an average annual rate of
15% between 1964 and 1969, a factor which can clearly be attributed to the massive investment
that the government injected in the economy within that same period. It is, however, difficult to
precisely pinpoint the factor/s that led to a negative growth rate in 1969, but it is likely that the
Rhodesian sanctions, and their resultant fuel and raw materials shortages, and the mass exodus of
expatriates staff after the first nationalisation programme, all contributed. It is also important to
realise that, despite the effect of UDI, Zambia was able to register a high rate of growth thanks
mainly to the high mineral royalties which grew from £239 in 1963 to £729 in 1969 (Burdette,
1988, p. 64).
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From 1970 onwards, however, we begin to see the Zambian economy in stagnation with reduced
per capita income due to rising population (see, figure 3.3; and tables 3A; 3.2). There are a
number of reasons to explain this phenomenon. The continued exodus of expatriate staff and the
subsequent premature Zambianisation programme that followed obviously had a negative impact
on the economy, especially on the copper industry. It can also be argued that nationalisation of the
economy in 1968 and 1969 discouraged both foreign and local investment so that in the end, only
public capital and resources were being utilised in the economy. The quotation below from
President Kaunda will help illustrate the mistrust and the poor relations that existed between
foreign investors and the Zambian government (see also Beveridge and Oberschall, 1979).
Today our society is being exploited very badly indeed by unscrupulous men and
women who are driven to the extreme right by the profit motive. A good number of
them bring very little capital into Zambia, but because of their know-how they are
able to build something locally on borrowed Zambian money and send out of the
country excessive profits after a very short time (Kaunda, 1969b, p. 37-37).
Although in reality the UNIP government allowed some form of private entrepreneurship, the
President made it very clear that the Government always had the option of interfering in this
sector.
I shall be the first to congratulate and admire a businessman who has managed to
create a very large enterprise. It shows initiative and ability. But at the same time, I
want them to see my point of view that when they get very big they must come and
work for the state, for the benefit of Zambia as a whole. I do not want to create
capitalism here (Kaunda, 1969b, p. 59).
No doubt, such statements coming directly from the president scared off both local and foreign
private investment and entrepreneurship. Mwanawina (1993, p. 72) further argues that Zambia's
problems in the mid 1970's through to 1991 were mainly due to severe mismanagement.
The corresponding impact of Zambia's economic problems in the construction market was seen in
reduced public investment in housing and severe shortages of building materials. This was mainly
because of the large import component in the Zambian building materials industry. The absence
of a thriving private market, for reasons already alluded to, meant that the local private
entrepreneur could not take advantage of the situation and promote a local materials industry.
Even those with private funds found the situation almost impossible to build, as most building
materials could only be got from the black market at prices 2 or 3 times the official price
(Fewings, 1991, p. 37; see also figure 3.7).
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The international oil crisis of the 1973 was like the final nail in Zambia's coffin. Zambia's annual
fuel bill rose from $17m to $252m overnight (Pagni, 1988, p. 77). As if that was not enough,
copper prices began their downward trend. So whereas the country's oil bill was growing, the
revenue from copper was declining. By the beginning of the 1980's Zambia's balance of payments
was severely in the red and needed foreign exchange support. It should be noted, however, that
Zambia's balance of payments first went in the red in 1971, and then again in 1972 and was able
to draw on the IMF's compensatory financing facility. In both instances no conditionalities were
given as the understanding was that this was a one off case and the situation would correct itself
in future (Mwanawina, 1993, pp. 71).
3.2.2.3 Structural Adjustment under the UNIP government
Zambia joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 1965 and is also a member
of the World Bank, hence its turning to these two financial institutions for help when it first
experienced severe balance of payments support problems in the 1970's. However, persistent
economic ills led the IMP to believe that corrective measures needed to be taken if the Zambian
economy was to grow. In 1976 when the Zambian government went back to the fund for more
balance-of-payments support, this time the fund attached conditionalities to the loan. At this time,
however, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund believed in monetary policies as a
way of correcting third world economies, hence the Zambian Kwacha was devalued by 23%
(Mwanawina, 1993, pp. 72). The theory was that, by devaluing the Zambian currency, this
measure would have the effect of reducing imports and stimulating exports, which would fmally
have the net effect of cancelling the negative balance-of-payments. Unfortunately this was not to
be, and again in 1978 Zambia approached the fund for more financial support and the IMF
applied the structural adjustment conditionalities to Zambia for the first time.
The World Bank and the IMF had, by now, concluded that Zambia's economic malaise was more
structural than was previously thought, and other global experiences would seem to point in that
direction. The ]MF wanted to see Zambia's economy back in private hands, hence the insistence
on liberalisation of the economy as the condition for borrowing. Although the UNIP government
agreed to this conditionality merely to secure the loan, no concrete -steps were taken in that
direction. The then UNIP government insisted on pursuing a socialist economy based on
humanistic values.
Finally in 1984 and 1986, when Zambia went back to it for more financial assistance, the IMIF in
close collaboration with the World Bank added the flotation of the Zambian currency on the open
market and the removal of price controls as some of the main conditionalities, and this time the
UNIP Government implemented the measures (Mwanawina, 1993, pp. 72). Although Zambia got
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a pat on the back for this bold decision, considering its strong socialist stand, the social-political
consequences were damaging. The removal of subsidies in December 1986 and again in June
1990, on the staple food maize almost doubled its price and the urban dwellers on the Copperbelt
and Lusaka rioted, destroying government property in the process (Hamalengwa, 1992:
Mwanakatwe, 1994).
In direct response to the first riots in 1986, subsidies were maintained and Dr. Kaunda announced
on both radio and television on the 1st of May 1987 that Zambia had broken off from IMF and
World Bank policies and would pursue its own brand of Adjustment Reforms. Defending the
decision to break away from IMF and World Bank-led policies, Dr. Kaunda simply said "We
were structuring every year, gaining nothing and getting weaker and weaker" (Pagni, 1988, pp.
76).
3.2.2.4 The New Economic Recovery Programme (NERP, 1987-91)
Following the abandonment of the IMF and World Bank-led policies, Zambia initiated its own
brand of structural reforms in 1987: The New Economic Recovery Programme, under the theme
"development from our own resources." Whilst retaining the major IMF and World Bank Neo-
Liberalist principals like reducing and finally removing subsidies and full cost recovery, it
differed significantly on the basis that the new programme was based on humanism. Thus;
(1) The role of the state, parastatals and the co-operatives (informal sector activities)
took precedence over capitalist enterprise.
(2) The rate of the Zambian Kwacha in relation to other major international
currencies was removed from the local auction system, and fixed by the central bank
(K8to 1US$).
(3) Interest rates were once again determined by the central bank (15 to 20 %).
(4) Debt servicing was limited to 10% of net export earnings after deducting
payments in respect of the mining, oil and fuel, Airline (IATA) and fertiliser imports.
(5) Privatisation of state companIes, whether profit or loss making was removed
from the economic agenda, and more money was put into these companies
(especially those with the potential to export) to reactivate them (Zambia, Republic
of, 1989).
As would be expected, the IMF, the World Bank and the international Western community did
not welcome this development in Zambia's economic affairs and stopped their donor support,
convinced that the break away would only exacerbate Zambia's already deteriorating economic
situation. The paradox, however, was that, having broken off with the international financial
institutions, Zambia was able to record a sizeable positive growth rate and reduce its inflation
rate, whereas it had recorded almost zero economic growth rate and raising inflation under the
IMF and the World Bank-led policies (Zambia, Republic of, 1992). This positive macro-
economic record did not, however, win a reprieve from the IMF, the World Bank and the Western
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Community, whose continued withdrawal of donor assistance finally led to the collapse of the
UNIP Government.
3.2.3 Social factors
The main social factor that contributed significantly to Zambia's economic and construction
boom was the rapid (and mainly urban) population growth rate. This was caused by the abolition
of the colonial pass laws which accelerated rural-urban migration, thus increasing Government
budget spending on urban social services.
3.2.3.1 Abolition of the pass laws and the resultant rapid rural-urban migration
At independence the restrictions on the movement of people were lifted, through article 24 of the
new Republican Constitution which stated that No person shall be deprived of his/her freedom
of movement." Today Zambia is one of the most urbanised countries in Sub Saharan Africa, with
about 50% of its total population living in urban areas. This urban phenomena is, however, very
recent compared to most other Third World countries. It is, however, difficult to give precise
figures of pre-independence African population in the urban areas because the first African
census only took place in 1963 on the eve of independence. During the colonial era, the rural
exodus was contained by pass laws, which initially only allowed single men in wage labour and,
only later on, their families in urban areas. African men were given short term employment
contracts in the urban areas and were thus expected to return to their native areas (sic) after their
contracts expired. These short term contracts thus led to circular migration as men were always
moving to and from the rural areas to urban areas. Circular labour migration meant that miners
returning to their villages went with consumer goods like radios and bicycles which then enticed
more villagers to work in the urban areas, especially the Copperbelt towns (Mashamba, 1990).
3.2.3.2 Urban population boom
Most of the urban growth took place in Lusaka and the Copperbelt towns. Lusaka alone is
recorded to have been growing at the rate of 13% annually and Copperbelt towns grew at rates
of about 7% or over, except for Luanshya, Chililabombwe and Mufulira, between 1963 and 1969.
But the rates slowed down during the period between 1969-1974, when Lusaka's rate dropped
down to 8..9% and that of the Copperbelt towns averaged about 5% (Central Statistical Office,
1974). In total, the Copperbelt province had a net gain of 183,000 persons and Central province
129,000 (see tables 3.1 and 3.2).
Note also that the overwhelming increase in urban female population of 93.0% between 1963 and
1968, was largely due to the lifting of travel restriction in 1964 imposed on women from rural
areas to urban areas in the colonial era. Whereas men were allowed to leave their native rural
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areas for the urban areas in search of work, provided they obtained a travel pass, women were not
allowed. With the attainment of independence in 1964, the new government lifted these travel
restrictions and most women were able to join their husbands in the urban areas, hence the high
percentage increase in women population in table 3.1 (Simons, 1976, 12). The influx of rural
women to urban areas proved to be of great benefit when it came to building informal housing in
the squatter settlements, as most of them had brought with them building skills from the villages.
It is important to mention, however, that there has been no recorded research to show that
Zambian women contribute significant to house building in urban areas. Schlyter and Schlyter
(1979, p. 115) did, nevertheless, state that mud bricks in the George upgrading scheme in Lusaka
were "often produced by women in the household" They did not, however, give figures of this
prevalence.
Table 3.1 Distribution of the increase in the urban population during 1963-1969 by
province and the percentage in the urban population during 1963-1969 in the
province.
	
Proportion of urban	 Percentage increase in the
population increase during urban population during
_________________________ 1963-1969 ____________ 1963-1969 ____________
Province	 Males	 females	 males	 females
Central	 27.6	 25.9	 67.5	 93.0
Copperbelt	 65.0	 65.8	 51.6	 77.5
Eastern	 1.1	 1.3	 51.5	 88.5
Luapula	 0.9	 1.0	 60.4	 106.6
North-western	 -	 -	 -	 -
Northern	 0.4	 0.7	 21.9	 58.3
Southern	 3.4	 4.0	 27.5	 49.8
Western	 1.6	 1.3	 134.7	 161.5
TOTAL 100 	 100	 _________ _________
Source: Central Statistical Office, 1963 and 1969.
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Table 3.2 Distribution and growth of Zambian towns 1963-74
TOWN	 1963	 1969	 1974	 ' 1963-69	 1969-74
	
Population	 Population Population
	 %	 %
___________________ ___________ 	
_____________ increase increase
Lusaka	 123,510	 262,425	 401,000	 13.4	 8.9
Kitwe	 123,027	 199,798	 251,000	 8.4	 4.7
Ndola	 92,691	 159,786	 229,000	 9.5	 7.5
Mufulira	 80,609	 107,802	 136,000	 5.0	 4.8
Chingola	 59,517	 103,292	 134,000	 9.6	 5.3
Luanshya	 75,332	 96,282	 121,000	 4.2	 4.7
Kabwe	 39,522	 65,974	 98,000	 9.4	 8.2
Livingstone	 33,026	 45,243	 58,000	 5.3	 5.1
Chililabombwe	 34,165	 44,862	 56,000	 4.7	 4.5
Kalulushi	 21,303	 32,272	 41,000	 7.2	 4.9
Kafue	 2,043	 12,500	 19,625	 35.5	 9.4
Kasama	 6,737	 8,924	 16,412	 4.8	 13.0
Chipata	 8,527	 13,500	 16,585	 8.0	 4.2
Mongu	 4,279	 10,107	 11,859	 15.4	 3.3
Mazabuka	 5,406	 6,274	 10,869	 2.5	 11.6
Choma	 6,940	 11,949	 10,413	 9.5	 -2.7
Mbala	 3,644	 5,282	 7,611	 6.4	 7.6
Mansa	 5,228	 9,012	 7,937	 9.5	 -2.6
Monze	 3,238	 4,181	 5,131	 4.4	 4.0
Samfya	 4,161	 5,656	 5,722	 5.2	 0.2
Serenje	 3,112	 4,241	 4,498	 5.3	 1.2
Kalomo	 4,989	 6,565	 4,697	 4.8	 -6.9
Isoka	 3,361	 4,545	 3,556	 5.2	 -5.0
Kawambwa	 6,180	 8,318	 2,762	 5.1	 -15.
TOTALS	 705,897	 1,230,882	 1,652,677	 9.7	 6.1
Source: Central Statistical Office, 1975
Amid this massive increase in urban population there was no corresponding increase in the formal
housing stock in the urban areas. Roberts (1978) notes that the only solution the local Authorities
seemed to have was the provision of convention houses. At best they constructed 5,000 to 6,000
houses per year, a drop in the ocean considering the numbers of unhoused people. The informal
settlements thus became the only refugee for the thousands of migrants who could not get a
council house. It is, therefore, not surprising that, within 7 years, the percentage of these informal
settlement household grew from 16% in 1963 to 35% in 1970 and to about 42% in 1972 in
Lusaka. The situation was no different in Kitwe, where for example, in 1975 Tipple (1976, p.168)
found that the City had a short-fall of 23,000 low cost housing stock, resulting in the proliferation
of 46 illegal settlements. At the national level by 1974, self-help housing was making a
significant impact, when 30% of the urban housing stock consisted of squatter dwellings and
another 7% consisted of site and service units (Robertson, 1975).
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3.2.3.3 Government mass housing programme
Initially government housing policy in reaction to this massive rural-urban migration and high
growth rate was to try and house its citizens in 'good and high standard' conventional houses with
all the basic amenities of water, water-closet toilet and electricity (Mashamba, 1990). But other
pressing economic considerations like UDI in Rhodesia and the sheer numbers of urban dwellers
waiting to be housed, "forced" government to abandon this approach and consider the relatively
cheap alternative of squatter upgrading, full site and service, and later the basic site and service
[where only the basic amenities were provided, no sanitation was provided by the council and
tenants were expected to dig their own pit latrines, whereas roads were not tarred] (Tipple, 1979,
p. 160). It was, however, still the wish of government to provide its citizens with a good housing
environment. The subject of squatter-upgrading and site and service has been too widely covered
by Richard Martin (1974; 1975; 1978: 1982); Rakodi (1980); Tipple (1976: 1979) and Schlyter
(1979; 1984; 1987) to justify detailed coverage here, however, a brief summary is presented
below.
The Lusaka Squatter upgrading, site and service schemes started in 1974, with the collaboration
among the Lusaka City Council (LCC), The National Housing Authority (NHA) and the World
Bank. The scheme covered upgrading in Lusaka's major squatter settlements: Chawama, George,
Chaisa and Chipata, serviced plots in the adjacent overspill areas and some new serviced site and
service plots (Martin, 1976). The major achievement of this scheme was that it covered and
benefited about 40% of Lusaka's urban population which was then only 401,100. In all, the
scheme managed to provide services to 17,000 households in squatter settlements, 7,600 serviced
plots in adjacent overspill areas, 3,200 new fully serviced site and service plots [individual water
and sewer connections] and a further 1,200 plots with basic services [Communal water supply
and pit latrine connections] (Rakodi, 1980, p. 3). The failure of this scheme, however, came with
the failure by the benefiting occupants to pay the monthly ground rents and service charges,
which meant that the improved services could not be maintained in the long run nor could the
scheme be replicated to other Sites or major towns (Bamberger et al, 1982).
Table 3.3 Estimated informal household population in the three cities in the 1970s
City	 1969	 1971	 1974	 % of Squatters Upgraded Site and
Squatters Squatters Squatters in 1974 	 squatter	 service
___________ ____________ ___________ ___________ __________________ units
	 plots
Lusaka	 80,000	 100,000	 189,000	 47	 17,000	 7,908*
Ndola	 23,000	 26,591	 51,000	 22	 N/A	 5,227*
Kitwe	 10,541	 16,500	 60,000	 21	 N/A	 2,595*
Source: World bank 1976a, p. 23 with additions from Tipple 1979, p. 160.*
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Having failed to replicate the system to other townships within Lusaka and to other two cities, the
Squatter-upgrading scheme was abandoned in the late 1970's and early 1980s. Even the basic site
and service plots, were never actively supported by the government in the early 1980s
(Mashamba, 1990, p.53). This notwithstanding, the squatter upgrading scheme and the site and
service schemes were the only successful urban mass housing schemes undertaken by the
Zambian Government (see tables 3.3 and figure 3.4).
Continued tying of housing to employment meant that the Government was spending huge
amounts of money on civil servants housing, which was by no means of low standards, hence
expensive. Civil servants contribution to the rent was a mere 12.5% of their monthly income
irrespective of the income or the house they were occupying. The net result was Government
housing subsidies to its employees, which unfortunately tended to give more subsidies to the top
civil servants and less to those at the bottom, hence defeating the intended purpose of helping the
less privileged rather than the better off. Those that could not be accommodated were given a
housing allowance of about 30% of their income. This practice was replicated in Parastatal
companies and private companies as the requirement was enshrined in the Employment Act.
The immediate effect was to take away the incentive from able bodied citizens to build their own
houses because they were guaranteed a house as long as they were in full employment. Rent
control was one other reason that discouraged private entrepreneurs from building for rent, let
alone for sale as "capitalist tendencies" were time and again denounced by the president.
To a humanist there is nothing wrong in owning some property. What is important
in this is; how is that property accumulated and used.. .The profit motive taken to
excess leads us to the road of capitalism (Kaunda, 1 969c, p. 35).
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Fig. 3.4 Zambia Housing Stock 1971 to 1991
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Source: Various NHA annual reports and Government development plans
3.2.3.4 The resultant social services programme
The UNIP government scored very highly in the areas of education and health provision as can
been seen from tables 3.4 and 3.5, considering that these facilities were provided free of charge
(non-fee paying). The quotation below summaries well the achievement of the UNIP government,
although it exaggerates by claiming that the UNIP government began from almost nothing, when
it is clear that the British Colonialist left some infrastructure on which the LJNTP Government
built.
We began from almost nothing to build new institutions and infrastructures, evolving
one of the relatively best managed civil administration in Africa in less than 10
years...We managed in 10 years to fly our own jets and we had aeronautical, mining,
civil, and all types of engineers of international standing born out of our progressive
education policies. There is currently no area where we do not have skilled
manpower.. .We freed medical services to all and built at least one provincial hospital
in each Province. Child mortality dropped, life expectancy increased and the
population doubled... Kapembe Nsingo: Zambia's Ambassador to the European Union
(The Courier, No. 111, Sept.-Oct. 1988, p. 79).
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The adoption of the non-fee-paying social services (the welfare state) like education and health
and the controlled rents for housing as guided by the philosophy of Humanism meant that the
Government was heavily subsidising all social services in the country. But as most literature has
shown, the number of both primary and secondary schools more than doubled, clinics and
hospitals were increased and a number of mass housing programmes were commissioned and
successfully completed. The building of very high standard housing and roads meant that
relatively fewer buildings and roads were built than would have otherwise have been built had the
Government adopted appropriate construction standards (Zambia, Republic of, 1966, p. 47).
Table 3.4 Student enrolments, 1964-1991
Educational level	 1964	 1974	 1982	 1991
Primary	 378,600	 858,191 1,121,769 1,409,848
Secondary	 13,900	 65,764	 104,859	 144,108
Teacher training	 1,500	 2,900	 3,343	 4,605
Adult education	 2,700	 59,974	 19,663	 40,000
Technical and Trades Training Institutions	 800	 5,666	 5,668*	 4,181*
University of Zambia 	 Nil	 2,612	 4,088*	 5,229*
Total	 397,500	 995,107 1,259,390 1,607,971
the dramatic tall and rise, is attributed to the integration of the Zambia Institute of Technology to Copperbelt
University in 1988
Source: Burdette, 1988, p. 67 with additions from Government development (TNDP)
and The Economic report 1991", 1992.
Table 3.5 Number of Medical facilities in Zambia, 1964 -1991
Health centre	 1964	 1976	 1982	 1989*	 1991*
Hospitals (Total)	 48	 81	 81	 82	 82
Government	 19	 42	 42	 N/A	 N/A
Mission	 19	 11	 11	 N/A	 N/A
Private(mainly Mine owned)*	 10	 28	 28	 N/A	 N/A
Health centres and clinics	 306	 657	 779	 923	 942
Government	 187	 388	 512	 N/A	 N/A
Mission	 63	 73	 65	 N/A	 N/A
Urban/Dept/Industrial 	 39	 138	 135	 N/A	 N/A
Mines/Other clinics	 17	 58	 76	 N/A	 N/A
Total	 354	 738	 860	 1005	 1024
Source: Burdette, 1988, p. 68 ( *with additions) from the "Economic report 1991", 1992, p. 59
3.3.0 The construction industry in Zambia
Having looked at the political and the socio-economic factors that shaped Zambia's development
strategies in the First (1964-1972) and Second (1973-1991) Republics, let us now concentrate on
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the net effects that all the above political and socio-eConomic factors had on the construction
industry.
3.3.1 The boom period of 1964 to 1974
The late 1960's and early 1970's was the boom period for the Zambian construction industry. The
construction boom was chiefly because of the socio-economic and political environment
prevailing at the time, rather than deliberate Government construction policy. Past Zambian
government policy objectives and achievement levels were always outlined in development plans,
so that a quick look at these plans should reveal the trend in the construction industry over the
years. Immediately after independence, the government initiated the transitional development
plan which covered the period 1st January 1965 to the 30th June 1966 (18 months). During this
period the initial focus was on military and education projects (Republic of Zambia, 1965, p. 6).
Construction expenditure for the Ministry of Defence took the form of staff housing, new
barracks, new airfields for the airforce, and roads to and from the new barracks and airfields.
However, precise figures and details were never made public, for even the mere possession of
such details in the form of figures or photographs could lead to a severe jail sentence. In the field
of education, however, much of the expenditure went into building new schools and colleges
(including the University of Zambia), including staff housing.
Given the low levels of educated Zambians and hence professionals, this was to be expected. At
independence in 1964, Rakodi (1986, p. 215) puts the number of Zambian construction
contractors in the largest category as only one, and that from a total of 256 contractors registered
with the Public Works Department (PWD) to carry out the lowest possible jobs only 26 were
Zambian owned. Of the construction professional (Architects, Planners, Engineers etc.) she notes
that there were only 3 Zambians from a total of 412. Without expatriates therefore, the
construction industry could not function, at least not efficiently. Some writers have often cited
this as being the beginning of the end of Zambia's economic boom. To fill the gap left by these
expatriates, as a result of nationalisation and constant verbal attacks from the Zambian workers
and the Government, a premature Zambianisation programme was initiated.
Expatriate supervisors were completely demoralised and unwilling to exercise
authority for fear of arousing the resentment of local workers and being unjustly
labelled as racist, with the possible threat of deportation. Discipline therefore
became lax, with consequent adverse effects on production. Zambian supervisors,
on the other hand, were anxious to prove their keenness and ability to exercise their
newly acquired authority. Their zeal was sometimes resented by their fellow
countrymen in subordinate positions and a number of incidents occurred involving
local supervisors and workers (Quinn, 1971, p. 82).
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From the outset, therefore, the construction programme ran into serious problems inherent with
the rest of Zambia's development problems, in that she was heavily dependent on expatriate
skilled labour, foreign owned construction firms, and the Southern 'white' states of South Africa
and Rhodesia for her construction materials. Nationalisation, economic sanctions on Rhodesia,
and the closure of the southern routes were, therefore, decisions that were made out of political
principles rather than on economic merit.
Although the immediate effects of UDI in Rhodesia was to reduce Zambia's growth rate for her
economy, the long term effects were to increase the economy substantially. For example, the rate
of growth in manufacturing sector fell from 31% in 1965 to 16% the following year, before it
recovered back to 27 % in 1967 (Faber, 1971, pp. 318). Consequently, the gross domestic product
for the construction sector grew from K20.Om in 1964, K39.Om in 1965, K79m in 1967 to
K115.9m in 1968 (Bostock, 1971, 328: Christie, 1971). However, the high dependence of
imported building materials from Rhodesia and South Africa, which Christie (1971, p. 379; 386)
has put as about 50%, meant that the multiplier effects were not really beneficial to local
industries and the economy. Unfortunately (for the housing sub-sector) most of this investment
went into building Schools, Hospitals, Offices, Roads, Bridges etc. and very little formal sector
housing was built for the thousands of migrants that kept coming from the rural areas.
In response to the construction boom, a number of publicly owned construction companies were
formed, among them INDECO Properties (staff housing), Kafue Estates (Residential and
Industrial township), Progressive Development (factory leasing), Crushed Stones Sales (Quarry
Sales), Monarch-Zambia (Metal window and door frames, wire mesh, brick and block ties)
Zambia Clay Industries (clay-glazed pipes and face bricks), and Chilanga Cement (cement
manufacturing and sales), all under the parent Parastatal Company: INDECO. It is important to
mention here that at this time the Government was merely a partner in most of these companies
until Government policy in 1968, 1969 and 1970, nationalised all major industries, in line with its
philosophy of humanism. Dr. Kaunda's motive in all this was to "consolidate political power with
economic power for Zambians" as can be deduced by his further pronouncements which restricted
the awarding of Public Works Department (PWD) contracts of less than K100,000 to Zambians
only.
A way in which the Government itself will assist Zambian contractors is that from
now on Public Works Department will award contracts worth less than K 100,000 only
to Zambians. Again I must stress that Zambians are Zambian citizens, people with
Zambian passports and green registration cards, and nothing else will be taken into
account in deciding whether or not a man is a Zambian. I have talked about restricting
resident expatriates businesses by making it more difficult for them to borrow money,
and by keeping them out of certain geographical area and certain types of business, all
87
Chapter Three: Background information on Zambia
these measures are going to create very favourable conditions for the people's business
to develop (Kaunda, 1969b, p.57).
This new ruling obviously placed expatriate-owned firms at a disadvantage and as a result most of
them sold out to Zambians and left the country. For a country with about only 100 graduates
(with most of them being social scientists when the country really needed engineers and
scientists) this had an adverse effect on the construction industry and ultimately on the rest of the
economy.
While appreciating massive Government investment in the construction industry in the late
1960's, we have already seen that most of this investment went into sub-sectors other than
housing. Housing was regarded as a consumption good rather than an investment venture capable
of recuperating the cost and earning returns. This was typical of the thinking in socialist states, so
very little investment was put into housing. For example, speaking at the socialist housing
seminar in Kieve, Germany, David Barkin (Trialog, 1985, pp. 6) argued that housing is a
competitor rather than a complementer of health and education in national development because
the two directly increase an individual's capacity to be productive whereas housing does not. The
enabling strategist would of course argue that a better housed worker is more productivity than
one who is poorly housed and that any investment in housing ultimately contributes to the
national economy through multiplier effects (Van Huyck, 1980; Klaassen et al, 1987).
In actual fact even the little that was put aside for housing was quickly consumed by the
expensively high housing standards that were set. Without giving details, the First National
Development Plan (FNDP) did admit that "high standards" and rising prices had pushed the
building cost of the average house from £320 to £800 (Government of Republic of Zambia, 1966,
p. 47).
Nationalisation of the private finance market in 1967 and 1968, and the restrictions of capital
finance credit to Zambians only, contributed to eliminating both private and foreign investment,
not only in the construction industry but also in the whole Zambian economy. As long as there
was government investment in the economy, especially during the years of high copper prices and
low oil prices, private and foreign investment was insignificant.
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Plate 3.1 Private sector formal housing using informal sector materials and
labour with public sector housing in the background in Lusaka's Chilenje
South extension
The major problem for the construction industry in the late 1960's and early 1970's was not lack
of investment, but the low capacity of the industry to meet government demand for infrastructure;
housing, roads, bridges, factories, offices and so on. For example, during the Transitional and
First National Development Plans some projects could not be implemented owing to what the
government called "a shortage of construction capacity, particularly in the rural areas, the lack of
certain types of skilled and professional manpower, and raw materials supply" (Zambia, Republic
of, 1965; 1966).
To remedy those constraints, the government set up first the Zambia Institute of Technology
(ZIT) in Kitwe for the training of technologists (Diploma level) in the field of Architecture,
QLlantity Surveying, Civil Engineering, Land Surveying, and Town and Country Planning among
other courses. Later on, the same courses, Architecture, Quantity Surveying, and Town and
CoLlntl-y Planning were to be offered at degree level, at the then University of Zambia at Ndola,
Kitwe campus, which became Copperbelt University in 1988.
Similar efforts were also made to ameliorate the supply shortages by setting up local building
materials firms. However, as was the trend then, most if not all such new companies relied on
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capital intensive technologies, imported from abroad. For instance, whilst having vast resources
of appropriate clays and unemployed labour for brick making, there was a tendency to promote
concrete blocks, which were mostly produced by state owned companies using capital intensive
technologies. This is a tendency that Chakwe (1983, p. 396) has attributed to the notion in the
construction industry to associate bricks and clay tiles with the past and poverty.
Besides setting up new materials companies, the government nationalised the existing (mainly
foreign owned) large private companies by buying 51% shares in them. The net result was to
create state monopolies in the materials market, which Chakwe (1983, pp. 372-73) found to be
lacking qualified and experienced staff, poor organisation and managerial skills, beset by
nepotism, corruption, maladministration and theft. Chakwe (1983) further goes on to illustrate his
point by citing a state-owned crushed stones sales company which had the monopoly in producing
aggregates from local stones, but yet failed to meet increased demand for aggregates to the point
that most projects were delayed.
On the other hand, however, it is interesting to note how the few remaining semi-private
companies were able to favourably cope with the construction boom. Chulanga Cement, owned by
the Commonwealth Development Corporation (which was to later sell 40 % shares to INDECO),
was better managed than the state companies and was thus able to cope with the increased
demand for its product, cement, to the point that it even started to export it to neighbouring
countries and continues to do so today.
3.3.2 Construction industry in decline: from 1975 onwards
In all fairness to the Kaunda regime, the decline in the construction industry in the late 1970s (as
witnessed in reduced employment levels in fig. 3.5 and the net contribution to GNP in figure 3.6),
was ignited by the sudden rise in world petroleum (fuel) prices, which also happen to coincide
with the fall in copper prices at the London metal exchange. The result was reduced government
revenue from copper exports and reduced construction investment (see fig. 3.2). The immediate
government response was to enforce strict foreign exchange regulations, promote non-mineral
exports, and to curtail public expenditure, which unfortunately tended to be centred on capital
expenditure and not recurrent expenditure. Strickland (1989, p. 212) has argued that this practice
of cutting capital rather than recurrent expenditure ensured that government did not antagonise it
power base (especially in urban areas, at least in the short term). For a construction industry
solely dependent on public investment, imported construction materials and skilled expatriate
labour force, this was a recipe for disaster and it did not take long to happen.
9°
Chapter Three: Background information on Zambia
The net result was reduced public investment in construction projects; such as new schools,
clinics, hospitals, roads, housing; maintenance and repairs jobs; and acute shortages of
construction materials as a result of foreign exchange restrictions. The expatriate labour force was
also reduced resulting in premature Zambianisation as a way of reducing the foreign exchange
bill. The resultant Zambianisation that followed the mass departure of expatriate skilled labour
was to further exacerbate the problems of the industry; as inefficiency, corruption, poor planning
and co-ordination became the order of the day (Strickland, 1989, p.135; Chakwe, 1983, p. 343).
Rather than allow the private sector (both local and foreign) to bring in their savings and
investments in the industry and the economy as a whole to supplement the dwindling public
investment, the Zambian government was still very adamant with its anti-capitalist stance. To
make matters even worse, the Zambian leadership code did not allow any political, military and
civic leaders with the necessary savings and investment to "engage in capitalist tendencies"
(building for profit). The capital market was non-existence for those willing to build but without
the necessary capital to do so. Not surprisingly, there was a slow down in the industry as
manifested by the decline in those employed in the construction industry.
Fig 3.5 Employment figures in the construction industry between 1964-1991
Source: Mandela, 1991, p.157; Yearbook of Labour statistics 1995, p. 390
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Table 3.6 Construction output: 1971-1976 in Kwacha million
Year	 1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1976
(1) Planned	 90.4	 97.6	 105.7	 114.4	 124.1	 134.0
(2) Actual	 73.6 - 81.5 - 86.8	 85.1	 100.9	 95.7
(3) GFCF	 - 264.5	 291.0	 248.5	 280.0	 259.0	 210.0
(4) Employment	 65 870	 72 320	 70490	 70 590	 71 750	 50270
a. Public sector	 -	 26880	 24500	 25390	 26610	 24940
b. Private sector	 -	 45 440	 45 990	 45 190	 44 3970	 29 400
(5) Buildings	 - 705000 637000 907000 1011700 1052000
1- Planned investment during SNDP, 1969 prices in K m
2- Actual in the SNDP, 1969 prices in K m
3- Gross fixed capital formation at 1965 prices in K m
4- Employment figures for the sector- Public and private fig. for 1976 are for mid year
5- Capital expenditure for government buildings
Source: Third National Development Plan, p. 307
It is interesting to note from the table 3.6 the differences in responsiveness (elasticity) of both the
public and private sectors employment figures to changes in macro-economic policy in Zambia.
Whereas the adverse macro-economic environment brought about a cut back of 35% in private
sector employment between 1971 and 1976, the corresponding cut back in the public sector was
only 7%, resulting in a fall of 21% in gross fixed capital formation. However, what is surprising
to note is that, amidst this fall in construction employment figures and GFCF, there was actually
an increase of 23% in government spending in the construction industry from the 1971 figures,
having reached 28.5% in 1975 before starting to fall in 1976. Two possible explanations can be
advanced for this rather illogical phenomenon. First, that the resultant heavy transport costs from
fuel increases increased the cost of construction and second that the acute shortage of
construction materials on most sites due to foreign exchange problems meant that most projects
were are at a standstill yet incurring costs (Fewings, 1991, p.32).
Inherent in all these macro-economic problems and subsequent government reaction, were the
consequences of inflation, black-marketing, high interest rates, and social and political instability,
which finally culminated in the lack of investor confidence in Zambia. Government's decision to
reduce foreign allocation to "non essential" sectors like construction, had the net effect of
reducing construction imports, which in turn raised the real costs of construction on the open
market. With price controls in place at the official market, a black-market emerged which would
snap up most of these materials (mainly through corrupt means) and resell at as much at 1000%
profit (Fewings, 1991, p. 37). The impact of these economic problems was to discourage private
sector demand for construction goods and services, thereby affecting the Zambian construction
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industry, which responded by reducing its construction supply in terms of new GFCF and the total
number of workers employed.
The continued downward trend of the economy and the subsequent turn to the ilviF and the World
Bank for assistance in the early 1980's; only enhanced calls for reduction in public spending
which was slowly implemented. However, the entry of the IMF and the World Bank in the
Zambian economy brought with it the promotion of the private investor. The Zambian
government was given, among others, the condition to start selling off public companies; among
which were consultancy, contracting, manufacturing and materials supply companies. However,
the Zambia government did not honour this conditionality; none of the construction based
companies was actually sold off between 1983 and 1986, and with the riots of December 1986,
the IMF and World Bank policies were abandoned. In its place, Zambia came up with it's own
brand of adjustment under the theme: GROWTH FROM OUR OWN RESOURCES.
3.3.2.1 The construction industry under the New Economic Recovery Programme
Although the Zambian government maintained that this was its own policy reform programme, it
had a lot of IMF and World Bank Neo-Liberal princip)t in, at least in construction policy
terms. For instance, the Zambian government was for the first time since adopting humanism,
willing to accommodate foreign investors, by allowing them to own land and to externalise their
profits. Suffice to say that foreign investors were only to be allowed on projects that required
huge capital investment which Zambians would have difficulties in raising; roads, dams and so on
(Zambia, Republic of, 1988, pp. 219 and 220). However, the government made no mention of
encouraging local private investment in the construction industry, nor were there any signs that
government would sell off its shares in the publicly owned construction companies, either to local
or foreign private companies or individuals. Its strategy of encouraging private investment was by
encouraging informal sector participation in the construction industry, through organisations like
the Small Industries Development Orgamsation (SIDO). As in the enablement approach, the idea
was to promote labour intensive construction projects that would stimulate employment
opportunities. The fallacy of this scheme, however, was that it relied heavily on government
financial assistance, hence defeating the intended purpose of easing pressure on government
capital expenditure.
The other major flaw in the construction policy strategy was the dependence on foreign financial
inflows (despite the rhetoric; development from our own resources) that, with the breaking of
relations with the IMF and World Bank, this flow of funds immediately came to a halt and the
industry was reduced to mere emergency maintenance of existing infrastructure and the
policy/strategy collapsed overnight in 1989 (see table 3.7 below).
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Table 3.7 Gross Domestic Product by kind of economic activity: at constant
(1977) prices. [K million]
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Fig. 3.6 Construction output in-relation to major economic indicators 1984-1991
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Drawn from data in Table 3.7 above (Note: Multiply Agg. GNP by 10 to get the true figure)
Table 3.7 above clearly illustrates that the objectives and priorities of the government during and
after the IMF and World Bank-led policies were in agriculture, manufacturing, health and
education. The period 1983-1986 (the IMIF and World Bank led policies) the percentage change
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in GDP as a contribution from the construction industry initially dropped by 13 % in 1984 before
picking up by 5% in 1986, but with the breaking off of relations in 1987 this figure dropped to -
4.7% and again by the same rate (-4.7 %) in 1988. The real value of the construction sector
further declined at an annual rate of 5.3 % between 1987 and 1991: when the new MMD
government was ushered in (Zambia, Republic of 1991, p. 23). This only goes to illustrate the
importance of donor funding in capital expenditure and the effect the abandonment of the I1MF
and World Bank-led policies had on the Zambian construction industry, which seems to have
started picking up just before the Zambian government relented on IMF and World Bank Neo-
Liberalist economic policies. It is also important to relate the close linkage between the
performance of the copper mining and the construction through figure 3.6 which show that the
two industries closely following the same trends. Note also that figure 3.6 shows that in the late
1980s, increased productive in the manufacturing industry did not result in a corresponding
increase in the construction industry.
However, what is interesting to note is that whilst the four macro-economic indicators relating to
agriculture, manufacturing, education and health, all performed very under the Zambia's own
economic policy after 1987 rather than under the IMF and World Bank initiated policies, this was
not transformed into construction gains as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. This suggests, therefore,
that most of this money went into recurrent expenditure like salaries and wages or towards
offsetting inflation, rather than on maintenance or new infrastructure, i.e., roads, factories,
schools, staff housing, hospitals, and clinics.
- lit.. 3.7 Price Index f building materials 1980-1991, December 31st. 1974=100
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In analysing present day policies and when making new proposals, it is important to recognise
and appreciate the efforts that the UNIP Government put forward in trying to salvage the industry
and to note its key strengths and weaknesses. For example, the UNIP government drew up good
criteria tables (Tables 3.8 and 3.9) for screening and prioritising projects. Although the 4th NDP
and more especially the construction policy part of it was never successfully carried out 1 , the
policy proposal shows that the government was slowly realising the importance and role of the
construction industry in national development.
Table 3.8 Criteria for prioritising construction projects
Table 3.9 General criteria for screening projects
Source: Tables 3.9 and 3.10, Zambia, republic of, 1989
Continued negative economic growth in the late 1970's, balance of payments problems and the
urban economic discontent, which 'forced' the self proclaimed socialist/humanist state to turn to
'The 4th NDP was planned for the period 1989- 1993, but the UNIP government lost the 1991 elections.
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the World Bank and the IMF, further alienated the government from socialism and aligned to
capitalism, as the conditions of IMF assistance (loans) demanded. The 1990 Lusaka riots
eventually degenerated into a short-lived time coup by a section of the army, after which
President Kaunda decided to allow multi-party politics and the following year of October 1991 he
lost the elections to the new government. These events have thus led to the theory that Kaunda's
downfall was caused by his following of the IMP and World Bank policies of removing subsidies
and bring in market prices (Hamalengwa, 1992; Mwanakatwe, 1994). However, the irony to this
theory is that the new government is more pro-JMF and World Bank policy-oriented than the
Kaunda government.
3.4.0 The MMD Government and the Third Republic (1991-1996)
Following, the abolition of the one party state by the then UNIP government in 1990, the pressure
group calling for multi-party politics formed itself into one "united" political party: the Movement
for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). This was a coalition mostly of academics, trade unionist and.
politicians who, besides calling for the restoration of multi-party politics, also wanted the
Zambian capitalist economy and human rights record restored.
3.4.1 The MMD Development strategy: Adjustment and enablement
General elections were set for October 1991, and the new MMD party campaigned on the
platform of restoring the economy based on "the Neo-Liberalist economic principal of
ENABLEMENT." In the party manifesto (section 3. a) the new party committed itself to creating
an enabling environment;
The MMD is determined to bring about a new era of opportunity of economic policy
realism which rewards and motivates individual initiative. The MMD is committed to
the creation of a stable economic environment by pursuing positive macro and micro
economic policies.
The MMD is committed to creating an enabling environment for economic
development in Zambia by implementing a balanced structural adjustment programme
specifically suited to Zambian conditions.
In order to bring about a suitable climate in which both the private sector and the
public sector will flourish, the MIvID will formulate and implement suitable monetary
and fiscal policies; create a positive system of administering investment incentive
schemes; abolish monopolies and provide a free market system; ensure free collective
bargaining, institute market determined allocation policies; stimulate positive growth-
oriented international trade policies; mobilise domestic savings and develop a capital
market; and rationalise government regulatory measures (MMD, 1991, pp. 6).
3.4.2 New housing strategy: The Enabling Shelter Strategy
The MMD party manifesto (3. n) promised the Zambian people the following;
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The MMD government shall create an appropriate fund by creating marketable
instruments to attract long-term investments from pension schemes and other long-
term sources of funds to finance the housing programme. Appropriate rules and
standards will be set to govern the type and quality of housing for any specified area
of habitation (MMD, 1991, pp. 7).
It is important to note here that the MMD had already committed itself to Neo-liberal economic
policies well before they entered government and were not, therefore, enticed by the International
Financial Institutions like the IMF or the World Bank. Another striking feature of the MIvID
manifesto is in the fact that the macro-economic and housing programmes reflect the views of
the international financial institutions- the IMF and the World Bank, although the MMD was still
talking of squatter upgrading, controlling the mushrooming of squatter settlements and the
attainment of high housing standards as their primary housing goals. Since taking office,
however, the MMD government has tended to follow the World Bank's Enabling Shelter Strategy.
Summary
With hindsight, it is easy to criticise Zambia's nationalisation policies of private companies and
property, and argue that this policy should not have been carried out in the first place. But as this
chapter has attempted to show, the circumstances at the time, especially the Southern African
political environment of the time, necessitated that line of policy action. The industrial and
administrative power base of Zambia was still in the hands of white settlers who, with UDI and
the Southern African security conflict were not easy to trust, hence the need to transfer the power
base to indigenous Zambians. It is equally important to understand also that in the 1960's national
development strategies in most Third World countries and even some developed countries like
Britain were heavily biased towards rapid industrialisation and nationalisation of private property
(Todaro, 1977).
We have seen that, although Zambia was able to record unprecedented high growth rates in the
construction industry and the macro-economy in the late 1960's and early 1970's, these high
growth rates came to a halt and started a downward trend in 1975. Among the reasons for this
downward trend was the growing tendency by the President to appoint defeated and retired
politicians to top management positions in the newly established state companies like the Zambia
State Insurance Corporation and the Zambia Building Society. The net effect on the economy was
reduced productivity. Whereas Zambia was earning more money from copper than the economy
could absorb, the rapid and premature Zambianisation, and increased labour cost due to rapid
rises in wages encouraged industries to use capital-intensive techniques. For example, although
the economy was able to create over 100,000 jobs between 1966 and 1969, inflation due to
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increased wages, the use of high capital-intensive techniques and the very high rates of rural-
urban migration still caused unemployment problems in the country (Pettman, 1974, p. 142-145).
We can summarise factors that contributed to the downfall of the economy and consequently the
construction industry to the following;
The high rural-urban migration that followed immediately after independence and increased
the urban population in some towns by as much as 100% in just 10 years. This had the effect
of stretching government resources in areas like schools, clinics/hospitals and housing, which
were provided either at subsidised rates or free of charge;
• The maintaining of controlled foreign exchange rates by the Government which were kept at
relatively high rates in relation to international currencies, thereby promoting imports, capital
intensive construction and manufacturing methods and unemployment in the country;
• The protection of local and mainly state monopoly companies and industries by the
Government also gave these same companies a false sense of sustainability and as a result.
there was no incentive for them to reduce prices or the cost of production. The tendency was,
therefore, towards subsiding consumption rather than production;
• The withholding of business loans to foreign based companies and foreigners also destroyed
the existing foreign well established companies and entrepreneurship, resulting in most of
these skilled foreigners leaving the country;
• The introduction of rapid and premature Zambianisation against a backdrop of only 100
university graduates also meant reduced productivity and efficiency as most Zambians that
took over from expatriates were not qualified for these jobs.
• The conc,tant attacks on capitalist tendencies meant that even Zambians with savings could
not openly invest their money in the local economy and thus they opted to invest outside the
country. Foreign investors were also reluctant to invest in the country following the mass
nationalisation of private foreign companies during the 1968, 1969 and 1970 economic
reforms programme.
We also noted the close relationship between the Zambian copper mining industry and its the net
effect on the construction industry. Figure 3.6 shows that in times of low mineral revenue and
low GNP from the copper mining industry, the contribution industry also records low levels of
net contribution to total GNP. This therefore, shows that the copper mining industry is one of key
determinants of the performance of the construction industry.
Beginning in the next chapter, we shall look at the measures that the new MMD government has
taken to arrest the above situation and thereby assess the impact these measures are having on the
construction industry and the macro-economy.
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Chapter Four: Creating an enabling environment
4.1.0. Introduction
Having outlined our research aims, objectives and approach, and the detailed steps that we took in
conducting the field work in chapter one (of Part One), in Part Two we now began to analyse our
field and secondary data. We begin our field analysis with chapter Four, in which we critically
look at the various measures and legislation that has been taken and passed by the Zambian
government in the last five years, in an effort to "create an enabling environment", especially in
the construction industry. The prime motive in creating an enabling environment is to encourage
both private local and foreign investors to invest in the Zambian economy, thereby stimulating
private sector construction demand. However, as the Zambian government itself will be quick to
admit, some of the so called "enabling legislation" have had a negative effect on the Zambian
economy and the construction market in particular. Some investors have been put off in their
plans to invest in the Zambian economy, whilst others have taken on the challenge, but only to
shy away from the construction industry altogether. On the other hand, some of this enabling
legislation has attained its desired aims and objectives on the macro-level and the micro-level,.
i.e., the construction market.
In this chapter, we also set the context of the changes that have been made to the Zambian
construction industry in the areas of structural, fiscal and monetary matters, within the overall
framework of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the affiliated policy of Shelter
Enablement. Having said that, it must be recognised that enabling legislation is formulated with
the macro-economy in mind and it is, therefore, up to the construction industry to take advantage
of this legislation to enhance itself. Shelter or construction issues can no longer be seen and
tackled as unique issues in themselves, they must be tackled in association with other national
matters: economic, social and political matters (World Bank, 1993).
4.2.0 National Policy on the Construction Industry (NPCI)
In view of the socio-economic changes brought about with the change of government and
development strategy in 1991, a new construction policy was initiated. This involved proposals
from various individuals and institutions, through the Ministry of Works and supply in
fornulating a National Policy on the Construction Industry (NPCI) in Zambia. The NPCI
document was finally presented and accepted by the Zambian Government in 1995. In
recognising the socio-economic changes made by the new MMD government, the NPCI draws
attention to the crucial role to be played by the private sector in the construction industry by
stating in its preamble that:
The Government has adopted strategies that aim at promoting a market economy
where private sector initiative would act as the engine of growth. In the new
102
Chapter Four: Creating an enabling environment
scenario, the role of the ministry of Works and Supply is largely that of facilitating
development of the construction industry in conjunction with other stakeholders.
Since the policy direction is one of encouraging the development of the sector
through free market-led economic principles, the private sector will have to play a
leading roles. The new role of the ministry is merely to create an enabling
environment in which other partners should be able to function fully (National
Policy on Construction Industry: Ministry of Works and Supply, 1995, p. ii).
To achieve the above aim, the NPCI document goes further to set the overall objectives of the
Zambian construction industry as that of:
1. Promoting and developing private sector participation in the construction industry;
2. Providing incentives for investment in equipment for the development of infrastructure
in the construction industry;
3. Developing and promoting appropriate construction standards and regulation;
4. Promoting the use of low construction materials;
5. Creating employment and contributing to the balance of payments; and
5. Developing and promoting appropriate, sustainable and environmentally friendly
infrastructure.
Although the NPCI proposes the creation of a National Council for Construction to monitor
developments in the industry, i.e., review, modify standards, legislation and regulations, the
government has yet to set up the proposed Council. It is no wonder that since the adoption of the
NPCI, nothing has been heard or said on the new construction policy in the country. There has,
nevertheless, been a marked increase in private sector consumption in the Zambian economy in
the last five years, amid a decline in government consumption. Unfortunately, the increase in
private consumption has not translated into an increase of Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(GFCF). The GFCF has continued to fall, although there was a slight increase between 1992 and
1993. Calculated at constant 1990 prices, the country has witnessed a 40% drop in GFCF
between 1990 and 1995 (see fig. 4.1 below). What is more worrying about this reduction in
infrastructure investment is that it is taking place amidst an increase in population of about 16%
during the same period'. As a percentage of GNP, GFCF has thus been reduced from 13.42% in
1990 to 8.56% in 1995. This reduction in GFCF is an indication of the low levels of construction
activities taking place in Zambia, after the application of both SAP and the Enabling Shelter
Strategy. It is important to note from chapter three, however, that the downward trend in
construction activities started well before the two aforementioned strategies were applied in
Zambia, although their application seem to have failed to arrest that trend.
'Based on populations estimates from the International Financial statistics, 1997, p.738.
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Fig. 4.1 GFCF, government and private consumption between 1990 and 1995 (at 1990
prices in millions of Kwacha)
120000
Source: International Financial Statistics March 1997, p. 738 (Adjusted to 1990 prices)
4.3.0 Housing and Local Government Ministry reforms
In the shelter sub-market, the MMD government restructured and renamed the then Ministry of
Decentralisation as the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Although no major
restructuring was done within the ministry itself, the operation system of the local government
was changed drastically. Hitherto, local government administration in Zambia had been based on
the one party political structure, whereby all elected councillors belonged to the ruling and only
party- UNIP, with District Governor (replacing the traditional Mayor) appointed by the President.
The Mayor has replaced the District Governor in the Third Republic. Plans are also under way to
have a Mayor directly elected by the electorate, rather than is the case now where the Mayor is
elected from among the councillors by the councillors themselves.
The direct impact of the former Local Government administrative structure on the construction
market was the tendency for Local Councils to make political decisions at the expense of
economic and social development. For example, when setting rent and rate charges, the
councillors under the leadership of the District Governor always made sure that party members
were appeased to win votes, rather than set realistic and economic rates and rents that took into
account the level and type of service that the councils were giving to the residents (Mashamba,
1990). The decision, therefore, in 1991 to return to the traditional British form of Local
Government was based on the understanding that this new local administrative structure would
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bring back professionalism and local accountability to the local councils and, in the process,
sustain local development.
Under a K5.8bn ($5.8m) agreement with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
efforts have already been made to train and retrain Local Government staff in the light of the new
Local Government administrative structure and operations (Public Sector Reform Programme-
PSRP). Unfortunately, however, politicians continue to play party politics at the expense of local
development and long term sustainabilty. Only recently (January 1996) in Mufulira, a copper
mining town on the Copperbelt, the Mayor and some of his councillors were suspended from the
Party by their local branch for increasing water charges and house rents in the township. After
bitter disagreements at which blows were even exchanged in the council chamber, the proposed
increases were reversed. This reversion in charges was made against a backdrop of rapid
increases in the cost of imported water treatment chemicals (due to the falling rate of the Zambian
Kwacha), increases in the cost of house maintenance and the inability of the council to pay its.
workers for months. In the minds of the Mufulira MMD party hierarchy, however, increasing
water charges and house rents in an election year would have made the ruling party very
unpopular with the voters and thus cost them votes (Times of Zambia, 17/2/96).
The full implementation of the concept of economic rent, as a way of boosting the financial
standing of the councils, is not only being resisted by the local Government politicians but also by
Central Government. Whereas Government has recognised that rent control and subsidised
service charges are detrimental to increasing housing production and the standard of services
offered, the Government has not completely given the Local Councils the autonomy needed in
setting realistic charges. Although there has been an average increase of over 100% in the rents
and service charges in all urban areas in the last five years, councils claim that the charges are still
well below the market prices, considering the rapid fall of the Zambian currency during the same
period.2
Another structural weakness of the present local government administration has been in its failure
to de-link local government administration from the Central government, or from the President.
Only recently, most Urban Councils put their housing stock up for sale, after a lengthy process in
accordance with the government's objectives as contained in the country's housing policy. The
President immediately directed that all houses built before 1959 should be given to sitting tenants
free, and that houses prices be reduced. The Local Councils were only allowed to charge legal
2Based on an interview with Mr. A. Jere, the Director of Water and Sewerage Department of the Kitwe City Council.
On the other hand, domestic Electricity charges have been increased by about 70% in the same period.
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fees of between K10-20, 000 ($ 10-20) for the change in ownership. What is particularly worrying
about this development is the very fact that the same MMD Government has championed the
independence of the Local Councils to run their own affairs based on professionalism and local
need. This understanding has led most Urban Councils to sign huge loan agreements for water
and road rehabilitation works with foreign investors 3 , with the hope that they will recoup their
investment based on the user pay principal. Although to date no donor or private investor has
expressed their worries on the return to government intervention on the market, it is most likely
that this development will have the effect of scaring away any potential investors in infrastructure
provision and rehabilitation. Continued Government intervention in setting (and reducing) public
utilities charges set by the Local Councils would also explain the very low number of foreign
private investors in the Zambian public utilities market.
4.3.1 New Housing Policy
Although the MMD government has said that it is very committed to structural reforms in the
shelter sector, it was only in January 1996 that the formal housing policy document was official
launched. This late launching of the shelter policy document should not, however, be
misconstrued to mean that Zambia has not had a shelter policy guide-line in the last 5 years,
because most of the reforms as guided by the Enabling Shelter Strategy were taken in the early
years of the new government assuming power. The formal documentation of the Zambian housing
policy document was a mere confirmation of the previous undocumented reforms that had in most
cases already been implemented4. What has been lacking, however, has been the political will on
the part of government to effect most of those changes.
For instance, the law that had long obliged employers to provide housing or a housing allowance
in lieu of a house, under section 41 of the Employment Act of 1972, was scrapped in 1993, in a
move that was then seen to encourage workers to build and own their houses and thus lessen the
dependence on their employers. Ideally this move of scrapping social housing should have gone a
long way in reducing company overheads and eventually the prices of their products too. The
introduction of a market economy in the housing market aided by the sale of council houses,
should also have increased private sector construction and productivity in the construction and
related industries, like the building materials industry. Figure 4.2 below shows a matrix
explaining the benefits of selling council houses to sitting tenants to the construction industry. In
this matrix, we see that basically the construction industry benefits from the sale of councils if
3The German Government has been the major partner in water and sewerage rehabilitation programmes, having
agreements with all the three cities of Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola. The Japanese on the other hand have just signed a
$7m aid package with the Lusaka City Council for the rehabilitation of the road network in Lusaka.
4The author was one of the members of the housing policy formulation team that drafted the Zambian housing policy
document before he left for PhD studies in September 1994.
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and when the new house owners embank on house improvements and extensions using
construction firms. As was highlighted in chapter one, most of these households tend to use
informal sector contractors because of their low construction overheads. The most common
improvements noticeable during the field visits was for most households to install burglar bars,
build a security fence, repair the house and in some cases add one or two bedrooms. The external
extensions and additions to these houses also had the effect of increasing local council revenue
throLigh building inspection fees, although council inspectors rarely inspected such building sites.
These building activities by the new house owners, thus increased the volume of work for small
scale contractors (most of whom were in the informal sector) especially for painters; bricklayers5,
welders and carpenters, thereby increasing job opportunities and demand for construction
materials in the construction industry.
Fig. 4.2 Benefits of selling council houses to the construction industry
Former council houses sold
to private individuals
(Mos1 low cost houses')
New house owners make
renovations and extensions
to their houses
Increase council revenue	 House extensions made	 Burglar bars Installed
through scrutiny fees and	 e.g. more bedrooms added 	 welders benefit
building inspection fees
Informal sector
construction Industry
grows
crcaflng more job
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
5 1n Zambia. even those that lay cement blockwork are commonly refereed to as bricklayers
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4.3.2 Housing provision in the 1990s
In chapter three, we saw how the previous Zambian government tried to solve the housing
problem through public mass housing. The introduction of the Enablement Shelter Strategy was,
therefore, an attempt by the new government to encourage more formal private sector housing
investment against a backdrop of reduced government and public sector housing investment. The
results, however, have not been as expected, as there has been little (conventional) housing
construction place in Zambia in the last 5 years. For instance, Lusaka and Kitwe have not had
any major conventional housing construction schemes since 1989 and 1972 respectively
(Mwanza, 1996). Ndola was fortunate to have had 118 low cost houses built in 1996, under the
Chinese aid scheme. The only substantial increases in housing stock has been in the informal
traditional housing market.
The National Housing Authority (NHA) the major parastatal that provided the bulk of housing in
the 1980s, has failed to do so in the 1990s. For example, whereas in 1994 the National Housing.
Authority completed 59 housing units, in 1995 the number reduced to only 54 units, reducing
further to 40 units in 1996. This is a big drop in annual production figures, considering that the
NHA was able to building hundreds of housing units in the 1970s. The situation was no better in
the formal private sector, where on average 8,000 to 10,000 housing units were constructed
between 1990 and 1994. Most of the house construction was in the informal and mainly
traditional housing sector (see table 4.3 below). Driving through the three cities during the field
survey, it is, however, very hard to believe that during the period 1991 to 1995, there were more
conventional houses built (36,120) than squatter houses (13,646, see table 4.1). The other
possibility is that the NHA housing record system, especially for the informal sector is grossly
effective.
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Table 4.1 Zambia Housing Stock, 1991 to 1995
Category	 No. of Units %	 No. of Units %	 Increase
in 1991	 in 1995	 in stock
__________________________ _____________ ________ ____________ _______ 1991-1995
Traditional	 855,200	 65.7	 938,687	 65.0	 83,487
Squatter	 135,100	 10.4	 148,746	 10.3	 13,646
Upgraded sites and services	 50,900	 3.9	 54,877	 3.8	 3,977
Sub-Total Unconventional	 1,041,200	 80	 1,142,310	 79	 101,110
Low Cost	 180,500	 13.9	 216,620	 15.0	 36,120
Medium Cost	 35,900	 2.8	 38,992	 2.7	 3,092
High Cost	 20,900	 1.6	 21,662	 1.5	 762
Servants quarters	 22,500	 1.7	 24,550	 1.7	 2,050
Sub-Total Conventional	 259,800	 20	 301,824	 20.9	 42,024
Grand Total	 1,301,000	 100	 1,444,134	 100	 143,134
Source: NHA, 1995
4.3.1.1 Selling of council housing stock
Early moves by the new government as early as 1991 to promote the home ownership scheme
which, among other measures, involved the selling of public housing units to sitting tenants.
Admittedly this was not an entirely new measure by the new government, as the previous UNIP
government had started to sell some of the council housing stock as far back as 1988, starting
with the sale of the low cost housing units in Chilenje South, Lusaka. In 1993, the Government
again revived its commitment to selling public houses to sitting tenants, when it signed an
agreement with the public service workers for the sale of public houses to civil servants.
However, not a single unit has been sold to this day6. The councils have equally been very slow in
disposing of their housing units, blaming the slow pace of the sale on delays from the Ministry of
Local Government and Housing in releasing the relevant policy guidelines. The Minister of Local
Government and Housing finally issued the new guidelines on the sale of council houses at a
press conference in Lusaka on the 15th. February 1996. Among the key prerequisites was the
requirement for the councils to seek initial approval of the proposed sale through full council
meetings and later apply to the Minister for final approval. The councils were also required to
provide a current Government valuation report, the market value of the houses, the proposed
6This agreement was formalised by the publication of Circular No. 13 of 1993, although, as stated above, no ministry
or any Government department went further to effect the agreement.
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selling prices of the houses, and proposals on the use of the money realised from the sale of these
houses.
Despite efforts in the last few months by both the central and local governments to implement the
policy of selling public houses to sitting tenants, by the end of the field work in March 1996, only
Kitwe City Council had gone ahead and sold over 7,000 of its housing units to the public. Ndola
had also started though on a small scale, but had announced that approval had been sought from
the Minister to sell 5,000 of its units. In Lusaka there were delays because prices set by the
Council and the modalities of the sale had led to residents forming housing associations to
petition the council on the house prices, areas, and houses chosen for sale.
Despite the slow start, the indecision and party politics that continue to surround the sale of
council houses, there was a surprisingly high number of our respondents, 54% in all, that viewed
this policy measure as a positive step that had contributed to the well being of their businesses.
Another 24% of the respondents were not quite sure of the impact in this measure and only 22%
actually felt that the sale of council houses had not helped their construction businesses. Thus, it
appears that, had this policy been implemented earlier on with much more diligence, the results
may have been much better for the construction industry and the macro-economy.
Table 4.2 Progress on selling councils houses and % level of satisfaction by construction
companies
Kitwe	 Total	 No. of council formal small-	 Informal	 Total of all
council	 houses sold or scale	 sector	 firms
housing	 given out free construction 	 firms
___________ stock	 _____________ respondents 	 _________ _________
Lusaka	 17,759	 N/A	 51	 67	 49
Kitwe	 33,344	 7,000	 65	 84	 59
Ndola	 22,589	 2,000*	 59	 71	 54
*At the time of the field survey, Ndola City Council had received approval to sell another 5,000 houses
Source: NHA annual reports and survey data
These results follow the varying efforts made by the three councils in disposing of their housing
stock. Kitwe which was leading the other two Cities in the sales, had the highest positive effect
on iocal businesses (59%), followed by Ndola with 54% and least of all Lusaka (which was still
fighting petitions) with 49%. The level of satisfaction was even higher for informal sector
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construction firms (see table 4.2 above). These figures do not come as a complete surprise,
considering that house extensions and repairs that most new house owners carry out are too small
to involve medium and large scale contractors, save for those in manufacturing construction
materials and supply. This shows that sale of council/public housing stock enhances business
operations in the construction industry (See figure 4.2).
TABLE 4.3 Effect of selling council housing stock on local construction companies in %
Kitwe	 Not sure Helped Not helped
Suppliers	 19	 62	 19
Consultants	 38	 38	 24
Manufacturers	 27	 55	 18
Contractors	 14	 67	 19
Totals in %	 21	 59	 20
Ndola	 not sure helped not helped
Suppliers	 33	 67	 0
Consultants	 17	 50	 33
Manufacturers	 20	 40	 40
Contractors	 27	 55	 18
Totals in %	 25	 54	 21
Lusaka	 not sure helped not helped
Suppliers	 13	 87	 0
Consultants	 42	 16	 42
Manufacturers	 38	 24	 38
Contractors	 13	 78	 9
Totals in %	 27	 49	 24
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
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Fig. 4.3 Effects of selling council housing stock on the different sectors of the Construction
Industry
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 Survey data
Fig. 4.4 Effects of selling council houses on the formal and informal construction
companies
Formal construction sector	 Informal construction
sector
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Figure 4.3 shows that, when analysed as different sectors of the Construction industry, we see a
different pattern emerging. The sale of council housing stock has mostly benefited suppliers of
construction materials and contractors, who registered positive effects of 70% and 69%
respectively. Consultants and manufacturers of construction materials have not really benefited,
registering positive effects among only 26% and 42% of the respondents respectively. This
suggests that the expected repair, maintenance and extension works that have been carried out on
these previously owned council houses are not being done by conventional consultants, i.e.,
architects, engineers and quantity surveyors, but by informal sector artisans or the residents
themselves7. Similarly, the high rate of confidence placed on the exercise by suppliers/traders
7Most of the construction taking place is mostly in the form of security walls.
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(70%) as against the manufacturer's 42% would go to support the allegation by the Zambia
Association of Manufacturers (ZAM), that most of the materials being used in the industry are
imported. This, however, is contrary to the theories of adjustment and shelter enabling with all
their postulated benefits of the trickle down and the multiplier effects, but is consistent with other
research findings on the negative effects of adjustment on the local industry, at least in the initial
phase of the programme (Dijktsra, 1995).
Note, however, that since mid March 1996, the President has issued an ultimatum to all urban
councils in the country to dispose of some of their housing units by June 1996 or face severe
reprimand (ZANA, 19/3/1996). Whether the president's intervention in the house sale was as a
result of the inertia exhibited by the Councils in selling their stock or it is a mere election
oimrnick as alleged by the other opposition parties, remains to be seen. The MMD has however,
continued with its policy of selling council and Government housing stock to sitting tenants even
after winning the 1996 elections.
Plate 4.1 Former council and private sector houses in Riverside extension
(Kitwe) now surrounded by new security walls, mostly built by informal
sector contractors
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In the short run, the effects of the President's intervention on the housing market are likely to be
falling standards of services offered by the affected councils, while in the long run there is the
likelihood that the private sector (both local and foreign) will not be enticed into investing in this
sector. The other effect is the one that the Kitwe City Council is already going through, which is
having to look for money to refund those tenants that bought the houses at prices that were set by
the full council meeting and approved by the Minister, but have since been given free by the
President. A total of over K400m ($0.4m) was raised by Kitwe City Council from the sale of over
7,000 of its housing units. 8 However, it is not clear yet, how much money has to be refunded.
Obviously plans that were drawn up to build new houses from this income, will now have to be
abandoned. Ndola City Council is also reported to have raised K21m ($17,500) from legal fees in
changing ownership of the 2,000 houses that were given to sitting tenants of houses built before
1959, an amount which can only build three low cost houses at current prices.
Mr. Chiluba directed Chililabombwe Municipal Council to give away free some
housing stock in Lubenge township whose value had completely diminished and
appealed to all sitting tenants to make little savings in readiness to buy the houses.
Mr. John Chiyama was all smiles when President Chiluba instantly pegged his one
bedroom house with a dome roofing shape at K250, 000 ($250). Mr. Chiluba
described the monthly rental of K7,000 ($7) for a one bedroom house in the
township as exploitative.
In Chibolya, township of Mufulira a woman fell to her knees ululating and thanking
Mr. Chiluba after he ruled that her house, which was built in the 1940's should be
sold to her at no more than K200,000 ($200) [sic]9. The council had pegged the
house at K375,000 [$350] (Zambia News Agency, 18th. March 1996).
Following the intervention of the president in the sale of council houses, the Civil Servants Union
of Zambia (CSUZ) also joined in on calling the President to help expedite the sale of government
houses to civil servants. To this end, the government announced on the 16th. of April 1996 that
the cabinet had met and approved the sale of 9,000 units to the public service, leaving 7,000 units
for use by political leaders, security services, education and the health services. Notwithstanding
the benefits of such a move, as postulated in the enabling shelter strategy, this measure seems to
be ill planned, given that no detailed plans on the modalities were announced. We will recall,
however, that the government had earlier signed a similar agreement with the Civil Servants
Union (CSUZ) and failed to implement it.
works out to average cost of $57 for each of the houses!
9But according to the President's earlier decision, all houses built before 1959 were supposed to be given free to
sitting tenants save for legal costs.
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4.4.0 Privatisation of public companies
We have already seen in Chapter one that private sector participation is important to both the
Structural Adjustment Programme and the enabling shelter strategy. To this end the Zambian
government formed the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) in 1992, an autonomous agency of
the Government established through the Privatisation Act No. 21 (of 1992). The ZPA is charged
with the responsibility of disposing of publicly owned companies, which hitherto comprised 80%
of the national economy, to the private sector and raise funds for public sector expenditure. Not
only has Government raised money from the sale of these companies, but it has also made huge
savings from the subsidies that would otherwise have been given to these companies. For
example, between 1985 and 1989 the Zambian government paid US $455 million in hidden
subsidies to these companies, against income received of only US $22 million, making a total loss
of US $433 million (Zambia Privatisation Agency [ZPA], 1995).
The modalities of selling public companies include public tender, mainly for smaller companies -
which are sold as single entities, public flotation for large and complex organisations, and
Management Buy Outs (MBOs). As of December 1996, 165 companies had been sold to both
local and foreign investors, resulting in a total of 1,700 job losses through redundancies. There
are about 110 companies still to be disposed of (ZPA, 1997; Financial Mail, 2 1/01/97). Among
companies being sold have been some from the construction industry, notably Chilanga Cement
Limited to the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Mulungushi Construction to a
management buy-out team and Zambia Steel and Building Suppliers Limited, which was broken
down into smaller units and sold.
Although it is too early to say what effects privatisation has had on the construction companies, as
both Mulungushi Construction and Zambia Steel and Building Suppliers were only recently
privatised (March and April respectively), Chilanga Cement, which was privatised earlier on, has
performed to near expectations. Chilanga Cement PLC, which is now traded on the Lusaka Stock
Exchange, has not only managed to satisfy local demand but remains the only major Zambian
construction company exporting its products within the region.
It was also envisaged that the privatisation of public companies would lead to an increase in
business activities in the construction industry, as the new owners of these hitherto low capacity
production companies began to rehabilitate them, and invest in new fixed capital stock. Whereas
some companies like Chilanga Cement have indeed managed to increase production and the
capital base of the company through floating their shares on the Lusaka stock exchange, a number
of companies were simply liquidated and their fixed stock sold through auction. Zambia Airways,
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the national Airline, and United Bus Company were two such companies that were liquidated and
their offices and houses sold to the general public. The urgency to recoup the losses and salvage
something to pay the debtors has also meant that most buildings belonging to these liquidated
companies are being sold way below the replacement values. The effect of such moves has been
to undermine the construction industry, as most households find it cheaper to buy these
undervalued houses than build new ones. Take for example, a 50 square metres, two bedroom
low cost house going for K2m ($2000), when building a new one would cost about K6m ($6000)
at 1995/6 prices'0.
Nevertheless, privatisation has assisted in increasing govermnent revenue. For instance, by the
end of the third quarter of 1996 alone, ZPA had raised a total of K3lbn ($26m) from the sale of
public companies (Financial Mail, 14/01/97). Most of the money that has been raised has
unfortunately been used to pay for redundancy packages for the affected workers, leaving the
government coffers with little or no money for real investment in the economy, contrary to
postulated expectations in the two theories (see also fig. 4.1). Unfortunately, the delays in starting
the privatisation programme and the decision to channel resources released from the sale of
public assets to paying personnel benefits has meant that very little if any real benefits have gone
into creating more capital. One could still argue that the retrenched workers with their benefits
have still to start up their own businesses. But as our field work has demonstrated, only 30% of
the respondents felt the benefits of privatisation were trickling down to their businesses, whereas
(6 1%) had not benefited from this exercise.
The other major drawback in the privatisation programme has been Government's indecision in
pnvatising the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), the biggest single company and
main export earner (over 80%) in Zambia. ZCCM employs over 50,000 workers, about 10% of
the total formal Zambian labour force, mostly employed on the Copperbelt. ZCCM is not only the
biggest customer of construction services and products on the Copperbelt, but it is also the
biggest single consumer of cement in the country. With its huge revenues from the glory years,
ZCCM not only controls the Zambian economy, but runs and owns it own primary and secondary
schools, clinics and hospitals, colleges, housing estates, roads and railway network, police force,
markets and community centres, and so on.
The uncertainty of the status of ZCCM has thus meant capital projects have been suspended
pending the sale of the Company. The lack of capital investment in the mining conglomerate has
also resulted in a drastic fall of copper production, thus reducing the revenue for the mining
10The building price for a low cost hQuse has be calculated using the average cost building prices of K120,000
($ 120) per square metre, that was being used at the time.
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company and exacerbating the situation. The ZPA has put the figure for desperately needed
capital injection in ZCCM to be able to run it properly at US $ 2 billion, money which can only
come from private sector funding considering the low levels of state coffers (ZPA, 1995). Given
this scenario, we are unlikely to see the expected influx of foreign investors in Zambia, and a kick
start in a private sector economy, unless ZCCM is dismantled and privatised, "lip service to
privatisation is not good enough" •11
p
Plate 4.2 One of the former ZCBC shops in Kitwe: Now repainted and with new
security wall
Having said that, it would be wrong if we gave the impression that the construction industry and
the macro-economy have not benefited from privatisation, because some of these pnvatised
companies have gone on to make physical improvements to the real estate and even build more to
add to their existing stock. A good example is what used to be the Zambia Consumer Buying
Corporation, a nation wide chain stores that was sold to Shopnte-Checkers (a South African
company), who immediately renovated all their city stores, using Zambian construction
companies at a cost of $12m and went on to employ 110 Zambian workers (Times of Zambia,
11 Note, however, that the World Bank 'Findings Report' Privatisation in Africa: The Zambian example. 1996, states
that the Zambian privatisation programme is a model for other African countries to follow.
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26/10/95; Refer also to fig. 4.5). The benefits of privatising companies are best illustrated in the
fig 4.5, in which we shall use the case of the Shoprite Checkers plc (South Africa) buying the
former ZCBC shops as a typical example. At the top of the chart (fig. 4.5), we see that the
benefits start with Shoprite Checkers buying the former ZCBC shops, and the Zambian
government receiving money from the sale. Some of that money was spent on constructing new
and improving existing infrastructure in the country. Although as noted earlier, most of the
money received from the sale of these properties was spent on retrenchment benefits for those
retrenched and other recurrent expenditure by the government. Some of the retrenched workers,
some of whom will have been working in the hardware department of the former ZCBC used
their retrenchment benefits to open their own hardware shops, either in the formal or informal
sectors. Those in the formal sector thus contributed to increased government revenue, by paying
corporate and income taxes. There was also an opportunity to contribute to new employment
opportunities in the industry, if the new owner of these hardware shops employed one or two
more people.
In the meanwhile, the new owners: Shoprite Checkers was busy making renovations to their
newly acquired chain stores. From what the author saw in Lusaka, Kitwe and Ndola shops during
the field survey, the renovations were quite comprehensive. The renovations included both
internal and external features at a total cost of $12m, from minor works like shelving, painting,
and glazing to more major works like the installation of new air conditioning units, new floor
finishes, lighting and electrical rewiring, The design of these revonations, obviously had an input
of both local and foreign (South African) consultants (aclite.cts, rttxty s'ert'yors, buiXàing
services and electrical engineers), which ultimately increased the volume of work in this sector
and possibly job opportunities. Manufactures and suppliers of construction materials also
benefited from the increased volume of their trade, resulting from these national-wide
renovations. Contractors and their specialised sub-contractors (electrical, air conditioning and
shop fitting) also benefited, although it must be said that in all the three cities that the author
visited, all the contractors and their sub-contractors were all from the formal sector, including the
foreign ones, like those engaged to install the air conditioning and refrigeration units.
No doubt the use of some foreign consultants, main and sub-contractors and the importation of
some finished products like air-conditioning and refrigeration units will have meant that some of
the some money spent of renovating these shops finally went abroad. However, there is no
disputing the fact that most Zambian construction firms benefited from this exercise, including
the Zambia government which was collecting money through VAT and taxes from both local and
foreign firms involved.
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Fig. 4.5 Theoreti,Linkages of Privatising public owned companies and the construction
industry: Case study Shoprite Checkers stores
Some workers from the II old ZCBC are retrenched
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Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
4.5.0 The new Investment Act of 1991 (Amended 1993)
Another very important step that the Zambian Government took in her efforts to facilitate and
attract private investment in Zambia was to enact the Investment Act of 1991 which was
subsequently amended in 1993. The primary aims and objectives of this Act are to attract private
investors to invest their resources in the Zambian economy and not another competing country in
die region or any other part of the world, by giving investors special incentives. The Act caters for
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the creation of an Investment Centre and Board which is charged with promoting investment in
Zambia by the speedy processing of investment applications.
....the functions of the (investment) centre shall be to...
(d) assist in the securing from any Ministry, government department, local
authority or other relevant body any permission, exemption, licence, bonded status,
land and any other thing required for the purpose of establishing or operating a
business enterprise (Investment Act No. 39 of 1993, P. 278).
Added to the speedy processing of investment licences, would-be investors were also given
various incentives once their application papers meet the relevant prerequisites and were
approved. Among the incentives that were given were tax free benefits for capital goods brought
into Zambia, and reduced rate of income taxation (15%) for those going into farming, non-
traditional products and rural enterprises. Note, however, that these tax incentives were
withdrawn in the January 1996 budget, following company and income tax reductions for.
everyone in the country. Although the company and income tax reductions contained in the
January budget are to be welcomed, the mere fact that the Government was able to withdrawn tax
incentives given to investors as contained in the Investment Act, is likely to cast doubt on their
sincerity on future promises to investors.
TABLE 4.4 INVESTMENT LICENCES/CERTIFICATES ISSUED (Jan. 1993-Sept. 1995)
Sector	 Number of Licences	 I	 Pledged_investnient [S S nu	 I
________________________________ I 993 	 1994	 1995	 1993	 1994	 1995
\tiit,Iiurc	 124	 95	 __________________ ____________________ _____________________ _____________________
\I;tntiIic;uri:i	 lUb	 I 17	 3(	 I 32.54	 2	 '.2 3'
57	 37	 14	 15.79	 3
_________________________	 42	 3!	 12	 5 52	 2 33	 __________________
___________________________ 	 12	 4	 3	 l0.'	 'II	 ____________________
(outrucIiou	 13	 5	 4	 10.29	 I .9	 2.88
	
tIsUIiaJK\	 4	 I	 (1	 4.45
IiInt	 4	 2	 3	 4.3!	 T _____________
	
.ruceiin	 4	 4	 I	 I 72	 302	 14
II.iIil1	 I	 5	 (1	 77	 7	 _________________________________
'..e.	 9	 2(	 21	 I 99	 2.Ss	 24
IMI\I5	 32	 313T5	 ___________
Source: Profit, Vol. 4 No. 8, p. 25
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Official statistics at the Investment centre show that, between 1993 and 1995, a total of 845
investment licences were approved with a pledge of $63 1.52m investment, of which only 22 (3%)
licences with a total pledge of $15.06m were in the construction sector (see table above). The low
number of construction industry related licences should not however, be taken as a negative factor
on the part of the construction industry. On the contrary it should be taken as a positive factor for
the industry because, in the main, investors that go through the investment centre are those that
seek tax incentives and rebates on capital goods brought into the country. For example, the
$15.06m investment pledge that was recorded in the 3 years by the Investment Centre is due
mainly to donor funded roads and water rehabilitation programmes which, in the main, have been
carried out by foreign based construction companies using a lot of capital intensive techniques,
hence their application for investment licences (Mashamba, 1996). Yet what the country really
needs are local and small scale labour intensive construction firms, that will help absorb the
masses of unemployed citizens, especially the youth in urban areas. The number of construction
companies registered at the Government Buildings Department, nevertheless, increased from 345.
in 1993 to447 in 1995.
No doubt the liberalisation of the economy under policies of structural adjustment has attracted a
great deal of investment. Notwithstanding the purported high failure rate for construction firms to
survive in the industry, there was a considerable high rate of new entrants in the construction
industry. This was demonstrated from our own field data, which found that 34% of all the firms
interviewed were formed between 1991 and March, 1996, a period of four and half years (See
table below). It is also particularly important to note that 70% of all the post-adjustment finns are
small scale companies, just the size of firms that Government policies were aiming for. However,
expectations that the advent of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its concomitant
retrenchment of public civil sector workers would see a massive increase in informal sector firms
seem not to have materialised. For instance, figure 4.6 shows that informal sector construction
companies have been steadily increasing since 1983, although the rate increased substantially in
1993. This could mean that most of the retrenched workers have opted not to go into the
construction business because of the high risks and low rate of returns, as was the case in Nigeria
(CASSAD, 1991).
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FIG. 4.6 Cumulative frequency table for construction companies and the year formed
Year firm formed and cumulative total
- Total (including
formal companies)
Informal companies
66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
On the other hand, however, there has been a noticeable influx of private informal investment in
all sectors of the economy under the umbrella of trade liberalisation. Rather unfortunately, much
of this investment has gone into petty trading, mainly in second hand clothing from Europe and
the US., leading to the collapse of the Zambian clothing industry. "Salaula," as the business is
called in Zambia, is conducted at very small scale, the construction industry has not benefited
greatly for this upswing in informal and private business incentives as, all the Salaula trader does
is to build a small timber structure with plastic roofing and without windows and doors, as his
business premises. Furthermore, the low forward and backward linkages associated with trading
in foreign goods has thus deprived the macro-economy of any meaningful benefits, except for the
jobs created for those involved in this business.
Arguably, Zambia is today the most liberalised country in Africa' 2, and a lot has been achieved in
attracting private sector investment in the country in the last five years. However, the
democratisation of South Africa in 1993 has brought in a new and more advanced competitor in
the field. Considering the existing sophisticated infrastructure in South Africa, it is difficult to
forecast that Zambia will continue to attract more foreign investors into the country. The political
tension that surrounded the barring of former president Kaunda in the 1996 presidential elections,
the emergence of a hitherto underground group that has been planting bombs around the country,
and the subsequent suspension of aid by the leading industrialised countries, are likely to reverse
12 The World Bank and the IMF has described Zambia's privatisation programme as a model for Privatisation in
Africa. See Privafisation in Africa: The Zambian example, 1996a
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the gains of the last five years. If the lessons of 1987, when the donor community suspended aid
to Zambia, are anything to go by, then we are likely to see these investors (both local and foreign)
invest their capital elsewhere, where their investment will be safe and stand a chance of growing.
4.5.1 Liberalising the foreign exchange market
There can be no doubt that attracting foreign investors, as we have seen in the foregoing
subsection, can only succeed if a country has liberal foreign exchange policies, not only for
flexibility in importing materials, but also in externalising profit. No wonder the MMD
government was quick to repeal all restrictive regulations pertaining to the selling and buying of
foreign exchange on the open market, in a step by step method between April 1992 and January
1994 (Mulaisho, 1994). There were hopes that the removal of currency restrictions would
eliminate black marketeering in foreign currency and help stabilise the Zambian Kwacha at its
real market value, as postulated in the structural adjustment theory. It was expected that the
Zambian Kwacha would immediately fall drastically against international currencies, with the.
consequences that imports would become dearer on the local market, thus discouraging imports
and promoting local production with the strong possibility of surplus for export.
In view of these liberal policies in the foreign exchange market, the Zambian Kwacha has
depreciated by 4,500% between 1991 and June 1996, from K29 to K1,300 per US dollar.
However, despite this massive devaluation on the open fmancial market, imported goods have
continued to compete with locally produced goods and Zambian goods have literally failed to fmd
markets within the Sub-region, contrary to expectations in the adjustment theory. The Zambia
Association of Manufacturers (ZAM) President, Mr. Mark O'Donnell, has attributed this trend to
the alleged export subsidies given to foreign firms by their governments to promote exports and
discourage imports.
...Liberalisation has brought in a flood of cheap imports for manufacturers to
compete against. In order to do this lowering staff levels and increasing efficiency
has been the only option for many companies...
We are pushing hard for a trade agreement with Zimbabwe whose exports currently
have open access into our market. Many of the goods coming into Zambia have no
duty paid on them because of smuggling while we have limited access into their
market...
With South Africa we feel the trade imbalance is a great disadvantage to Zambian
producers. The 1993 figures show exports to Zambia of US $ 360 million while
exports from Zambia were US $15 million. The reason is that Zambian goods are
kept out of South Africa because of high tariffs. We want access into that market
through lowering of tariffs (Aked, 1995, p. 22-23).
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Although foreign exchange liberalisation has failed to make the average Zambian goods and
services more competitive than foreign ones, industry represented by 90% of respondents were of
the strong view that foreign exchange liberalisation had, nevertheless, helped in the easy
procurement of foreign currency, hence making business operations easier than was the case
before. One good reason that could have led to Zambian goods failing to compete with foreign
goods both in and outside Zambia could be that a landlocked country is highly susceptible to fuel
price increases as a result of the falling Kwacha. Another reason may be that falling copper prices
in the last five years have reduced the amount of foreign exchange available on the market,
coupled more recently with the withholding of donor aid by the industrialised World.
4.6.0 Improving land delivery with the Land Act of 1995
It is abundantly clear from existing literature that current shelter-construction problems in most
Third World countries are a result of inadequate legislation and practices to effectively distribute
land to the majority of inhabitants (Habitat, 1983; Habitat, 1984; Dowall, 1991). In Zambia, the.
historical development of most urban low income settlements has shown that the bulk of the
housing stock for the medium and low income earners is built on land acquired through the
informal process, without the consent and control of the planning authorities (Habitat, 1988, p. 9;
Mashamba, 1990). Other scholars have gone further to draw the conclusion that low house
production in most of the Third World countries is largely due to the insecurity in the land tenure
system pertaining in these countries and that, given a more secure land tenure system, these low
income earners would do much better than is the case now (Turner, 1989; Martin 1976). Other
scholars have pointed to poor land administration in the Third World as been the other major
obstacle in the housing-construction industry (Dowall, 1991, pp. 7-10).
The subject of land in Zambia has always been a controversial one, whereas colonial policy has
always been criticised for its racial bias, post independence legislation on the other hand has been
viewed as being too bureaucratic and unfavourable and, least of all, incompatible with the new
principles of economic liberalisation. We will recall from Chapter Two that, since the Land
(Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975, all freeholds and long-term leaseholds of over 100 years was
converted to leaseholds of 100 years. The Conversion of Titles (Amendment) Act No. 15 of 1985
went further to exclude aliens and foreigners from being granted land in Zambia. There was,
however, provision in the 1975 Lands (Conversion of Titles) Act for long leaseholds of over 100
years to be granted, were international obligations required this. However, the most contentious
of all clauses was the declaration that all undeveloped or bare land was without value, thus all
transactions in bare land were illegal under Zambian law. These measures were obviously in line
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with the UNIP government's inward looking development strategy as guided by its philosophy of
Humanism, in contrast to that of the MMD, which is more outward looking.
The opening up of Zambia to foreign investors with the coming to power of the MMD, as
prescribed in its Neo-Liberalist manifesto, obviously required the enactment of appropriate
legislation in land policy, if only to assure and safe guard the interests of private investors. The
repealing of all old land laws as passed by the previous UNIP government and the subsequent
enactment of the 1995 Land Act came as no surprise. What was surprising was the uproar and
resentment expressed by most Zambians on the clause to grant land to "aliens" and foreigners
who would come into Zambia to invest (Kaunda, 1995, pp. 90-91).
Although the passing of the 1995 Land Act raised a great deal of controversy, there is
overwhelming consensus to the effect that past legislation on land was very restrictive, not only
for construction purposes, but in other areas of national development, for example agriculture.
The enactment of the 1995 Land Act has thus been hailed as a step in the right direction by
government, as it has been argued that it will ameliorate the aforementioned developmental
obstacles. Unfortunately this optimism by government is not shared by the traditional chiefs, who
see the new Land Act as taking away their powers to distribute land for developmental projects in
their areas. The bone of contention for the traditional chiefs being that the new Land Act of 1995
allows their subjects to acquire individual leasehold titles to land, hence effectively depriving
them of their erstwhile powers over customary land (Kaunda, 1995, p. 91). Fortunately for the
construction industry, the continuing controversy on the 1995 Land Act is confined to rural and
agriculture land, rather than urban land which does not fall under customary land.
In the main, the 1995 Land Act has had the effect of liberalising the Zambian land market, by
allowing for the buying and selling of all land (including bare land), to anyone. For whatever
reason, the government decided on maintaining the 99 years leasehold tenure system, rather than
returning to the freehold system which had been pertaining before 1975 (see chapter three). The
other land reform measures have taken place with the computerisation and decentralisation of the
land administration. Whereas previously all land transactions where conducted in Lusaka, there is
now a regional land office in Ndola to cater for the Copperbelt and adjacent provinces. It is hoped
that the computerisation and decentralisation of the Lands Office will facilitate land delivery and
construction in Zambia. It is, however, too early to assess the effect this will have on the
construction industry or the macro-economy for that matter.
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The decentralisation of the land office to the Copperbelt town of Ndola has somewhat eased the
problems that most developers have had to face in the past of having to travel to Lusaka each time
they had land problems, queries or ground rent to pay. The major problem of inadequately
serviced land has, however, not been solved by recent structural and administrative reforms in the
Ministry of Lands. This problem will only be solved by the training and deploying of a number of
qualified land surveyors at the Ministry, a task which seems to have started in earnest with the
new land surveying degree at the University of Zambia in Lusaka. The resumption of the diploma
course at the Copperbelt University, suspended due to lack of qualified staff, would also help in
easing the land delivery problem.
Admittedly land per se has not been a major problem in Zambia, at least not for housing or other
construction purposes. The problem has been with the non-availability of adequately serviced
land. However, the situation was made easier by the fact that most housing was either built by
the public sector or the informal sector, both of whom had some leeway with the acquisition of.
land from the authorities. The public housing sector which comprised the Municipal Councils,
Parastatals, and the National Housing Authority, had easy access to serviced land if and when
available. The informal sector on the other hand was able to command some form of favours from
the politicians, because of its political muscle, especially during election times.
4.7.0 Improvements to the Zambian tax regime
Low and evenly spread taxes are advocated in a Neo-Liberalist economy as they are said to be a
catalyst to investment and an incentive to people to pay their taxes and at the same time
encourage savings and investments. On the other hand, high and thinly spread taxes are said to
discourage people from paying their taxes and discourage savings and investments, thus denying
government the much needed public income. Like most other Sub-Saharan countries, Zambia has
had to depend on a small taxable base for tax collection, with the result that a very few people and
companies pay very high taxes: 35% until last January 1996 when it was reduced to 30%.
Although there are now many small scale and informal businesses, there has been no
comprehensive form of tax collection for the majority of these informal traders, businesses and
self-employed persons, many of whom make more profit than some formal businesses.
Only recently, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) managing director, Michael Camdessus,
implored Sub-Saharan African countries, including Zambia, to stop the practice of raising or
keeping taxes high on an over-burdened portion of the population and instead broaden the tax
base and devise sensible means of reducing inflation (Times of Zambia, 19/1/96).
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4.7.1 The new Value Added Tax (VAT)
The decision in April of 1995 to introducef Value Added Tax (VAT) in place of sales and excise
tax should, therefore, be seen in the above context of spreading the tax base. The unique feature
with VAT, as against the old sales and excise tax, is that it allows for the offsetting of tax paid on
business inputs against tax due on sales. There are two ways in which this was achieved in
Zambia: Zero rating and exemption. Zero rating makes allowances for VAT incurred in business
purchases and other expenses to be reimbursed back from government, whereas exemption
allows for VAT relief on sales, but does not allow for any relief on expenditure incurred on
purchases and business expenses (Aked, 1995, p. 29). The government further stipulated that all
business enterprises with a taxable income of K20 million (US $20,000) should register their
businesses for VAT. The major drawback for small firms, however, is the practice by some
Public companies, Parastatal and government departments to demand VAT certificates from all
their suppliers and contractors, hence denying business opportunities to small scale companies.
Another very pertinent element in the new VAT regime is the zero rating that has been given to
exports, in an effort calculated to make Zambian goods and services more attractive on the
international market, by eliminating the cost of input sales tax for exporters. However, the
imposition of import sales tax at 23% compared to 20% VAT set for local goods has not made
any significant difference to prices for imported when compared to local goods. Furthermore, the
setting of VAT at 20% in Zambia. compared with lower rates of competitors in the Sub-region
(for example in Zimbabwe it is 12.5% and South Africa 14%) has only enticed more people to
smuggle goods from these countries to Zambia' 3. This would explain the influx of imported
building materials on the streets of Lusaka, of which the street vendors are not always willing to
disclose their sources. To illustrate this point further, in one particular interview in Lusaka's
Soweto market, the respondent threatened to discontinue the interview after he was probed about
the source of his materials, having said that he bought his materials (electric cables) from
"somewhere in town", without saying the name of the shop/s.
Zambia's manufacturers feel betrayed. Last year when our farmers suffered from
drought, the government rushed to the rescue, but this year our manufacturers are
being left to drown in a flood of cheap imports. Those in textiles and clothing are the
most vulnerable. With no protection against salaula (second hand clothing) they are
falling like the proverbial ninepins. In Livingstone well known companies like JR
textiles and Zambia Fashions have closed. In Kitwe my own Medwich Clothing is a
casualty. And these are just three among many. Other sectors of industry are hard hit
13 Outcry from the President of the Zambia Association of Manufacturers on cheap imported goods coming into
Zambia, mainly due to smuggling: Interview at the New Savoy Hotel in Ndola on the 12th of January 1996.
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by competition from cheap imports, thanks to the liberalisation of the IMF sponsored
Structural Adjustment Programme (Sanderson, 1993, p. 18).
In its quest to attract foreign investment in the construction industry, the government has
unfortunately gone to the extent of giving foreign road construction companies, like Astrilda and
Phoenix tax rebates, allowing them to bring road machinery into the country tax free. What makes
this measure unfortunate is the fact that Zambian road construction companies have to pay import
duty and VAT on their machinery imported into the country and are expected to compete with
these already established companies for road contracts in Zambia. It would explain why the road
rehabilitation exercise involving the Great East and Great North Roads have both been
undertaken by foreign companies, using capital intensive methods.
In the rental housing market, VAT has been set at 0%, meaning that no VAT is paid on rental
charges, which is in line with the government philosophy of enabling more Zambians to acquire
affordable housing. Note, however, that landlords still have to pay tax on income received from
rentals. The biggest drawback on the new tax regime is the law that all VAT remittances be made
within 21 days of sale, whether cash or credit sale. This insistence has had the effect of restricting
credit sales in the economy, as most construction involves the largest single investment for many
households and institutions. The 21 days limit can only be seen as counter productive, as the
following case study of Woodcrafters in Kitwe will illustrate.
Mashamba: How are you coping under the new tax regime, more especially VAT?
Mr. Naik: Quite frankly VAT is a much better tax system than what we hitherto had in Zambia,
but then again I think the government needs to think again on one or two matters of detail, before
a lot of companies, especially on the Copperbelt, go under.
You see, under the new VAT system, we are supposed to remit all tax due to government, within
21 days of the actual sale. Unfortunately, by government definition, sale is said to have taken
place whether money changes hands or not, so long as the goods or services have changed hands.
On the other hand, ZCCM the major customer for many businesses on the Copperbelt, has an
internal financial regulation which stipulates that payment can only be made after 90 days for any
goods or services sold to them. So where do we get the money to pay Zambia Revenue Authority
(ZRA), if ZCCM can only pay after 90 days, and these days you are even luck if they (ZCCM) do
pay you after 90 days.
You remember my former partner in the light industrial area? Only 3 weeks ago, he was forced
to close down because he failed to pay the K100,000 (US $100) per day fee that ZRA are
demanding he pays them as penalty for failing to pay them within the stipulated 21 days period,
when ZCCM has not even paid him.
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Mashamba: But have you brought this problem to the attention of either ZRA or Government?
Naik: Do you think we could be waiting for our businesses to go under if there was anything we
could do? These guys are simply not listening.
When contacted on this same issue, ZRA officials said that their duty was to implement
government legislation and referred all queries on the 21 days ultimately to the Minister of
Finance. The 21 days maximum period for VAT returns imposed by the ZRA coupled with the 90
days payment by the ZCCM are obviously working against firms dependent on the mining
conglomerate for construction business. Adopting cash transactions for VAT remittances to ZRA
like in many other countries, rather than base it on sales receipts would save these firms from
their current problems. Furthermore, with runaway inflation currently running at over 40%, and
bank interest rates at over 50% (having peaked at 110%), it is obviously to ZCCM's advantage to
have this 90 days grace payment period. However, it is detrimental to the selling companies who,
by the time they receive their payment, will have the real value of the Kwacha drastically cut..
Being a giant company, no single company has the capacity to force ZCCM to change its internal
financial regulations. This may be another good reason for calls quickly to break down ZCCM
into smaller units and privatise it.
4.7.2 Company and Income Tax changes
Despite recent attempts in the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 1995 to widen and lessen the tax
burden for the few Zambians in formal employment, Zambia still remains one of the most highly
taxed countries in the world. With company tax and the highest income tax bracket set at 35%
and 30% respectively (reduced from 35% in January 1996), it is no wonder that ZACCI and ZAM
are always complaining to government for a reduction in this rate. They argue that a reduction in
company and income tax rates will help to encourage more investment and reduce the current
high rate of tax evasion. Arguably, the reduction of both company' 4
 and the highest income tax
bracket, from 35% to 30%, is a step in the right direction, but a mechanism to tax the growing
informal sector continues to elude the Zambian government. More and more public sector
workers continue to be retrenched only to find work in the informal sector. Unless this sector is
taxed, very soon government revenue from income tax will drop drastically as the formal sector
continues to shrink under the Structural Adjustment Programme.
One way of ensuring this in the construction industry would be to enforce a compulsory
contractor/supplier registration system with the local councils, such that only those registered
with the council would be allowed to undertake work in their areas, at a fee. As long as this fee
14Th,s only applies to companies listed on LuSE
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was kept as low as possible, it would raise some money for the Government which could then be
used in the development process.
The high rate of inflation in Zambia has also added to the effect of eating into the pockets of
individuals and companies each time there is an increase, as this example below by the ZACCI
illustrates.
A company with a working capital of K100 million makes a net profit of 50 per
cent or K50 million. Very high, but then inflation exaggerates profits. On this
profit the company pays 35% tax amounting to K17.5 million. Because of cash
constraints, the shareholders receive no dividend. Instead the company ploughs
back all the money after tax profit of K32.5 million to start the next year with a
working capital of K132.5 million. That looks good. But inflation was 100 per
cent, so in order to maintain operations at the level of the previous year the
company now needs a working capital of K200 million. Had it not been charged
company tax, the enterprise would have ended the year with K150 million to make
a loss in real terms of K50 million. Despite that loss, it is assessed to pay tax of
K17.5 million. The taxing of illusory profits caused by inflation amounts to
confiscation of capital. (Zambia Association for Chambers of Commerce and
Industry [ZACCI] Profit, October 1995 p.14.)
The above scenario, therefore, encourages more and more individuals into informal investment
were they do not pay any taxes. It is important to note that the administrative arrangement of the
Zambia Revenue Authority has already begun to bear fruit. For instance, the Chairman of the
ZRA announced at a press conference in Lusaka that, for the first time the ZRA was able to
surpass Government revenue target in 1995 by 14%, collecting K546bn ($546m) against the
targeted K480bn ($480m).
4.8.0 Infrastructure rehabilitation
There can be no exaggerating the critical role played by infrastructure in the establishment of an
enabling environment in any country. Raj (1994), in a research study carried out in India,
demonstrated that areas/towns or countries with good physical infrastructure facilities are
relatively better equipped to attract industrial and commercial activities. The realisation of this
fact by the Zambian government has led to some very fundamental decisions being made during
this period of structural adjustment, and notable steps have already been taken in the fields of
roads and telecommunications.
When the MMD took office in 1991, the road network had almost totally collapsed due to years
of neglect. Equally run down were the water reticulation system in all the urban centres and the
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telecommunication network. With government coffers almost empty and the crucial role played
by our roads in the land locked country fully realised, the government in 1993 devised a fuel levy
which was put into an account for the purpose of road maintenance and repairs managed by the
Roads Management Board. As roads constitute a major part of the construction industry, the road
rehabilitation exercise is dealt with in more detail in the next chapter.
In the area of Telecommunications, the government's first move was to break down the then
"giant" Posts and Telecommunications Company into its two main constituency areas of Postal
services under the new Zambia Postal Company and telecommunications under the Zambia
Telecommunications Company (ZAMTEL). Both companies have been given more autonomy in
fixing (market) prices and in everyday management in an effort to improve efficiency.
Unfortunately, the business community continue to cry out over poor services, despite the
increase in prices under the market economy.
The introduction of the electronic mail and mobile telephones on the Zambian telecommunication
market by private institutions are factors that have no doubt helped in enhancing business
operations and opportunities. Business information is now readily available on the World Wide
Web, offering investment opportunities to investors all over the world.
4.9.0 Impact of Planning and Building regulations on the construction industry
Ideally and in most developed countries, planning and building regulations are normally intended
to ensure health, safety, and convenience of all residents. In Third World countries, however,
research has shown that most planning and building regulations are inappropriate to local socio-
economic conditions and, therefore, only contribute to retarding construction programmes and
projects (Habitat, 1985a; Habitat, 1985b) Whereas there are no problems with the safety and
health aspect of these two regulations, there is every reason to question the imposition of
minimum planning and building standards, which ultimately restrict the number of settlements
and buildings that can be allowed to develop (Briscoe, 1988, p. 219; Gakenheimer and Brando,
1987, pp. 133-134). Research in various parts of the World has shown that the imposition of high
planning and building standards in the Third World, and in particularly Sub-Saharan Africa have
had the effect of promoting foreign imported construction materials or local materials produced
by large-scale and often public sector companies (Moavenzadeh, 1987, p. 97). The promotion of
the local and small scale production industry in countries like Zambia, is therefore, limited by
these outdated colonial planning and building regulations.
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Birkeland (1968, p.129) has argued that, rather than impose minimum standards that are a
hindrance to the development of new materials and designs, planning and building regulations
should consist of:
(a) functional requirements stating in general terms what purposes the building or component
should achieve, for example, the structure of a building must sustain the combined dead and
imposed load without loss of stability; and
(b) performance standards qualifying minimum measurable levels which must be attained, for
example, the thermal transmittance of a wall.
In Zambia, planning and building legislation are governed by the Town and Country Planning Act
of 1965, and the Local Government (Urban Building and Drainage) regulations of 1968
respectively. Both laws are basically British colonial planning and building legislation which
have not been amended in recent years. The problem with these regulations, especially the Urban
Building and Drainage regulation Part IV which deals with materials and methods oL
construction, is that they are based on specifications of conventional designs rather than on
performance standards, i.e. they specify materials and minimum dimensions to be used, such that,
should new research and technology come up with better materials that can achieve the same
performance standards but with less dimension, the new material fails to meet the requirements of
the Act (law).
For example, the building regulations on materials and construction of floor slabs specifies that:
The ground floor of every new building which is in immediate contact with the
ground shall be constructed of concrete of not less than three inches thick
composed of not less than one part cement to two parts of approved sand and four
parts of approved coarse aggregate laid on a properly consolidated bed (Chapter
480 of the Laws of Zambia, part iv, Section 50 (1) Materials and construction).
This regulation effectively limits the variety of materials and methods of construction used in the
construction of floor slabs. It further hinders the future research and development of other types
of materials and construction that can satisfy the same safety and health standards as provided by
the above regulation. Countless similar examples exist in the Zambian planning and building laws
that tend to hinder the future development of other materials and construction methods.
Surprisingly, very few respondents, including prominent Zambian architects and engineers saw a
need in making changes to these two Acts. An overwhelming 82% and 83% of respondents were
of the opinion that adopting appropriate planning and building regulation respectively, would
have little or no direct impact on their business. Maybe this only goes to validity Gakenheimer
and Brando's (1987, p.140) findings that "suppliers are a clear case of vested interest in higher
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infrastructure standards". As is to be expected, the 10% of respondent that advocated a revision in
both planning and building regulations were in the timber business and all wanted regulations
changed to allow for timber houses in council controlled areas.
Another area in which a change in the building regulation would help the local Zambian
construction industry would be in the Act to allow for Clay pipes in sanitation construction, rather
than insist on Asbestos and cast iron pipes, which are mainly imported from outside or have a
high import component. Allowing the use of clay pipes would encourage the small scale
entrepreneurs to venture into their production, thereby contributing to employment creation and at
the same time saving the country foreign exchange.
4.10.0 Summary
In this chapter we have seen that, although the Zambian government has tried to create an
enabling environment for private sector investment, as prescribed in the theories of the Structural.
Adjustment Programme and shelter enablement, the enabling environment is far from being
achieved. This has been mainly to the fact that both private and public investment has not gone
into GFCF, which as a result has been falling. But as Zambia's graduation from the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) to the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) has
demonstrated, much has been achieved in the last 5 years. On the other hand, the most striking
reason for some of the failures point to the lack of political will on the part of government to
implement in full the Neo-Liberalist conditionalities, especially as time drew near to the
September/October, 1996 general elections.
Undoubtedly, the other mistake that the Zambian government made in her effort to create an
enabling environment was to delay the implementation of most of these measures, i.e.,
privatisation and the sale of public housing stock, as little time is now left for the benefits of these
measures to filter through in the economy. Looking back at the decision to give away council
housing stock built before 1959 free to sitting tenants, and the indecision to tax the growing
informal sector, it is very clear that political expediency is taking precedence over economic and
developmental matters. Unless this practice is reversed, it is hard to see how long economic
sustainability will last in Zambia, and whether private sector confidence will continue in view of
continued party political decisions at the expense of national development.
Having analysed the effects of creating an enabling environment on the construction industry and
business as a whole, we now move to look at very specific sectors of the construction industry,
beginning with construction financing and investment in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five: Construction investment and financing under adjustment conditionalities
5.1.0. Introduction
In the last chapter we drew attention to the efforts by the Zambian government in trying to create
a enabling environment, an environment in which the private sector is supposed to be playing a
very important role in the economy, both in the construction industry and the macro-economy. In
this chapter, we now turn our attention to the specific aspects of the resultant liberalised economy
as prescribed by both SAP and the Enabling Shelter Strategy, and in so doing see how structural
adjustment and the liberalised economy have affected the investment and financing patterns in the
Zambian construction industry.
This chapter should therefore, be read against the background that the Zambian capital market has
over the past years been controlled by way of various restrictive government legislation, thereby
creating a situation of capital flight out of Zambia. This situation was brought about as a result of
the insecurity that most successful Zambian and foreign entrepreneurs felt consequent to the mass
nationalisation that occurred in the late 1960's and early 1970s. Consequent to this, the problem in
Zambia has not been so much the lack of capital for domestic investment, but the flight to other
countries of capital which would otherwise have been invested in Zambia (Nkhata, 1993, P. 27).
Given that investment in real estate requires large amounts of money, for individuals this
normally takes a life time savings, a good and sound financial market is of paramount importance
to the construction market. Without it, the would-be buyers of houses, offices, and other
construction products would have no access to large amounts of funding with which to purchase
or finance their construction demand. It follows, therefore, that low construction demand
emanating from the lack of financial resources will ultimately result in low construction supply
on the construction market.
5.2.0 Investment opportunities in the construction industry
Although we have said that the construction industry plays an important role in national
development, it is equally important to note that, in a liberalised economy, individuals and
institutions are free to choose what sector of the economy to invest in. This decision obviously
takes into account many factors, but ultimately the investor is most interested in the rate of return
from his/her investment input. In other words, the construction business is an economic activity
just like any other in the economy, at least in terms of attracting both local and foreign private
investors. Investors, thus, always have to weigh investment returns in the construction industry
with returns in other industries within the same economy and with other construction investments
and other business investments in other countries, so as to maximise and safe guard their
investment returns. In this regard, therefore, the onus is with national Governments to create
secure and attractive business environments that best attract private international capital to invest
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in their countries. Every Government is busy trying to attract capital and resources from other
countries to invest in their national economies, and to further channel this investment in Gross
Fixed Capital Formation amid reduced public sector investment. It is important, however, to
make the distinction between investing in construction supply, i.e. construction plant and
machinery and construction facilities i.e. schools, houses, roads, offices, and so on. To avoid that
confusion, we shall refer to investors in construction plant and machinery (contractors,
consultancies, manufactures and suppliers) as construction investors, whilst investors in
construction output such as houses, schools and so, will be refereed to as property developers. In
making the distinction between property development and construction investment it is important,
however, to note that construction investment is directly related to property development, in that
increased property development leads to increased construction investment in the construction
industry and vice versa. In other words, therefore, property investment is basically construction
demand as discussed in chapter two under the subsection titled construction demand.
The creation of an enabling environment is important as we have seen in the foregoing Chapter.
However, it is equally important that the supporting infrastructure and institutional framework are
prepared if some specific industries like the construction sector can be attracted to invest in that
particular economy. For the construction industry, support structures, institutions, and facilities
like sound and well developed capital and financial markets are needed. Capital and fmancial
markets as we shall see later, are catalysts and engines for the growth of the construction industry.
This point, however, should not be taken to mean that the presence or absence of a sound capital
and financial market is the only significant factor in attracting and maintaining investors in the
construction industry and property developers.
The predominant reason why investors choose the construction industry is because of the
background specialisation that they already have, i.e., civil and structural engineers, architects,
quantity surveyors, painters, bricklayers, and so on.
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Fig. 5.1 Reasons for going into construction business
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Ideally there is no reason why we should despair in the fact that the Zambian construction
industry consists of about 40% of investors who come in because of the working experience they
have had. This is particularly true for the consultancy and contractor sectors of the economy,
where government regulations still demand that a certain level of construction skills be attained
by the investor/s in the company before it can be allowed to operate. For instance, architectural,
quantity and valuation surveying, structural and civil engineering, building and civil construction
all need registered professionals before the companies can be allowed to formally practise. In the
consultancy sector, the law goes even further to bar such professionals from being employed by
non-registered persons. Thus all construction consultancy firms are owned by their appropriate
professionals in Zambia. Whereas we are not suggesting that the practise of ensuring that such
firms are manned by qualified personnel be discontinued, it is quite absurd to insist that they be
owned by such professionals. It surely would benefit the Zambian construction industry if
investors without the necessary professional qualifications were allowed to invest and own firms
in this sector, provided they employed qualified personnel as required by the law. This would also
lead to such consultancy firms being able to float their companies on the Lusaka Stock Exchange
(LuSE) as a possible source for extra capital for improvements, modernisation and expansion.
5.2.1 Future investment patterns in the construction industry
Whereas it is very important to attractive potential new investors to the construction industry, it is
equally important to retain old and "seasoned" investors within the industry, knowing very well
that other sectors of the economy provide equal if not better rates of returns to investors. For
example similar studies in Nigeria on the impact of structural adjustment on that country's
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housing investment market, environmental improvement and urban productivity levels, found that
most small scale investors had switched their investments from building housing for rent to more
short-term-return businesses like commercial (trading) and transport activities (CASSAD, 1991).
Similar sentiments have equally been expressed in Zambia, by both the Zambia Chambers of
Commerce and Industry (ZCCI) and the Zambia Association Manufacturers (ZAM), to the effect
that the advent of SAP has seen more and more investors shifting from the productive sector to
the mere trading in imported goods (Sanderson, 1993, p18-19). Although this view is not strongly
supported by our field data, there is still a strong case for supporting and reassuring existing
construction investors. For instance, table 5.1 shows that there are serious reservations from most
respondents on the future prospects of the Zambian construction industry.
Table 5.1 Respondents views on the future of the construction industry by sector in %
Thoughts for the Getting	 No change Likely to Not sure
future	 worse	 improve
Suppliers/Traders	 24	 3	 30	 43
Consultants	 5	 43	 30	 22
Manufactures	 34	 38	 7	 21
Contractors	 18	 33	 11	 38
TOTALS	 18	 31	 19	 32
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Table 5.1 above, shows the high uncertainty surrounding the construction industry, where 32% of
our respondents were not quite sure as to what the future held for them. Equally worrying is the
high percentage of respondents, 49% (18+31%) in total who envisaged the current gloomy
position of the industry continuing for the next five years or worsening even further (refer to 4.1
which shows continuous declines in GFCF from 1990 and table 4.1 showing minimum new
housing stock). Only a mere 19% of all the respondents had positive hopes in the future of the
industry, i.e., saw that the likelihood of things picking up. If construction investors are to be
discouraged from leaving this industry and invest in other sectors of the economy, they should be
encouraged and assured by the government through the necessary construction indicators, like
high construction demand and low construction costs.
What is worse about this particular variable, is that both contractors and manufacturers of
construction materials, which are more labour intensive than consultancy and material supplying
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sectors 1, both recorded lower positive expectations 11% and 7%, respectively, as compared to
30% for both consultancy and materials supplying. If these expectations were to be realised as
feared by the respondents, then the programme to create more employment opportunities through
the construction industry, as postulated by Tipple (1994b) and Woodfield (1989), will have been
greatly curtailed.
However, when the same sample was asked whether they planned to remain in the same
construction business in which they were currently engaged, an overwhelming 63% said yes, with
only 10% contemplating leaving (see table 5.2). Given the high percentage of professionals and
craftsman in the industry, rather than mere investors 2, it is easy to understand the reluctance to
leave this industry and pursue other investment opportunities, even though most of them are not
optimistic of the future.
Table 5.2 Business plans for the next five years by sector in %
Business plans for Remain in Not sure	 Leaving Constr.
the next 5 years	 Constr.	 ______________ sector
SupplierslTraders	 63	 27	 10
Consultants	 79	 13	 8
Manufacturers	 63	 25	 12
Contractors	 73	 24	 3
TOTALS	 63	 27	 10
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Of the total 10% of respondents that were contemplating leaving the construction industry, it was
not surprising to note that 93% were thinking of going into some other form of business (possibly
trading), with 5% thinking of taldng their businesses outside Zambia. The remaining 2% just
wanted to either retire or simply close down.
5.3.0 Resource mobilisation for Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)
Among the catalogue of problems facing many property developers to increase gross fixed capital
formation in Zambia and indeed many other Third World countries, the lack of fmancial
resources stands out as the most crucial single obstacle (Habitat, 1996, p. 202). The financial
1 The labour intensiveness of the four sectors of the construction industry are discussed in chapter 6.
2By mere investors, we refer to investors who investor in the construction output for profit motive, i.e. selling cement,
aggregates and so on, rather that those that have construction qualifications like Architects and Civil Engineers.
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market has not been well developed to deal with the domestic problems, more so with the vast
numbers of individuals and households that are prepared to build structures using informal
financial arrangements. What is particularly worrying is the revelation in recent studies that up to
70% of capital resources for low income housing is sourced from non-formal financial
institutions, and yet most Third World countries continue to ignore this very important sector of
their financial market (Abdallah, 1993, p. 5). The quest, therefore, by the Zambian government to
mobilise personal and institutional savings from among its citizens, who hitherto externalised
their savings for lack of financial security and confidence in the domestic market, is
understandable and desirable.
5.3.1 Savings mobilisation
No financial market can be said to survive without a corresponding source of willing and able
savers, as after all, the financial market is made up of the interaction between savers and
borrowers. The mobilisation of savings is the basis of modern day financial markets, and income
is a chief determinant of savings. This means (all things remaining the same) that the higher the
levels of income, the higher the expected levels of savings. It is important to note that savers are
ordinary individuals or institutions that are willing to postpone their consumption if they can be
convinced that the benefits are worth it, in other words they will not lose out in the process but
will end up making some sort of gain. In this respect, therefore, low inflation, interest rates, and
the feeling of security are the key determinants of the willingness of the people and institutions to
save.
In our study we found that the biggest single source of funding for construction companies was
from savings (40%) and family help (12%), with the remaining 48% subdivided among pensions,
money lenders, and loans from both the informal and formal sectors. Although savings was the
single most important source of financing for construction companies, it was also interesting to
note that 76% of those companies that used savings as their source of construction finance were
founded before 1991: the adjustment period. This does not come as a surprise, considering the
very high bank base rates that have been prevailing in the country, immediately after the
liberalisation of the Zambian financial market. During the adjustment period, the total percentage
of companies using savings as a source of construction investment fell to 34% from 40% prior to
the Adjustment period. The fall in the savings source was thus taken up by an increase in family
help 12% to 19% during the same period. Not surprisingly, there was also a total reduction in
bank and informal money lending as a source of construction finance during the adjustment
period. This can only be attributed to the very high interest rates that continue to prevail in the
Zambian economy.
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Fig. 5.2 Sources of construction finance (up-to 1990)
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Note, however, that there has been an increase from 6% to 16% in the use of pension funds in
financing construction investment in the last five years as compared to the period before
Adjustment in just 5 years. One possible explanation for this is the high number of retrenchments
in the public sector that have been witnessed in the period under review, and these people having
to set up their own construction companies in the private sector. This explanation carries more
weight if we consider the fact that 38% of all those engaged in the construction industry went into
this type of business because of the construction expertise that they possess. What was surprising,
however, was the very low number of people, especially from the informal sector, that had relied
on informal sector lending as their main source of construction finance. There is no significance
difference in the use of informal sector loans to finance construction investment, prior and after
SAP in 1991. This was only 1% prior to the Adjustment era and 0% during the Adjustment
period. One possible explanation to this is the fact that informal sector lending is, by and large, an
illegal activity in Zambia, and most respondents opted not to "incriminate" themselves by stating
the true source of their finance.
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Fig 5.3 Sources of construction finance for firms formed between 1991-1996.
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Another striking observation, comes from looking at the sources of construction finance of all the
companies formed during the adjustment period, when broken up into their individual sectors,
i.e., Traders, Manufactures, Consultants and Contractors. In this instance, all the companies that
financed their initial investment through loans were in the consultancy sector and all of the loans
were non-bank loans. Another distinct feature about consultancy companies is their reliance on
formal structures for investment sources. These would be in the form of savings (money realised
from private commissions-moonlighting) rather than the more personal and unorthodox methods
of pensions and family help. Given the highly skilled personnel encountered at this level
(consultancy), it is understandable that they should prefer the more western and formal
investment structures.
The picture is somewhat different with the less skilled levels encountered when looking at
traders/suppliers and contractors which are dominated by less skilled entrepreneurs. With traders
and contractors we see a large percentage of companies relying on the more personal sources of
family help, savings and pensions. In view of Government intentions to strengthen the small
scale construction companies, it is, therefore, important to take note that small and less skilled
COnStruction companies are largely dependent on informal and more personal sources of
Construction finance. Clearly our data points to the fact that providing more money for
Construction investment and financing through conventional bank loan facilitates is not a an
Option that would assist most small and medium scale construction firms, considering the very
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low percentage (0%) of respondents willing and able to take advantage of the bank loans through
the current bank structures. We shall elaborate on this subject under subsection: 5.6.0 The role
played by commercial banks.
Fig. 5.4a Sources of construction finance by Sector (1991-1996)
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Fig. 5.4b Sources of construction finance by sector in % (199 1-1996)
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5.3.1.1 High inflation rates
When looking at construction investment and financing during the past 5 years of Structural
Adjustment, it is of paramount importance that we also take a critical look at the varying rates of
inflation that have been prevailing. In so doing, we shall also take a look at the in-built measures
of fighting inflation within the Structural Adjustment Programme, and see how far this affected
the Zambian economy and the construction industry in particular. Inflation is said to be the fall in
the value of money as prices increase. Since inflation erodes the value of money, it can therefore,
be taken that savers will lose out on their savings if the rate of interest is below the rate of
inflation. In this instance, it is generally assumed that would-be savers would then prefer to buy
real estates, whose values tend to go up with the rate of inflation to offset losses due to inflation.
This phenomenon thus translates into a situation of boom-times in the housing and real estates
market in times of high inflation, as savers tiy to fend off inflation. Indeed this has proved to be
the case, at least in the Western World, but can the same result be replicated in the Third World
like Zambia?
The Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy can both be said to be
inherently inflationary in their nature, at least in the short term and immediately after their
application, as subsidies are removed and market prices are introduced. In the medium and long
term, however, prices are then expected to stabilise, and the rate of inflation is expected to fall as
well (Sinha, 1995). This phenomenon has been manifest in Zambia, where almost all subsides on
basic goods and services were removed, raising inflation to unprecedented levels. The
liberalisation of the foreign exchange controls was one other important component that also
helped in pushing up prices and inevitably inflation, especially for those goods and services that
are imported into Zambia. In actual fact the prices of almost everything went up because of the
corresponding increase in the price of fuel. The price of fuel is always fluctuating because it has
to be imported from outside using the market foreign exchange and, then transported to
landlocked Zambia, through other countries.
By the end of the year 1992 (after a full year of adjustment policies), inflation had reached its
peak at 19 1.3% p.a., see fig. 5.5 below. Apart from the obvious implications of such a steep rise,
the net effect on the construction industry was a slow down of construction activities, and an
increase in the rate of abandonment of existing construction sites, as original budgets were over-
shot by inflation and the cost of borrowing more than doubled. This would explain the very high
rate of abandonment of construction projects during the last five years. Our study found that the
rate of construction abandonment reached 27% in the consultancy sector and only 7% for
144
Chapter Five: Construction investment and financing under adjustment conditionalities
contractors, indicating that most construction projects were cancelled at "drawing board stage"
rather than on site.
Fig. 5.5 Annual average inflation rates based on consumer price indices
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We have already pointed out that adjustment policies are inherently inflationary. It must equally
be said that adjustment policies also have in-built measures to fight and reduce inflation, given its
adverse effects on industry and long term economic stability in the macro-economy. It therefore
came as no surprise when, towards the end of 1992, with inflation at almost 200%, the
Government quickly introduced some stabilising measures in the economy in an effort to arrest
the run-away (hyper) inflation which was hitting industry and consumers. The key measures taken
included the introduction of the "cash budget" and of the issuing of Treasury bills, liberalisation
of the commercial banking loan rates, and the increase of the reserve ratio for commercial banks
in an effort to reduce liquidity in the economy. No doubt these measures had their desired effects,
as inflation was successfully brought down from 193% at the end of 1992 to about 36% at the end
of 1996.
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However, the consequence or rather the side-effects of the above anti-inflationary measures to the
Zambian economy, and the construction industry in particular, were devastating. These measures
had the net effect of squeezing private credit and ultimately restricting (construction) demand. For
example, the introduction of the "Cash Budget3" system meant the postponement of most public
construction projects by the Zambian Government. Capital rather than recurrent expenditure was
always sacrificed by the Government in order to reduce inflation, because it is always easy for
Government to get away with the postponement of capital expenditure rather than tamper with
recurrent expenditure like wages and salaries for civil servants and public workers for obvious
political reasons. Although there has been much talk of infrastructure rehabilitation as part of the
structural adjustment programme, little or none has actually taken place, at least not with public
funds. It is no wonder that when asked how much the government programme of infrastructure
rehabilitation had helped his construction business, the Managing Director of Apollo enterprises,
a large scale civil and building contracting company, simply asked satirically in return "What
infrastructure rehabilitation programme? Where? Here in Zambia?"
The reduction in Government's budgetary allocation for capital expenditure is illustrated further
in Government's own records which show that, whereas in 1995 the government's recurrent
expenditure of K445,155 million ($445m) was exceeded by almost 19%, capital expenditure was
reduced by 45% from the budgeted K82,125m [$82.125m] to only K48,254m [$48.254m]
(Zambia, Republic of, 1996, p. 38).
5.3.1.2 High interest rates (Base rates)
Another important component affecting savings and consequently construction investments and
fmance involves the movements of commercial bank (base) rates. Commercial bank base rates
have been observed to run almost parallel to the rates of inflation, although there is a noticeable
time tag between them. It is not surprising, therefore, that, during the period 1992 and 1994 when
inflation was at its highest in Zambia, some commercial bank base rates also reached
unprecedented levels, peaking at an average rate of about 100% with savings and fixed deposits
interest rates concurrently running at about 65% and 80% respectively (Profit, various between
1993-194).
Although the above drastic rise in base rates can be attributed directly to the monetary squeeze
brought about under the Structural Adjustment Programme, the introduction of treasury bills by
the government as a source for debt serving almost at the same time exacerbated the rise. With
3Cash Budget system of accounting refers to a type of budget in which the Government only makes available money
for items if and when that money is available in government coffers.
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about 43% of Zambia's $6.3 billion dollar debt owed to multilateral creditors and not, therefore,
eligible for rescheduling, there was no way that the Zambian government could have included
debt servicing on the "Cash Budget," hence the introduction of Treasury Bills to finance this
aspect of the budget (World Bank, 1994, PP. 78-85). The credit squeeze brought about by the cash
budget and treasury bills on the monetary market, therefore, meant that government had to come
up with excessively high short term rates if the scheme was to work, and it would appear that this
is exactly what happened.
Fig. 5.6 Commercial Bank interest (base) rates between 1990-1996
Source : Profit (various), from 1990-1996
Three types of treasury bills were introduced, 28, 91, and 128 day bills, with the immediate
consequent of raising interest rates on the financial market. The very attractive rates for treasury
bills also meant that there was an apparent deviation of capital from the productive private sector,
i.e., construction and manufacturing, to these short term securities. Short term securities were not
only risk free, unlike construction and manufacturing businesses which can sometimes incur
losses, but also guaranteed real investment returns of over 100% within a year, compared to the
relatively low 40% returns associated with the construction and manufacturing industries (see
rates in appendix II). Not surprising, 80% of the respondents were unhappy with the effects high
interest rates were having on their businesses, compared to only 7.5% who said they were
satisfied with the prevailing rates. The other 12.5% of the respondents were not sure whether the
prevailing high rates were working to their advantage or not. Given the very high interest rates
from treasury bills which have been well above the rates of inflation, it is surprising that some
private investors are still engaged in these other forms of businesses, with all the business risks
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involved, when they can simply buy Government treasury bill and be guaranteed huge profits
after 28, 91 or 128 days.
To illustrate our point, let us take an investor interested in investing say K6m in the Zambian
economy. With K6m he/she can build a low cost house of 50 square metres (at current rates of
K120,000 per square metres, but excluding land costs and consultancy fees), and rent it out at a
maximum rate of K150,000 per month in Lusaka (K80,000 in Kitwe), less 15% Government
withholding tax on rental income; leaving a monthly income of K127,500 (K68,000 in Kitwe).
However, investing the K6m in Treasury bills or a fixed deposit account with a 50% interest rate
(p.a.) would give the investor K212,000 4 as his/her first monthly return, and the sum would be
increased in subsequent months. Given the acute problems of securing serviced land in the three
cities, it is easy to see why most investors will prefer to invest in high yielding securities than in
housing or real estate.
High interest rates have also worked against the construction industry, as public resources have
gone into servicing the huge internal debt. The debt was mainly a result of donors' withholding
and/or reducing their aid commitment to Zambia, following the MM]Ys government change of
qualifications for aspiring candidates in the 1996 Republican Presidential elections.
Consequently, increased internal borrowing in 1996 resulted in the Government having to pay a
total of K98bn on interest repayments for its loans with Commercial banks in the first three
quarters of 1996, and yet only K32bn was spent on capital programmes in the same period
(Financial Mail, 17/12/1996). Bilateral and multilateral aid agreements not only have lower rates
of interest5, but also have longer repayment periods, which makes them more economical than
borrowing from Commercial banks, especially with market rates of over 50% p.a.
5.4.0 The Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE)
In capitalist societies, the Stock Exchange has always been the traditional arena for trading in
existing securities. Shares are bought and sold on the stock market and ownership of industry can
easily be changed by the number of shares owned. By offering shares on the Stock Exchange, it
is, therefore, possible for the company to raise capital for its operations. By the same token, a new
company can raise its initial capital on the market by selling new issues. The advantages of the
stock exchange in raising capital for industry lies in its ability to offer many shares priced in small
amounts, thus attracting both small and large investors, without necessarily involving them in the
day to day management of the company. With the Government already having made its decision
6,OOO,OOO x 50/100 x 1/12= 250,00 less withholding tax on interest of 15%, thus K212,500 per month.
5Previously Zambia was borrowing at rates of about 5-8% from the IMF and the World Bank under SAP, but following
Zambia's graduation from SAP to ESAF in 1996, the rate has been reduced to 0.5%.
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to withdraw from active participation in industry and the economy as a whole, the establishment
of a stock market in Zambia was, therefore, a positive step by the Government, in an effort to
raise investment and productivity in Zambia.
To this end, the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) was opened on the 21st of February 1994, with
great expectations that this move would help in mopping-up small individual and institutional
savings in the economy and then channel them onto the productive sector. After two years of slow
business, and with only eight companies trading, the Government has given a tax incentive to all
those companies that will trade their shares on the LuSE, in the form of a reduction of company
tax paid to Government from 35% to 30%, beginning from the 1st. of April 1996. It is, however,
too soon to judge the effectiveness of this 5% company tax reduction on encouraging many other
companies to list their shares on the Lusaka Stock Exchange. Other incentives given by
Government include the non-payment of property transfer tax on listed securities and capital
gains tax. With such attractive incentives and innovative ways of re-capitalising ailing companies,
it is hard to understand why parastatals and other firms in the construction sector, like the
National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS) have not
taken up this challenge.
The privatisation and subsequent listing of Chilanga Cement PLC the sole cement manufacturer
in Zambia on the Lusaka Stock Exchange, has demonstrated that stock exchange flotation can be
one of the best ways of re-capitalising ailing (public construction) firms, especially in this era of
high interest (base) rates. We shall have more to say on the achievements of Chilanga Cement in
meeting local and export orders in Chapter seven, when we shall examine the industry's response
to the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy in increasing
productivity and supply.
5.5.0 The role of the Building Societies
Historically the state owned Zambia National Building Society (ZNBS) has been the sole
financial institution concerned with the financing of housing and other real estate (on the demand
side), since the nationalisation of all other building societies in Zambia in 1968. The Structural
Adjustment Programme has since ensured that the building society market is fully liberalised with
the amendments to the Zambia Building Society Acts No. 46 of 1968 and No. 67 of 1970, which
now allows for private competition in this market. In the strict legal sense, the Zambia Building
Society Acts No. 46 and 70 of 1968 and 1970 respectively did not bar any private entrepreneurs
from establishing their own building societies in competition to the ZNBS. What they did was to
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instil fear of nationalisation in any privately owned building society so that no private building
society was ever set up during the Second Republic.
It must be emphasised here that the main criticism with monopolies and state ownership of
Building Societies lies not so much on the type of ownership, but with Government intervention
in the day to day management of the Building Society. The Governments got involved in
determining mortgage rates, drawing up of criteria for mortgage borrowing, and the appointment
of the society's directors and managers. It is for this reason that the liberalisation of the building
society market was hailed with such great expectations within the construction industry,
especially that house prices have gone up and out of the reach of most Zambian savers. There
were hopes that competition in the building society market would work in the customer's
advantage.
Unfortunately and contrary to expectations, the liberalisation of the economy and the building
society market, which started in earnest about 1991, has failed to witness an influx of new
building societies to compete with the ZNBS. Whereas, for example there has been a number of
new commercial banks established in Zambia, only one new building society: Finance Building
Society (registered on the 20th of March 1996) has so far been established. Finance Building
Society was formed with a pledge to customers to focus on "the provision of attractive and
competitive investment rates." Nothing was said about offering competitive mortgage rates to
borrowers. Not surprising, therefore, when the new Finance Building Society fmally opened its
doors to customers on the 15th of July 1996, its mortgage rates set at 55% were no different from
its competitor the ZNBS.
As to what impact this new building society will have on the market remains to be seen. But
going by the existing high bank (and mortgage) rates prevailing in the country (at about 5 3-60%),
it is doubtful that this new Building Society will have an immediate effect on the housing market.
In the long run, however, when mortgage rates and interest rates eventually come down,
competition between building societies will help in bring down mortgage rates and enhance
efficiency in the market.
For the moment, the very high mortgage rates which have remained constant at about 50-60% for
some time, continue to be a very crucial stumbling block to many people's having access to
mortgages to finance their housing dreams. One branch manager of the Zambia National Building
Society actually confessed in an interview that, in the last 3 years, the society had relied solely on
business from its banking operations (savings accounts) rather than on mortgage lending. It was
150
Chapter Five: Construction investment and financing under adjustment conditionalities
further revealed that this same branch had not lent out money for mortgages for the first 9 months
of 1995! When asked why this was so, the manager simply answered, "At current mortgage rates,
not even people with well paying jobs like yourself can afford our mortgage rates". It was further
noted that, even with the Council's having to sell their low cost houses (then going at between
K2-4m [$2,000 to 4,000]), none of the tenants had even bothered to find out their mortgage
entitlement from this particular branch of the ZNBS!
5.6.0 The role played by Commercial banks
Commercial banks are not a traditional source of finance for long term construction finance like
housing and real estates, because of the long term repayment periods involved, although they do
sometimes provide some form of financing. In Zambia commercial banks have tended to favour
agriculture, manufacturing, trading, transport and communications, mining and building and
construction in that order (Zambia, Republic of, 1996, p. 40). The bias against lending to the
construction industry is further compounded by the fact that the Zambian Government's own
treasury bills offer very attractive short term rates 6 whereas lending to the construction industry
involves a number of years before repayments, let alone profits, start coming in. The use of
capital realised from treasury bills by Government to fmance recurrent expenditure only goes to
'fuel' inflation and further depress the productive sector of the economy.
Another significant factor that has led to the marginalisation of commercial banks as a source of
construction finance in Third World countries, and Zambia in particular, is the insistence by
commercial banks on the formal prerequisites to lending (based on developed countries) of
collateral, monthly (periodic) payments, and certificates of registration for companies. Yet it is a
well known fact that much lending goes on in most Third World countries based on informal
lending principles. For instance, we found that, from the 11% of respondents that got loans to
finance their businesses, only 3% got their loans from the commercial banks, whilst the other 8%
got theirs mainly from friends and relatives. Whereas there has been a more than 100% increase
in the number of commercial banks operating in Zambia in the last 5 years, mainly due to the
liberalised economy, there has been a surprisingly fall in the number of construction companies
obtaining loans from commercial banks in that same period (see fig. 5.2 and 5.3), from 3% prior
to the 1991 to 0% during the Adjustment period. The main reason for the fall in these numbers
has been the very high interest rates charged by commercial banks (which once reached 110%).
Although inflation has equally been very high, which should have made borrowing still cheaper
in the long run, the lack of business and the difficulties in getting stage payments (as we shall see
6See appendix II
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in Chapter seven) has meant that keeping up with bank repayments has been very difficult if not
impossible for most companies.
Although so far there is no known record of any construction company having gone bankrupt for
failing to settle periodic payments, unless the operational standing of these companies improves,
it is almost certain that those companies that took bank loans and have yet to finish repayments
will come or have come under increasing pressure of high interest rates. Luckily, as we have
already seen, our study suggests that very few construction companies are financed through bank
loans.
Fig. 5.7 Problems in obtaining financial assistance from commercial banks
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Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
5.6.1 The loss of savers' confidence (in the Zambian Banking system)
The liberalisation of the economy by the government in 1991, also saw the emergence of more
private and indigenous banks in the Zambian financial market, which had hitherto been
dominated by state owned and foreign owned banks. However, the austerity measures that have
accompanied the liberalisation of the economy (of which high interest rates have been the greatest
concern) have also meant that very few of the bank customers are able to repay their loans and
other obligations to these banks, rendering most banks vulnerable to collapse. Indeed, that is
exactly what happened in the latter half of 1995, when four of these indigenous banks all
collapsed (three of them in a period of two months). The first bank to close with the loss of
customers accounts was Capital Bank in May 1991. This was followed by Meridien Bank
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(Zambia) in May 1995, Commerce and African Commercial Banks in November 1995, and
finally the Co-operative Bank in December 1995.
Although commercial banks in Zambia do not play an important part in construction financing,
they do remain an important source of mobilising savings from small time savers to the (big)
capital market. It is, however, important to note that savings mobilisation is entirely dependent on
savers confidence in the banking system. The absence of savers' confidence can, therefore, be
very costly to an economy, especially one like Zambia which is trying to reduce inflation and
promote production through the mobilisation of savings from both individuals and institutions.
The direct impact on the economy of the loss of these banks, apart from obvious direct job losses,
was the loss of millions of Kwacha by individuals and companies (including construction
companies) that held accounts there. Money which would otherwise have been used in the
economy, and in the construction industry in particular, was lost and more job losses resulted
throughout the economy. The problem was made worse by the fact that one of the banks
(Meridien Bank-Zambia) was, by then, the second largest bank in Zambia, and its closure was
linked to unorthodox lending of money to the ruling Party the MMD, without any form of
collateral. As if that was not enough, the Zambian Government is said to have pumped in an
estimated KlSObn ($150m) of state money to resuscitate it against Bank of Zambia regulation and
advice. Yet at the same time governments in the rest of the World were busy taking over the
operations of Meridien Bank (International) for the sake of their customers and national
economies (Bull and Simpson, 1995, pp. 15-20). The Bank of Zambia Governor was
subsequently reported to have been fired for refusing to commit public money to rescue Meridien
Bank, resulting in the appointment of a new governor and the bailing out package going ahead,
although it still failed to rescue the bank (Times of Zambia, 26/11/95).
Arguably, the collapse of these three banks has little to do with the Structural Adjustment
Programme and enabling shelter strategy per Se, but it is very clear that, in the quest to promote
more private and indigenous banks, little attention was paid to policing and supervising these
banks. Consequently the national economy has suffered as a result of the low investor confidence
in the Zambian financial market, rather than benefiting from the envisaged trickle down effects. It
is not surprising, therefore, that, after this banking fiasco and the alleged Kl5Obn ($150m)
attempt to rescue the bank failed, the government immediately introduced many new taxes and
even printed money in an attempt to arrest the situation, more especially to balance its books for
the un-budgeted rescue package. The Government has since introduced new banking legislation
to prevent the situation recurring.
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The collapse of these indigenous banks has resulted in the steady rise in interest rates, which had
hitherto been brought under control 7, and the erosion of customer confidence in our financial
market, at a time when private capital is expected to play a very vital role in raising local
investment and production. The trend for Zambians to keep their savings and income in foreign
banks and countries is surely bound to continue.
Fig 5.8 Market share of Commercial Banks in Zambia: as at January 1995 in %
Source: Profit, June 1995, p. 19 (Arrows added to indicate the closed banks)
5.7.0 Informal sector financial market
Although the above problems in the Zambian financial market are on the extreme end of the
financial market in the Third World, they are by no means an exceptional case in the sort of
problems that continue to besiege these countries. The absence of appropriate and well developed
financial and capital market in most Third World countries has consequently led to the emergence
of a strong and vibrant informal financial market in its own right. According to Dr. Lawrence
Clarke, the Deputy Governor at the Bank of Botswana, in virtually all Third World countries,
only up to 25% of all household investment is financed by the formal financial market (Clarke,
1993, 28). Dr. Clarke's statement implies, therefore, that more than 75% of all household
investment in the Third World is financed by informal sector finance. Whereas, this statistic may
not come as surprise to many scholars dealing with Third World shelter issues, it is difficult to
understand why the informal finance market is largely ignored by the host Governments.
A one week seminar organised by the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and
Industry to look at the problems faced by small and medium scale entrepreneurs in Zambia
identified the lack of access to loans by medium and small scale companies as the major problem
7see fig. 5.6
154
Chapter Five: Construction investment and financing under adjustment conditionalities
inhibiting the growth of the Zambian export base (Financial Mail, 30/7/96). If, indeed, the formal
sector lending institutions are not helping the medium and small scale companies, it should
therefore, not come as a surprise that the informal sector financial market has taken advantage of
this situation to promote its own activities. In Zambia, for instance, informal sector lending goes
by the local name of "Kaloba" and normally attracts interest rates of about 100% per month.
Although this practice is very wide spread even among the educated people, it is still technically
illegal in the eyes of the law. In view of the great demand for loans and the unwillingness by the
formal market to help, it is important that governments, and particularly the Zambian
Government, recognise this market and regularise it before it is lost to unscrupulous people. Here
we have in mind drug barons and their money laundering activities which are well documented in
other countries. This worry is real if we consider the fact that, in the very recent past, the Zambian
Drugs Enforcement Commission (DEC) has been seizing large amounts of money, amounting t
Klbn ($lm) in cash, from drugs barons in Zambia, and the fear is that this drug money will fmd a
ready market (if it has not already) from the desperate households excluded by the formal market
(Grant, 1994, pp. 23-41).
5.8.0 Financing public construction programmes
Despite the introduction of the market economy based on the user pays principle, especially in the
construction market, it is important to note that there still exists the need for public construction
programmes to be undertaken by the Government and other public organs. Construction
programmes that still fall under public domain include the national road network, hospitals,
schools, universities, buildings for the police and security forces, and Government buildings.
Some of these public sector activities are now slowly being privatised and put in the hands of the
private sector. Education and health are being lined up for what the Government calls
"autonomous and self sustaining bodies," meaning that these bodies should generate enough
funds to fend for themselves. In the meantime, however, the Government still has the obligation
to fund public construction programmes but, in view of the severe economic problems already
alluded to in our study, the Zambian Government has now come up with new ways and means of
financing some of these programmes, albeit within the framework of the Adjustment programme
and its affiliated policy of shelter enablement.
In this connection, therefore, the overriding principle in sourcing fmance for public construction
programmes has been the idea that the users of that service should pay for its use and that no
government subsidies should be used. Where possible also, it is Government intention that the
private sector should be encouraged to provide some of the services on commercial basis that
have hitherto been provided by government. Already we have seen private schools, clinics and
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hospitals emerging under this scheme. For those services that still remain in public hands, user
tees have been introduced, for example in education and health, fees have already been
introduced, and most hospitals and schools are being rehabilitated using money collected under
the fee scheme. Sadly, despite the Government deliberate policy to rehabilitate public
infrastructure, maintenance works still only accounts for a fraction of all construction works in
Zambia. For example, we recorded from our field data that, of all construction works
commissioned, 46% were for completely new works or extensions, 41% consisted of a
combination of 75% new works and the 25% maintenance/repairs, and only 13% were mainly
maintenance or repair jobs. This finding is consistent with findings by Edmonds and Miles (1984,
p. 10) in other African countries, where repair and maintenance work was found to be on average
less than 15% of total construction output.
Plate 5.1. Example of Government owned school still in need of repairs-
Chilenje South Primary School in Lusaka
Admittedly, the fees that have so far been introduced fall short of what is needed to rehabilitate
and maintain the infrastructure, but this scheme of user pays, has saved the Government millions
of Kwacha. From the stand point of the construction industry, however, the most important factor
to come from this scheme was the ability of most public institutions to contract repairs and
routine maintenance. Examples of this include the rehabilitation works at the Kitwe and Ndola
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Central Hospitals and the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka, and primary and secondary
schools throughout Zambia that are constructing security fences and repairing leaking roofs and
broken glass panes. The beauty of it all is the fact that most of these works are at a small scale
and thus only attract local and small scale labour intensive contractors.
5.8.1 Fuel and toll gate levies
The neglect of the road infrastructure network in Zambia prior to the Third Republic8 was so
widespread and worrying that it quickly became an election issue in the 1991 presidential and
general elections. Promises were made by all political parties to rehabilitate the road network
within the shortest possible time, although none of the parties was able to show the electorate
how that was to be achieved. On assuming office in October 1991, it soon became apparent that
the new MMD government had underestimated the magnitude and extent of the financial
resources that were needed to carry out the road rehabilitation exercise through out the country.
For instance, in the first two years in government, with the structural adjustment programme in
full flow, the government was very much relying on donor funding to fmish off road repairs on
the national network that had been started by the previous government, totalling about 37,190
Kilometres. It thus became clear that other innovative and cost saving measures had to be sought
if any meaningful results were to be seen within the Government's term in office.
It was in this connection, therefore, that the government introduced the fuel levy in 1994 and the
National Roads Board to manage and administer this fund. The administrative arrangement for
this fund was that, for every litre of fuel bought at filling stations, the government through the
Board would levy Kl0 without subjecting it to VAT, and in turn use this money to maintain the
road network in the country. The levy was subsequently increased to 1(30 ($0.03) per litre of fuel
in the January 1995 budget and again to K40 ($0.04)per litre in the January 1996 budget.
Admittedly this fund continues to contribute immensely to the improvement of roads in Zambia.
Only recently, the Chairman of the National Roads Board, Mr Raymond Jhala, told the Zambian
press that, at the current levy of K40 ($0.04 has since depreciated to $0.03) per litre, it would take
1000 years to rehabilitate all of Zambia's roads (The Post, 25/7/96). The Roads department
estimates that Zambia needs on average about K65bn annually for effective national roads
maintenance programme, and yet the fuel levy only raises Kl5bn annually (National Roads
Board, 1996d).
8 Zambia's political history is divided into three Republic eras, the First Republic began with the birth of Zambia as
an Independent state from Britain in 1964 based on multi party politics, the Second Republic starts from 1971 when
Zambia abolished multi party politics for the One-Party political system, and finally the Third Republic is what
ushered in Multi-Party politics once again in 1991.
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Plate 5.2 A "once upon a time" tarred road in a high cost area of Kitwe.
What is more worrying are reports that the Ministry of Finance is deviating some of the money
trom the fuel levy for other recurrent expenses (Profit, July 1996, p.7). If this trend is to halted
and reversed it will be necessary to make the National Roads Board completely autonomous, with
separate accounts from those of the Ministry of Finance. It is also very important that the
Government quickly introduces the toll gates so that foreign truckers who buy fuel in their home
countries also contribute to the road maintenance scheme.
Despite, the pitfalls above, table 5.3 shows that tangible results in form of road construction
demand have been recorded as a result of the introduction of this fuel levy. Apart from the
obvious improvements to the road network, other economic knock-on effects were recorded in the
construction industiy. Records from the National Roads Board further show that a total of
K5,926.58m ($5.926m) had been disbursed to the 61 local councils as at January 1996. This
disbursement of fuel levy funds enabled most municipal and rural councils to engage local roads
construction companies in this road rehabilitation exercise. However, the three cities of Kitwe
(K500rn [$O.5m]), Ndola (K120m [$O.12m]) and Lusaka (K561.lm [$O.561m]) under study all
opted to engage mostly foreign construction companies for the same exercise. When asked why
they opted for foreign based companies to rehabilitate their roads, they all had the same answer
which was that, in the past, they had engaged local companies, only to be disappointed with the
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workmanship once the rains started, but this is not the case with the workmanship of foreign
based companies. According to one City Engineer who refused to be identified, "although the
tender price for these foreign companies tended to be higher than local ones, in the long run it was
a price worth paying, as it reduces future maintenance cost."
Table 5.3 Cash flow and disbursement by the National Roads Board during field survey
(between Sept. 1995 and Jan. 1996) in Km
_________________ September October November December January Total
a. Receipts	 ____________ _________ ____________ ___________ __________ _________
Fuel Levy	 900	 975	 900	 975	 975	 4,725
h. Payments	 ___________ _________ ___________ ___________ _________ _________
Councils	 1,780	 1,600	 2,757	 2,600	 1,200	 9,937
PREs	 450	 750	 543	 750	 000	 2,493
Consultancy	 50	 85	 100	 205	 000	 440
DifTerence (a - 1))	 -1,300	 -1,460	 -2,500	 -2,580	 -225	 -5,212
Pr v ncial Roads Engineers
Source: Mashamba 1996, survey data obtained from the National Roads Board, (March 1996d)
Plate 5.3 Part of the Kitwe-Chingola road under rehabilitation by Phoenix Contractors
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In the more remote municipal councils (especially those off the line of rail), local road
construction companies have continued to render a valuable service, mainly because foreign
based construction companies tend to big and capital intensive, thus making them even more
expensive and uneconomic for small rural contracts. This situation, consequently, makes rural
road contracts more attractive to local roads companies in Zambia, and gives them an opportunity
to perfect their workmanship in the trade, before tendering for much bigger and more complex
contracts in the urban areas/cities of Zambia, and possibly within the Sub-region. Though not by
design, we can thus say that rural roads projects in Zambia are indeed labour intensive and have
helped in creating local employment, by effectively fighting off capital intensive and foreign
based construction companies in the remote areas of Zambia.
5.8.2 Donor funded construction programmes
One remarkable and positive result of liberalising the Zambian economy in line with the
structural adjustment programme of the World Bank and the IMF has been the net increase in the
inflow of donor funds to Zambia. Prior to October 1991, the Western donor community had
shunned Zambia because of the previous government's rejection of the structural adjustment
programme as prescribed by the World Bank and the ilviF, in preference for its own programme
of "development from our own resources" which ultimately led Zambia and the International
Financial Institutions to part company 1987. The situation was made even worse in September
1991 just before the change of governments, when Zambia failed to settle a US $20.8 million debt
to the World Bank, and the World Bank retaliated by suspending the disbursement of funds
totalling US $78 million meant for various developmental projects in Zambia. However, with the
change of Governments in October 1991, and a new commitment to implement the structural
adjustment programme by the new MMD Government, Western governments were quick to fund
projects and programmes in Zambia. Within the first year of the new Government, foreign grants
increased by 215.5% from their 1990 levels. Some Western governments like Sweden, Finland
and Italy even went further to cancel all of Zambia's debts, whilst the British government
undertook to cancel 60% of Zambia's debt on condition that she followed and implemented the
structural adjustment programme (Zambia. Republic of, 1992, pp. 18-32).
The sectors that greatly benefited from this influx of donor funding are Water from the Gennan
Government, Roads from the American and Japanese governments, Maternity and Urban clinics
programmes by the Irish government, public health by the British government, and tertiary
education from the Japanese governments. All these projects and programmes called for the
construction and rehabilitation of new and existing infrastructure, which should have gone far in
supporting the local construction market. Unfortunately, however, most donor funded projects
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carry a component of foreign experts, contractors and imported materials, thus defeating the
postulated principle of the multiplier effect in the macro-economy of Zambia. This can be seen in
the donor-funded Livingstone to Chingola (885km) and the Lusaka to Chipata (567Km) road
rehabilitation exercises where all contractors are foreign based, the urban water sector programme
is being done by Germany experts, and so on. Some local Zambian firms currently do benefit one
way or another from this arrangement, but the benefit is minimum compared to what it could be if
Zambian firms were engaged on a large scale.
Given that these projects are funded from outside, there is little if anything that the Zambian
government can do. It is no wonder donor-assisted projects are seen as "the giving with the left
hand and taking away with the right" because, by engaging all these foreign experts, contractors
and imported materials, the supposedly donated funds ultimately return to their countries oi'
origin. Some would argue that some of these projects and programmes require expertise that is
currently not found in Zambia, hence the engagement of these foreigners, but how we you explain
the awarding of Chinese funded low cost housing in Ndola, to Chinese contractors? Surely there
are hundreds of Zambian contractors who are able and willing to put up low cost houses in
Zambia, using the much preferred labour intensive techniques (Mashamba, 1996).
With the current debt and financial position of Zambia, it is easy to understand the role of donor
funded projects, although this form of assistance should not be relied on heavily. One only hopes
that the dependence on this sort of funding should be gradually reduced with time, with private
sector finance increasingly taking the role of the hitherto public sector financing. Unfortunately,
events in the last five years show that Zambia is increasingly relying on donor funding for its
capital expenditure. For example, in the 1996 budget, it was envisaged that of the planned
K381.lbn for capital expenditure, K292.8bn or three quarters was to come from donor
contributions (Price Waterhouse, 1996, p. 18). Given the above experiences with donor funded
projects and programmes and the continued reliance on donor fmance for capital programmes, we
can predict that the construction industry in Zambia will remain prone to external shocks,
especially with the relationship between Zambia and the donor community. Already, the
Americans, British, Japanese and the Scandinavian countries have suspended their aid packages
to Zambia, in protest at the undemocratic practises of the MMD government relating to Dr
Kaunda's decision to stand for the 1996 presidential elections. Notwithstanding the suspension of
donor funding to Zambia, there is also great need for the Zambian Government to convince the
donors in one way or another to utilise Zambian expertise, contractors and materials or the
multiplier effect will never filter through to the rest of the economy. Evidently, this demand will
require that Zambian construction reaches international standards to satisfy the donors, but then
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again how do they reach that standard if they are not given contracts with which they can later
finance their modernisation process?
5.9.0 Summary
Much as the Zambian Government is trying to promote the productive sector, especially the
construction industry, with measures embedded in both SAP and the enabling shelter strategy
much remains to be done. In the short term, is would appear that the construction industry has not
faired quite as is postulated in the two development strategies. However, it is equally important to
note that some of the measures contained in both SAP and shelter enablement, that now appear to
be inhibiting growth and productivity in the construction sector (and the national economy for
that matter), are only meant to be negative in the short term. For instance, the liberalisation of
interest rates, which resulted in increasing the cost of borrowing, is meant to stabilise in the
medium and long terms, and indeed that would appear to have been achieved before the
Government spoiled it with the Meridien bank fiasco.
The other major draw back continues to be the neglect in the broad measures of SAP and shelter
enabling in incorporating the informal sector financial market in matters of national development,
even when studies and practise show that this sector plays an important part in construction
finance and household expenditure. The insistence on western types of security, continues to be a
source of great concern in the construction market. On the other hand, it is also apparent that,
whereas the Structural Adjustment Programme and its affiliated policy of the enabling shelter
strategy have opened up opportunities in the construction investment sector, the Zambian
construction industry has somewhat failed to take advantage of these opportunities.
Another striking feature of the Zambian construction market, more especially the public sector, is
its reliance on donor funding even when past experience has shown that this tendency leaves the
industry vulnerable to international politics, vis-à-vis Zambia's human rights and governance
records with the international community. But as we have seen in Chapter Two, and countless
other examples of countries being denied aid, good governance and community enablement are
now the salient conditionalities for Third World (including Eastern bloc) countries to receiving
development aid from the Western World.
162
6.0.0. CHAPTER SIX:
RESULTANT LABOUR AND INCOME LEVELS
(IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY)
6.1.0. Introduction.........................................................................................................................164
6.2.0 New labour reforms.............................................................................................................165
6.2.1. The changing labour environment in the construction industry................................168
6.2.2. Labour fluctuations in the three cities......................................................................172
6.2.3. Labour fluctuations by size of company....................................................................174
6.2.4. Labour fluctuations by sector of construction industry............................................. 175
6.2.5 Formal and Informal sector labour fluctuations........................................................176
6.3.0. Gender balance in the (construction) industry....................................................................177
6.3.1 The food for work Programme and women participation in road construction........177
6.3.2 Gender inequalities in construction employment opportunities.................................178
6.3.3 Gender inequalities in earnings..................................................................................182
6.4.0. Construction skills and training..........................................................................................183
6.4.1. Skilled labour and formal traini...............................................................................184
6.4.1.1. Expatriate labour force and its effects..........................................................187
6.4.2. Unskilled Labour and informal training opportunities..............................................188
6.4.3. Small scale and labour intensive construction methods............................................190
6.5.0. Income and earnings...........................................................................................................194
6.5.1. Forex component for wages and salaries................................................................... 196
6.5.2. Factors determining wages and salaries....................................................................197
6.5.3. Trade unionism, labour productivity and pay............................................................199
6.6.0. Summary.............................................................................................................................201
Chapter six: Resultant labour and Income levels
6.1.0 Introduction
In chapters four and five we looked at Governments' attempts at creating an enabling
(construction business) environment, more especially at attempts at facilitating construction
investment and finance, using measures contained in Neo-Liberal policies. We saw then that it is
not enough simply to put in place legislation that encourages and supports private sector
investment without ensuring that construction demand and the other means (factors) of
production are equally catered for. Among these, labour stands out as one of the most important
in increasing the levels of industrial productivity and, in so doing, alleviating poverty and
increasing the average standard of living.
Human resources.. .constitute the ultimate basis for the wealth of nations. Capital and
natural resources are passive factors of production; human beings are the active agents
who accumulate capital, exploit natural resources, build social, economic and political
organisations, and carry forward national development. Clearly, a country which is
unable to develop the skills and knowledge of its people and to utilise them effectively
in the national economy will be unable to develop anything else (Fredrick H. Harbison:
quoted in Todaro, 1994, pp. 363-364).
The role played by labour in national development is well appreciated in both SAP and the
Enabling Shelter Strategy, as can be witnessed in the new labour and employment strategies
contained in these two related policies, i.e., labour intensive production techniques and the Urban
Management Programme. The key labour policy strategy in both SAP and shelter enablement
have been the creation of more employment opportunities and increased labour productivity,
through education and training, which are postulated to result in increased construction output
and thus positive national development. The prognosis in the Structural Adjustment Programme
and further elaborated in the Enabling Shelter Strategy is that increased investment in shelter and
hence the construction industry have significant impact on national incomes and the creation of
employment opportunities. However, it is important to note that, before this industrial
restructuring in the construction industry can materialise, technological and managerial changes
must also be effected. It is thus envisaged that, once these changes have been effected, the
construction industry among other things should begin to substitute the bulk of imported
materials with local products and also ensure that some of the locally produced materials are
exported to earn the country foreign exchange. Materials are also expected to be made under
labour intensive methods.
These rather high expectations placed on the construction industry are based on various country
studies that demonstrate that the income multiplier effects for the industry are normally about 2
and above, with seven to fourteen additional jobs created for every $10,000 invested in the
industry (Grimes, 1976, p. 32-34; McCuthchen, 1995; Tipple 1995). Given the very high levels of
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unemployment and the poor housing delivery systems in most Third World countries, it is easy to
understand, therefore, the keen interest in validating this sub-hypothesis and go on to reap its
reward of creating more job opportunities in the economy. Underlying this policy of job creation
is the assumption that it will help in alleviating the abject poverty and at the same time contribute
to growing national economies in most Third World countries.
In analysing Neo-Liberalist labour policies, we should be aware of the moral, social and political
issues involved. For example, whereas reducing the 134,000 strong public service (representing
27% of total formal employment) has the effect of saving the Government huge amounts of
money and thus helping in balancing the budget, the immediate and resultant mass unemployment
has the potential of igniting serious civil and political unrest in the country (Zambia, Republic of,
1996b, p. 3). A phenomenon we are all too familiar with in Zambia after similar attempts in the
late 1980's ended in mass riots and the eventual down-fall of the UNIP government
(Hamalengwa, 1992).
Notwithstanding the moral, social and political issues raised above, we shall in this chapter
endeavour to assess and focus more on the net impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme
and its affiliated policy of shelter enablement in creating employment and raising national income
in the construction industry and the rest of the economy. We shall go further and look at other
related Government labour objectives like gender balance and the development of a well trained
and motivated labour force in the industry during the past five years of SAP and shelter
enablement.
6.2.0 New labour reforms
As is to be expected, the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its
affiliated policy of Shelter Enablement have had serious political and socio-economic effects on
the Zambian labour market and the economy as a whole. The globalisation of the World economy
has also meant labour changes and events in other countries, especially those in the Southern
African Sub-region, have had effects on the Zambian labour market and ultimately labour policy.
Globalisation of the national economies has meant that national labour markets have been
integrated into one global labour market, where international competitiveness is the operative
term. In this global labour market, high labour earnings in one country can easily drive out
industries to other countries with relative low wages and salaries (all other factors remaining the
same). Similarly, workers will also try to migrate to those countries which offer them the higher
earnings and better working conditions. Already we are witnessing an exodus of skilled labour
from the rest of the Southern African region to the "new" South Africa, where wages and working
conditions are far better than elsewhere in the region. The weak infrastructure, low standards of
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industrial skills and unstable political climates in the rest of Southern Africa make it hard for
South African industries and those from the rest of the World to be attracted to these countries to
benefit from their low wage rates.
In consideration of this global labour phenomenon and its own aims and objectives as contained
in SAP and the Enabling Shelter Strategy, the Zambian government has put in place labour
policies and practises that are meant to assist in the realisation of national development goals.
Labour reforms in Zambia started in 1992, with the change of name and key labour objectives of
the then Ministry of Labour and Social Services to the now Ministry of Labour and Social
Security. The role of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security is now increasingly associated
with increasing employment opportunities and productivity in the economy (particularly the
construction industry in our case). The labour ministry is also charged with the responsibility of
ensuring that workers in the country have some form of social security and also to give some
retraining to those retrenched. In an effort to increase industrial productivity in the country, the
government also added a new department at the new ministry: the Productivity Development
Department to the already existing Factories Department and Occupational Health and Safety
Departments among others.
The prime objective in the new government labour policies was to give workers some form of
social security, minimum workers rights and at the same time increase industry production
through industrial harmony, better education and training. In this regard the Zambian government
introduced a new National Pension Scheme under the Tndustrial Relations Act (Statutory
instrument No. 171 of 1995) which is basic and compulsory to all (formal) workers, covering
edrly retirement, physical and mental incapacity and funeral grants benefits. The Government has,
however, been reluctant to set a minimum wage for all workers in the country for fear of more job
losses, despite the party manifesto pledges of the ruling MMD.
Unfortunately, however, these new labour policies tend to benefit mostly formal sector workers,
whilst informal sector workers continue to work in hazardous and insecure environment for less
pay. It is fair to say that the none implementation of these policies and measures in the informal
sector is not deliberate on the part of the government, it is almost impossible to effectively
monitor and implement such polices in this sector (Hansenne, 1991). The situation is made worse
by the fact that the informal sector is usually mobile and, therefore, difficult to monitor. Despite
the state intervention in the labour market, the Zambian government believes in leaving day to
day labour matters to employers and employees. In this connection, therefore, the latest
Government labour policy has been in sharp contrast with previous socialist labour policies of the
UNIP government or Keynesian labour policies for that matter, that advocated Government
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intervention in the labour market in various forms like the adjustment of taxes and interest rates
(World Bank, 1995, P. 5).
Given the position of Government to withdraw from past interventionist strategies in the labour
market, the attainment of industry harmony in the labour market is paramount if the employees
and employers can be left to themselves, to regulate labour price levels and stabilise the labour
market. To the workers, industrial harmony entails having good working conditions and
environment, a living wage/salary, gender balance and sensitivity, a motivated labour force and
some form of job security. While on the part of the employer it entails having a well trained and
motivated work force with the minimum of work stoppages, resulting in the company/industry
attaining maximum production levels possible and corresponding profit margins. To this end, the
Zambian government has ratified the International Labour Organisation conventions No. 87
which gives workers the right to organise and form trade Unions or workers associations and
convention No. 100 which guarantees equal remuneration for all workers with the sane
qualifications, regardless of race or gender (World Bank, 1995, p. 152). However, although
Zambia has also signed convention No. 138 which is against the employment of children, there
are currently about 3.0 million children working in various sectors of the economy (Ihonvebere,
1996, p. 195). It is now a common sight to see children working with or without their parents on
most stone crushing, blocking making or welding sites in the informal sector.
The Zambian government also created a new "vendors desk" at state House in late 1996 under the
direction of the State House deputy Minister, to look at matters involving street vendors and the
informal sector. Unfortunately, the role and duties of the "vendors desk" have not been clearly
spelt out, nor is there a budget for this so called "vendors desk". We believe that if the informal
sector is to be fully integrated into the Zambian economy, the sector needs to be looked after by
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security just like the formal sector, with a ministerial budget.
Street vendors and others in the informal sector, nevertheless, organised themselves into an
association called the Vendors and Self-Help Association of Zambia (VSHA). In recognising the
increasing role and size of the informal sector labour market, the Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU) has also amended its constitution with a view to incorporating informal sector
workers (Zambia Daily Mall, 19th June 1996). It is difficult to envisage how many workers in the
informal sector will be able to form trade unions and join the ZCTU, considering that most
workers in this sector tend to be family families or children (see chapter one). Collective
bargaining is also more likely to scare away many informal sector employers in allowing trade
unions at their work places, least they lose their competitive edge (Hansenne, 1991).
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6.2.1 The changing labour environment in the Construction industry
The Government's human resources development policy for the rest of the construction industry is
guided by the following aims and objectives: as contained in the National Policy on the
Construction Industry:
(a) Improve national educational and training systems for the construction industry;
(b) utilise local technical experts and contractors, as a first option, on all Government
construction projects;
(c) create mechanisms for facilitating the participation of national professionals on
major construction projects undertaken for Government by foreign contractors;
(d) develop a cadre of national professionals who will be competent to carry out
relevant research and development work for the construction industry;
(e) facilitate capacity building of national professional researchers by creating or
supporting the infrastructure used for research and development;
(f) retain technically qualified personnel in the Ministry responsible for construction
by providing improved conditions of service; and;
(g) strengthen local government administration for the purposes of enforcing and
monitoring of construction standards and maintenance of civic infrastructure under
their respective areas ofjurisdiction.
The human resources policy document on the construction industry goes on to propose that all
relevant curricula pertaining to the education and training of all levels of personnel in the
construction industry should be reviewed in the light of modem day requirements of the Zambian
construction industry. It further emphasises the training of small and medium sized contractors,
consultants and manufacturers and reaffirms Government support for construction research and
institutions in the country. The document does not, however, specify which institution/s are to
cany out these proposed changes, nor who is to finance them, let alone co-ordinate the
programme. Given recent Government intentions to involve the private sector in staff training and
reduce its contribution, it is important that such details are worked out well in advance. There is
also a need for dividing the programme into short, medium and long term targets for easy
monitoring and evaluation. Unless these details are resolved sooner or later, the whole
programme risks failing even before it is implemented.
Unfortunately, the postulated benefits above, have yet to be seen in the construction industry or in
the rest of the economy. Employment levels and average national incomes continue to fall despite
the five years that the country has had to apply these labour strategies, as contained in the
Structural Adjustment and Enabling Shelter Strategy. It is important to take note, however, that
the downward trend both in employment levels and incomes started way back in the 1970s with
the advent of the global fuel crisis coupled with the fall In copper prices at the London Metal
Exchange (See also figures 3.5 and 6.1).
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After experiencing an employment boom immediately after independence, when overall
employment figures rose from 248 000 in 1964 to 366 000 in 1971, representing a 47.3%
increase, formal employment figures were roughly stagnant for some time until the mid 1970's,
when Zambia began to register falling employment levels and incomes. Admittedly, therefore, the
fall in real employment figures started long before the Structural Adjustment Programme and the
Enabling Shelter Strategy were implemented, although it should be said that they exacerbated the
process. Measures in SAP and shelter enablement to reduce the public service, privatise the large
scale public companies, and liquidate ailing public companies and institutions have only added to
the growing unemployment figures. Government's own figures for workers declared redundant
have been very modest. For instance, they show that in 1994 a total of 6,528 workers were
declared redundant and in the following year the number increased modestly to 6,905 (Zambia,
Republic of, 1996, pp. 33-34).
Figures from the Zambian business community, however, reveal significant higher numbers of
workers affected, for example their latest figures show that a total of 75,000 workers have lost
their jobs in the last five years, an average of 15,000 jobs lost per year (Financial Mail, 8th.
October, 1996). Studies in other parts of the World show similar patterns, that structural
adjustment policies are associated with declines in real income, loss of employment opportunities
and the deterioration of working conditions (United Nations, 1995, P. 8). The situation is no
different in the construction industry, where measures by the local and central governments to
reduce on public sector spending, staffing levels, and stop deficit budgeting for capital projects
have all resulted in reduced national construction demand and ultimately in the number of
workers in the industry. For instance, data from the Central Statistics Office show that formal
Construction labour was almost halved (44%) between 1991 and 1994, when the overall labour
reduction in the whole economy was only 9% (see figure 6.1).
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Fig. 6.1 Formal employment and construction labour force between 1990 and 1994
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NB: For construction employment figures between 1964 and 1991 please see figure 3.5 in chapter 3
Source: Employment trends, Central statistics Office 1994, p.17
Arguably, the Zambian economy has witnessed an overall rise in the informal labour market, but
since no comprehensive data exists on the informal market, it is difficult to argue with certainty
that it is indeed absorbing the unemployed and those retrenched from the formal market. Our
research study, however, will show that amidst the reduction in formal construction labour of
44% between 1991 and 1996, the informal sector labour force witnessed an increase of 80%
during the same period (see table 6.3).
Clearly the continuous decline in formal construction labour in the country for the past 20 years is
a manifestation of the reduced investment in the industry (see also figure 3.5 in chapter 3). Going
by the high multiplier effects and number of jobs that are created for every $10,000 spent on
construction, mentioned above, we can conclude that the Zambian economy has indeed lost out on
a golden opportunity of creating mass employment through increased investments in the
construction industry.
Evidently, the construction industry has had its share of the radical labour reform programme
under the Structural Adjustment Programme, as revealed by Government own statistics and our
field data. For instance, whereas the Zambian construction industry was the second largest
employer in 1971, with over 70,100 employees representing 18% of total formal labour market,
the number has since been drastically cut to only about 18,500 workers in 1994, representing only
3.7% of total formal sector employment (See also figure 6.1). The dismantling of the giant
parastatal construction companies, which were in the main capital intensive, and the subsequent
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emergence of private and small scale firms which are in the main labour intensive, have failed to
arrest the situation in a shrinking formal construction industry.
In all fairness, whilst the formal construction labour market has been reducing, the informal
labour market has increasingly taken over some of the roles and activities of the much reduced
formal construction market. For example, in Kitwe the two major construction manufacturing
companies (and parastatals) lost a total of 365 workers in the last years; Zambia Ceramics
Limited (306) and Zambia Steel and Building (59), on the other hand, small scale and informal
manufacturing firms were on average doubling their small work force. For example, Musonda
building blocks in Musonda compound increased its work force from 3 to 6 workers, and
similarly Chimwemwe welding at Chimwemwe main market also increased its work force from
only one worker to 3 workers during the same period. We encountered many other countless but
similar examples in the small scale and informal construction sectors. Whereas, the Zambian
Government has been encouraging the growth of the informal construction market, its failure to
devise a mechanism of collecting personal and company taxes from this growing sector has meant
that the postulated gains in Government revenue have not materialised. This has also meant that
the tax burden for workers and companies that have remained in the formal sector continues to
grow whilst those in the informal sector continue to pay nothing to government.
Ideally this transformation of the labour structure does not in itself present any serious
problems, as long as the informal sector is able to produce the same goods and services as the
formal sector and the national economy grows. Otherwise, the failure of the informal sector to
adequately service the industry as the formal sector shrinks would led to increased construction
imports or shortages in the country. Government's efforts are now more directed at encouraging
private sector initiative in creating more job opportunities than taxing the informal sector which
is creating jobs. This is particularly true in Zambia, where the high levels of unemployment and
its offshoots of crime, poverty, malnutrition and political instability, have reached a crisis
point.. With recent studies by the World Bank (1994, p. 141) showing that about 40% of urban
dwellers in Zambia are living below the poverty line, due mainly to high unemployment levels,
the last thing Government wants to do is to discourage the informal sector job market with a
new tax regime.
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Fig. 6.2 Total registered redundancies between 1985 and 1995
Source: Central Statistics Office 1994 and Economic Report 1996
6.2.2 Labour Fluctuations in the three cities
Whereas is it quite clear from the data that average employment levels in the Zambian
construction industry are falling, it is interesting, to note that the trend is not uniform in all the
three cities. For instance, we note from Table 6.1 that the greatest labour reductions of 43%
workers were recorded in Lusaka: the capital and commercial city, followed by Ndola the
industrial city with 23% and, lastly, Kitwe the main mining city which recorded only 15%
reduction of workers in during the period 1991 and 1996.
The finding that the least number of redundancies was recorded in Kitwe comes as a total
surprise, considering the collapse of the copper mining industry on which the construction
industry in Kitwe is so heavily dependent. Our surprise is further compounded by the fact the
delays in privatising the copper mining industry also meant the suspension of major capital
projects in the area pending the final sale of the industry. Under these circumstances, we expected
the greatest construction labour reductions to be found in Kitwe. There can only be two possible
explanations for this turn of events, one of which is that the non-traditional construction market in
Kitwe has steadily emerged and replaced the dominance of the copper mining industry as a
customer for construction. If we consider from Chapter Three that Kitwe City Council has been
leading in the sale of council housing to its sitting tenants, we begin to see why is should be so:
the sale of public houses has led to the newly house owners making improvements, alterations
and extensions to their new owned houses and thus stimulating construction activities in the City.
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This is clearly evident in the number of new security fences, built in block work in those areas
where the council has sold its houses.
Table 6.1 Labour fluctuations in the last five (5) years-by location and sector
_____________________________ Kitwe	 Ndola	 Lusaka	 Totals
Siiiall scale firms
\VoiLcrs 5 Yr. ago	 256	 274	 444	 974
\Vorkci, noW
	 295	 196	 398	 889
lltIctLIUt ions	 +39	 -78	 -46	 -85
Huctuations in %
	
+15%	 -28%	 -10%	 -9%
lLIl)lic_(._ompanies 	 __________________ ________________ _________________ _________________
\Voikeis 5 Yr. ao
	 2118	 0	 0	 211$
	
now	 463	 ()	 ()	 463
Huctuations	 -1655	 0	 0	 -1655
Fluctuations in %	 -78%	 0	 0	 -78%
Privatetompames	 __________________ ________________ _________________ _________________
\Vorkcrs 5 Yr. azo
	
1276	 432	 5456	 7164
\Vorkcrs now
	 2030	 297	 1492	 3818
Iluctuations	 +75-1	 -135	 -3965	 -3346
Huctuations in %
	
+59%	 -31%	 -73%	 -47%
(	 ernment	 __________________ ________________ _________________ _________________
\VrLr 5 'i r. ago	 18	 1481	 1026	 2525
\\'orkcrs now
	 3 17	 1184	 2066	 3567
Fluctuations	 +299	 -297	 + 1040	 + 1042
Fluctuations in %	 +1661%	 -20%	 +101%	 +42%
lotal fluctuations in %
	 - 15%	 -23%	 -43%	 -32%
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
The other possible explanation could be that, since both Lusaka and Ndola as provincial capitals
have a higher number of public sector companies and government departments than Kitwe, the
shedding of "excess" public sector labour prescribed under SAP has seen more workers lose their
jobs in these two cities. This, however, has not been the case as we shall see in the next section.
On the contrary, the public sector, especially the local and central Governments, have been
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increasing their manpower levels in the past five years, thus giving more credence to our earlier
explanation.
6.2.3 Labour fluctuations by size of company
Having looked at the labour fluctuations in the Zambian construction industry by location (City),
let us now assess them by the size of the company, i.e. small scale and private companies, which
tend to be small in size, and the large public sector companies and government departments. In
doing this, we have in mind the aims and objectives of the Structural Adjustment Programme and
the Enabling Strategy of scaling down the operations of the large public construction companies
and promoting the emergence of the small and private construction companies. In this regard,
Government plans are being fulfilled in that our data show that the small scale construction sector
registered the lowest reduction in labour levels, compared to the medium and large sized public
sector institutions. The city of Kitwe actually witnessed a 15% increase in employment levels for
the small scale construction sector (see Table 6.1 above). We are mindful of the work of Briscoe
(1993, p.283) in which he has suggested that large scale construction companies are best able to
specialise and thus are more likely to have higher productivity levels than small scale companies.
But, given Zambia's unemployment situation, the Government is interested in creating more job
opportunities in the economy and is, therefore, prepared to forgo some national benefits of
economies of scale in having large sized companies.
Our study further revealed that there was a combined 9% total loss of workers in the small scale
sector, 78% for the Public sector and 47% for the private sector. The central and local
Government departments, contrary to SAP and the enabling shelter strategy, registered a 41%
increase in the number of workers. Looking at the high labour reduction figures for the Public
sector companies, we can say that Structural Adjustment policies have successfully been
implemented. It is however, unlikely that savings have been made yet, considering the huge bill
for redundancy packages that have to be made, although it is quite clear that savings will be made
in the long-run.
Asked as to why Government was contravening its own policy of trimming the civil service by
actually employing more workers, the Chief Engineer at the Buildings Department in Lusaka
explained that the Government was actually reducing labour levels in the non-technical scales,
but still had to fill-up the vacant technical positions. He went on to explain further that, whilst
every effort was being made to reduce manpower levels at clerical levels which were obviously
over-staffed, the department was still very under-staffed at professional levels, i.e., Architects,
Electrical, Civil, Road and Electrical Engineers, Quantity Surveyors and Planners.
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The employment of more professionals at the Ministry of Works and Supply has also meant that
the Government is now in a better position to cope with most public construction programmes
and projects. This has meant that fewer consultancy jobs are now been given to the private sector.
Given the high priority given to the small scale and private construction companies by the
Government, as guided by both SAP and Shelter Enablement, the revelation that the Government
is actually increasing its manpower levels at the professional scales has come as a serious blow to
the small and private sector consultancy firms that were heavily dependent on Government and
the public sector for business. This could explain the insistence by the Zambia Institute of
Architects (ZIA) to Government that all architectural contracts in the country by commissioned
only by their members! Should the Government give in to this demand, it will also mean loss of
jobs for informal sector designers, who currently undertake many of the small sca'e. ldmg
designs. The increase in the number of consultancy workers at the Government buildings
department will no doubt have had some impact not only on the private consultancy sector, but
also on the other sectors like contracting, particularly for professionals like Quantity Surveyors,
Electrical and Civil Engineers would are capable of working for both consultancy and contracting
firms.
6.2.4 Labour fluctuations by sector of the construction industry
Lastly, let us look at the labour fluctuations that have occurred in the construction industry by
sector, i.e., construction, consultancy, manufacturing and supply. Of these four sectors,
construction and manufacturing tend to be more labour intensive and have high multiplier effects
to the rest of the economy than the two other sectors: consultancy and supply (see table 6.2). For
this reason, site construction and manufacturing sectors have been given high priority in Zambia's
labour plans of creating more employment opportunities and boosting the economy through their
related forward and backward linkages (Moavenzadeh, 1987, pp. 73-109; Klaassen et al, 1987,
pp. 35-59). The consultancy sector on the other hand, although it is not very highly computerised
in Zambia, is nevertheless not very highly labour intensive and tends also to exclude the majority
of low skilled workers. The sector dealing with the trading or supplying of construction materials
also has lower multiplier effects in the economy, especially as most of the products they deal in
are imported either from Zimbabwe and or South Africa.
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Table 6.2 Labour fluctuations in the construction industry by sector
Sector	 of	 the Number of Current	 Labour	 Mean	 Median	 Highest
Construction	 Workers 5 Number of Fluctuations Number	 Number of No.	 of
industry	 years ago
	
Workers	 over 5 years of	 workers	 Workers in
(now)	 in %
	
workers	 per firm	 one firm
_____________ ________ ________ ________ per firm _______ ________
Suppliers/Traders 	 401	 334	 -17%	 11.13	 5.0	 215
Consultancy	 1,215	 2,425	 +100%	 63.81	 6.5	 1,000*
Manufacturers	 660	 567	 -14%	 23.62	 6.5	 163
Contractors	 10,505	 5,411	 -48%	 98.38	 14.0	 1,500
* This high number of consultants was recorded from the Government's own Buildings Department,
which employs all the central Governments construction consultants in the country. the high number of workers
at the building department has thus pushed up the average for this sector.
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
6.2.5 Formal and Informal sector labour fluctuations
In the previous sections we have discussed labour fluctuations in the whole Zambian construction
industry without regard to whether the construction firm was in the formal or informal sector
which does not give a very clear picture of the labour situation in the industry. For example,
whereas it is true that the overall Zambian construction labour market has fallen in the last five
years under discussion, the situation is very different when the labour fluctuations are analysed
either as informal and informal sectors. Table 6.3 below shows that whereas the formal labour
market reduced by 44% between 1991 and 1996, the informal construction labour market
increased by 80% during the same period. In absolute figures this means that a total of 5,066
workers lost or left their jobs in the formal labour market, whereas the informal construction
sector witnessed an increase in of 1,022 workers. The difference between the two figures, thus
gave the industry a net loss of 4,044 workers, representing a net loss of 32%.
Table 6.3 Labour fluctuations in the informal and formal sectors between 1991-1996
Sector	 No. of Workers Current No. of Difference 1991- % difference
______________ 5 years ago	 Workers	 1996	 1991 and 1996
Formal	 11,510	 6,444	 5,066	 -44%
Informal	 1,271	 2,293	 1,022	 +80%
Total	 12,781	 8,737	 4,044	 -32%
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
176
Chapter six: Resultant labour and Income levels
6.3.0 Gender balance in the construction industry
Contemporary research in national development and shelter strategies has found that women,
despite being a majority of most national populations, are generally under represented in national
development issues (United Nations, 1995). Women on average receive less income than their
male counter parts and they also make up the majority of those groups under the poverty datum
line. These findings have, therefore, meant that contemporary development strategies including
SAP and shelter enablement have had to pay particular attention to the gender issue. Studies by
the United Nations (1995, p. 8) and many Non-Governmental Organisations (in the Copenhagen
Alternative Declaration, 1995) have shown that women (and children) are specially vulnerable to
the effects of SAP, thereby putting more pressure on SAP and its associated strategies to address
this negative effect.
6.3.1 The Food for Work Programme and women participation in road construction
In response to these criticisms and others from the Neo-Marxist school (Mamdani, 1991), SAP
ha now incorporated the "social safety net" as part of its strategy to alleviate the particular
problems faced by women and Children. In Ghana (Ghana, Government of, 1987) and Zambia,
for example, the "Food for Work programme" is part of this social safety net programme, were
women are given road and other construction jobs in exchange for a ration of food or clothing.
Although this social safety net strategy has helped many families in Zambia, especially during the
drought period of 1992/3, its long term sustainability is doubted. It has simply failed to convince
its opponents on how the payment of food and clothing to poverty stricken families in exchange
of their labour on construction sites and other work places can bring about the much talked about
forward and backward linkages in the construction industry and improve the macro-economy.
The argument that the social safety net programme is only an emergency aid measure is not
credible any more because we have already seen this programme go on for five years now.
The food for work programme was first implemented by the new MMD government in 1992
when it abandoned the mealie meal (staple food) subsidy and converted the subsidy into a work
programme intended for the poorer section of the Zambian society at a total cost of Klbn [$5.8m]
(Zambia, Government of, 1992, p. 22). The programme is thus seen as a social safety net for
helping the vulnerable groups i.e. women and children in light of increased mealie meal prices.
The programme is managed through the Ministry of Community Development and Social
Welfare with the assistance of local and international NGOs. In some rural areas, the government
has also given some women hammer mills in exchange for their labour. The fact that the food and
clothing involved is imported from the donor countries, only goes to confirm fears of its critics
that this programme is meant to boost foreign industries and the economies of its donors. Having
said that, we are all too aware of the improvements that have been made to most pen-urban roads
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in Zambia under this programme, especially that the roads involved are in non councils areas
which do not benefit from the national Roads Board nor from local council funding. For this
reason, therefore, there is no fear of this programme depriving the informal and formal
contractors of their work, as it is funded entirely under a different budget and programme. It is
important also to note that the Food for Work Programme is only open to women from
households whose income is below the government's own poverty threshold.
There is a need, however, to revisit this scheme with a view to making it a tool for breaking the
poverty trap rather than perpetuating poverty. This would entail, for example, allowing women to
form road construction co-operatives that would be able to undertake road repairs and new road
construction projects, with all contracts transacted in the normal medium of exchange. In this
way, women should be better able to save, expand their businesses, own land and property. The
creation of a Government department for Women's affairs has not helped matters either, as the
department seems more active in attending/organising international and national conferences and
seminars for upper class women rather than caring for ordinary women in the streets.
6.3.2 Gender inequalities in construction employment opportunities
Although SAP has been accused of gender insensitivity (United Nations, 1995, p. 8), its affiliated
policy of Enabling Shelter Strategy on the other hand does identify the special role to be played
by women in shelter development (ILO[UNCHS], 1995, p.2'7-28). In recognition that huge gender
imbalances still exist in the shelter market of most Third World countries, specific measures have
been drawn up to enhance the women's' roles in shelter income-generating activities and decision
making process. Global efforts contained in the decade for Women (1975-1985) and the 1995
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing have only added to calls for gender equality in
the shelter market.
Gender balance in the Zambian construction market is not particularly different from the global
picture above. For instance, recent research by the World Bank (1994) in Zambia found that the
overall rate of unemployment amongst women is more than double that of men and that average
earnings for women are way below those for men. The situation is no better in the construction
industry, where women are under-represented in all the four sectors of the industry (see fig 6.1
below). The under-representation of women in the Zambian construction industry, especially in
the informal building sector could be attributed to the diminishing roles of thatching and mud
plastering that are traditional done by women in rural areas, but are less applied in the urban
areas. There are hardly any thatched roofed and mud houses in urban informal settlements,
rendering the art of thatching and mud plastering almost irrelevant in the urban environment. This
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of course is no excuse in excluding women in the construction industry, as their can be easily
trained just like men to do other construction jobs to suit the urban environment.
In traditional or old societies (Zambian). ..the husband with the assistance of his
friends is generally responsible for building the superstructure of a house, erection
of the timber (basket frame) and thatching grass is provided by the women -wife
and is assisted by her friends and or relatives who complete the house by
braiding and filling the wall construction with clay, clay floor and decoration
Today, the wife and other members of the family and even including the husband
is most cases do not understand how the house is produced (Chakwe, 1983, P. 51
and p. 145).
Fig. 6.3 Distribution of Workers in the Construction industry by Gender
Førae
r.e
oo
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Fig. 6.3 above reveals disturbing and wide-spread gender imbalances in the Zambian construction
industry in that 17 out of every 18 (or 94%) of Zambian construction workers are males and yet
the total female population in Zambia is well over 51%. Given, however, the physical nature of
the most work on construction sites, it is understandable that there should be a predominant
percentage of males on the physical side on construction sites. But the equally low (female)
percentage figure in the office or trading side of the construction market is not reasonable (see
figure 6.4 and table 6.4 below). The above imbalance, therefore, calls for urgent attention from
the Government in uplifting women's participation in national development as outlined in the
enabling shelter strategy and the Fourth World Conference on Women of 1995 in Beijing. It is
important, however, to note that research carried out to assess poverty in Zambia did not find
female headed households to be any worse off than male headed households in the urban areas,
although the picture was somewhat different in some rural areas (World Bank, 1994).
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Fig. 6.4 Distribution of Labour in the Construction Industry by Gender and status
Fene	 rikIe
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Table 6.4 Distribution of construction labour by Gender and construction sector in %
Traders	 Consultants	 Manufact.	 Contractors	 Totals
F M F M F M F M F M
Trade
Professionals 10.0 90.0
	 4.8	 95.2 13.9 86.1 3.6	 96.4 5.4	 94.6
Skilled	 19.2 80.8	 38.2 61.8 23.0 77.0 11.5 	 88.5	 17.6	 82.3
Semi-skilled	 5.9	 94.1	 11.1	 88.9 14.9 85.1 2.4	 97.6 5.2
	 94.8
Unskilled	 0.0	 100.0 6.9
	
93.1 8.8
	
91.2 0.3
	 99.7	 1.8	 98.2
Totals	 6.3	 93.4	 10.3 89.7 14.0 86.0 2.6	 97.4 5.5	 94.5
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Looking at the low levels of professionals and skilled female labour in the construction industry,
we would expect to find the root cause of this under representation to be in the low number of
female students enrolled in the Zambian education system, as is the case in many other Third
World countries (United Nations, 1995). Figure 6.5, however, clearly shows that this is not the
case in Zambia, as the difference in numbers between boys and girls in primary and secondary
schools is not as wide spread as that found in the construction industry.' For instance, at most the
difference between the number of boys and girls enrolled in secondary schools is only 17%,
1 The 1990 census report recorded a 76.4% adult literacy rate for males and 56.5% rate for females
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whereas the gender difference in numbers at the professional levels in the industry is as high as
89% in favour of men.
Fig. 6.5 Secondary School Enrolment by Gender and Grade (1995)
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A further look at the enrolment figures at the University of Zambia (UNZA) and the Copperbelt
University (CBU) by gender, reveals the root cause of the gender imbalance in professional
grades of the Zambian construction industry and subsequently in the macro-economy. At the two
Universities, the female population is at most only about 25% of the total student population, yet
at secondary school level, the female student population is about 40-45% of the total population.
This therefore, suggests that the real problem starts at University selection of students from the
secondary schools, were the bias is more towards male students or that girls are not applying for
technical subjects. Looking further at the enrolment figures for the schools of Engineering and
Built Environment at the two Universities, it also becomes very clear that these two schools are
dominated by male students, hence explaining the low numbers of females in the technical fields
of the construction industry.
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Fig. 6.6 Under-Graduate Enrolment at the Universities (1994/1995)
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Fig. 6.7 Enrolment figures in the school of the Built Environment- Copperbelt University
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
6.3.3 Gender inequalities in earnings
Besides being under represented in the employment opportunities in the national economy,
studies world wide have shown that women on average receive only a fraction of the
wages/salaries paid to their male counterparts (United Nations, 1995; Commonwealth Secretariat,
89, p.39). Zambia is not exceptional. Studies by the World Bank (1994, p. 143) found that female
monthly incomes tended to be a fraction of those of their male counterparts in waged and salaried
employment, whereas in the self-employment sector the difference was even more, on average 2-
3 times less than of males (see table 6.5). Although the study referred to above was conducted in
1991, just when SAP and the enabling shelter strategy were being been implemented, there is no
evidence to suggest that the situation has improved since. If anything, the situation could even be
worse now with some women having to receive food and clothing under the "social safety net"
programme.
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Table 6.5. Average monthly urban wages and profits (Kwacha) by gender
Earnings per
	
Earnings per	 Profit per month Profit per month
______________ month	 month	 ________________ __________________
Occupation	 ________Male	 Female	 Male	 Female
____________ Mean Med.	 Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean	 Med.
Prof./Tech.	 14,371	 6,000	 7,569	 6,000	 14,203	 6,720	 5,831	 3,250
sales	 10,900	 4,500	 10,715	 3,750	 27,285	 9,600	 13,815	 5,000
Production/	 6,592	 4,000	 4,901	 4,000	 17,829	 7,500	 5,428	 3,010
Transport_________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ __________ _________
Total Average	 8,248	 4,509	 8,157	 4,700	 20,883	 7,000	 11,541	 4,000
Source: World Bank, 1994, p. 143
6.4.0 Construction skills and training
Although it is acknowledged that the construction industry is a major employer of unskilled
labour, it should nevertheless, be noted that the industry still needs a steady flow of skilled
manpower to sustain an efficient and sustainable housing supply system (Tipple, 1993, p. 3). In
this connection, therefore, education and training are a key prerequisite in sustaining a vibrant and
sustainable construction industry, without which the private investors would be very wary of
investing. Rapid improvements in information technology, construction materials and
construction technology have also added to the demands for a well trained and disciplined labour
force. These observations have not escaped the minds of the protagonist of the Neo-Liberal
policies who also acknowledge that only a well trained labour force can successfully implement
its polices and hence ensure sustainable national development (Harris, 1992, p. 79).
In recognition of this fact the World Bank, UNDP and Habitat developed the Urban Management
Programme (UMP) which is an integral part of the Structural Adjustment Programme and was
designed to deal with issues that have dogged most Third World countries in matters of planning
and implementing urban development programmes. Given the old urban management styles that
were practised in most Third World countries, especially in socialist-based economies like
Zambia, it is easy to appreciate the need for appropriately trained staff equipped to deal with the
new socio-economic environment brought about by SAP and the enabling shelter strategy. It
should be made very clear from the outset that UMP is a programme specifically drawn up to
cater for municipal and public service workers in the areas of research, planning, policy
formulation, implementation and evaluation, yet ensuring effective, responsive, accountable and
transparent local governance (Hildebrand and McAuslan, 1992, p. 93-103). The Urban
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Management Programme further concentrates on the issues of urban land management,
environment management, infrastructure and municipal finance in the running of local councils.
Despite the policy emphasis on training, accountability, and efficiency in local councils, coupled
with a K5bn ($lm) funding for the Local Government Support Project (LOGOSP) by the British
Government for the training and retraining of staff in local councils, the results have not been
encouraging. For example, only recently a Parliamentary Committee on Local Administration
found that Zambian local councils were riddled with "gross mismanagement, weak internal
controls, missing accounting documents, fraud involving senior staff, and infringement of tender
procedures in Zambian local councils. The same Parliamentary Committee found that Councils
were in the habit of not preparing audited final accounts and cited the case of Lusaka City
Council which has not prepared its accounts since 1982, despite having a director of finance, two
chief accountants and numerous other accounts staff. The Auditor-General's report has equally
been very critical of the operations of the councils and the Ministry of local Government and
Housing. For example it was found that the Ministry and the Lusaka City Council had spent over
K360m ($240,000) on the construction of the new Soweto market in Lusaka and yet no budget or
clear records of the sources of funds existed for such a project (The Post, 27/9/96; Daily Mail, 8
/10/1996; Daily Mail, 10/10/96).
6.4.1 Skilled labour and formal training
In view of the ever rising population, coupled with reduced available resources, there is now an
increasing need for adopting more efficient construction techniques in the Zambian construction
industry. This will also call for the adaptation of appropriate organisational structures, and the
employment of appropriate and efficiency manpower levels so as to maximise production from
minimum resources. To be able to achieve these targets in this new industry transformation, the
labour force must have the desired training and skills.
So far Zambia has faired quite well in this area, thanks mainly to the high priority that was given
to free education from primary school to university level by the previous UNIP Government.
Today Zambia with its two Universities has been successfully producing Civil and Structural
Engineers, Quantity and Valuation Surveyors, Planners and Architects for the local market. The
University of Zambia has been running the Engineering degree programmes for more than 25
years, while the Copperbelt University has run the other construction based courses for more than
10 years. Together these two institutions have produced more graduates than can be absorbed by
the local construction industry so that most of their graduates now find work in the neighbouring
countries of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Nainibia and even South Africa. It is important to note this, in
itself, does not mean that Zambia has solved it construction manpower problems, for example
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recent reduction in university funding has raised questions over the calibre of our graduates. Field
trips for students have been greatly reduced, research for staff is almost non-existent and the
quality of the remaining teaching staff is increasingly coming under question. The best lecturers
all seem to head South, where earnings are much higher and the abolition of expatriate conditions
and pay has also meant very few high quality lecturers from outside can be attracted to Zambia2.
Given that a primary school teacher at one of the schools run by the Zambia Consolidated Copper
Mines (ZCCM) earns more than a University Lecturer, it is easy to see the source of frustration
and low morale amongst lecturers at Government-run construction educational programmes in
colleges and universities (Cornia, 1996, p.52).
Although the Structural Adjustment Programme and the policy of shelter enablement places great
emphasis on education and training, experiences on the ground point to a completely different
picture. This situation arises mainly because of the high priority given to balancing the
Government budget. For example, whereas in 1990 the Zambia Government spent K50,000m
($2l6m) on Education and Training, in 1993 that amount had been cut to K30,000m ($130m), a
reduction of 44% in just three years (World Bank, 1994, p. 95)3 The reduction in resource
allocation for education and training is not only a concern for the construction industiy, but also
with the overall Government policy on poverty alleviation. For instance, research by the World
Bank in Zambia has found that educational status is highly correlated with poverty status, that is
to say poor people tend to be those of the minimum of education (World Bank, 1994, pp. 30-69).
This correlation between education and levels of development is further supported by studies that
have been carried out in the Far Eastern Asia in assessing the ability of the so-called "Economic
Tigers" of Asia in achieving rapid and sustainable long term economic growth. Here studies show
a strong correlation between the high levels of education and research investment and their ability
to achieve and sustain economic development (World Bank, 1993).
Although it should be noted that overall gross funding for education and training in Zambia has
been greatly reduced in the last five years, it is interesting to note that university education budget
has been increased4 (World Bank, 1994, p.100). Inasmuch as we appreciate university education,
surely this should not be done at the expense of primary and secondary school education (basic
education), trades training schools and colleges. The result of this has seen some minimum
improvements of facilities at the two universities, but the total collapse of trades training schools
2The take home pay for a starting University lecture in Zambia at current exchange rates is $266 per month, whereas
in South Africa it is on average $800-1000.
The figures were calculated at real 1993 Kwacha levels
41n real terms, however, even University funding has been greatly reduced. The Minister of Education further
revealed in a television interview with the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, on Tuesday the 25th. of March
1997, that the two Universities were getting 44% of the total education budget (see also the national daily papers of
the 26th March 1996).
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like those at Lukashya in Kasama and Choma Trades College for the training of painters,
carpenters, bricklayers and plumbers.
Not only does university education cost more per head than basic education, it also does not
benefit most people at the grassroots: the very people that the strategies of Neo-Liberalism are
trying to promote. It is no wonder that the Zambia Institute of Architects is complaining of poor
workmanship at most building sites. As if that was not enough, the Government pays University
students K90,000 ($90) per month and yet only pays graduates working in the various ministries a
starting salary of K60,00 ($60) per month ( See also World Bank, 1994, p. xiv)!. Such irrational
decisions obviously go to highlight the politicisation of socio-economic decisions in Zambia.
The integration of the former Zambia Institute of Technology (Z1T) in Kitwe, which used to
produce certificate and diploma graduates for the construction industry, into the new Copperbelt
University in 1988 has also contributed to the low turnout of graduates in the middle technical
scales of the construction industry. Today the Copperbelt university produces more architects
than architectural draughtsmen and has meanwhile suspended the quantity surveying diploma
course but yet still runs the degree course. In short, the trend at the Copperbelt University School
of the Built Environment is to focus more on the degree courses and in the process neglect the
certificate and diploma courses it inherited from ZIT. Surprisingly, we found this trend in the
construction industry as well, where on average 2% of the companies sponsored their workers for
university training and, 3% each for college and trades training (see table 6.6).
Considering the high expenses involved in university education and the working ratios between
university graduates and college/trades graduates in the work place, we expected to find more
companies sponsoring trades training than for University training. The conventional norm in the
rest of the World is for having 3-5 draughtsmen for every architect or quantity surveyor produced,
and yet in Zambia we seem to have the ratios the other way round (see table 6.6). There is equally
a greater need to improve the primary and secondary school's curriculum, so as to include more
practical and vocational subjects like carpentry and bricklaying, if the bottom-up effects in shelter
and the construction sectors are to be realised.
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Table 6.6 Percentage of companies with workers at formal (construction) training
institutions
Type	 of University College	 Trades	 Other	 None
Company__________ _________ School	 ________ ________
Small scale	 2	 2	 1	 14	 81
Companies__________ _________ __________ ________ ________
Public	 0	 25	 0	 25	 50
Companies__________ _________ __________ ________ ________
Private	 3.5	 3.5	 7	 18	 68
Companies__________ _________ __________ ________ ________
Government	 0	 0	 9	 82*	 9
Sector____________ ___________ ____________ __________ _________
Totals	 2	 3	 3	 20	 72
Bilateral training agreements through the Government, which included all levels of training: degrees, diplomas and
certificates
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
The situation is made worse by the evidence that a large number of companies, 72% in all, have
no formal training programmes for their workers. It is also interesting to note that the private and
small scale construction companies which the Government is desperately trying to promote are
the ones with the lowest rates of staff training scholarships (32% and 19% respectively). In view
of reduced funding for education and training by Government, there is need for the private sector
to organise itself and develop a training programme and research body for themselves. This
programme could take the form of that in Botswana, where all construction companies are levied
a training fee for use in the training of students and workers in the construction industry. Unless
this is done, the industry risks lagging behind the rest of the region, thereby failing to compete
with them and the rest of the World. The industry needs to prepare itself for all-out competition
especially when all trade barriers are expected to be fully removed under the newly launched
Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA).
6.4.1.1 Expatriate labour force and its effects
Unfortunately there is a growing view in Zambia that the advent of economic liberalism has
resulted in an influx of expatriate workers in the construction industry at the expense of local
expertise. The local unemployment crisis among the professionals in the industry is blamed on
this "new phenomenon" whereby foreigners are said to be given jobs that can easily be done by
locals (Mukalula, 1995, p. 4). Our findings, however, do not support that view point. On the
contrary we found a growing tendency by construction companies to employ local expertise,
especially by the small scale companies. Out of a total of 147 companies surveyed, we only found
10 (7%) companies that were employing a total of 18 expatriate workers. Even Minestone, one of
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the three biggest construction companies in Zambia that had 78 expatriates in 1978 (Turner, 1995,
p.1), now only employs four expatriates.
It is difficult to explain this xenophobia towards expatriates given the global economic order and
the promotion of foreign investment in the Zambian construction industiy. It seems quite naive to
welcome foreign investment and yet exhibit xenophobia towards foreigners. Understandably, this
xenophobia arises from the fact that other countries in the Sub-region, especially Zimbabwe and
South Africa, have very tight trade barriers. But surely the right policy should be to get these
other countries to open up their construction markets, especially as the free-trade agreement under
COMESA has already been signed.
Another reason why we continue to see expatriates in some Zambian construction companies is
that we have not yet managed to train and retain professionals in all fields of construction. This
was clear from our survey which found that 7 (70%) out of the 10 firms that employed expatriat
workers gave the reason of there being no qualified Zambians for the kind of work offered. For
example, Zambia is still lacking indigenous professionals in the areas of geotechnical
engineering, foundations, piling and roads engineering. Wade Adams the only piling and
foundations company in Zambia only has one Zambian working there, and has at times to rely on
its parent company in the UK to do some of its work in Zambia. Case in point is the Konkola
Deep mining project which Wade Adams had done the preliminary survey work for the Zambia
Consolidated Copper Mines, with the help of Wade Adams (UK). Nevertheless, Zambia should
be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the 1960s and 70s when rapid Zambianisation was
effected despite having only a handful of quality graduates and professionals. In the words of the
Managing Director of Apollo Enterprises, "it takes a further 5-10 years of on-the-job training
under appropriate supervision to produce a professional from a graduate straight from school."
This is a fact we seem to ignore in Zambia not only in the construction industry, but in other
industries as well.
6.4.2 Unskilled labour and informal training opportunities
The construction industry is generally characterised by its large proportion of semi and unskilled
labour force. This is the characteristic that makes construction an attractive industry to absorb
masses of unskilled and unemployed workers in the economy. There is, however, a pressing
demand under the new economic order for improved efficiency, productivity, and profitability,
that ultimately calls for some level of a well educated and trained labour force even among the
lower scales of the construction workers (Habitat, 1996, p. 225; Tipple, 1994(a), pp. 9-11). The
low level of education and training amongst most construction workers in third World countries
has been cited as one of the key reasons why Third World countries have failed to utilise the new
188
Chapter six: Resultant labour and Income levels
research findings in small scale construction technologies and management skills that have been
adopted world wide (Lisk, 1996). This has resulted in most Third World construction companies
having to rely on "traditional and outdated production technologies, which are wasteful on raw
materials and energy" (Habitat, 1996, p. 226).
The acquisition of new construction skills by construction workers, especially those with little
formal education, need not, however, be confined to the formal trades schools and colleges.
Experiences from a number of countries, including Zambia, have shown that informal training
schemes can be equally as effective, if not more cost effective than the formal schools. The
informal training centres with their low operational cost thus auger well with countries like
Zambia, that are having to cut back on the education budget. The Zambian government, through
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Vocation Training, has thus seized this opportunity to
set up a number of what it calls "open air demonstration centres." These are centres in the urban
areas where unemployed youths are trained in various trades like brick laying, carpentry and so
on. Although these "open air demonstration centres" are currently targeted at unemployed youth
in the urban centres, there is no reason why this scheme should not be extended to include
retrenched and unemployed men and women throughout Zambia.
The National Housing Authority (NHA) with the assistance of UNCHS (Habitat) has also for a
long time being training the unemployed in various construction skills at its demonstration centre
in Lusaka's Bauleni compound. A number of construction training centres already exist in
Zambia, many of which are run by various NGO's and the local councils through their housing
departments. What is lacking is a co-ordinated national training scheme that would avoid
duplicating scarce national resources. For example, whereas the NHA has being running
experiments at the Bauleni Stabilised Soil Block demonstration centre for over 3 years, its
activities and achievements are not well known. Consequently, similar efforts are being
duplicated elsewhere in Zambia. The same can be said about countless other projects that have
been undertaken by NGOs and the Small Industries Development Organisation (SIDO). One
resource which the country lacks, therefore, is a national body to oversee, co-ordinate and
disseminate information on construction training throughout Zambia.
There is a need also to encourage more construction companies to take-on fresh graduates from
these training centres, rather than insist on employing workers with industrial experience;
otherwise the benefits of education and training will not be felt. For instance, Table 6.7 shows
that the private sector has a higher percentage of companies that insist on past industrial
experience when employing new workers than the public sector. This situation arises because the
private sector has too little financial and human resource to engage workers without industrial
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experience and thus have to spend their time and other company resources on giving these new
recruits the relevant industrial experience. To overcome this obstacle it might be necessary to give
these small scale private companies some form of tax incentives to encourage them to employ
some of these informally trained workers with little or no industrial experience.
Table 6.7 Percentage of Companies employing workers with/out practical experience
Without	 Practical With	 practical
__________________________ 
experience	 experience
Small scale Companies 	 61	 39
Public Companies 	 100	 0
Private Companies	 70	 30
Government sector 	 70	 30
Totals	 65	 35
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Given the need for a well trained labour force and the high cost involved in training workers in
formal schools and centres, it is particularly interesting to note from table 6.8 the fact that public
sector companies tend to marginalise informal training, with none of the public sector companies
having any form of internal and informal training programme for their workers. It is equally
disappointing to note that 67% of small scale companies have no informal and internal training
programmes for their unskilled workers.
Table 6.8 Companies with an informal (internal) training programme in %
Type of Firm	 With a Training Without a Training
__________________ Programme	 Programme
Small scale firms	 33	 67
Public Companies	 0	 100
Private Companies	 36	 64
Government Sector 	 73	 27
Totals	 35	 65
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
6.4.3 Small scale and labour- intensive construction methods
It must be said that the success of the job creation exercise in the construction industry depends
very much on the industry being able to employ more labour intensive construction techniques.
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The enabling shelter strategy also favours the use of small scale private sector construction
companies over public and large construction companies because of the need to do away with
monopolistic tendencies and thence reduce prices through competitive tendering. It should,
however, be noted that small scale companies are not always synonymous with labour-intensive
techniques, although most small scale companies tend to be labour intensive for lack of capital to
buy machinery. Labour-intensive construction policies aim at substituting human labour for
machines in the construction process, with the hope of creating more employment opportunities
in the construction industry. The transformation of either a company or industry from capital to
labour-intensive inevitably entails changing the technology employed in the construction process
in order to utilise more manual labour: unskilled and semi- skilled labour.
This process is clearly evident in previously socialist countries like Zambia, where the
construction industry was dominated by large scale public sector companies that favoured capital
intensive techniques. It is important to note, however, that the transformation from capital to
labour-intensive construction methods, employing mainly unskilled and semi-skilled workers,
does not in itself mean that construction standards are compromised. It should equally be made
clear that labour intensive construction methods are not necessarily cheaper than capital intensive
methods as this depends very much on whether the return from the amount of capital tied up in
machinery is greater than the rate of interest charged on capital (City of Soweto, 1992, p. 4).
Apart from creating employment opportunities for a number of unskilled and semi-skilled
workers, labour intensive construction techniques also save the country foreign exchange by
avoiding imported machinery, spares, fuel and expatriate labour to run them. Although it is
difficult to quantify these savings in monetary terms, it is quite clear that the liberalisation of the
Zambian economy as contained under SAP and the enabling shelter strategy has helped in
changing the dominance of the construction industry from one of large public companies to one
of small private companies. In table 6.9, for example, we see that over 50% of surveyed
companies are now made up of those consisting of 1-9 workers. The same table also shows that
about 90% of construction companies are now small and medium sized and these tend to be
private sector companies. This transformation should be taken as a major success considering that
only 5 years ago Zambia's construction industry was dominantly by the large state and parastatal
companies like Zecco and other private but very large scale companies like Minestone, Lewis,
Apollo, Roan, Bancroft and J. Whyle construction companies.
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Table 6.9 Size distribution of construction companies
Size of Work- No. of Firms % of Total No. Cumulative %
force	 _____________ of Companies	 Totals
	
1-4	 42	 28.6	 28.6
	
5-9	 41	 27.9	 56.5
	10-14	 20	 13.6	 70.1
	15-19	 10	 6.8	 76.9
	20-49	 18	 12.2	 89.1
	50-99	 6	 4.1	 93.2
	100-199	 3	 2.0	 95.2
	200-499	 2	 1.4	 96.6
	500-999	 0	 0.0	 96.6
	
1000+	 5	 3.4	 100.0
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Local councils have been found to be the largest employers of labour-intensive methods, albeit
seasonally. Zambian urban local authorities tend to employ casual labour in the clearing of storm
water drains, cutting of grass on the road-sides and on open spaces, and in patching up of
potholes. The seasonal nature of these (cleaning exercises) means that councils find it more
economical to employ causal labour than full-time workers or machinery. This makes economic
sense, although it is feared that the seasonal employment of casual labour has the risk of attracting
and engaging pen-urban and subsistence agriculture workers at a time when they are most needed
in agricultural work. If indeed people are abandoning their agriculture to work on this scheme,
agricultural production is suffering. The Trade Unions and the Neo-Marxist school will no doubt
also argue that this scheme is exploiting casual workers because they are not entailed to the same
fringe benefits as their full-time colleagues.
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Plate 6.1. Clearing drainage and cutting grass in the Townships using
Labour intensive methods: Kitwe City Council
i1
14
=
Plate 6.2 Concrete Block making using Labour intensive techniques: Ndola
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6.5.0 Income and Earnings
Average earnings in all sectors of the Zambian economy started falling back in the mid 1970's at
the height of the oil crisis and have continued to fall since. The successive devaluation of the
Kwacha in the early 1980s, coupled with the attempted foreign exchange auction system in the
late 1980's only worsened the situation (see table 6.10). The continued fall of the Kwacha in the
last five years in response to market forces under the Structural Adjustment Programme has
worsened the situation to crisis point. In 1992 for instance, total average real earnings for
Zambian workers were only about 21% of their 1975 values (see figure 6.8 and table 6.10).
Excessive wage and salaiy increases, that were awarded to workers with the hope of offsetting
inflationary pressures, only exacerbated the inflationary situation. For this reason the Structural
Adjustment Programme has an in-built strategy of controlling wage-push inflation especially in
the public sector, by freezing or controlling "excessive" wage and salary increases.
Various attempts by the Zambian Government, however, to control or even freeze public sector
wages and salaries, have been met with stiff resistance from the Unions. The latest measures that
were contained in the 1996 budget resulted in country wide strikes, which eventually forced
Government to back down and start salary negotiations with the all public sector unions. Going
by past experience, it was quite obvious that Govermnent was never going to successfully
implement the 1996 wage freeze budget proposals, given that Parliamentary and Presidential
elections were scheduled for October of the same year. Past experience has shown that, in
election years, political expedience take priority over all socio-economic matters in the country
(Hamalengwa, 1992).
In table 6.10, we see that, despite the fail in national average real earnings, earnings in the
construction industry have remained 9% above the national average value of 21% (1975=100).
Despite this relatively favourable showing for construction sector earnings, the truth of the matter
is that construction earnings are still very low and the fear is that this trend will only attract top
quality personnel away to the richer countries to the South. The acute unemployment situation in
the country and the emergence of the informal construction sector have contributed to the
lowering of average earnings in the sector, as desperate job seekers are willing to accept wage
rates below those recommended by their Union and the Government. The refusal by the
Government to fix a minimum wage in the country is clearly a manifestation of its commitment to
a free labour market which is regulated by demand and supply. The Government's lack of
political will to face the electorate on the consequences of this on a free labour market is,
nevertheless, a serious drawback that will continue to affect its economic and development
programmes.
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Clearly the Zambian downward earnings pattern is no different from the findings in other African
countries undergoing Structural Adjustment as has been revealed in research by Ghai and
Alcantara (1991). Their research found that the tendency for fonnal employment markets to
decline and the informal markets to increase also leads to a reduction in earnings in the informal
sector. Bangura and Beckman (1993, p. 77) have argued that this is how it should be, because
African workers have on average been overpaid in the past, compared for example, to their Asian
colleagues who have higher productivity. The salient feature in the Structural Adjustment
Programme, therefore, is that wages and salaries should only be raised if and when productivity is
increased, which should be self regulated by demand and supply forces in the labour market. But,
as the Zambian case and that of Nigeria (Bangura and Beckman, 1993) have demonstrated, civil
servants and public sector workers often resort to "obstructing" government day-to-day business
to bring the Government to its knees.
Fig. 6.8 Average wages for unionised workers in all sectors
Source: Economic report 1991, p. 29
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Table 6.10 Average Annual Real Earnings of Employees by Sector
Fcunuimc Sector
	 1965 1970 1975 1977 1979 1980 1986 1991	 1992
Agriculture,	 9()	 139	 100	 I 1 I	 I! 8	 119	 136	 48	 22
Iorestry and Fishing _________ _________ _________ __________ _________ __________ __________ __________ _________
\Iiiiing and	 110	 126	 100	 71	 63	 62	 36	 34	 22
(iia rrvi og	 ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
.\ lanulactu ring	 100	 I 1	 100	 78	 72	 7 I	 37	 25	 23
Construction	 84	 119 100	 78	 46	 30
n/a	 n/a	 n/a	 _________ ________
lraiisport and	 75	 I 02	 100	 69	 26	 20
('ommun ication	 _________	 _________	 n/a	 n/a	 n/a
Services	 99	 103	 100	 76	 73	 69	 40	 26	 20
Total	 97	 III	 I 0()	 77	 73	 72	 44	 30	 21
Source: World Bank 1994, p. 15
6.5.1 Foreign exchange component for wages and salaries
We will recall from sub-section 6.4.1.1 that one of the main reasons expatriate construction
labour was viewed with scepticism was because of the alleged fear that the much needed foreign
exchange would be lost through the payment of expatriate salaries. With the liberalisation of the
foreign exchange market, however, it is no longer necessary to pay expatriate workers in hard
foreign currency, as they are can easily buy their desired foreign currencies given the local
Kwacha equivalent. The continuous depreciation of the Kwacha, nevertheless, means that
expatriate workers are better advised to quote their salaries in a stable international currency, like
the British Pound or the American Dollar and then settle for the local Kwacha equivalent.
Otherwise, they stand to see their real earnings depreciate just like their Zambian counterparts.
Whereas others welcome this development as a trend that will nevertheless promote
Zambianisation, it means, however, that it has become increasingly difficult to attract qualified
and able expatriate staff in those positions in which Zambia still lacks qualified local staff.
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Table 6.11 Currency in which wages and salaries are paid: by construction sector and in %
of total
	
US Dollar/UK Zambian 	 Combination of
	
Pounds only Kwacha	 Kwacha and US $
_________________ ___________ only
	 /UK
Small scale Companies	 0	 98	 2
Public Companies	 0	 100	 0
Private Companies	 0	 82	 18
Government Sector	 0	 100	 0
Totals	 0	 95	 5
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Although it is quite clear from table 6.11 that Government and the Public sector remain major
employers of expatriate staff, it is equally important to note that these public sector bodies do not
necessarily pay them. This is because most of the expatriate workers concern come directly under
the various multilateral and bilateral aid schemes, which entails their being paid directly by their
aid agencies. In the private sector, however, we saw a tendency by the employers of these
expatriates workers to break their worker's earnings into two components: (a.) Zambia Kwacha
and (b.) one of the international currencies: i.e., Dollar/Pound. This practice is meant obviously to
offset the erosion of earnings of workers by the runaway inflation currently prevailing in the
country. Its only drawback, however, is that it ultimately increases company production costs due
to Kwacha fluctuations against international currencies and could, therefore, cost the company its
cost/price advantage in a highly competitive construction market.
It is also interesting to note that only 2% of the small scale construction companies were paying
their expatriate (or local staff) in foreign currency, compared to 18% of medium and large sized
private sector companies. This goes to validate the theory that private and small scale
construction companies are more inclined to employ local staff than the other companies and
sectors. That being the case, private and small scale construction companies should have higher
multiplier effects than the rest, i.e., Government and public sector. It can, however, be argued
that it does not really matter whether only a few percent of companies in the economy pay their
workers in foreign currency, for as long as there is a liberalised foreign exchange market, foreign
workers can still purchase foreign currency in the local economy and export it.
6.5.2 Factors determining the wages and salaries
There are a number of factors that construction companies take into account when determining
the wages and salaries of their workers. Traditionally, the key factors in determining the
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wage/salary levels for workers have been the construction skill and experience possessed by the
workers, the productivity and profitability levels of the company and the wages/salaries
agreements signed between the employer and the workers. In the past 5 years, however, we have
seen increasing attempts by Government to change that culture and reduce the role of Trade
Unions in pay negotiations. The marginalisation and salient efforts to scale down the powers of
Trade Unions in the era of SAP, has been so overwhelming that some scholars have concluded
that there is deliberate policy agenda under SAP to destroy Trade Unions (Bangura and Beckman,
1993). Certainly that would appear to be the position in Zambia, if we consider the break-up of
the once very strong relations between the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and the MMD prior
to the MMD forming a government. For example, the current Republican President, the Ministers
of Labour and Social Services and Home Affairs were all in the top four in the hierarchy of the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions prior to the 1991 elections and campaigned on a platform of
Trade Unions related matters like minimum pay based on a living wage. Yet today the same
Trade Union sponsored MMD Government has not implemented any of its promises to the
workers.
Obviously, the Government realises that any attempt in fulfilling any of the above promises,
despite the lost of confidence by its political backer the labour movement, would seriously
undermine its economic restructuring programme. For instance, setting a minimum wage would
increase production prices, forcing more companies to lose their production advantages and thus
result in more unemployment. It will be interesting, however, to see the pay deals that will be
conducted in privatised construction companies like Mulungushi construction in Kitwe, which
was sold to a management and workers buy out scheme. For example, what will be the basis of
wage/salary deals between management and workers and what measures will the workers take in
case of a pay dispute? Should this scheme prove a success, then maybe the solution in dealing
with the current nation-wide pay disputes lies in selling most of these public sector companies
and departments to the workers and letting them manage their own affairs. This scheme would
also solve Government's problem of finding redundancy packages in that the workers would be
given shares in the company equivalent to their redundancy packages. The scheme is also likely
to raise the productivity levels of these companies as no worker would want to see his/her work
fold up, as the closure of the company would mean the loss of the workers' own life time savings.
Understandably, the other reason why Government is reluctant to implement the poverty datum
line and it associated minimum wage is because of its financial inability to pay it own workers.
The fact that 84% of total government expenditure is already being spent on personal emoluments
makes the prospects of implementing the minimum wage in the near future even more remote
than has been suggested (1995 Economic report, 1996, p. 37). The Structural Adjustment
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Programme solution to this problem is for the Government to reduce the number of public sector
workers and then give the remaining workers a 'living wage." But with the Zambian Government
failing to pay terminal benefits to retrenched workers in the public sector, the option of public
sector retrenchment is no longer a viable one. All the more reason why the Zambian Government
should now seriously consider the option of management and workers buy out schemes on a
larger scale.
6.5.3 Trade Unionism, labour productivity and pay
In Zambia, the interests of workers in the building, construction and allied industry are looked
after by the Zambia National Union of Construction Workers (ZNUCW) which, like any other
Union, looks after the working environment, wage and salary rates and the general welfare of its
members. The employers on the other hand have the Zambia Federation of Employers, although
the contractors have their own specific organisation called the Association of Building and Civil
Engineering Contractors, which among other things, negotiates with the ZNUCW on matters of
pay and condition of service for construction workers. The strength of the ZNUCW has, however,
been greatly eroded over the last few years by the great reductions in membership, arising mainly
from redundancies, that it now commands very little influence in the industry. The mushrooming
of the informal construction sector has not helped matters, as both workers and employers are not
registered with either organisation.
Although there is now an increasing tendency, especially in the private sector, to base workers
earnings on labour productivity and profitability levels of the company, Government departments
and public sector companies still rely very much on standard wage/salary rates agreed with the
unions. Table 6.12 shows for instance that, whereas there are only 3% and 7% of small scale and
private sector companies respectively that depend on trade union agreements in fixing the rate of
earnings for their workers, all of Government departments and public sector companies do so.
This is possibly the basis for the huge losses and the low productivity levels in Government
departments and public sector companies. If workers can get wage/salary increases by simply
exacting their political and bureaucratic powers on Government, there is no reason why they
should put in any extra effort. After all, their individual labour productivity has no bearing on the
level of their earnings. Even in cases where these public companies have collapsed due to
inefficiency, mismanagement and theft, as was the case with Zambia Airways and United Bus
Company, all the workers are given full benefits without any effort to bring the culprits to book.
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Table 6.12 Determinants of Wages and Salaries in %
Trade	 Government Productivity	 Other- By Combination
______________________ Unions 	 Legislation ______________ agreement of factors
Small scale Companies	 3	 1	 86	 5	 5
Public Companies	 50	 50	 0	 0	 0
Private Companies	 7	 0	 46	 11	 36*
Government (Central
	 27	 45	 0	 0	 27.
and Local)
* Combination of Trade Union and Productivity
• combination of Trade Union and Government Legislation
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Although the new productivity-related wage formula should be hailed as a positive step to
increasing industrial productivIty as compared to the standard collective bargaining and Trade
Union formula, it is important to state that we are in no any way advocating the elimination or
destruction of Trade Unions. On the contrary, we are suggesting that Trade Unions realise the
changing socio-economic environment we are living in and adapt their activities accordingly. For
instance, it was very clear during the field trips to a number of informal construction sites that
informal construction workers were being subjected to poor working conditions. Workers were
seen working on Saturday afternoons, and the whole of Sundays, and without safety shoes,
helmets, and any form of protective clothing. Conditions are even worse for many women who
break rocks for sale as crushed stone, for use in the construction industry. No doubt this is one of
the bases on which informal construction firms are able to sell their products at a lower cost than
the formal business: they have very low overheads coupled with the fact that they do not pay any
form of taxes, but surely Government should set minimum safety standards even in a liberalised
market economy. No surprising, none of the informal sector construction firms in our survey
based their wages/salaries on trade unions or government recommended rates, they all based their
workers pay on productivity and their ability to pay.
Given the new economic dispensation under the Structural Adjustment Programme and the
enabling shelter strategy, there is now a growing need for the trade unions to change their
classical view that they hold diametrically opposed interests to the owners of the means of
production (the capitalist) to maximise wages and salaries from their labour. The mere fact that
the Zambian Government is no longer going to support public sector loss-making companies, and
the advent of privatisation, means that the onus is now with the workers to contribute in making
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their companies more efficient and profitable, if only to safeguard their jobs and ensure increased
earnings. Similarly, companies have to realise also that only a well paid and motivated worker is
able to give them his/her maximum input. It is now becoming increasingly evident that the
classical Marxist argument that the two parties are at "War" to find which party gains most from
the arrangement is out of touch with our new global socio-economic and political environment
(Nobbs, 1983, p. 265; 286-292).
6.6.0 Summary
/Government's plans in the labour and education sectors of the construction industry and the
economy as a whole have been frustrated basically by two main factors:
(a) The lack of money, which has meant that the public sector retrenchment exercise has stalled
for lack of funds to pay terminal benefits. The standard of education and training of workers has
equally been affected by the massive reductions in the education budget
(b) The power that public workers, especially civil servants, exert over Government when they try
to trim the size of this sector and determine productivity and market based wages and salaries.
(c) Low government and private sector capital investment in the construction industry which has
resulted in low construction demand. Low construction demand has ultimately resulted in formal
construction labour retrenchments.
The failure to successfully carry out the public sector reform programme has had far reaching
implications on the construction industry and the rest of the economy. With 86% of Government
budget committed to emolument related expenses, it follows that the only way Government was
able to commit more money for capital projects and the productive sector was by reducing its
wage bill and diverting the money to production. But what we saw was a situation where the
Government is held to ransom by the public sector workers and the electorate, to go against its
adopted national development strategy. The political decision in giving University students more
money in monthly allowances than it gives its own graduate workers has only weakened its case
for adopting a productivity related wage/salary structure.
The positive factor to emerge from the little retrenchment that has so far taken place has been the
emergence of a vibrant informal sector labour market in almost all sectors of the economy, not
least in the construction industry which recorded a 80% increase in our survey. The only
drawback has been a complete absence of a comprehensive tax regime in the country, to tax this
emerging sector and thereby help in spreading the tax burden that is currently taken by a very
small proportion of workers in the formal labour market. Taxing the growing informal sector will
also help in boosting dwindling Government coffers. Taxing the informal construction sector
would take the form of a building fee for every building contract submitted through the council's
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building inspectorate. Admittedly, this would leave out informal housing in the squatter
settlements, but at least it would make a start on taxing the sector. Until that is done, Government
revenue from income and company taxes will continue to dwindle with every public sector
company closed and worker declared redundant.
The high priority that has been given to balancing the national budget above all else has also seen
massive declines in the education and training budgets. Although cuts in these budgets have the
immediate effect of helping balance the national budget, they have far-reaching long-term
implications on the national economy, as this will mean that the future generation will lag behind
in technological and managerial skills to compete with other countries in this competitive world.
The constant fears of being retrenched from the public sector and the frequent non payment of
public sector wages on time (in some cases for months) have also contributed to the very low
morale in the public sector. Consequently, public sector urban and construction programmes have
suffered, as most of the quality professionals have left the sector for greener pasture in the private
sector or simply left the country altogether (See also Cornia, 1996, P. 52). Yet it is very clear,
even to the protagonist of the Neo-Liberalist theories and policies, that only a strong and efficient
public sector can ensure high urban productivity in Third World countries (World Bank, 1991,
23).
Another area of concern is the gender imbalance in national development issues, especially in the
construction industry, where women, despite making the bulk of the national (and urban)
populations continue to be marginalised. Rather than look at real issues that disadvantage their
participation in national development, the government seems only interested in making symbolic
gestures like creating a new department for women that spends almost all its resources on
international conferences and seminars, when our women need equal access to business loans,
mortgages, assistance to land acquisition, education and training.
Declining wage/salary earnings for workers in the country have also meant that very few people
have any savings worth talking about, let alone being able to invest in housing and other related
investment programmes in the economy, to stimulate the construction industry.
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Chapter Seven: Construction Supply responsiveness to adjustment and enablement conditionalities
7.1.0 Introduction
From chapters four to six, we looked at various enabling policies and measures that were put in
place by the Zambian Government in an effort to stimulate the construction industry and
ultimately the rest of the national economy. In this chapter we intend looking at the net effects
that all these apparently unrelated Neo-Liberal legislation and measures have had on the supply
side of the construction industry. It is important to note that, in a Neo-Liberal environment, the
Government is more interested in promoting and increasing construction supply (output) in direct
response to the postulated increased private sector and aggregate construction demand.
This branch or form of macro-economics is commonly referred to as supply side economics, and
aims mainly at "managing the level of aggregate supply in the economy" (Warren, 1993, p. 197).
This explains the ultimate aim of the combined programmes of structural adjustment and its
affiliated policy of shelter enablement in directing their resources at increasing domestic
construction supply by eliminating the structural rigidities in the socio-economic and political
system of Third World countries. This does not mean that the demand side of the economy is not
taken care of or appreciated. On the contrary, increased industrial supply is postulated to lead to
more employment opportunities and ultimately to increased incomes, which should ultimately
stimulate and sustain construction demand. Warren (1993, p. 180) has argued that supply side
economics has the advantage over demand side economics in that it does not cause inflation in an
economy as supply is always ahead of demand.
The underlying assumption in the Structural Adjustment Programme and shelter enablement is
that the construction industry has been besieged by the problems of inefficiency, high prices
brought about by monopoly and bureaucratic tendencies, imperfections in the information
available, rigidity in the supply of housing and other related structural and monetary rigidities.
In fact, in developing economies, the basic indicators of underdevelopment are
related to gross inadequacies in physical infrastructure, shelter and related amenities
which result from the constraints of the construction sector. Thus, the construction
industry can be the backbone of national economic development (Habitat, 1985, pp.
1).
The key policy objectives of SAP and shelter enablement are to remove these "structural and
monetary barriers" in the national economy and allow the (construction) industry to perform with
the minimum of hindrance from the Government, bureaucrats and politicians. It is important to
point out from the outset that, under this new paradigm, the size and quality of the goods and
services to be produced are determined through free market forces.
204
Chapter Seven: Construction Supply responsiveness to adjustment and enablemeni conditionalities
7.2.0 Resultant (construction) supply levels in the industry
We have already seen that the ultimate aims and objectives of both the Structural Adjustment
Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy as they pertain to the construction industry are to
remove the production-bottlenecks and thus attain maximum production levels possible, from the
available minimum resources. At this juncture, we will have to remind ourselves of the need to
validate these policy measures through testing the sub-hypothesis which states that "construction
supply has increased in the last five years that Zambia has applied both programmes of structural
adjustment and shelter enablement". To test this sub-hypothesis we will take stock of the amount
of construction that has been carried out in the last five years and compare the figures with similar
figures of the past, and see if there has been a marked improvement in the period under review. It
is important to note, however, that local construction supply can increase in an environment of
reduced local construction demand, if the excess supply can be channelled to exports. The case of
Chilanga Cement plc, ZAFFICO and Turnall Asbestos Products which have increased production
due to increased exports amidst reduced local cement, timber and asbestos roofing sheets demand
respectively, will illustrate this phenomenon.
Unfortunately, all the three city councils under survey could not provide precise figures of the
amount of construction that took place in their respective cities prior to and during the
Adjustment period. The de-politicisation of the informal housing market under the new 1991
political structure of multi-party politics has also meant that UNIP which monitored and kept very
good records of the new development in the informal sector is no longer able or allowed to do so
under the new multi-party political system. The study will, therefore, use secondary data from the
National Housing Authority and the Monthly bulletins of statistics from the United Nations on the
overall construction output and Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) in Zambia (This information
was presented in earlier sections of this study). For instance, tables 4.1 and 7.1 clearly showed
that there has been little house construction and civil engineering works taking place in the
country in the last five years. This was collaborated by evidence in figure 4.1 which showed that
both government and private sector investment in construction goods and services have been
declining during the period under review.
Table 7.1 goes further to show that in the five years of the Structural Adjustment Programme and
its affiliated policy of Shelter Enablement, activities in the construction industry have halved in
real terms, although figures at current prices show a 1,235% rise! The steep fall of -23.6% in the
growth rate of the industry in 1993 can be attributed to the introduction of the cash budget in the
same year, which went further to reduce capital expenditure or public sector construction demand.
Although there was little formal sector construction demand, table 4.1 shows that there were
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101,110 new informal housing stock (mostly traditional though) compared to only 42,024 formal
housing stock between 1991 and 1995.
Table 7.1 Gross domestic product of construction activity between 1991 and 1995
_____________________	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995
At current prices in K' 	 8,352.8	 20,975.2	 61,310.3	 65,757.9	 65,334.6
millions___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
At constant (1977) prices	 61.8	 58.5	 44.7	 38.7	 33.5
Real growth Rate	 -1.3	 -5.3	 -23.6	 -13.4	 -13.4
In % of GDP	 3.8	 3.7	 3.8	 2.6	 1.9
Source: Zambia, Republic of, 1996c, (Ministry of Finance)
Another method used to assess the successes in Government's effort of eliminating structural.
barriers in the industry was by assessing the amount of construction abandonment in the period
under review and finding out the reasons for this. In this regard, our study recorded a total of
2,342 commissioned consultancy projects, of which 624 failed to take off, representing a 27%
failure rate. While contractors recorded a total of 4,234 contracts, 299 of them failed to reach full
completion stage, representing a 7% failure rate.
Considering the very high interest rates, the massive cuts in both Government and the sector
public spending in capital expenditure (refer to chapters five) and the steep raise in construction
materials (see figure 7.1), the two abandonment rates of 27% and 7% can be taken to be quite
low. The wide gap between the consultants and the contractors failure rates, further suggests that
most construction projects were abandoned at design stage rather that on site. This is to be
expected, in view of the high financial costs involved in abandoning a construction project on site
rather than on the drawing board. The absence of corresponding failure/abandonment rates for
construction projects before the era of Structural Adjustment and the Enabling Shelter Strategy,
denies us the opportunity to compare these figures from the two different eras.
7.2.1 New construction works
Despite the gross neglect of existing infrastructure that is constantly being proclaimed by the new
Government, most construction work recorded in Zambia is still basically new works with very
little routine and repair works (Financial Mail, 3/12/96). Our field survey found that 85% of the
contractors interviewed had 75% of their contracts in new works. The demand for new works is
understandable, given Zambia's' population growth rate of around 3.7% p.a., expected to double
every 17 years. This extremely high growth rate (currently the highest in the World) obviously
demands that new infrastructure be constructed to absorb the added population especially in the
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sectors of Education: schools and Universities; Health: clinics and hospitals; and shelter: roads,
electricity and water. However, massive cuts in the Government budget for capital expenditure
has meant that public sector demand has not been as expected or postulated in Neo-Liberal
literature. This is reflected in figure 4.1 in chapter four, which showed that Gross Fixed Capital
Formation in Zambia reduced by 27% in real terms between 1991 and 1995. Although there was a
55% increase in private sector consumption, while government consumption fall by 25% during
the same period, the increase in private consumption could not be translated into construction
demand.
7.2.2 Routine maintenance and construction repairs
In supporting the infrastructure maintenance and repair sector of the construction market, it is
important to understand this programme in economic development terms; that is, routine
maintenance and repairs to infrastructure is more cost effective than the total renovation of
collapsing infrastructure. Moavenzadeh (1987, p. 98) further argues that, since routine
maintenance and repair of construction projects are more labour intensive than new construction
work, routine maintenance and repair in the construction industry should be more effective in
employment creation. This should prove more helpful in providing jobs for the unskilled workers
and in the use of local construction materials and contractors. Whereas in developed countries
routine and construction repairs take up to 40% of all construction contracts, in Third World
countries like Zambia, the percentage share is still relatively very low (Moavenzadeh 1978, p.88).
To illustrate the prominence of the repair and maintenance sectors of the construction industry in
developed countries, Hillebrant (1974, p.10) has argued that, in Britain for example, the repair
and maintenance sector of the construction industry employs more workers than those in
agriculture, horticulture, coal mining, shipbuilding, marine engineering, timber and furniture put
together. In Zambia, however, contrary to expectations that the programme of infrastructure
rehabilitation under SAP and shelter enablement would see a steady rise in the amount of repairs
and routine maintenance to the hitherto run-down infrastructure, maintenance and repairs still
only account for less than 25% of all construction contracts undertaken.
Our worry concerning the very low market level for this sector is further compounded by the
finding that of the only 3% of the contractors specialising' in this sector, are concerned with roads
works and none are in the building sector. Although this finding does not tell us explicitly that
very little maintenance and repairs are been undertaken to existing Zambia's infrastructure, it does
give us an indication of the way things are progressing in the construction market vis-à-vis new
1 Specialising in this context means having up-to about 75% of contracts in maintenance and repairs, as opposed to
new works.
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works and maintenance/repairs. It was also very clear during the fieldwork that most public sector
buildings, especially schools and Government offices (including the police service) were in very
bad condition and needed urgent repairs before they are simply condemned as unfit for human
use. Clinics and hospitals on the other hand seem to have benefited greatly from donor support
under the Health Reform Programme, as most of them are now in a better condition than they
were five years ago.
7.2.3 Industry buildings
Although industrial buildings do not fall under the enabling shelter strategy per se, they are an
integral part of the strategy, in that industrial rejuvenation is said to be the key factor for national
development and economic sustainability (Adjedeji et al, 1991). The construction of more
industrial buildings and increased productivity is supposed to lead to economic prosperity and
ultimately to full employment, better incomes and more and better housing for workers. Industrial
buildings tend to represent large capital investments for both the owners of the building and the
contractors undertaking the project. For instance, in 27% of cases, industrial buildings presented
the contractors with their largest contracts both in money terms and construction site time. It
follows, therefore, that the longer the construction of the project takes on site the longer will the
workers, especially casual workers, be in gainful employment.
The privatising of public companies, however, has also meant than most of the new foreign
investment in the country comes from buying existing industries rather than building new ones.
This has certainly assisted in creating job opportunities, but has done little to stimulate the
construction industry. It must be admitted though that most of the existing industries that have
been privatised, such as Chilanga Cement plc and Shoprite Checkers plc, have had their physical
infrastructure improved (refer to fig. 4.5). Since most foreign investment coming to Zambia is
invested in existing infrastructure 2, rather than constructing new infrastructure, this situation has
meant that new investment flows in the country cannot be physically corroborated to the levels of
construction taking place in Zambia.
7.2.4 Residential buildings
Although shelter is the main concern of the enabling shelter strategy, it is important to recall that
other public services such as water reticulation, street lighting, roads and drainage also fall this
heading. Prior to 1991 and to some extent recently, the major supplier of shelter in Zambia has
been the public sector. In the last 15 years no major housing scheme has been undertaken by any
of the local authorities (Refer to table 4.1 and figure 4.1). Ironically, now that Zambia has fully
2We will recall from Chapter Four that todate a total of 90 public sector companies have now been privatised, most
of which are large companies.
208
Chapter Seven: Construction Supply responsiveness to adjustment and enablement conditionalities
embraced Neo-Liberalism and it affiliated policy of Enabling Shelter Strategy, the Government
through Ndola City Council has started building mass housing for rent. The 118 low cost houses
at a tender cost of $3. im being built by the Chinese Government in Ndola's Masala Township is
the only major council housing programme that has been carried out in the last five years.
Although Local Councils have not built new houses for the last 15 years, the new Government
policy of selling council houses to sitting tenants seems to have stimulated the Zambian housing
market, with people buying and selling these previously council owned houses.
However, the under valuation and in some cases the giving away of these houses free to sitting
tenants has tended to reduce the price levels in the low cost housing market and undermine the
building of new houses3 . House buyers and prospective house builders are realising that it is
cheaper to buy one of these former council houses from the new private owners and renovate or
extend it, than to buy or build a new one. The Presidential directive to all councils that they
dispose of their housing stock, has also meant that there are now more houses on the private
housing market and it follows from the principles of demand and supply that house prices should
decline.
Table 7.2 Public sector housing stock- in various major cities and towns of
Zambia before the sale of public housing
Type	 of Local	 Central	 Parastatal	 Total
Dwelling	 Authority	 government	 owned
___________ owned	 owned	 __________ ___________
Low cost	 95,955	 17,055	 39,390	 152,400
Medium cost	 1,611	 4,724	 6,145	 12,480
High cost	 1,261	 4,864	 6,864	 12,989
Total	 98,827	 26,643	 52,399	 177,869
Source: National Housing Authority, 1995 Lusaka
The scaling down of mining and other industrial operations, including the closures of giant
parastatals companies like the United Bus Company and Zambia Airways has also put thousands
of former company houses on the private sector housing market. Already Kitwe City Council has
had to repossess 100 houses in Ndeke township from the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
(ZCCM), due to falling manpower levels in the mining conglomerate. In Mufulira, another
mining town, ZCCM had to lease 2,900 of its houses to various organisations including
Reference is made to the price movement of real estate in Zambia from the Government Valuation Department,
Quarterly Bulletins from September 1993 to December 1995.
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Government departments, private companies and individuals following similar reduction in
labour-force levels (Times of Zambia, 4/3/96: 19/1/96).
7.2.5 Civil engineering works
The roads and water sector rehabilitation programmes, which have largely been sponsored and
undertaken by donor countries on behalf of the Zambian Government, have dominated the
Zambian civil engineering sectors of the construction industry in the past five years. The high
technology and skills involved in this sector has meant that, despite the visible infrastructure
rehabilitation exercise that is taldng place in the country, very few Zambian companies have
benefited. For example the Water rehabilitation exercise is been undertaken by the Germany
Government with their own expertise, while the Road Rehabilitation Exercise has been
dominated by Phoenix, a Danish company. Local supplies of construction materials have,
however, benefited from this infrastructure rehabilitation exercise. For example, Bituminous
Products of Ndola and Crushed Stone Sales of Zambia are some of the local companies that have -
benefited from the Road Rehabilitation Exercise.
7.3.0 Construction materials
In Zambia, materials costs have been found to account for about 60% to 70% of the total contract
value of an average construction project (Fewings, 1991, p.144). From this finding, it is quite
obvious that, if any meaningful savings are to be made to the final cost, the main factors to look
at should be the choice of construction materials and their cost implications. Prior to 1991,
consultants and contractors had no real choice of the construction materials to use, due to the
acute shortages that characterised the construction materials market. Consequently, the picture is
very different now as consultants and contractors can now specify materials of their choice,
depending on their income.
Before 1991, the construction market problem was that of excess demand over supply, coupled
with monopoly tendencies of the state companies that supplied these materials. As a consequence,
prices of materials were always very high. However, the liberation of the Zambia economy
changed the above situation. At present, a variety of imported construction materials are coming
into the country thereby eliminating the earlier shortages of construction materials. Prices are also
competitive, thereby bringing down the general price levels in the market. The privatisation of
most public construction materials companies has also seen the improvement in production levels
of some of the locally produced construction materials. Chilanga Cement plc as noted below has
been the model of what privatisation can do to ailing public sector construction companies. Kapiri
Glass Products looks set to join Chilanga Cement plc as one of the successful companies of
privatisation, since the company has attracted new German investment.
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Kapiri Glass Products (KGP) the country's sole supplier of glass products was incorporated in
1972 by the state. The company has been making losses for the past 10 years prior to its being
sold to a German company for $9.2m in 1995. Expectations are that, with the proposed new
Germany investment of $7m, Kapiri Glass Products should now be able to venture into the
production of large sheet glass for the building sector. In the past, the company tended to
concentrate on bottle making rather than on sheet glass making for lack of appropriate investment
and machinery (Times of Zambia, 26/1/96). In the meantime, the country continues to rely on
imported building glass panes at great expense.
It is already very clear from the variety of construction materials on the Zambian market that a
great deal of effort is being made to develop new and appropriate construction materials.
However, unless the aforementioned restrictive planning and building regulations are changed,
very little will be achieved. If the private sector is not willing to lead in this direction, as our study
suggests, the Government should commission its own Building Department or a private
consultancy firm to make these changes, before local and small scale producers of materials are
frustrated.
7.3.1 Output, price 4 and supply
The salient alms and objectives of both the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling
Shelter Strategy as pertaining to the supply side of the construction market are to improve the
quality and quantity of goods and services provided, at much reduced prices. The emergence of
the informal construction materials market has seen the formal market increase its dependence on
this sector for materials and labour, as a cheap source and a way of avoiding taxes (Moavenzadeh,
1987, p.78). Contrary to most Neo-Liberalist literature in other Third World countries that the
informal sector tends to concentrate on local materials, in Zambia we found a different trend
among most informal construction material traders. They tend to specialise in the selling of
imported materials mainly from South Africa and Zimbabwe, which they buy through cross-
border trade and resell on the streets of all major Zambian cities and towns.
4Most of the formal sector price information is based on ZCCMs Construction Department tender price documents
between December 1995 and March 1996, and is contrasted with informal sector prices at the same time.
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Plate 7.1 Construction materials informal market at Lusaka's main city market
In the absence of other fuels like natural gas and the prohibitively expensive and imported
petroleum products, hydro-electricity is the chief fuel for Zambian industries, especially for those
companies producing construction materials. For example, electricity accounts for 75% of the
total production costs for the Zambia Ceramics of Kitwe. The monopoly supply status of the
Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), in producing and supplying electricity in
Zambia, leaves most Zambian companies at their mercy. For example, the introduction in 1995 of
a 50% "import surcharge" on electricity bills exceeding 1,000 kWIh monthly consumption rate
increased the cost of most locally produced goods in Zambia. Companies like Zambia Ceramics
were effectively pushed out of business with this overnight 50% increase in addition to 20%
excise tax and 20% VAT 5. It is no wonder that imports are costing much less than Zambian goods
and services.
In all fairness, financial problems for Zambia Ceramics started before ZESCO effected this 50% electricity import
surcharge.
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Fig. 7.1 Average cost of some building material in Zambia 1988-1996
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Table 7.3 Rise in price of some building materials in Zambia 1991-1995/6 in %
Product	 Price in	 Price in	 % increase at	 % increase
1991	 1995/6	 current	 in $ (real)
__________________________ __________ __________ (Nominal) prices	 prices*
Cement (one 25kg Pkt)	 175	 6,350	 3,529%	 135%
Asbestos (roofing sheet)	 734	 23,880	 3,153%	 117%
Burnt clay brick	 11	 300	 2,627%	 88%
Concrete hollow block (6") 	 27	 550	 1,937%	 34%
Stone aggregate (one tonne)	 400	 5,808	 1,352%	 -11%
River sand (one tonne) 	 380	 8,500	 2,137%	 47%
* This % increase is obtained by converting the prices of building materials in 1991 (I$=K65) and 1995/6
(l$=Kl,000) in US $ at the then ruling rate, to take into account inflation and devaluation
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data with 1991 price from Lubaba 1993, p. 4
Another important salient feature of the Neo-Liberal policies is the elimination of monopoly
tendencies, such that no one company has control over the supply of one construction material so
as to influence price. This will obviously take time to effect, but already the country has seen the
emergence of small scale companies influencing the aggregate supply of most materials like
cement blocks, timber and so on. Although the quality of most products coming from the
informal and small scale sector is quite low, it is hoped that competition for the market and more
213
Chapter Seven: Construction Supply responsiveness to adjustment and enablement conditionalities
especially from imported products and the elimination of Government protectionist policies will
quickly raise these standards.
Table 7.4 Sources of construction materials (for construction suppliers and
traders) as % of total
Construction Material Formal market (e.g.	 Informal outlet	 Direct
Hardware Shop in (Open air traditional import from
__________________	 CBD)	 markets)	 abroad
Iron and Steel
	
57	 36	 7
Timber	 54	 46	 0
Cement	 100	 0	 0
Electrics	 78	 11	 11
Blocks/Bricks	 33	 67	 0
Grass	 67	 33	 0
Burglar Bars	 38	 62	 0
Plumbing items	 100	 0	 0
Aggregate	 33	 67	 0
NB. The informal sector buys cement directly from Chilanga cement and then resells iniormally (see also fig.
7.5)
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Another very apparent observation that was confirmed in our study was the increasing role that
the informal sector is playing in the supply of construction materials in the Zambian construction
market. For instance, in the supply of cement blocks and bricks, burglar bars and aggregates, the
informal sector is now the leading supplier of this product to the industry, controffing 67%, 62%
and 67% respectively of the construction market. Our study also revealed that the informal sector
is slowing taking a larger market share of the timber market with a current market share of 46%.
Understandably, some of the lowest market share for the informal sector in the construction
supply market was recorded in the Electrics field, where as we would expect customers to prefer
some form of guarantee on the products that they buy. But unfortunately, most informal
construction traders/suppliers tend not to operate from permanent premises, making trade
assurances or guarantees very difficult if not impossible.
But in areas where such guarantees are not necessary or the product can be inspected at the point
of sale, for example sand, crushed stones or burglar bars, the informal sector traders/suppliers
seem to be competing very well if not better than the formal market traders/suppliers. It is clear
from table 7.5 that the reason most construction merchants choose to buy their construction
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materials from the informal sector is because of their cheap prices when compared to the formal
sector.
Table 7.5 Reasons for obtaining materials from table 7.4 above, % of total
Construction	 Only	 Good	 Cheap	 Credit	 Other
material	 source	 source	 source	 facility	 reasons
______________ _________ __________ _________ 
available _________
Iron and steel	 13	 37	 44	 0	 6
Timber	 42	 0	 54	 4	 0
Electrics	 0	 78	 11	 0	 11
Cement	 43	 0	 43	 7	 7
Blocks/Bricks	 0	 0	 100	 0	 0
Glass	 100	 0	 0	 0	 0
Burglar bars	 0	 11	 89	 0	 0
Plumbing	 0	 50	 50	 0	 0
Aggregates	 0	 0	 100	 0	 0
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
Table 7.6 Is getting these materials a problem?
Construction material	 Facing problems in	 No problem in
_______________________ getting material 	 getting material
Iron and Steel
	 6	 94
Timber	 0	 100
Electrics	 9	 91
Cement	 0	 100
Blocks/bricks	 0	 100
Glass	 0	 100
Burglar bars	 0	 100
Plumbing items	 0	 100
Aggregates	 0	 100
Source: Mashamba 1995/6 survey data
7.3.1.1 Cement
The explicit mention of Portland cement in Zambia's' building regulations as the binding material
for building construction purposes has resulted in Portland cement being the main building
215
Chapter Seven: Construction Supply responsiveness to adjustment and enablement conditionalities
material on all building sites in Zambia. Although lime was used successfully in the rural areas by
the early missionaries, its deliberate omission in statute books means that it can not be legally
used in Zambian urban areas. Although cement is produced locally, the fact that it is produced by
one company: Chilanga Cement plc, means that monopoly price tendencies are very much in
evident. For example, figure 7.1 and table 7.3 show that cement has had the highest nominal and
real price increase between 1991 and 1996 of 3,528% and 135% respectively. It is fair to say,
however, the reliance on electricity for cement production and the recent liberalised/market prices
for electricity will have contributed significantly to these price increases. The absence of a perfect
substitute that will be accepted under the country's building regulations means that Chilanga
Cement plc totally controls the market in that respect.
The privatisation of Chilanga Cement Products and the subsequent listing of the company on the
Lusaka Stock Exchange has seen it increase its industrial production. With both the Government
and the ZCCM reducing their capital projects, Chilanga Cement Plc now produces cement in
excess of local demand. Chilanga's maximum production capacity at both its Chilanga and Ndola
plants is 500,000 tonnes of cement per annum, although it is currently operating at 65% capacity
(producing only 335,000 tonnes), meaning that there is still room for both local and export
expansion. Zambian cement already finds a market in Tanzania, Malawi, Zaire, Namibia, and
Burundi, which despite the war was said to have increased it cement imports by 50% in 1995
(Mutukwa, 1996, p. 29).The export sales figures for Chilanga cement Plc increased from 38,826
tonnes in 1995 to 111,758 tonnes in 1996, the high increase is be attributed mainly to the end of
the war in Burundi and increased orders in Zimbabwe (Financial Mail, 18/03/97).
l'i. 7.2 Total cement production and ex port flaures by Chilanaa Cement plc
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Table 7.7 Chilanga Cement export figures in the Southern African region
Country	 Tonnes	 % of Exports
Malawi	 11,247	 39
Burundi	 8,513	 29
Zaire	 4,447	 15
Tanzania	 3,416	 12
Namibia	 660	 3
Mozambigue	 361	 1
Zimbabwe	 282	 1
Total	 28,926	 100
Source: Chilanga Cement plc (P. Gorman-General Manager), 1995
Ideally, under circumstances of reduced cement demand, the price of cement should have been
falling or have fallen but the rise in price of other inputs have prevented this from happening. It is
very common to see informal traders by the road side selling cement bags below the retail price in
most established hardware shops. For example, whereas the factory price at Chilanga Cement plc
was K4,906 for a 25Kg bag of cement, we found on average most formal traders in Kitwe selling
the same bag at K6,500 ($6.50) and the informal sector average price was K6,200. Most informal
traders were willing to negotiate the price, if one was buying in bulk. It was unfortunate to note,
however, that most informal sector traders did not keep their cement in dry and sheltered
conditions, so that their cement cannot be guaranteed to be good condition (see plate 7.2).
Obviously, competition between the formal sector shops and the informal traders is working to
the advantage of the consumers by keeping the prices down. However, the failure once again by
the Government to tax the informal sector means that government is losing Millions of Kwacha in
uncollected company and income taxes, at a time when it badly needs this money to finance
various other programmes.
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Plate 7.2 Cement sales through the informal sector market in Lusaka's SOWETO market
The other serious mistake Government made in view of its own anti-monopoly policies was to
sell both the Chilanga and Ndola plants to one owner, rather than sell the two plants separately
and let the two compete. This would have helped in keeping prices low at factory level.
7.3.1.2 Aggregates (Crushed stones and building /river sand)
Crushed stone and building/river sand, or simply aggregates as they are commonly known, are
both used in building and civil engineering projects. In the building sector, aggregates are used
mainly in floor slab and beam construction, whilst in civil engineering sector aggregates are used
for consolidating the base of foot paths and roads. The "aggregate business" has not been the
same ever since women along Kafue Road started manually crushing stones from the surrounding
large rocks and others picked sand from the river banks of the surrounding streams and rivers.
This not only brought the price of aggregates down, but also saw the Government-owned Crushed
Stones company start to concentrate its business on supplying the large scale consumers like road
contractors. Table 7.3 shows that aggregates are the only construction material that have had their
price reduced in real terms (-11) during the last years of Structural Adjustment, although in
nominal terms the increase was 1,352%. Obviously, the role of the informal sector will have
contributed to this relative nominal low price increase between 1991 and 1995/6, although the
fact that there is no foreign exchange involved in breaking these stones will be another important
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factor. It was also quite clear during our field survey that most small scale consumers of
aggregates were opting to buy their supplies from the informal traders whose price was far lower
than those charged by the formal crushed stones companies who on top of their high prices, had
to add VAT (refer to Table 7.4).
In Kitwe, for example, one load (1 cubic metre) of building sand from the formal sector was
selling at K8,316, whereas the same load was being sold from K6,600 to K8,000 by informal
sector traders. We also noticed a tendency by most of these informal traders to charge different
prices for their goods depending on the looks and status of the customer. The informal business of
selling aggregates has now spread to all other major towns and cities in Zambia. Where ever you
see a construction site, there is bound to be these informal sector traders dealing in aggregates.
They tend to be women and children. Our only health and safety concern with this emerging
market is the lack of protective clothing for these women and children. But as Hansenne (1991,
cited in ILO, 1995) has argued, the informal sector cannot be helped by merely creating a less
discriminatory policy environment or by giving it public money. The sector needs special
attention and assistance from the Government, if it is to over it 'teething' problems. The
Environmental Council of Zambia and the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources have
now added their concerns to this growing trade, citing the environmental damage that these
mostly enterprising women and children are causing to the areas in question.
The illegal quarrying for building sand and stone for building purposes which
began on i small scale has now reached worrying proportions and whilst my
ministry does recognise that the small scale stone-breaking industry is good
enterpreneurship and job creation initiative which needed to be encouraged, this
activity needed to be controlled as a matter of urgency because the health, economic
and environmental consequences are far reaching. [Mr. William Harrington:
Minister of Environment and Natural Resources (Daily Mail, 19/6/1996)1.
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Plate 7.3 "Loads" of manually crushed stones for sale: By the informal sector in Chilenje
South Extension
7.3.1.3 Cement blocks, burnt bricks and chinaware
In Zambia, there is a strong tendency to use more cement blocks than ordinary burnt bricks, as
can be seen by the high percent of companies that are involved in cement block making as
compared to brick making. This is to be expected considering the high price of fuel (electricity,
petroleum or firewood) incurred in making burnt bricks. Past experience of large state companies
with Government support that have failed to make it in this business could also have added in
discouraging most entrepreneurs in going into this business.
In 1967 the Zambian government formed a parastatal company by the name of Nega-Nega
brickworks for the sole purpose of supplying the Zambian construction industry with burnt bricks.
The company soon ran into serious problems (in 1981) and was never really able to satisfy local
brick demand. Another parastatal company, Kalulushi brickworks was also commissioned with a
view that the company would serve the Copperbelt region. Zambia Ceramics Limited, another
state owned company in Kitwe involved in the production of bricks and sanitary products, is in
serious financial trouble. At the time of our field work, the company had not paid its workers for
over six months. Its Commercial Manager, Mr. Lackson Chiana, was quick, however, to point out
that the company's problems were mainly because of the delayed process of privatisation. He
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further explained that, although the company had export orders from South Africa and Botswana,
it was unable to meet the orders as it was operating at only 20% of its capacity for lack of fresh
capital to replace and maintain the existing machinery, which was old and constantly breaking
down. The problems the Zambia Ceramic Company are currently facing are basically the same as
those that forced the closure of the Nega-Nega brickworks: sophisticated and imported machinery
which need imported spare parts thus requiring foreign exchange and, specialised manpower to
run them (Chakwe, 1983).
Following the demise of all the public sector brick making companies and the liberalisation of the
economy, some private and small scale companies have since taken up brick making. One good
example is that of Jupiter Pottery Works of Ndola that recently acquired a K18.5m brick and
chinaware Kiln from South Africa, to boost its existing chinaware and brickwork capacity. Jupiter
Pottery Works managing director, Mr. Tresphor Muyagwa, said that with the acquisition of this
new kiln he expected to attain a production level of about 5,000 bricks per week. The company
also has plans for the production of toilet cisterns and wash-hand basins. 	 -
-	
-4	 _%__.
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Plate 7.4 Cement blocks made by the informal sector: Notice the poor quality,
especially the rounded and broken edges
We found a varying range of prices for concrete cement blocks and burnt bricks, although it must
be said that most burnt bricks we came across were of very poor quality (see plate 7.4 above).
Consequently, prices in the informal sector were again much cheaper than those in the formal
221
Chapter Seven: Construction Supply responsiveness to adjustment and enablement conditionalities
sector, but none of the informal sector block/brick makers had any equipment to measure or test
the load bearing capacity of the products.
7.3.1.4 Roofing sheets
Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence that asbestos roofing sheets cause cancer, asbestos
roofing sheets continue to be the most commonly used roofing material in Zambia. This is partly
because they are produced locally and are, therefore, cheaper than clay tiles or corrugated iron
sheets. The advantage of an asbestos roof is that it is lighter than a tiled roof and does not need
trusses. Simple purlins without the support of trusses tend to suffice on a low to medium cost
house. Corrugated iron sheets have the disadvantage of needing constant painting and
maintenance, making them more expensive in the long-run. Although a number of small scale
companies are now engaged in producing clay and cement roofing tiles, their use is still minimal
because of the strong roofing structure that is needed to support the heavy tile roof.
Turnall Asbestos Products (TAP) are the sole producers of asbestos roofing sheets in Zambia;
they also produce asbestos pipes. The company currently has a production capacity of 30,000
tonnes although plans are already underway to increase it to 70,000 tonnes, mainly as a result of
increased export orders from Namibia and Malawi. We did not find informal sector traders
engaged in the selling of asbestos or corrugated iron roofing sheets and not surprisingly, there was
very little price differences in these materials in the formal shops we visited. For Asbestos
building products the prices were almost uniform with price variations of only K200 ($0.20),
which could be attributed to having manufacturing and distribution centres for these products in
Lusaka, Ndola and Kitwe by TAP Building products. The recent hike in the price of asbestos
roofing sheet from K734 in 1991 to K23, 880 in 1995/6 (a nominal 3,153% increase) is likely to
discourage low income earners from using this material and finding other cheaper alternatives in
future.
7.3.1.5 Steel
With the break up and privatisation of the former Zambia Steel and Building Suppliers, Shonga
Steel Limited now has a virtue monopoly in supplying the construction industry with construction
steel, which it imports from Zimbabwe and South Africa. The bulkiness and weight of steel
makes it extremely difficult for small scale suppliers to enter into steel importation and local
redistribution. There are mainly two types of construction steel sold by Shonga Steel namely Mild
steel rods and iron reinforcement bars, both starting from diameters of 6mm to 32mm. The
monopoly status of Shonga Steel in supply construction steel meant that there was no marked
difference in the price of steel within the individual cities surveyed, except that prices were
cheaper in Lusaka than in Ndola and Kitwe due to transportation costs.
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With most buildings being low rise, we would have expected a low rate of steel work in the
Zambian building industry, yet the opposite is true. The very high rate of burglary has forced
many households to build steel grill doors and burglar bars to all windows.
This trend of "fortressing buildings" has helped in promoting the businesses of most informal
sector steel welders. All the major roads in the markets of the three cities of Lusaka, Ndola and
Kitwe are filled with traders dealing in burglar bars, steel grille doors and steel gates. The only
problem with this development, from an economic point of view, is that steel has to be imported,
and this is costing the country foreign exchange. For example, a 12 metres 6mm diameter mild
steel rod was costing K2, 460 ($2.46), whilst a 32mm diameter, 13 metres rod was costing
K81,2086 ($81.21) at Shonga Steel. It was not surprising, therefore, to notice during the field
survey that most informal sector manufacturers were using recycled iron and steel. This led to
unsubstantiated reports that some unscrupulous businessmen are involved in vandalisIng
electricity pylons and other iron and steel structures, for use as scrap metal, which in turn is used
for making burglar bars and other steel products in the building industry.
7.3.1.6 Timber
Although Zambia is endowed with a variety of timber species, its planning and building
regulations still does not allow for timber building structures. The key argument being that timber
buildings are susceptible to termites and would easily spread fire to surrounding buildings in case
of a fire. Yet there are studies to prove this theory wrong. For examples, studies by fourth year
Architectural students at the Copperbelt University in various parts of Zambia, have shown that
timber buildings built by the early missionaries are still standing, despite the poor maintenance
given to these buildings. We are of the view that, allowing timber buildings, especially houses irs
designated council areas would create more job opportunities for the carpenters in the
construction industry and at the same time put cheaper houses on the housing market. This would
in-turn promote the local timber market and job opportunities in the timber busines&
Currently, Zambia earns in excess of $800,000 annually from the export of timber products to
Tanzania and Namibia through the State owned Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries
Corporation (Financial Mail, 5/11/96). This is despite the timber export curb by Government,.
which limits the amount of timber to be exported from Zambia to 75% of the total productioni
Making the announcement in Lusaka, the Environment Permanent Secretary,. Mr Peter
Mwamfuli, said the export limit was "a way of regulating the industry and protecting the locaL
industry" (Times of Zambia, 20/10/95). This is clearly another contradiction. on the part of
Government and its policy of letting market forces determine the demand and supply of goods 1w
the time, this was about two months salary of a government schoot teacher.
22
Chapter Seven: Construction Supply responsiveness to adjustment and enablement conditionalities
the economy. With such Government export controls, which will inevitably mean more
bureaucratic paper work in monitoring this 75% limit, it is likely that we shall see more illegal
export of timber and the loss of Government revenue. We must emphasis here as well, that the
increase in timber exports have been made against a backdrop of reduced local demand,
especially by Zambia Railways who are now replacing their timber sleepers with concrete ones.
Fig. 7.3 Zambia's sawnwood production in thousand cubic metres
Source: National Nations-Statistical Yearbook, 1996, p. 454
Whereas we support Government efforts in trying to ensure sustainable practices in the timber
industry, we strongly feel that the above measures by Government are not only counter-
productive to the construction industry and the economy as a whole, but that they will fail to
achieve their desired aims and objectives. For instance, it is an "open secret" in Zambia that
hardwood like Mukwa from the North-Western Province is fmding its way to neighbouring
countries outside the formal market and this control will only encourage this trade. Instead we
propose that timber merchants be required by law to plant more trees than they cut down, and
impose a timber tax on the sale of timber that would be used for afforestation throughout Zambia.
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Plate 7.5 Informal traders selling timber by the main road side: Kitwe -Ndola dual
carriage road
7.3.2 The use of indigenous construction materials
Without doubt, the number one factor that is hindering the use of indigenous construction
materials in Zambia and in other parts of the World has been the old and restrictive planning and
building regulations (Habitat, 1985b). Although the University of Zambia, the National Housing
Authority and the National Council for Scientific Research have all done some research and
produced some prototype indigenous materials for use mainly in house building, none of these
prototypes has been developed commercially. For example, the National Housing Authority's
sisal reinforced cement roofing sheets, though tried and tested on some demonstration houses in
Lusaka, have not been replicated on any of the Authority's housing schemes, those of the local
councils nor by private house builders.
7.3.3 Research into new low cost construction materials
Despite successes achieved in producing skilled construction manpower, the two Universities
including the National Council for Scientific Research (NCSR) have failed to develop innovative
and appropriate construction materials and techniques for the country. Although the National
Housing Authority (NHA) and the National Council for Scientific Research have previously
developed Cement Fibre (Sisal) reinforced roofing sheets and the stabilised soil blocks. These
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products have received very poor publicity throughout the country that very few people outside
these two institutions know anything about them. For instance, 69% of our respondents had no
idea of any type of research conducted in the Zambian construction materials field.
As research is expensive, it is most likely that only large public construction companies can
afford to spend money researching cheaper and more efficient production methods (Warren,
1993, p. 99). With the new Government policy (under SAP and the enabling shelter strategy) of
breaking down the large parastatal companies in favour of the small scale private companies, we
fear the likelihood of reduced research in the industry. Without research the Zambian construction
industry risks lagging behind her competitors within the Southern Africa region and the rest of the
world. It is important that other strategies are found for financing and carrying out research in
indigenous materials and construction methods, as this is the only way of finding appropriate
construction methods and materials for Zambian conditions (See also Briscoe, 1988, p. 288).
It is important, however, that research results are effectively disseminated throughout the
industry. There is no point in Government having to spent millions of dollars in scared resources
for such research, if all this information will just end up as published papers in foreign journals
without any meaningful benefits to the country. From our field results, it very clear that the lack
of an efficient information system for the construction industry has played an important part in
the failure to disseminate research findings.
7.4.0 Construction imports
The liberalisg-of the Zambian economy under the Structural Adjustment Programme has no
doubt seen the hitherto "closed" Zambian market opened up to foreign goods and services, not
only in the construction industry but also to the rest of the economy. Whereas in the past
Government policy was geared towards import substitution and protectionist policies for infant
domestic industries, now imports are allowed 'freely' into the country and local companies are
expected to compete with foreign and established companies. The immediate impact of this
import liberation policy on the Zambian construction market has been to ease the former
shortages of construction materials and thus minimise delays on construction sites. It should be
noted that short construction periods also mean lower construction costs, especially in countries
with high inflation like Zambia.
The absence of iron and steel works in Zambia means that all construction steel used in
reinforcement and iron-mongery is originally imported and later redistributed locally by local
suppliers. Table 7.4 also shows that only Iron/steel and construction electric goods have a higher
direct import content than any other construction material in Zambia. The poor quality of some of
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the locally produced construction materials has in the past also resulted in the importation of
construction materials. For example, the poor quality of fair faced bricks in Zambia, resulted in
the importation of the same material from Zimbabwe when building the Lusaka High Court
extension. The inability in the past of Kapiri Glass Products to produce large sized glass panes
also led to the country importing building glass panes, although this was done by Zambia Steel
and Building Suppliers (ZSBS) who later redistributed locally. Very few informal sector traders
who normally engage in cross border trade if any are likely to fill the void left by ZSBS in
importing glass considering the fragile nature of the product and the transport means they use i.e.
public transport.
7.4.1 Sources of construction imports
As has already been alluded to, most our of respondents obtain their construction stock from
South Africa and Zimbabwe. The easy access and short distances involved would appear to be the
main reasons why the formal and informal sectors prefer these two countries. The Zambia
Association of Chambers for Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) has accused the Zambian
Government in the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) of laxity in collecting customs duty and
corruption as the main reasons why informal traders and smugglers are rushing into this form of
business (Profit, 1995, p. 12). There is need for Government to investigate this allegation and
should investigations it right, the Government should move in quickly and seal these ioop holes.
Failure will mean that the Government will continue to loss millions of Kwacha through such
illegal operations. The high production costs emanating partly from high taxes of Zambian
products have only gone to encourage the importing of cheap construction goods. It must be
noted, however, that informal traders tend to deal in small construction items like mortise locks,
lamp holders, putty, electric switches and so on, rather than bulk items like bath tubs, or geysers
which are still dominated by the formal sector.
7.4.2 Effects of imports on the local industry
The positive impact of the import liberation policy was well appreciated by the respondents, 73%
of our respondents said that imports had helped their businesses. Only 17% saying otherwise,
with the remaining 10% not quite sure or not responding to this particular question. We note also
that the 17% of the respondents that said they had not benefited from the import liberation policy
were mainly manufacturers of construction materials, who were now having to compete with
cheap, and in most cases superior products from South Africa and Zimbabwe. This is not
withstanding the findings by most researchers that the importation of most construction inputs in
developing countries are providing marginal benefits to the national economy (Habitat, 1985,
p.7).
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The reliance on imported construction materials means the use of foreign exchange and very low
multiplier effects. The dependence on imported materials also means that the local industry has to
decline to give way to these imports, thereby reducing Government revenue collected from
domestic company and income taxes.
7.5.0 Stimulating construction exports
With an external debt of $6.2bn, and Zambia's traditional export copper fetching less and less on
the London Metal Exchange, the desperate search for more non-traditional exports has taken top
priority in Zambia's development policies. In this respect all sectors of the economy are expected
to earn some foreign exchange through promoting production and exports. Some construction
companies notably Chilanga Cement plc and the Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries
Corporation (ZAFFICO) are exporting their products and earning some foreign exchange. For
example figure 7.4 shows that export earnings from building materials and sawnwood increased
by 62% and 99% respectively between 1991 and 1995. Note, however, that the reduction in
exports earnings from construction materials between 1993 and 1994 was as a result of Zambia
applying economic sanctions on Burundi following civil unrest in that country, which is one of
the main importers of Zambian cement. Ideally, the exports figures should be increased only in
markets where domestic consumption figures are met but, as we have seen with cement export
sales, reduced national demand has helped Chilanga Cement Plc to increase its export figures.
Fig. 7.4 Zambia's construction export earning between 1987- (August) 1996 (US$',OOO)
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The text book strategy and that of the Zambia Association of Chamber of Commerce and Industry
and the Zambia Association of Manufacturers for rising exports has always been to ask
Government to give tax incentives (or subsidies) to exporters (Mutukwa, 1996, p. 10-14). The
problem with this strategy, especially in this Neo-Liberal global economy is that it overlooks the
point that producers in other countries can retaliate by raising their import tariffs or simply ask
their own Government for similar incentives or subsidies. This in our view is not the solution.
The solution lies in increased productivity and efficiency, which the Government can help
through education and training, but the onus lies with the management of local companies.
The only strategy for companies in the construction and other industries to win exports orders is
to attain high efficiency levels and reduce their production costs. With the birth of COMIESA and
the signing of the World Trade Organisation agreement to cut down on tariffs and eliminate
unfair trading, Zambian companies will soon learn that only efficiency and good quality goods
and services are the key to the promotion of exports. Chilanga Cement Plc is one good example
of how privatisation coupled with good management can lead to more export orders for Zam6ian
construction companies.
The traditional strategy of lowering the exchange rate (devaluation) is no longer a viable option
given that the rate of foreign exchange is now determined solely by the forces of demand and
supply on the Zambian money market. Besides we have already seen that even in instances when
the Kwacha has been falling rapidly (in essence devaluation), Zambian companies have failed to
break into foreign markets. From past experience we can say that in Zambia devaluation in
essence means increased fuel prices and therefore, increased production costs for local
companies, thereby negating the cost advantage brought about by devaluation.
The other important factor to be considered in the export promotion drive is the quality of goods
and services. Years of Government protection of local industries seem to have done more harm
than good to the quality of most Zambian goods. Aked (1995b) has gone even further to warn
that, although regional and world trade barriers are likely to go within the next few years, the
biggest obstacle to Zambia's export drive is the "quality barrier."
The 5% import levy for goods into Zambia since 1995, that the Zambian companies asked for in
the first place, has also back fired on them, as it does not discriminate between raw materials,
intermediate goods and finished goods. Thus, in effect, the new 1995 import levy has had the
effect of increasing the cost of production for most companies dependent on imported raw
materials and making their goods even more expensive than imported goods. With a continuos
downward fluctuation of the local currency the Kwacha, we would have thought that domestic
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companies would be interested in entering the export market, so as to sustain the continuos
increases in input costs due mainly to exchange losses and salary/wage increases.
The case of Chilanga Cement plc, Turnall Asbestos Products, and the timber subsector have
shown that Zambia has the capacity and ability to enter the construction export market, but as
figure 7.4 will show, current export figures are still very low. It is expected that once Zambia
Ceramics Limited is privatised, the new owners can service the modern but unserviced equipment
and increase its current 20% operating capacity. With local construction demand now
significantly reduced, it should not be difficult for the company to export its excess production of
ceramic and roofing tiles, ceramic toilet pans and wash-hand basins.
7.5.1 Targeting the international and regional construction markets
Studies from around the world show a close relationship between countries with a high GNP and
a high export base. The recent signing of a zero rate tariff by the year 2000 by the Common
Market for Southern and Eastern African opens up export markets for Zambian goods and
services. Zambia has also signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) trade
protocol which is designed to eliminate all barriers to inter-SADC trade, import tariffs, and
quantity restrictions, and will become operational as soon as two thirds of the member states
ratify it.
Until now, the complaint by most Zambian companies was that they could not penetrate Southern
African markets (especially those of Zimbabwe and South Africa) because of the very high
import tariffs that these countries had imposed on Zambian exports. The significance of these
trade arrangements in either SADC or COMESA can best be seen in the fact that the Eastern and
Southern African market has a total population of over 215 million and a combined GNP of
$1 34,305m, more than 50 times the local market..
What makes this Eastern and Southern African Common Market more interesting from a
construction point of view is that two of the member states, namely Angola and Mozambique, are
just coming out of civil wars and are now rebuilding their physical infrastructure. South Africa,
the region's economic giant, has also only recently gained majority rule and is in a hurry to redress
the housing and social infrastructures imbalances left under the apartheid era. There is currently
in motion an ambitious £2bn housing scheme to build about one million houses in the next five
years, and the rest of the region is eagerly waiting to share the cake. To try and achieve this task,
the South African government has recently set up a National and regional Housing Boards,
coupled with government housing subsidies to try and solve its housing crisis (Ofori et al, 1996,
p. 215) The opening up of the Southern African Market also brings in a richer clientele, for
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example, the average Tswana and South African has an income of $2,600 compared to the local
income of $290 in Zambia.
Clearly the legislative process has been set and the future now looks promising, but, the Zambian
construction industry is unlikely to be ready to exploit these opportunities in the larger the
regional market. This is because of the very low percentage of companies intending to expand
into the export business. Only 1% of our respondents had any immediate plans (in the next five
years) of expanding their businesses to cater for export orders or commissions and yet the free
trade area comes into effect in the next four years. This raises serious doubts, concerns and
questions about the management and operations of our construction industry. Obviously, there
could be other reasons for this but, from our previous chapters, we know that the very high
interest and inflation rates have been major factors in inhibiting businesses from securing loans
for business expansion and quality improvements.
7.6.0 Summary
There has not been an industrial miracle in the supply side of Zambian construction industry in
the past five years, but positive steps and gains have been taken. The supply-side economics that
the Government has adopted for the whole economy seem to have achieved some results,
especially in eliminating the hitherto acute shortages of construction materials in the country (see
table 7.6). This has been achieved mainly due to new Neo-Liberal Government policies that have
eliminated state monopolies in construction materials supply and the promotion of small scale
and private contractors and suppliers. It was also clear from figures 7.1 that the reason why there
has been an apparent local supply excess to support increased exports was that local construction
demand has reduced resulting in reduced real growth for the industry. This fact is further
supported by comparing, for example, production and export figures of cement and sawnwood,
which show that whereas the country increased export earnings by as much as 62% and 99%
respectively, the corresponding production figures were no way near those percentages. It is
therefore, doubtful that in the event that local construction demand was to be increased, the
country could be able to export and earn such amount of foreign exchange from construction
based products.
The privatisation of State monopolies like Chilanga cement plc and Kapiri Glass Products to
single private investors have failed to eliminate monopolies altogether in that they have only
transferred state monopolies to private sector monopolies. Although monopoly has been said to
be detrimental to consumers, the case of Chilanga Cement plc demonstrates that private sector
monopolies can still respond to market forces and even earn foreign exchange through exports.
Although private sector monopolies do not benefit the consumers directly, they can help in
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balancing the country's trade and ultimately the local economy if only they can employ good
management techniques, efficient production methods and compete with foreign goods and
services.
The private small scale and mainly informal sector entrepreneurs in the construction industry
have also contributed significantly to filling the void left by the liquidated, closed or privatised
public construction companies either as contractors or mitnufacturers of construction materials.
The buying and selling of construction materials among the various sectors of the industry results
in an interaction by all these sectors as can be seen in figure 7.5 Although there is little interaction
between the large scale formal and the informal sectors, there is much more interaction between
the small scale formal and partly the medium scale construction firms and the informal
construction sector. We note, however, that quality assurance for most goods and services in the
emerging informal sector and some in the formal sector are still very much below international
standards to make a break into the export market. Archaic and very high planning and building
standards have also made it hard for innovative local companies that are prepared to research into
appropriate and indigenous construction materials that do not conform to current planning and
building regulations.
With a very devalued local currency running at $l= K1300, one would have thought that the
macro-economic conditions are favourable for local construction companies to emulate other
sectors of the economy (see table 7.8) and enter into the export business but this is not the case.
This goes to confirm Mosley and Weeks' (1993) findings that most Sub-Saharan countries that
have hitherto been dependent on exporting primary goods will not be able to adjust easily to new
Neo-liberal and global conditions.
We have also noted that Globalisation of world trade, especially with the forthcoming free trade
Zones for Southern Africa (COMESA) and the rest of world (World Trade Organisation
agreement) is a double edged sword. It gives Zambian businesses an opportunity to break into the
world market, but at the same time it could lead to the total collapse of the Zambian companies
should they fail to adjust and compete with foreign goods and services that come into the country
tax free. Dijkstra (1996, p. 544) has argued that "increased competitiveness does not fall from
heaven, the state must do more than liberalise the markets." He further goes on to argue that the
Government "should promote technological development, human capacities, quality standards,
and anti-monopoly legislation."
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Chapter Eight: Summary and conclusions
8.1.0. Introduction
In this final chapter, we now summarise the key points and draw conclusions on whether the
application of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy have
helped the construction industry increase production in response to post 1991 macro-economic
changes in the country. In doing so, we intend to look at whether the Zambian construction
industry has achieved the set aims and objectives as prescribed in both Neo-Liberal strategies i.e.
increasing employment opportunities, construction exports, housing stock and finally aggregate
GFCF in the country. To able to draw these conclusions, the study will summarise the situation in
the construction industry prior to the application of the two aforementioned Neo-Liberal
strategies and then assess their effects on the industry after 1991, when the strategies were
applied. After assessing the post 1991 situation in light of changes brought about by SAP and the
shelter enablement, the study will then draw its conclusions on whether the Neo-Liberal strategies
have achieved their set aims and objectives as they pertain to the construction industry.
To be able to do that, the study will assess the various construction related indicators as
summarised in Figure 8.1 and see whether they have gone in the direction in which the
government through the two strategies wanted them to. For easy valuation, all the relevant
construction industry indicators as showed in figure 8.1 and compiled from earlier chapters have
been indexed to 1991=100. In this figure, therefore, a recording above 100 shows a positive
growth rate and one below 100 shows a decline in that indicator in the period after the application
of both SAP and the Enabling Shelter Strategy (from 1991 to 1996).
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Fig. 8.1 Construction industry performance related indicators between 1991 and 1996
1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996
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Source: Mashamba 1997, various tables and figures in past chapters
8.2.0 The Zambian construction industry in pre-adjustment era (before 1991)
To have a clear assessment of the Zambian construction industry in the post adjustment (1991)
era and be able to draw objective conclusions as to whether the application of the two strategies
under review have achieved their aims and objectives, it is important that we surnmarise pre-
adjustment construction industry era. In this regard, it was clear in chapter three that whereas the
Zambian construction industry was able to record high production output, largely due to huge
public sector construction demand, that situation was not held for long. The construction industry
grew rapidly between 1964 and 1974/5, but stagnated for some time in the late 1970s and then
began to fall there after. This phenomenon was substantiated in figures 3.5 and 3.6 which showed
corresponding raises and falls in construction employment figures and the share of GDP for the
construction industry during the period referred above. Equally revealing was figure 3.4 which
showed a stagnation in new conventional housing stock after 1971, although the informal housing
stock grew modestly.
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We were also able to see the close correlation between the performance of the copper industiy
and that of the construction industry. In particular, we saw in figure 3.2 and 3.6 that the raise in
the activities of the construction industry between 1964 and 1974/5 and the fall that followed was
following similar trends in the copper mining industry, on which the Zambian economy is so
heavily dependent. With high income from copper sales, the government was able to invest in
social services like schools and health institutions which on average increased in stock by more
that 300% between 1964 and 1991 (see tables 3.4 and 3.5). Other economical and political factors
like the declaration of UDI and the nationalisation of private property also resulted in huge
investments in the road network, oil pipelines and local public industries. Consequently GDP rose
from $1,500m at independence in 1964 and stagnated at $3,500m during the 1970s and 1980s,
although raising population reduced the capita income from about $500 in 1964 to about $290 in
1991 (see figure 3.3). The dependence on imported raw materials, personnel and technology
proved critical when the country's foreign exchange earnings were substantially reduced through
low copper prices, reduced copper production and the concomitant raise in oil prices after the mid
1970s, The nationalisation of the economy and the anti-capitalist culture that was inculcated in
the nation through Humanism, thus discouraged the private sector from effectively filling the void
left by the public sector in sustaining and stimulating construction demand.
The construction industry thus grew rapidly from being a small sector in the national economy
employing only 40,000 workers in 1964 to a peak record of 71,750 workers in 1974 before faffing
to 33,100 in 1991. The reduction in construction labour was, therefore, in direct response to
reduced public sector construction demand in areas such as housing. Among the main reasons in
falling housing stock was the insistence on high construction standards by the authorities, which
pushed up building costs. For example, we saw how the cost of one public sector low cost house
increased in cost from £320 to £800 within the first two years immediately after independence.
Dependence on imported raw materials and final construction materials resulted in even higher
construction costs, as a result of devaluation of the Kwacha and the mismanagement of the
nationalised construction companies. For instance, we saw in figure 3.7 that aggregated prices for
construction materials increased by over 2,500% between 1974 and 1991. Individual construction
materials like cement, the main binding material in the construction industry increased by over
2,800% over the same period.
The above factors had the effect of reducing both public and private sector construction demand
in the country as demonstrated in figures 3.4 and 3.6. The reduction in formal sector housing
output, formal employment levels amidst a rapid national population increase of about 300%
between 1964 and 1991, thus resulted in the emergence of a viable informal sector housing
market and an accompanying informal construction sector.
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8.3.0 The effects of SAP and the Enabling Shelter Strategy on the construction industry
Having looked at the key issues and problems in the Zambian construction industry prior to the
application of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy, let us
now summarise and make conclusions on the key measures introduced under the two strategies
and their net effects on the industry. We should bear in mind that the application of SAP and the
Enabling Shelter Strategy as they relate to our study was specifically applied with the intention of
arresting the downward trend in the construction industry that started under the UN]IP government
prior to 1991. In summarising the various legislation and practices after 1991, we shall, therefore,
be looking 'at whether these measures helped in arresting the decline in the construction industry
and further helped it to grow.
8.3.1 Enabling legislation and practices
Beginning with chapter four, we discussed the change of government in October 1991 and the
new development strategies of SAP and Enabling Shelter Strategy in an effort to reverse the
downward trend in the macro-economy and especially the construction industry. The new
government strategy was that of liberalising the Zambian economy and promoting private sector
participation in both the overall economy and the construction industry. We recall from our
literature review in chapter two that the strategy behind enacting enabling legislation is to
encourage private local and international businesses to invest in the country by giving them
business security and investment guarantees. Experiences from the late 1960's and 1970's, when
the UNIP government enacted prohibitive private sector legislation, have testified to the need for
enabling legislation and a hospitable business environment.
There is no other choice than to liberalise the economy. Almost every
centrally planned economy in the World has collapsed. The role of
government is to govern and it is for the private sector to run business. Mark
O'Donnell, Chairman: Zambia Association of Manufacturers (Aked, 1995, p.
22)
We shall continue to provide an enabling environment...In the past the
Government used to own companies that were manufacturing shoe laces,
including those that were baking bread. That is not the role of Government.
Government is supposed to legislate laws that will improve industry. F.T.J.
Chiluba, President Republic of Zambia (Times of Zambia, 17/01/97).
In this respect, notwithstanding the high failure rate for companies in this industry, our study
findings that, of the companies interviewed, 34% were set up during the first four and half years
of implementing Neo-Liberal policies, is clear manifestation of Government's positive efforts in
enacting enabling legislation. The proliferation of private sector construction companies amid
closures of most public sector companies is indicative of recent Government efforts in creating an
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enabling business environment. We also noted that there was a corresponding increase in the
percentage of informal sector constructions during the same time, although the percentage
increase was not very dramatic (see fig. 4.6). This is not to say, however, that the enabling
environment had been fully attained, there were still areas that need improving or were yet to be
implemented. For instance, we observed that the delayed privatisation of the Zambia
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), which still contributes on average over 80% of the
country's foreign earnings, with its massive socio-economic infrastructure of houses, schools,
colleges, clinics, hospitals and so on, had not helped the construction industry. This was as a
result of ZCCM not being able to investment in its socio-economic infrastructure, mainly because
of the uncertainties in its future and the lack of internal capital for further investment.
Another enabling policy measure introduced by the Zambian government to kick-start the home-
ownership scheme was the decision to sell council houses to sitting tenants. Although the
government did not explicitly state that it wanted to promote the construction industry with this
measure, it was clear from the high rate of satisfied respondents (54%) in the industry that this
measure was giving most contractors some construction business, especially those in the house
sub-market. When the same respondents were divided into their separate sub-sectors, i.e.,
supplier, consultants, manufactures, and contractors, the percentages of satisfied respondents was
much higher for suppliers (70%) and contractors (69%), whereas for consultants (26%) and
manufacturers (42%), it was much lower. Theses figures led us to believe that selling council
houses had led to most new house owners making improvements and extensions, that benefited
the local construction suppliers and contractors. It was no coincidence, either, that Kitwe the chief
mining city that was leading the other cities in seffing council houses, had the highest percentage
of satisfied respondents (58%) than Lusaka (49%) and Ndola (53%), despite drastic falls in
capital investment by the mining conglomerate. Not surprising, Kitwe was also the only city that
recorded employment gains in the private sector.
Our study further found that the postulated gains in seffing council houses were largely felt in the
informal construction sector than in the formal sector, where nearly 80% of respondents were
satisfied with the programme of selling council houses in relation to their construction business
compared with 50% in the formal sector (refer to fig. 4.4). This finding was further validated in
the site visits by the researcher, where it was observed that most of the house extensions,
improvements and security walls were undertaken by informal sector contractors with their
materials. Unfortunately, however, the under pricing and giving away of some of these council
houses to sitting tenants meant that the councils did not get enough money from the sale of its
houses to build more houses. The failure by Local Authorities to build more houses, therefore,
contributed to declining levels of local construction demand and ultimately construction supply.
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The only major public mass housing programme of the post 1991 era was unfortunately built with
foreign aid and contractors, thus depriving the local industry of construction business.
8.3.1.1 Economic Liberalisation
By creating an enablement environment, especially in the construction market, the Zambian
Government was hoping to encourage both local and international entrepreneurs to invest in the
country's physical assets (GFCF) and thus stimulate the construction industry. In this regard,
therefore, economic liberalisation was a step in the right direction. Although we observed that
there had been some foreign investment coming into the country (se table 4.4), as a result of some
incentives given to foreign investors, little had gone into stimulating the declining construction
demand or supply. It was not surprising to note that of this foreign investment, only 3% went
directly into the construction industry. Although figure 4.1 shows that private sector consumption
increased by 55%, and public sector consumption reduced by 25% between 1991 and 1995, total
GFCF fell unabated during the Adjustment era by 38%. These statistics mean, therefore, that very
little in terms of private spending was going into the country's GFCF.
Although Zambia scored highly with the international community, especially with the World
Bank, in her efforts to liberalise the economy through its privatisation programme, 65% of the
respondents were of the view that this programme had not benefited their businesses. This high
unhappy response rate could be attributed to the fact that most of the companies that were
privatised had tended to concentrate on internal restructuring to maxirnise efficiency in the initial
stages, and thus invested very little in their fixed assets like buildings. It is however, hoped that
once this internal restructuring and money saving exercise is over, most of these companies will
begin to invest in their fixed assets, and the benefits will thus filter through to the construction
industry.
8.3.1.2 Value Added tax (VAT)
Another set of enabling legislation introduced by the Zambian government was the introduction
of VAT set at 20% in July 1995. The advantage in having VAT over the old sales and excise tax
is that it allowed for the offsetting of tax paid on construction inputs against tax due on sales.
Zambia's neighbours and main competitors; Zimbabwe and South Africa on the other hand, have
theirs set at an average of 13%. Although the high VAT rate in Zambia in comparison with its
neighbours was alleged by the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(ZACCI) to be responsible for making local goods and services more expensive than imported
ones, we noted that it enabled the informal sector to buy cheaply from outside the country and
resale locally. It remains to be seen, however, if the recent reduction in VAT from 20% to 17.5%
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(effectively from 1st. of July 1997) will reverse this trend and reduce informal trading in small
construction materials and other items.
It also came out very clearly that the method of collecting VAT using the accrual accounting
method by the Zambia Revenue Authority was not only unfair to most contractors and suppliers
of counteraction materials, but also led to bankruptcy to some of the affected companies. We
therefore, conclude that, to remedy the situation, the Zambia Revenue Authority should be made
to use cash accounting as opposed to accrual accounting when demanding VAT receipts,
otherwise companies selling on credit and to ZCCM will continue to be penalised.
8.3.1.3 Treasury Bills
Whereas the introduction of Treasury Bills as a short and medium term source of Government
finance had the positive effect of reducing inflation, we found the use of this money for recurrent
expenditure counter-productivity. Not only was the use of Treasury Bills' receipts to finance
emoluments counter productive in the fight against inflation, it also deprived the construction
industry of the necessary capital to increase production and other industries the money to invest in
GFCF. We further observed that although the introduction of Treasury Bills presented the
government with an opportunity to increase its revenue base from which to finance its capital
programme, given its reduced share of income from mineral sales, the government failed utilise
the opportunity. The government could have gone further and introduced long term Treasury Bills
(appropriately called Bonds) with similar high rates to Treasury Bills, tradable on the Lusaka
Stock Exchange, to finance capital programmes, thereby stimulating construction demand.
In the same vein, we noted the use of privatisation funds to pay retrenchment-related payments
and the alleged deviation of the same funds and the fuel levy' to other recurrent expenditure-
related liabilities by the Government. To elimirate any future abuse of these funds, it was
proposed that Government establish a special account with either the Bank of Zambia or any
other Commercial Bank, separate from other general Government accounts, where such money
will be deposited and used only when sanctioned by the appropriate independent boards.
8.3.2 Construction finance
In chapter five, it was observed that construction finance continues to be a source of worry in
implementing a viable construction supply side-market. We will recall that the absence of a well
developed capital market, largely due to the socialist-based policies of the past UNIP government,
had resulted in low capital outflows to the construction industry. With the introduction of SAP
I The Deputy Minister of Works and Supply estimates that a total of K4bn ($3.3m) has been deviated to other
government programmes and projects ((Zambia Daily Mail, 30/01/97; Sunday Mail, 02/02/1997). ZACCI
investigations have, however, put the figure at K5.3bn (Profit, Vol. 5, No. 2 July 1996, p. 7)
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and the re-establishment of relations with the International Financial Institutions, we saw stability
in the financial market, although we observed that most private sector finance was not going into
the productive sectors like the construction industry. The introduction of short term and high
yielding securities such as the Treasury Bills and the lucrative fixed call deposits, had resulted in
most capital been tied up in these securities. This did not come as a complete surprise,
considering the long period needed to recoup one's investment in the construction industry as
compared to other industries or high street securities. We saw for example that, in Nigeria, the
effects of SAP led local investors to invest their capital in taxis and petty trading rather than
investing in shelter (CASSAD, 1991).
It was also observed that, although the introduction of the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) opened
new sources of capital for most under-capitalised firms, only eight firms were trading their shares
on the LuSE. Of these eight companies, only Chilanga plc is a construction based company.
Expectations are, however, high that the introduction of a corporate tax reduction in the 1996
budget from 35% to 30% for companies listed on LuSE, will attract more companies to list their
shares. It is, nevertheless, too early to assess the impact of this tax reduction on the construction
industry. It will be necessary, however, to evaluate the impact of the 1996 corporate tax reduction
on LuSE volume of trade in the next two or three years, and take appropriate corrective action.
The low number of construction based companies and real estates companies leads to the
conclusion that there is need to start a serious marketing campaign of LuSE and its tax incentives
and benefits. Our conclusicrn i that th	
large companies/investors involved in the construction industry both locally and outside the
Zambia.
In this respect, we saw no reason why the National Housing Authority, other construction based
companies, or any of the local Authorities, could not sell their shares on the LuSE and use the
extra capital to increase their production capacities and construction demand power. The law
already allows for this. For instance, section 6 of the Local Government Act number 22 of 1991
states that "every council is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal
capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name and with power subject to the provisions of
the act..." The councils could use this legislation to sell bonds on the stock exchange and use the
proceeds to finance its roads, water and housing projects.
8.3.2.1 Liberalised interest rates
We saw how a combination of very high interest (base) rates from commercial banks and
stringent western society style securities contributed to discouraging a number of entrepreneurs
from obtaining loans from commercial banks. Given, however, that in a liberalised economy
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interest rates are mainly determined by market forces, there is little that the Government could
have done to reduce these high interest rates. We observed, however, that reduced internal
Government borrowing through Treasury Bills could have assisted in reducing commercial banks'
base rates. For example we found that in 1996 alone the government paid a total of K92bn on
interest rates and yet spent only K32bn on capital expenditure. High internal borrowing by the
government obviously increased local commercial bank rates, which in turn discouraged more
people/firms from borrowing to promote their business, increase or improve their physical stock
and for mortgage lending purposes.
We further observed that, although interest (base) rates had reduced to about 50% in the last few
months of the study period, from their peak rates of about 100%, they still remain quite high for
most businesses and individuals, considering that inflation rates were lower (see fig. 8.2). This
meant that it was too costly to borrow in the long run, although the situation could have been
different had inflation rates stayed equally high or higher. Surprising, however, 31% (almost a
third) of the respondents were of the view that liberalised interest rates had helped their
businesses one way or the other, 52% had contrary views and the remaining 17% were not sure.
The only possible explanation in the high number of respondents with liberalised interest rates
was that these were companies with bank account accounts in credit or had bought treasury bills,
and were therefore, earning high sums of money from high interest rates.
Fig. 8.2 Movement of Commercial bank base rates & inflation between 1991 and 1996
Source: Profit and Government Valuation Department Quarterly Bulletins
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8.3.2.2 The impact of inflation on construction finance
The adverse effects of high inflation on national economies is well noted by the protagonists of
both the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy, such that both
strategies carry in-built measures of fighting inflation. In Zambia, the 'Cash Budget' strategy was
one way of fighting inflation. The failure to substantially reduce public sector pay and the very
high percentage of emoluments as a percentage of total Government budget (on average 75%)
meant that continuous public sector salary increases continued to fuel inflation. Relatively high
rates of inflation then running at about 50% also meant that construction projects which
sometimes run for 2-3 years, had their initial budgets doubled or tripled whilst still under
construction. For instance, figure 7.1 shows that the average nominal increase in the price of
construction materials rose by as much as 2,500% for some materials like asbestos roofing sheets
between 1991 and 1996, although aggregates had a negative gain of 11% in real terms within the
same period. In this respect, the 7% completion failure rate for construction projects recorded in
our survey was a remarkable achievement for the industry and the economy. Nevertheless, this
financial environment had a tendency to scare away potential investors, who readily invested their
capital in high yield and less risky businesses, like Treasury Bills or ready-built real estate.
8.3.2.3 Mortgage lending and the shelter sub-market
Although the government liberalised the Building Society market, the survey recorded only one
privately owned building society opening in competition with the state owned one: the Zambia
National Building Society (ZNBS). The high mortgage rates running at over 50% were found to
be largely to blame for the lack of movement in this market. Ti was tt&t
establishment of more Building Societies will lead to competition and, eventually, in reducing
mortgage rates. Nevertheless, the mortgage rate reduction was not expected to be sufficiently low
as to attract more households to apply for mortgages, given the prevailing high mortgage rates.
For example, in Zimbabwe a slight reduction in the mortgage rates in 1996 resulted in a huge
housing demand, increases in house prices and a critical housing shortage in Harare (Pan African,
28/01/97). A similar reduction in mortgage rates in Zambia2, would have had the same effects on
the housing market, thereby stimulating the housing market and the construction industry. Given
the above example from Zimbabwe, it was difficult to understand Government's decision in 1996
to subject building society bonds to taxation. Our conclusion in this respect, is that this decision
does not help in bringing about affordable mortgage rates, on the contrary it makes building
societies less attractive than commercial banks in attracting deposits. It was further noted in
chapter five that Building societies and commercial banks play an important role in mobilising
21n Zambia we reckon the reduction would have to be more substantial, considering that Zimbabwe has a far smaller
rate of inflation, interest rates and a stronger economy. See table 7.8 for Zimbabwe's economic profile
243
Chapter Eight: Summary and conclusions
small deposits from small-savers and transferring this aggregate capital to the productive sector of
the economy. The closure, therefore, of three indigenous banks no doubt eroded depositor
confidence in the Zambian financial market.
8.3.2.4 Donor funding and the construction market
Events of the last few years indicate that Zambians had not yet learnt the lessons of 1987. when at
the time the country was heavily dependent on the donor community and when, aid was cut off,
this led to the collapse of the economy and eventually of the UNIP Government. The observation
in post 1991 budgets that over 75% of Zambia's capital expenditure budget was donor funded,
therefore, came as a very disappointing development, especially that Zambia was already at odds
with the donor community, who once again cut off their aid package. 3
 It is fair to say, however,
that donor funding and net investment income was not only reduced in Zambia but in the whole
of the Sub-Saharan African region (United Nations, 1994a, p.25). Given the low financial
resources of the Zambian Government, there was a very clear need for the Government to
encourage more private international capital inflows, rather than Government-to-Government Aid
Programmes which are so vulnerable to domestic politics.
8.3.3 Labour and training
The need for a well educated and trained construction labour force in attaining increased
construction supply and a sustained national economy were well lñg'hiiglited in chapter six. The
relation between a well trained labour force and high productivity was supported with empirical
examples from the Far Eastern Asian countries (Tigers of Asia). Despite this undisputed linkage
and the theoretical support for education and training under SAP and shelter enablement, in
reality we found that the government continues to reduce her budgetary allocation to this sector.
This finding was in conformity with experiences in other Sub-Saharan African countries under
going SAP, where it was found that education and health budgets tended to be easily sacrificed in
favour of other sectors (United Nations, 1994a, 21). It was also observed that even the little
resources allocated to education tended unfortunately to favour university education, which only
benefited a handful of citizens, let alone the targeted vulnerable groups. Figures 6.5 and 6.6
showed, for example, that very few women benefited from the male-biased University system and
subsequently in the Zambian construction labour market.
8.3.3.1 Employment creation and labour intensive construction methods
Contrary to postulations in the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter
Strategy, that minimum government intervention in the construction industry and a liberalised
economy would promote job opportunities in the (construction) private sector, there was little
3The 1997 budget has, however, proposed to mobilise 75% of the K1.4 trillion ($1.2bn) budget from local resources.
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evidence of this. Only the City of Kitwe registere4 an increase of 51% in the private sector job
market, whereas Ndola and Lusaka recorded negative growth of 30% and 68% respectively. It is
important, however, to note that the net loss of jobs in the private sector could largely be
attributed to the 41% job increases in the government construction (building and roads)
departments, which resulted in the government doing its construction projects in-house.
Given the massive cuts in public sector investment in capital programmes, it did not come as a
complete surprise that overall, the construction industry lost 32% of its total labour force between
1991 and 1996. The withdraw of some donor funding for capital programme support, prevailing
high interest and mortgage rates only made matters worse in the construction labour market. The
only surprise in the construction labour market was in the 41% increase in government workers,
when both the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy advocate for
the complete reverse. The picture was somewhat different when the industry was broken down
into formal and informal sectors. When this was done, it was found that the informal sector
actually recorded a 80% labour increase, whilst the formal sector reduced its labour force by as
much as 44% (See table 6.3).
The use of labour intensive construction methods, especially by the local councils in road
mending, drainage digging and grass cutting, however, helped in creating some job opportunities,
although on casual basis. The choice between labour or capital intensive construction methods,
nevertheless, seem to lie mostly on the need to avoid expensive machinery and spares, rather than
real choice. This was particularly true with small scale and informal construction companies who
could not afford the money for imported machinery, spares and fuel to operate them. The above
situation could, however, change if Government was to grant the wishes of the Zambia
Association of Chambers for Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) and the Zambia Association of
Manufacturers (ZAM), to reduce or remove customs duty on imported machinery.
8.3.3.2 Informal sector construction labour market
Amidst the overall failing construction output in the country, we saw how it was the formal sector
that was declining, whilst the informal sector was continuously growing (table 6.3). Although we
noted the proliferation of the informal construction sector, it was disappointing to note that
women were largely under-represented even in sectors that did not require much physical strength
and given their traditional role in house building. Our other finding was the failure by
Government and its agencies to tax this growing sector, and reduce the tax burden on the falling
numbers of formal sector companies and their workers. The reluctance in setting a tax system for
this sector was based on government's fears not to discourage this sector with a high and
cumbersome tax system, although we noted that a small flat rate for all small informal
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construction companies could have been a starting point. Under our proposal we recommended
that the Government's own contractor classification scales with the Building Department be used
to determine the rate to be paid by all informal sector construction companies. Customers would
also be required to assist by demanding a tax certificate before awarding these informal
contractors any construction commissions.
8.3.3.3 Productivity and training
We already alluded to the theoretical viewpoint and the practical experiences of the Far Eastern
countries that better training for workers leads to increased productivity. In the Zambian
construction industry, however, only 52% and 35% of the construction companies surveyed had
formal and informal training schemes respectively (see tables 6.6 and 6.8). Whereas it was easy to
understand the relatively low percentage of firms with formal training schemes, given the high
cost of such training, the even lower rate for informal training could not be justified. It was
proposed, therefore, that one way of encouraging training and yet keep the costs down was by
introducing more in-service training schemes either through short breaks from work or through
evening classes. Although some firms especially informal sector ones were already using informal
training methods the levels involved were small.
8.3.3.4 Informal training
With Government having to reduce its education bill under these austerity economic measures, it
was quite clear that public and formal education and training could no longer be relied on as in
the past. Nevertheless, we could not ignore experiences through studies from the Far Eastern
countries that showed that education and increased productivity are closely related. Our field data,
nevertheless revealed that up to 81% of small scale and a further 68% of (medium and large)
private construction firms had no training programmes at formal construction training
institutions. To remedy the above situation, the government was already conducting "open air
demonstration centres" where the unemployed were been given various training skills among
which were construction skills. Given government's intention to reduce its role in education and
the economy it was, therefore, surprising to find that these open air demonstration centres were
run solely by the government without private sector or community participation. There was no
deliberate policy to target the vulnerable groups like women arid the unemployed youth, contrary
to government policy and pronouncements.
8.3.4 Construction supply
Warren (1993, p. 197) summarised supply-side economics by saying that it aims at increasing
agate production supply in the economy by eliminating structural rigidities in the country's
socio-economic and political environment. It was also made clear in Chapter two, that increased
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(construction) supply is increasingly associated and linked to environmental sustainability.
Unfortunately however, as the cases of the manually crushed stones and increased timber export
demonstrated, it is not always easy to reduce production costs, increase production and yet attain
environment sustainability (see also Wells, 1993, p.89).
Unfortunately, rather than find a more practical way of sustaining long term (environmentally
friendly) construction supply, the Zambian government chose to legislate and control the export
of timber and curb stone crushing. We observed that this government reaction did help in
ensuring that present or future timber or aggregate production did not damage the environment
nor restore the already damaged environment! sites. A position which could have been achieved
had government imposed a minimal environment tax on all affected producers for use in cleaning
the affected sites and for future sustainable construction production.
8.3.4.1 Improving the quantity of construction supply
Table 7.6 in chapter 7 clearly showed that in the post SAP era obtaining most basic construction
materials was no longer a problem, compared to the critical construction materials shortages and
a flourishing black market of the Second Republic (Fewings, 1991, p. 38-39; Mashamba, 1996).
The only unfortunate phenomenon with the post adjustment era was that some of the materials
were still being imported into the country, thereby denying the country the postulated high
multiplier effects in the local economy (Moavenzaden, 1987; Klaassen et a!, 1987; ILO[UNCHSIJ,
1995). But as Wells (1995, p73) has rightly argued, in developing countries such as Zambia, "the
supply of building materials at affordable prices has long been recognised as a prerequisite for
improved housing conditions," that the question on where and how these materials are obtained
are not vigorously pursued. It was also noted that the only large scale housing scheme to be
implemented in the last five was the construction of the 118 low cost housing units by the
Chinese Government in Ndola.
The roads and water rehabilitation exercises were some of the programmes completely dominated
by foreign based contractors. Here again, we failed to see how the postulated high multiplier
effects of the construction industry could filter to the local economy, when large scale projects
were dominated by foreign contractors, using imported materials. Given, however, that most of
these foreign contractor-dominated projects and programmes were donor funded, and in some
cases there were no experienced and appropriate Zambian companies to carry out these contracts,
there was little that the Zambian government or the Industry could do.
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8.3.4.2 Improving construction supply quality
In tables 7.4 and 7.5 we saw that the main reason why imports continue to dominate the Zambian
construction market is that Zambia does not produce all its construction materials and that
Zambian goods are viewed as being inferior to and yet more expensive than imported ones. We
therefore, observed that, there was no other way of promoting Zambian construction goods and
services, locally and for exports, than by improving quality. Although we did find some very
good locally produced construction goods, there were unfortunately some goods especially in the
informal sector that were poorly made (see also plate 7.4). This is not to suggest that all goods
and services in the informal sector were particularly poor or below standard, on the contrary some
informal sector goods and services were very good such that those in the formal sector did
business with this sector.
The absence on an effective, well funded and staffed local Bureau of Standards to grade the
various construction materials did not help matters either. The Zambia Bureau of Standards could
have helped by grading Zambian-produced goods appropriately, so that customers knew exactly
the quality of goods they are buying. This would have ensured that households on low income, or
projects that did not require very high quality construction materials, bought the low standard
goods and those with high incomes and projects preferring high quality construction goods
bought accordingly. The prevailing situation where most construction goods did not carry a
standard code did not help the customers nor the industry, because some of the Zambian
construction materials which were of good quality ended up being regarded as poor quality
simply because were made in Zambia.
We also found that, although a number of good construction-related research projects had been
commissioned by various institutions, their findings/results failed to reach the intended targets.
We found that part of the problem in disseminating construction research findings was due to
duplication of roles and research work by various institutions, which only meant less money and
effort in disseminating their findings. We thus conclude that this situation could have been
avoided had the Zambian government or industry established one body to co-ordinate all
construction-related research and its dissemination nation-wide.
8.3.4.3 Increasing construction exports
In chapter two, we saw how the Structural Adjustment Programme set about targeting exports,
especially non traditional exports from the Third World, as the only way of reducing their
indebtedness. The Enabling Shelter Strategy on the other hand emphasises increased exports of
construction goods and services. Unfortunately, our research did not find overwhelming evidence
pointing to increased construction exports, although there was very encouraging signs from a few
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companies like Chilanga Cement plc, Turnall Asbestos Products plc and the timber sub-market.
But as figure 8.1 will confirm, these exports were recorded against a background of reduced local
construction output, suggesting that the excess local output was being exported. This fact js
further demonstrated in appendix ifi which is a simple correlation table for all the construction
indicators, which shows a high negative correlation rate for exported materials and the level of
local construction output i.e, reduced local construction output was inducing more construction
exports.
What was even more discouraging, however, was the very high percentage rate of companies
(99%) that had no immediate intentions of going into the export market. This was despite the
consolidation of the Eastern and Southern African market through SADC and COMESA. This
was also despite the fact that the region's construction market potential was further strengthened
by the end of civil wars in Mozambique and Angola and the end of apartheid in South Africa
which resulted in massive reconstruction taking place in these countries.
8.4.0 Achievement and failures in the Zambian construction industry after 1991
Undoubtedly, the greatest achievement in applying the Structural Adjustment Programme and
Enabling Shelter Strategy on the Zambian construction industry have been in the ways in which
they have removed bureaucratic controls in business practices and transactions. The removal of
foreign exchange controls, easing of ently into the construction business environment, especially
the entry of the informal construction sector thus resulted in more construction firms than ever
before. This meant that retrenched public sector workers who would otherwise have been
unemployed, were able to found work or start their own business in the thriving private and
mainly informal construction sector. Although we could point to such positive gains above, it
also very clear that reduced construction demand by the government and other public sector
institutions in the last five years, has resulted in an overall shrinking construction industry (see
table 7.1). In short, therefore, the greatest failure of the two aforementioned strategies was in their
failure to substantially increase national construction output, especially in the areas like formal
housing stock and the formal construction labour market.
The acceptance of capitalist practices also meant that foreign firms were more welcome in the
economy without the fear of their firms being nationalised as was the case before. The anti-
inflationary measures of SAP are some of the positive attributes of this programme, in that they
managed within limits to reduce inflation and stabilise the foreign exchange rates. Although
stabilised foreign exchange rates were late in coming, when they were finally achieved they
allowed investors to plan ahead and minimum KwachalDollar fluctuation during construction
time.
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Trade liberalisation also ensured that construction firms with the production and quality capacity
were able to export their goods and earn the country some foreign exchange. The only draw back
was that these construction exports were only able to increase in the wake of reduced local
demand. Nevertheless, the achievements of Chulanga Cement plc, Turnall Asbestos Products and
the Timber industry, in earning the country huge amounts of foreign exchange have demonstrated
the export potential of the Zambian construction industry in producing construction materials
acceptable at international level.
In appendix IV, we also see a strong correlation between construction and copper output of
+0.808 as measured in GDP. This helps to explain the low construction output in the country in
the wake of reduced copper production by the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines and low
copper prices. We also noted that the reduced copper production and consequently low
construction output was partly because of the delays in privatising the ZCCM, which urgently
needed new capital injection to replace and improve it capital stock.
It was also clear in our study that, in most instances, the Zambian Government lacked the political
will to carry out in full some of the adjustment and enablement conditionalities. For example, the
failure by Government to effectively reduce the public service and, therefore, the public service
emolument bill was attributed to the lack of political will on the part of Government. Although
the Government later allocated K2Obn ($16.7m) in the 1997 budget for the Public Sector Reform
Programme, based on past experience, it was doubtful whether the government could fmally
gather enough political will power to carry out this measure (see also United Nations, 1994a, p.
21).
The xenophobia towards foreigners was another area which could have discouraged foreign
investments in Zambia and further demonstrated government's lack of will power to effectively
deal with the issue. This lack of political will was clearly manifested in the Livingstone racially
motivated riots in which billions of Kwacha worth of Asian property was destroyed, and
statements by grassroots politicians asking councils not to sell council houses to "foreigners".
To encourage more international private capital, which little or no bearing on domestic party
politics, it would have been imperative for the Government to have privatised and allowed more
private sector participation in traditionally dominated public sectors like education, health, and
public utilities. For example, rather than planning on building more publicly funded universities,
hospitals and hydro-electricity power stations, the Government should have encouraged (given
necessary incentives and investment securities) the private sector to do so. For a start all the
schools, colleges and hospitals that were nationalised from the missionary and other religious
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orders under the UNIP government should have been returned. Such a move would not only have
encouraged the private sector back into these sectors, but would also have relieved the
Government of some of its huge education and health budgets.
With copper, Zambia's main export earner not thriving, on the London Metal Exchange, we took
the view that the construction export market is an area of great concern, needing urgent
Government attention. We conclude, therefore, that the omission by the Government to
incorporate construction marketing into the already existing Export Board of Zambia (EBZ) and
Trade Missions in the foreign service, for purposes of promoting and selling Zambian
construction goods and services was a very serious mistake. This obviously, did not help in
marketing the Zambian construction industry abroad, especially within the COMESA region, the
way the tourist industry has been marketed. It could also be argued that Zambia, with a population
of 9 million people and per capita GNP of $290, is too small to be a self sustaining market and
should, therefore, work towards making a successful regional and international market.
8.5.0 Recommendations for future research
Being the first research of this kind in Zambia, our study looked at the overall effects of the
Structural Adjustment Programme and the Enabling Shelter Strategy on the construction industry.
As such it was not possible to do an in-depth research and analysis on each and every aspect of
the industry. It now remains for future research to start breaking the industry and the two Neo-
liberal strategies into smaller sectors, for more in-depth analysis. For example, in future it would
be useful to take each of our four chapters, from chapters four to eight arci carrj out eñeX
study analysis of the issues raised here at regular time periods, say every five years. The results
could then be used to make further improvements to the Zambian construction industry and for
the continuous development and refinement of the two Neo-Liberal development theories of
structural adjustment and shelter enablement.
For example, it will be important to monitor the performance of the construction industry in the
years to come and regression the various variables to see their interrelationship. For now, five
years presents only five yearly observations which was far too small observations to be able to
accurately regress the variables. For instance, an attempt to regress the variables in figure 8.1
using only the first five years of the strategies was able to give us the regression formula below,
which when tested was not very accurate, but quite close for lack of large data base of yearly
observations.
Const. output. = 592 + 1.05 Sawnwood + 2.23 Cement - 0.107 Employment. - 8.10 For.housing
Continued observations and regression of construction variables for another five years should be
able to establish a very accurate formula for predicating construction performance in Zambia.
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Where:
Const. output= Construction output (as measured at 1991=100)
Sawnwood= The amount of sawnwood production (as measured at 1991=100)
Cement= Total cement production by Chilanga Cement (as measured at 199 1=100)
Employment.= Total formal construction employment in Zambia (as measured at 1991=100)
For.housing= Total number of formal housing stock in Zambia (as measured at 199 1=100)
Inf.hou= Total informal housing stock in Zambia (as measured at 199 1=100)
MTB > Regress C4 5 ci c2 c6 c7 c8.
* Inf.hou is highly correlated with other X variables
* Inf.hou has been removed from the equation
* NOTE * Formal housing is highly correlated with other predictor variables
Predictor	 Coef	 Stdev	 t-ratio	 p
Constant	 592.4	 246.0	 2.41 0.25 1
Sawnwood 1.0535 0.3669
	 2.87 0.213
Cement	 2.226	 1.175	 1.90 0.309
Employm. -0.1071	 0.5578	 -0.19 0.879
For.hou	 -8.099	 3.201	 -2.53 0.240
s = 2.624	 R-sq = 99.7% R-sq(adj) = 98.4%
I Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF	 SS	 MS F p
Regression 4 2194.45 548.61 79.67 0.084
Error	 1	 6.89	 6.89
Total	 5 2201.33
SOURCE DF SEQ SS
Sawnwood 1 1563.16
Cement	 1	 183.79
Employm.	 1 403.41
For.hou	 1	 44.09
Unusual Observations
Obs. Sawnwood Cons.	 Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1	 100 100.00	 99.79	 2.62	 0.21	 1.00 X
5	 127	 54.00	 54.19	 2.62	 -0.19	 -1.00X
6	 127	 50.00	 50.17	 2.62	 -0.17	 -1.00X
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
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APPENDIX I
SURVEY QUESTIONS
The contribution of the construction industry to national development:
Opportunities and constraints under the Structural Adjustment Programme
and the Enabling Shelter Strategy in Zambia
Date__________________________________ Name of Interviewee___________________________________________
CaseNo._________________________________ Place_____________________________________________
SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR CONTRACTORS 	 I
1. What is the name of this company/organisation?
1. Name of
2. Based at
2. What is the form of ownership?
3. Is this a wholly Zambian owned company?
4. When was this company formed?
IYear:	 I	 I
5. Did you start this company?
a. Yes
b.No
1. Bought the company
2. Inherited the company
3. Nationalised by state
4. Other: specify
Appendices
6. Why did you choose to go into the construction materials business?
1. Construction reference background	 ________
2. Investment returns (profit margins)	 _________
3. High construction demand	 ________
4. Inherited business 	 __________
5. Other: specify	 _________
7. How did you finance your initial investment in this company?
1. Loan	 _______
2. Pension	 ________
3. Money Lender	 ________
4. Savings	 ________
5. Family help	 ________
6. Bank	 _______
7. Other: specify	 _________
8. How much was this initial investment?
Year:
Investment in Zambian Kwacha:
9. How much do you think this company is worth now: if you were to sell it, how much would you sell it for?
I Value of company in Zambian Kwacha: I	 I
10. What are the main activities of this company?
I 1. Of these activities above, what proportion is new works and maintenance?
(2. Who are your largest client/customer?
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13. How do you get your contracts/jobs?
1. Tendering
2. Personal contracts
3. Reference
4. Other: specify
14. How many workers do you have?
Total Number:
Male:
Female:
15. Of these (above) how many are;
16. How many workers did you start with, or how many did you haveS years ago?
(Which ever is the longest)
I No. of workers:	 I
17. Do you have immediate plans of increasing/decreasing the number of workers, and why?
Labour Plans
	 _____ Reasons
1. Increasing	 ______ ________________________________________
2. Decreasing	 _____ ___________________________________
3. Maintaining same No. 	 _____ ____________________________________
4. Not sure	 _____ ____________________________________
18. Do you have an internal training programme/ apprenticeship? If yes how many?
Yes:
No.:
19. Do you have any other training scheme for your workers or would be workers?
1. University_level-_Degree 	 ______
2. College_level-_Diploma	 _______
3. Tradesschool-_Certificate 	 ______
4. Any other- specify	 ______
5. None	 ______
20. Do you employ workers without practical experience, if yes how many?
YES:	 No.
NO:	 go to No. 22
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21. Do you have any expatriate workers working for you, if yes how many and why?
a. If none go to Question No. 22
b.
Yes
No. of expatriates
c. Reasons
1. No qualified Zambians available
2. Foreign based company
3. Other: specify
22. W hat are your plans for their replacements?
23. Is your wage /salary bill wholly in Zambian Kwacha?
Wholly US $1 British Pounds:
Wholly Zambian Kwacha:
LPartially Zambian Kwacha and US$/UK
24. How did you determine your wage/salary structure above?
1. Trade Unions
2. Government legislation
3. Productivity/profit and loss
4. Other: specify
25. Where do you buy your construction materials from?
material	 Kitwe	 Other	 Retail	 Informal	 Direct
Town-	 Shop 0	 Traders	 Import
_______________________________ ________ Specify	 _________ (SIDO)	 __________
1. Bricks/ blocks
	 ________ _________ _________ __________ __________
2. Electrical goods	 ________ _________ _________ __________ __________
3. Cement	 _______ _________ ________ _________ _________
4. Timber	 ________ _________ ________ __________ _________
5. Roofing sheets	 ________ _________ ________ __________ _________
6. Iron and steel	 ________ _________ _________ __________ __________
7. Glass	 _____ ______ ______ _______ _______
8. Window & door frames	 _______ _________ ________ _________ _________
9. Aggregates	 ________ _________ _________ __________ __________
10. Plumbing items	 ________ _________ ________ __________ _________
11. Other: specify	 ________ __________ _________ ___________ __________
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26. Why do you obtain them from these sources(above)?
1. Only source available
2. Good quality
3. Cheap price
4. Credit facility available
5. Other specify
material	 ________ _____________________ ___ 2 3 4 5
1. Bricks/ blocks	 ________ ________ ________ _______ ____________________
2. Electricals	 _________ _________ ________ ________ _____________________
3. Cement	 _______ _______ _______ ______ _________________
4. Timber	 _______ _______ _______ ______ _________________
5. Roofing sheets	 _______ _______ _______ ______ _________________
6. Iron and steel 	 ________ ________ ________ _______ ___________________
7. Glass	 ________ ________ _______ ______ __________________
8. Window & door frames	 _______ _______ _______ ______ _________________
9. Aggregates	 ________ ________ ________ _______ ___________________
10. Plumbing items	 ________ ________ _______ ______ __________________
11. Other: specify	 ________ ________ ________ _______ ___________________
27. Do you face problems in getting these materials, if yes what are these problems?
material	 yes/no	 problem
1. Bricks/ blocks	 _________ __________________________________________
2. Electricals	 __________ ____________________________________________
3. Cement	 ________ ______________________________________
4. Timber	 ________ ______________________________________
5. Roofing sheets	 _________ ________________________________________
6. Iron and steel 	 _________ ________________________________________
7. Glass	 ______ ___________________________
8. Window & door frames	 ________ ____________________________________
9. Aggregates	 _________ ________________________________________
10. Plumbing items	 _________ ________________________________________
11. Other: specify	 _________ ________________________________________
28. Do you prefer imported construction raw materials to local ones, if yes why?
Material	 YES	 NO	 Cheap	 Good quality	 Easily available
1. Electrical items	 _______	 ________ ________________ __________________
2. Window! door frames	 ______	 ________ ______________ _________________
3. Plumbing items	 ______	 ________ ______________ _________________
4. Timber	 ______	 _______ _____________ ________________
5. Roofing sheets	 ______	 _______ _____________ ________________
6. Other: specify	 _______	 ________ ________________ __________________
7. Other: specify	 _______	 ________ ________________ __________________
29. What measures would help in promoting Local building materials?
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30. Does your company have any plans of substituting imported materials with local materials in the next 5 years?
1. No plans
2. Not sure
3. Yes-(Specify materials)
31. Do you know of any research or efforts done in promoting local materials, if yes which ones?
1. No idea on local materials research activities
2. Yes( Specify research activities)
32. How did you get your first contract?
33. How many contracts do you have?
34. How many contracts have you had in the last 5 years or since you began operations (if started in the last 5 years)
I Number of contracts (jobs);	 I	 I
35. Of these contracts how many have not been completed successfully?
I Number of uncompleted contracts (jobs)	 I	 I
36. What are the reasons for not completing these projects?
37. What is the biggest contract (in money terms) that you have ever had and what was the contract sum?
279
Appendices
38. What is the smallest contract that you have ever had and what was the contract sum and time?
39. On average how long does it take you to complete a project?
I Average contract period	 I	 I
40. Do you sub-contract any of your works, if yes, which ones and do you intend doing these jobs in-house in future?
TRADE	 Sub-contract- 	 In-house in future
____________________ YES/NO	 YES/NO
1. Woodwork	 __________________ ____________________
2. Roadwork's	 ____________________ ______________________
3. Electrical	 ______________________ ________________________
4. Plumbing	 __________________ ____________________
5. Roofing	 __________________ ____________________
6. Other: specify	 _____________________ _______________________
7. Other: specify	 _____________________ _______________________
8. Other: specify	 ______________________ ________________________
41. How do you choose your sub-contractors?
1. Client chooses	 _______________
2. Consultants recommends	 _____________
3. Previous working knowledge	 _____________
4. Friends/ relatives	 ______________
5. Other: specify	 _______________
42. What machines do you use in your company?
MACHINE	 No.	 No. Owned by No. planned to
__________________________ _________ firm 	 be bought
I.	 _______________ ____________________ ___________________
2. ____________ _______________ ______________
3. ____________ _______________ ______________
4. ____________ _______________ ______________
5. ____________ ________________ _______________
6. ____________ _______________ ______________
7. ____________ _______________ ______________
8. ____________ ________________ _______________
9. ____________ _______________ ______________
10. __________________ _______________________ ______________________
43. When you finally buy these machines, will you then have to retrench some workers, if yes, how many? (by trade)
1. No retrenchment
2. Yes retrenchment
3. Number to be retrenched
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44. What form of assistance do you receive from either the central or local government and NGOs?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
5. Other -specify
45. But what assistance would you prefer to be given to you and by who?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
5. Other -specify
46. Of the following below which measures have helped your business in the last 5 years?
Policy measure	 Helped	 not	 Comments
___________________________________ _________ helped
	 ____________________________________
1. Easy availability of Forex
	 ________ ________ ______________________________
2. Non intervention of
Government in the construction
industry________ ________ _____________________________
3. Import liberalisation 	 ________ ________ ______________________________
4. Export liberalisation	 ________ ________ ______________________________
5. Withdrawal of subsidies and
grantsto parastatals	 ________ _________ ________________________________
6. Withdrawal of housing
allowances_________ _________ __________________________________
7. Privatisation of public
companies________ ________ ______________________________
8. Relaxing interest rates ceilings ________ _________ ________________________________
9. Selling of council houses	 ________ ________ ______________________________
IQ.Infrastructure rehabilitation ________ _________ ________________________________
47. On the other hand what are the negative things that have happened in the last 5 years that tended to slow down
your business?
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48. Do you face any problems in getting financial assistance, if yes what problems?
a. No
b. Yes
49. What form of financial assistance would you want given to you?
1. Loans with low interest rates	 ______
2. Long term investment loans 	 _____
3. Tax exemptions on capital investment	 _____
4. Loans at market rates	 _____
5. Other-specify	 ______
50. Has the liberalisation of the Kwacha affected your business, if yes how?
a. No
b. Yes
51. In your opinion what measures should be put in place to boast the construction sector?
52. Do you have immediate plans to expand your company?
53. Do you plan to remain in this type of business?
1. Yes
2. Not sure
3. No
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54. If not, what do you intend doing?
55. How do you see the future of this industry(construction) in the next 5 years?
1. Getting worse	 ______
2. Likely_to_remain_the_same	 ______
3. Not sure	 ______
4. Likely to improve	 ______
5. Other -specify	 ______
56. Would reducing building and planning standards help your business in any way?
Yes	 No
Building standards
Planning standards
57. Which specific building and planning standards would you want reduced or changed, and why?
1. Building
standards
2. Planning
standards
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The contribution of the construction industry to national development:
Opportunities and constraints under the Structural Adjustment Programme
and the Enabling Shelter Strategy in Zambia
Date________________________________ Name of Interviewee__________________________________________
CaseNo._________________________________ Place______________________________________________
I SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR MANUFACTURERS OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 	 I
I. What is the name of this company/organisation?
1. Name of
2. Based at
2. What is the form of ownership?
3. Is this a wholly Zambian owned company?
4. When was this company formed?
Ivear:	 I	 I
5. Did you start this company?
a. Yes
b. No
1. Bought the company
2. Inherited the company
3. Nationalised by state
4. Other: specify
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6, Why did you choose to go into the construction materials business?
1. Construction reference background	 ________
2. Investment returns (profit margins) 	 ________
3. High_construction_demand	 ________
4. Inherited business	 _________
5. Other: specify	 _________
7. Flow did you finance your initial investment in this company?
8. How much was this initial investment?
Year:
Investment in Zambian Kwacha:
9. How much do you think this company is worth now: if you were to sell it, how much would you sell it for?
I Value of company in Zambian Kwacha: I	 I
10. What are the main activities of this company?
11. Who are your largest client/customer?
12. How do you get to sell most of your products?
1. Tendering	 _______
2. Advertising	 _______
3. Personal contacts	 _______
4. Reference	 ________
5. Other: specify	 ________
13. How many workers do you have?
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Total Number:
Male:
Female:
14. Of these how many are
15. How many workers did you start with, or how many did you have 5 years ago?
(Which ever is the longest)
I No. of workers:	 I	 I
16. Do you have immediate plans of increasing/decreasing the number of workers, and why?
Labour Plans	 _____ Reasons
1. Increasing	 ______ _________________________________________
2. Decreasing	 ______ _____________________________________
3. Maintaining same No.	 ______ _____________________________________
4. Not sure	 ______
17. Do you have an internal training programmel apprenticeship? If yes how many?
Yes:
No.:
18. Do you have any other training scheme for your workers or would be workers?
1. University_level-_Degree	 _______
2. College level-_Diploma	 _______
3. Trades school- Certificate 	 _______
4. Any other- specify	 _______
5. None	 _______
19. Do you employ workers without practical experience, if yes how many?
YES:	 No.
NO:	 go to No. 22
20. Do you have any expatriate workers working for you, if yes how many and why?
a. If none go to Question No. 22
b.
Yes
No. of expatriates
c. Reasons
1. No qualified Zambians available
2. Foreign based company
3. Other: specify
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21. What are your plans for their replacements?
22. Is your wage /salary bill wholly in Zambian Kwacha?
Wholly US $1 British Pounds:
Wholly Zambian Kwacha:
Partially Zambian Kwacha and US$fUK
23. How did you determine your wage/salary structure above?
1. Trade Unions
2. Government legislation
3. Productivity/profit and loss
4. Other: specify
24. Where do you buy your construction materials from?
material	 Kitwe	 Other	 Shop	 Informal	 Direct
Town-	 Traders	 Import
_______________________________ _______ Specify _______ __________ _________
1. Iron and steel	 ________
2. Timber	 ______ _________ ______ __________ _________
3. _______ _________ _______ __________ _________
4. _______ _________ _______ __________
5. _______ _________ _______ __________ _________
6. ______ _________ ______ __________ _________
7. _______ _________ _______ __________ _________
8. _______ _________ _______ __________ _________
9. _______ __________ ________ ___________ __________
10. _________ ____________ __________ ______________ ____________
25. Why do you obtain them from these sources(above)?
1. Only source available
2. Good quality
3. Cheap price
4. Credit facility available
5. Other specify
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material	 1	 3	 5
I. Iron and steel
	 _______	 ______
2. Timber	 ______	 _____	 _________________
3. ______	 _____	 __________________
4. ______	 _____	 __________________
5. ______	 _____	 ___________________
6. ______	 _____	 __________________
7. ______	 _____	 _________________
8. ______	 ______	 __________________
9. ______	 ______	 ___________________
10. _______	 _______	 _______________________
26. Do you face problems in getting these materials, if yes what are these problems?
material	 yes/no	 problem
1. Iron and steel
2. Timber	 ________ __________________________
3. _________ _____________________________
4. _________ _____________________________
5. _________ _____________________________
6. _________ _____________________________
7. _________ _____________________________
8. _________ _____________________________
9. _________ _____________________________
10. ___________ ____________________________________
27 Do you prefer imported construction raw materials to local ones, if yes why?
Material	 YES	 NO	 Cheap	 Good quality	 Easily available
1. Timber	 ______	 ________ ______________ _________________
2. Steel	 _______	 ________ ________________ ___________________
3. ______	 ________ _______________ __________________
4. ______	 ________ _______________ __________________
5. _______	 ________ ________________ ___________________
6. _______	 ________ _______________ __________________
7. _______	 _____ ________
28. What measures would help in promoting local building materials?
29. Does your company have any plans of substituting imported materials with local materials in the next 5 years?
1. No plans
2. Not sure
3. Yes-(Specify materials)
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30. Do you know of any research or efforts done in promoting local materials, if yes which ones?
1. No idea on local materials research activities
2. Yes( Specify research
31. On average how long does it take you to produce your products?
Product	 Average production time
2. _________________________________________
3. _________________________________________
4. _____________________________________
5. _________________________________________
6. _______________________________________
7. _______________________________________
32. Do you subcontract any of your works, if yes, which ones and do you intend doing these jobs in-house in future?
TRADE	 Sub-contract-YES/NO In-house in future-
_________________ ______________ YES/NO
1. Research/design	 __________________ ___________________
2. Retailing	 __________________ ___________________
3. Export	 __________________ ___________________
4. Installation	 ___________________ ____________________
5. Other-specify	 ___________________ ____________________
6. Other- specify	 ___________________ ____________________
7. Other- specify	 ___________________ ____________________
8. Other- specify	 ____________________ _____________________
33. How do you choose you subcontractors?
1. Research /design consultants recommends
2. Previous working knowledge
3. Friends /relatives
4. Other -specify
34. What machines do you use in your company?
MACHINE	 No.	 No. Owned	 No. Planned to
______________________ ________ by firm 	 be bought
1.	 ___________ _______________ __________________
3. _________ ____________ _______________
4. _________ ___________ ______________
5. _________ ____________ ______________
6. _________ ____________ ______________
7. _________ ___________ ______________
8. _________ ____________ ______________
9. _________ ____________ ______________
10. _________ ___________ ______________
11. ___________ _______________ _________________
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35. When you finally buy these machines, will you then have to retrench some workers and how many? (Labourers,
mixers, etc.)
1. No retrenchment
2. Retrenchment (Yes)
3. Number
36. What form of assistance do you receive from either the central or local government and NGO's?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
5. Other -specify
37. But what assistance would you prefer to be given to you and by who?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
5. Other -specify
a. Central Government	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
b. Local Government 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
c. NGO's or CBO's	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5
38. Of the following below which measures have helped your business in the last 5 years?
Policy measure	 Helped	 not	 Comments
_________________________________ _________ helped
	 __________________________________
1. Easy availability of Forex	 ________ ________ _______________________________
2. Non intervention of
Government in the construction
industry________ ________ _______________________________
3. Import liberalisation	 ________ ________ _______________________________
4. Export liberalisation	 ________ ________ _______________________________
5. Withdrawal of subsidies and
grantsto parastatals	 ________ ________ _____________________________
6. Withdrawal of housing
allowances________ _________ ________________________________
7. Privatisation of public
companies________ ________ _______________________________
8. Relaxing interest rates ceilings ________ _________ ________________________________
9. Selling of council houses	 ________ ________ _______________________________
10. Infrastructure rehabilitation _________ _________ __________________________________
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39. On the other hand what are the negative things that have happened in the last 5 years that tended to slow down
your business?
40. Do you face any problems in getting financial assistance, if yes what problems?
a. No
b. Yes
41. What form of financial assistance would you want given to you?
42 Has the liberalisation of the Kwacha affected your business, if yes how?
a. No
b. Yes
43. In your opinion what measures should be put in place to boast the construction sector?
44. Do you have immediate plans to expand your company?
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45. Do you plan to remain in this type of business?
1. Yes
2. Not sure
3.No
46. If not, what do you intend doing?
47. How do you see the future of this industry(construction) in the next 5 years?
1. Getting worse	 ______
2. Likely_to_remain_the_same 	 _______
3. Not sure	 ______
4. Likely to improve 	 ______
5. Other -specify	 _______
48. Would reducing building and planning standards help your business in any way?
Yes	 No
Building standards
Planning standards
49. Which specific building and planning standards would you want reduced or changed, and why?
1. Building
standards
2. Planning
standards
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The contribution of the construction industry to national development:
Opportunities and constraints under the Structural Adjustment Programme
and the Enabling Shelter Strategy in Zambia
Date________________________________ Name of Interviewee_________________________________________
CaseNo._________________________________ Place______________________________________________
I SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR SUPPLIERS /TRADES OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 	 I
I. What is the name of this company/organisation?
Name of
Based at
2. What is the form of ownership?
3. Is this a wholly Zambian owned company?
4. When was this company formed?
I Year:	 I	 I
5. Did you start this company?
a. Yes
b. No
1. Bought the company
2. Inherited the company
3. Nationalised by state
4. Other: specify
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6. Why did you choose to go into the construction materials business?
1. Construction reference background	 ________
2. Investment returns (profit margins)	 ________
3. High_construction_demand	 ________
4. Inherited business	 _________
5. Other: specify	 _________
7, How did you finance your initial investment in this company?
8. How much was this initial investment?
Year:
Investment in Zambian Kwacha:
9 How much do you think this company is worth now: if you were to sell it, how much would you sell it for?
I Value of company in Zambian Kwacha:	 I
10. What are the main activities of this company?
II Who is your largest client/customer?
12. How do you get to sell most of your products?
1. Open_market/ shop 	 _________
2. Tendering/advertising 	 _________
3. Personal contacts	 _________
4. Reference	 __________
S. Other: specify	 __________
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13.How many workers do you have?
Total Number:
Male:
Female:
14.Of these how many are
15.How many workers did you start with, or how many did you have 5 years ago?
(Which ever is the longest)
I No. of workers:	 I	 I
16. Do you have immediate plans of increasing/decreasing the number of workers, and why?
Labour Plans
	
_____ Reasons
1. Increasing	 ______ ____________________________________________
2. Decreasing	 _____ ______________________________________
3. Maintaining same No. 	 _____ ______________________________________
4. Not sure	 _____ ______________________________________
17 Do you have an internal training programme/ apprenticeship? If yes how many?
Yes:
No.:
18. Do you have any other training scheme for your workers or would be workers?
1. University level- Degree	 _______
2. College level- Diploma	 _______
3. Trades school- Certificate	 ______
4. Any other- specify	 ______
5. None	 ______
19. Do you employ workers without practical experience, if yes how many?
YES:	 No.
NO:	 go to No. 22
20. Do you have any expatriate workers working for you, if yes how many and why?
a. If none go to Question No. 22
b.
Yes
No. of expatriates
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c. Reasons
1. No qualified Zambians available
2. Foreign based company
3. Other: specify
21. What are your plans for their replacements?
22. Is your wage /salary bill wholly in Zambian Kwacha?
Wholly US $1 British Pounds:
Wholly Zambian Kwacha:
Partially Zambian Kwacha and US$IUKE
23. How did you determine your wage/salary structure above?
1. Trade Unions
2. Government legislation
3. Productivity/profit and loss
4. Other: specify
24. Where do you buy your construction materials from?
material	 Kitwe	 Other	 Shop	 Informal	 Direct
Town-	 Traders	 Import
_________________________________ ________ Specify ________ ___________ __________
1. Iron and steel	 __________
2. Timber	 _______ _________ _______ __________ _________
3. _______ __________ _______ __________ _________
4. _______ _________ _______ __________ _________
5. ________ __________ ________ ___________ __________
6. ________ __________ ________ ___________ __________
7. _______ __________ _______ ___________ _________
8. ________ __________ ________ ___________ __________
9. _______ __________ _______ ___________ _________
10. __________ ______________ __________ _______________ _____________
25. Why do you obtain them from these sources(above)?
I. Only source available
2. Good quality
3. Cheap price
4. Credit facility available
5. Other specify
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material	 1	 3	 5
1. Iron and steel	 ______	 ______	 ____________________
2. Timber	 _____	 _____	 _________________
3. ______	 ______	 ____________________
4. ______	 ______	 ___________________
5. ______	 ______	 ___________________
6. ______	 ______	 ___________________
7. ______	 _____	 __________________
8. ______	 ______	 ____________________
9. ______	 ______	 ___________________
to. _________	 _________	 _____________________________
26. Do you face problems in getting these materials, if yes what are these problems?
material	 yes/no	 problem
I. Iron and steel	 ________ ____________________________
2. Timber	 ________ ____________________________
3. _________ _____________________________
4. ________ ____________________________
5. _________ _______________________________
6. _________ _____________________________
7. _________ _______________________________
8. _________ _______________________________
9. _________ _______________________________
10. ____________ _______________________________________
27. Do you prefer imported construction materials to local ones, if yes why?
Material	 YES	 NO	 Cheap	 Good quality	 Easily available
1. Timber	 ______ _____ ________ ______________ _________________
2. _______ _____ ________ ________________ ___________________
3. _______ _____ ________ _______________ __________________
4. _______ _____ ________ _______________ __________________
5. _______ _____ ________ _______________ __________________
6. _______ _____ ________ _______________ __________________
7. ______ _____ ________ ______________ _________________
28. What measures would help in promoting local building materials?
29. Does your company have any plans of substituting imported materials with local materials in the next 5 years?
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30. Do you know of any research or efforts done in promoting local materials, if yes which ones?
1. No Idea on local materials research activities
2. Yes( Specify research activities)
31. On average how long does it take you to replenish your stock?
Stock	 Average replenishing time
2. __________________________________
3. ____________________________________
4. _________________________________
5. __________________________________
6. __________________________________
7. __________________________________
32. What form of assistance do you receive from either the central or local government and NGO's?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
5. Other -specify
33 But what assistance would you prefer to be given to you and by who?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
5. Other -specify
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34. Of the following below which measures have helped your business in the last 5 years?
Policy measure	 Helped	 not	 Comments
_________________________________ _________ helped 	 __________________________________
1. Easy availability of Forex	 ________ _________ ________________________________
2. Non intervention of
Government in the construction
industry________ ________ ______________________________
3. Import liberalisation	 ________ _________ ________________________________
4. Export liberalisation	 ________ _________ ________________________________
5. Withdrawal of subsidies and
grantsto parastatals	 ________ ________ ______________________________
6. Withdrawal of housing
allowances________ _________ __________________________________
7. Privatisation of public
companies________ _________ ________________________________
8. Relaxing interest rates ceilings _________ _________ __________________________________
9. Selling of council houses 	 ________ _________ ________________________________
10. Infrastructure rehabilitation ________ _________ ________________________________
35. On the other hand what are the negative things that have happened in the last 5 years that tended to slow down
your business?
36. Do you face any problems in getting financial assistance, if yes what problems?
a.No
b. Yes
37. What form of financial assistance would you want given to you?
1. Loans_with_low_interest_rates 	 ______
2. Long_term_investmentloans	 _____
3. Tax exemptions on capital investment	 _____
4. Loans at market rates	 _____
S. Other-specify	 ______
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38. Has the liberalisation of the Kwacha affected your business, if yes how?
a. No
b. Yes
39. In your opinion what measures should be put in place to boast the construction sector?
40. Do you have immediate plans to expand your company?
41 Do you plan to remain in this type of business?
1. Yes
2. Not sure
3. No
42. If not, what do you intend doing?
1. Go into other form of business	 ______
2. Leave this country and pursue construction business	 _____
3. Retire! close down	 _____
4. Not sure	 ______
S. Other specify	 ______
43. How do you see the future of this industry(construction) in the next 5 years?
1. Getting worse	 ______
2. Likely to improve	 ______
3. Not sure	 ______
4. No change	 ______
5. Other -specify	 ______
44 Would reducing building and planning standards help your business in any way?
(Yes	 No
Building standards
Planning standards
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45. Which specific building and planning standards would you want reduced or changed, and why?
1. Building
standards
2. Planning
standards_
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The contribution of the construction industry to national development:
Opportunities and constraints under the Structural Adjustment Programme
and the Enabling Shelter Strategy in Zambia
Date________________________________ Name of Interviewee__________________________________________
CaseNo._________________________________ Place______________________________________________
SURVEY QUESTIONS FOR CONSULTANTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY	 I
I. What is the name of this company/organisation?
1. Name of
2. Based at
2. What is the form of ownership?
3. Is this a wholly Zambian owned company?
4. When was this company formed?
JYear:	 I	 I
5. Did you start this company?
a. Yes
b. No
1. Bought the company
2. Inherited the company
3. Nationalised by state
4. Other: specify
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6. Why did you choose to go into the construction materials business?
1. Construction reference background	 _________
2. Investment returns (profit margins)	 _________
3. High construction demand	 ________
4. Inherited business	 _________
5. Other: specify	 __________
7. How did you finance your initial investment in this company?
1. Loan	 ________
2. Pension	 ________
3. Money Lender	 ________
4. Savings	 ________
5. Family help	 ________
6. Bank	 ________
7. Other: specify	 _________
8. How much was this initial investment?
Year:
Investment in Zambian Kwacha:
9. How much do you think this company is worth now: if you were to sell it, how much would you sell it for?
I Value of company in Zambian Kwacha: I	 I
10.What are the main activities of this company?
It. Of these activities above, what proportion is new works and maintenance?
12. Who are your largest client/customer?
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13. How do you get your consulting contracts/jobs?
1. 'rendering/competitions
2. Personal contracts
3. Reference
4. Other: specify
14. How many workers do you have?
Total Number:
Male:
Female:
15. Ot these (above) how many are;
16. How many workers did you start with, or how many did you have 5 years ago?
(Which ever is the longest)
I No. of workers:	 I	 I
l7. Do you have immediate plans of increasing/decreasing the number of workers, and why?
Labour Plans	 _____ Reasons
1. Increasing	 ______ _________________________________________
2. Decreasing	 ______ _______________________________________
3. Maintaining same No.
	 _____ _____________________________________
4. Not sure
18. Do you have an internal training programme! apprenticeship? If yes how many?
Yes:
No.:
19. Do you have any other training scheme for your workers or would be workers?
1. University_level-_Degree 	 _______
2. College_level-_Diploma 	 _______
3. Trades school- Certificate
4. Any other- specify	 ______
5. None	 ______
20. Do you employ workers without practical experience, if yes how many?
YES:	 No.
NO:	 go to No. 22
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21. Do you have any expatriate workers working for you, if yes how many and why?
a. If none go to Question No. 22
b.
Yes
No. of expatriates
c. Reasons
1. No qualified Zambians available
2. Foreign based company
3. Other: specify
22. what are your plans for their replacements?
23. Is your wage /salary bill wholly in Zambian Kwacha?
Wholly US $ / British Pounds:
Wholly Zambian Kwacha:
Partially Zambian Kwacha and US$IUKI
24 How did you determine your wagelsalary structure above?
1. Trade Unions
2. Government legislation
3. Productivity/profit and loss
4. Other: specify
25. In your opinion, what measures would help you specify local construction materials?
26. Do see your company specifying more local construction materials in the next 5 years?
27. Do you know of any research or efforts done in promoting local materials, if yes which ones?
1. No idea on local mate
2. Yes( Snecifv research
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28. How did you get your first contract?
29. How many consultancy contracts do you have?
30. How many contracts have you had in the last 5 years or since you began operations (if started in the last 5 years)
Number of contracts (jobs); 	 I	 I
3 I. Of these contracts how many have not been completed successfully?
I Number of uncompleted contracts (jobs)	 I	 I
32. What are the reasons for not completing these projects?
33. What is the biggest contract (in money terms) that you have ever had and what was the contract sum?
34 What is the smallest contract that you have ever had and what was the contract sum and time?
35. On average how long does it take you to complete a project?
I Average contract period	 I	 I
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36 Do you sub-contract any of your works, if yes, which ones and do you intend doing these jobs in-house in future?
TRADE	 Sub-contract- 	 In-house in future
___________________ YES/NO
	 YES/NO
1. Structures	 ______________________ ________________________
2. Roadwork's	 __________________ ____________________
3. Electrical	 ______________________ ________________________
4. Plumbing	 __________________ ____________________
5. Quantities	 ____________________ ______________________
6. Other: specify	 ______________________ ________________________
7. Other: specify	 _____________________ _______________________
8. Other: specify	 ______________________ ________________________
37. How do you choose your sub-contractors?
38. What consultancy aids (e.g. computers) do you use in your company?
MACHINE/CONSULTANCY AID No.	 No. Owned by No. planned to
__________________________ __________ firm	 be bought
1. _______________ ___________________ __________________
2. _____________ ________________ _______________
3. ____________ _______________ ______________
4. ____________ _______________ ______________
5. ____________ _______________ ______________
39 When you finally buy these machines, will you then have to retrench some workers, if yes, how many? (by trade)
1. No retrenchment
2. Yes retrenchment
3. Number to be retrenched
40. What form of assistance do you receive from either the central or local government and NGO's?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
5. Other -specify
41. But what assistance would you prefer to be given to you and by who?
1. Staff training
2. Business advice or Construction based Information technology
3. Subsidies/Grants
4. Loans
S. Other -specify
307
Appendices
42. Of the following below which measures have helped your business in the last 5 years?
Policy measure	 Helped	 not	 Comments
_________________________________ _________ helped 	 __________________________________
1. Easy availability of Forex 	 ________ _________ ________________________________
2. Non intervention of
Government in the construction
industry________ _________ ________________________________
3. Import liberalisation	 ________ _________ ________________________________
4. Export liberalisation	 ________ _________ ________________________________
S. Withdrawal of subsidies and
grantsto parastatals	 ________ ________ ______________________________
6. Withdrawal of housing
allowances________ _________ __________________________________
7. Privatisation of public
companies________ ________ ______________________________
8. Relaxing interest rates ceilings ________ _________ __________________________________
9. Selling of council houses	 ________ _________ ________________________________
10. Infrastructure rehabilitation _________ _________ __________________________________
43. On the other hand what are the negative things that have happened in the last 5 years that tended to slow down
your business?
44 Do you face any problems in getting financial assistance, if yes what problems?
a. No
b. Yes
45. What form of technical/business assistance would you want given to you?
1. Business information and technology	 _____
2. Research_findings_in_the industry 	 _____
3. Periodic seminars and workshops on current issues 	 ______
4. Certain protection from foreign firms by Government ______
5. Other-specify	 ______
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46, Has the liberalisation of the Kwacha affected your business, if yes how?
a. No
b. Yes
47. In your opinion what measures should be put in place to boast the construction sector?
48 Do you have immediate plans to expand your company?
49. Do you plan to remain in this type of business?
1. Yes
2. Not sure
3. No
50. If not, what do you intend doing?
1. Go into other form of business 	 ______
2. Leave this country and pursue construction business	 ______
3. Retire/ close down	 _____
4. Not sure	 ______
5. Other specify	 ______
51. How do you see the future of this industry(construction) in the next 5 years?
1. Getting worse	 ______
2. Likely_to_remain_the_same 	 ______
3. Not sure	 ______
4. Likely to improve	 ______
5. Other -specify	 _______
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52. Would reducing building and planning standards help your business in any way?
Yes	 No
Building standards
Planning standards
53. Which specific building and planning standards would you want reduced or changed, and why?
1. Building
standards
2. Planning
standards_
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APPENDIX II Annual and monthly economic indicators (1991-1996)
Year /and Exchange Savings 	 Commercial Inflation rate Treasury Treasury Treasury
month	 Rate	 Account	 Bank	 Annual/Monthi bills yield: bills yield: bills yield:
	
Kwacha	 rate	 Base rates	 y rise CPL	 28 days	 91 days	 128 days
__________ to US $
	 __________ 
(Weighted) 1975=100	 _________ _________ _________
1991	 64.63	 33.00	 46.00	 118.00	 ________ ________ ________
1992	 172.21	 46.00	 54.00	 200.00	 _________ _________ _________
1993	 231.40	 N/A	 N/A	 91.40	 _________ _________ _________
1994,Jan.	 644.72	 62.2	 93.6	 97.50	 148.0	 90.6	 115.5
Feb.	 641.23	 63.9	 97.7	 102.40	 -146.3	 101.4	 111.0
March	 680.16	 64.5	 95.0	 104.40	 -132.3	 81.4	 -108.2
±pril	 702.48	 64.8	 91.4	 107.30	 - 130.9	 98.8	 - 109.0
May	 689.13	
_61.4	 88.1	 109.90	 107.3	 118.8	 108.1
June	 698.67	 53.5	 78.3	 112.00	 82.8	 89.6	 90.4
July	 674.38	 44.6	 70.7	 113.10	 68.0	 77.7	 75.1
August	 669.42	 36.9	 61.5	 113.80	 56.3	 68.2	 66.3
Sept.	 667.36	 31.5	 53.7	 114.70	 41.0	 53.9	 47.6
Oct.	 665.69	 22.1	 43.4	 116.40	 21.5	 29.4	 26.3
Nov	 667.17	 14.7	 38.5	 118.10	 16.7	 18.9	 19.6
Dec.	 680.81	 - 12.8	 36.2	 122.10	 21.1	 21.5	 21.3
1995, Jan.	 688.65	 13.5	 -	 38.1	 127.30	 26.6	 25.1	 23.4
Feb.	 769.57	 20.2	 39.0	 130.60	 30.3	 26.4	 23.5
March	 797.08	 22.3	 40.7	 133.30	 35.9	 29.7	 27.5
April	 802.06	 22.6	 40.8	 133.70	 37.9	 30.9	 27.1
May	 829.00	 24.3	 45.7	 134.00	 43.8	 39.3	 29.9
June	 893.51	 26.3	 48.7	 136.70	 47.1	 45.6	 30.3
July	 929.71	 27.6	 49.6	 140.30	 48.7	 48.9	 41.2
August	 940.09	 28.6	 61.5	 140.60	 47.7	 49.9	 48.0
Sept	 942.01	 28.0	 53.7	 144.50	 42.5	 45.3	 46.2
Oct.	 941.74	 26.9	 43.4	 153.00	 38.8	 40.1	 42.1
Nov.	 941.80	 27.1	 47.4	 156.90	 39.9	 39.8	 38.2
Dec.	 947.15	 28.7	 47.7	 160.50	 42.0	 41.2	 38.7
(996. Jan.	 984.90	 28.9	 48.2	 164.60	 43.7	 43.8	 41.9
Feb.	 1,039.35	 29.3	 50.0	 168.70	 46.9	 45.0	 43.8
March	 1,135.47	 29.5	 50.5	 171.20	 48.1	 46.8	 46.6
April	 1,232.98	 28.6	 51.2	 185.50'	 49.2	 49.3	 49.3
May	 1,240.92	 26.6	 52.2	 188.40	 52.6	 52.7	 51.8
June	 1,241.03	 29.9	 54.2	 192.50	 53.5	 52.8	 53.1
July	 1,259.12	 30.7	 54.6	 193.90	 54.7	 53.3	 54.3
August	 1,267.86	 32.3	 55.2	 199.40	 55.1	 53.2	 53.4
Sept.	 1,266.74	 32.4	 56.1	 202.20	 56.4	 54.1	 52.8 -
Oct.	 1,269.03	 30.2	 56.4	 204.20	 57.6	 57.9	 55.6
Nov.	 1,269.83	 28.3	 57.0	 209.50	 57.2	 59.2	 60.0
Dec.	 1,288.27	 27.1	 57.4	 218.5	 57.6	 58.6	 61.8
Source: Ministry of Finance; Various Profit' and Government Valuation Department reports
1 From April 1996, weighted average annual rise in inflation is based on three categories: urban high, urban low and
non-urban and taken at Index l994= 100.
311
Appendices
Appendix III
Buildings Department registered, materials suppliers, contractors and consultants
categories
Category	 Value	 Personnel	 Plant and
Equipment for
contractors only
General	 Up to K15 000:00	 4 Tradesmen/women	 Any mode of transport
Maintenance	 (on hire basis! or
___________________ ________________________ _____________________ capacity to hire)
	
GI	 From K15,000:00 to	 1 Technician and	 1 Pick-up
__________________	
1(20,000:00	 4 Tradesmen	 1 Concrete mixer
	
Gil	 From K20,000:00 to	 2 Technicians and 4	 1 Pick-up
__________________	 K50,000:00	 Tradesmen	 2 Concrete mixers
	
Gifi	 From 1(50,000:00 to 	 1 Professional,	 1 Tipper
	
K120,000: 00
	
2 Technicians, and	 2 Pick-ups
__________________ _______________________ 
5 Tradesmen	 2 Concrete mixers
	
GIV	 From K50,000:00 to	 3 Professionals 	 2 Tippers
	
K250,000:00	 4 Technicians and	 2 Pick-ups
__________________ _______________________ 10 Tradesmen	 4 Concrete mixers
	
GV	 From K250,000 to K	 5 Professionals	 4 Tippers
unlimited	 6 Technicians and	 5 Pick-ups
20 Tradesmen	 6 Concrete mixers
2. Plumbing and air conditioning
Main contract value range equivalent to:
P1	 General maintenance to Gil
PH	 GffltoGV
3. Electric
E	 General maintenance
El	 GItoGil
Ell	 GffltoGV
4. Piling
I P	 I Main contract value range equivalent GV only 	 I
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